docs(reports): point the reports index and work log at the vuln issues

The audit's vulnerability clusters are now filed on Gitea as dank/command-center#67..#77, one issue per host-and-package cluster. Link them from omp-docs/reports/index.md and record the PR/issue references on the matching log.md entry, so a reader of the audit can find the open work without leaving the bundle.
Merge pull request 'docs(reports): land the fleet security audit with its per-host vuln passes' (#66 ) from docs/fleet-security-audit-2026-10-21 into main
2026-10-21 15:05:41 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 14:56:06 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 14:04:33 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 11:49:23 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 10:47:56 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 09:46:51 -07:00
364 changed files with 12492 additions and 5508 deletions
@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
+# LFS routing for image types. Measured 2026-10-21: this repo tracks ZERO LFS files
+# (`git lfs ls-files` = 0) — the wallpaper library became live theme state and is gitignored
+# (omp-docs/tools/dotfiles-deploy.md), so these four rules match nothing today. They are kept
+# because tracked media is a plausible future and idle filters cost nothing; deleting the file
+# is a pruning call for a session with Frank, not a cleanup an agent runs alone.
+#
+# Do not cite this file as the reason `git-lfs` is installed on a box. The manifest carries its
+# own justification (packages/common.pkgs), and a tool justified by dead config is a tool nobody
+# can defend when the config goes.
+
 *.jpg filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
 *.jpeg filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
 *.png filter=lfs diff=lfs merge=lfs -text
@@ -1,25 +1,145 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Secret gate: block any commit whose staged diff contains live-secret shapes.
-# This repo is pushed to a Gitea remote; anything committed is instantly visible
+# Secret gate: block any commit whose staged diff contains live-secret shapes or
+# credential assignments. This repo IS the deployment and every workstation
+# pulls it, so a committed secret is instantly in every agent's context window
 # on the fleet. Deliberate override: ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit ...
+#
+# Two rules, deliberately different in scope:
+#
+#   1. Token SHAPES are scanned across the ENTIRE staged diff, whatever the file
+#      type. The first version of this gate whitelisted extensions
+#      (*.md *.yml *.yaml *.json *.toml *.sh *.ts *.js), so a `postgres.env`, a
+#      `.container` quadlet, an `.ini`, or an extension-less dotfile — exactly
+#      the shapes the dotfiles tier is made of — was never read at all.
+#   2. Credential ASSIGNMENTS (PASSWORD=…, secret_key: …) are scanned only in
+#      non-prose files. The auto-learned memory tier is prose ABOUT credentials,
+#      and a gate that fires there gets overridden until it means nothing; the
+#      2026-10-20 audit measured 7 such prose hits on the tracked tree. Markdown
+#      keeps shape detection only, which is what it had before.
+#
+# Bcrypt hashes and Basic-auth headers joined the shape list on 2026-10-20
+# (issue #40) after a live Caddy basicauth hash plus its plaintext password —
+# and the Pi-hole internal password — were found in a tracked memory file.
 set -uo pipefail

-staged=$(git diff --cached --diff-filter=ACM -U0 -- '*.md' '*.yml' '*.yaml' '*.json' '*.toml' '*.sh' '*.ts' '*.js')
-[ -z "$staged" ] && exit 0
+shapes='sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{18,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20}|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|ASIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY|aes_[A-Za-z0-9/+]{40}|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.ey|\$2[aby]\$[0-9]{2}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|Authorization:[[:space:]]*[Bb]asic[[:space:]]+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{24,}'

-patterns='sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{18,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20}|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|ASIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY|aes_[A-Za-z0-9/+]{40}|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.ey'
+# `newpass1234`, `secret_key: "rotated-value"` — an assignment with a literal
+# value. `$VAR`, `${VAULT}`, <placeholders> and empty values cannot match.
+assign='[A-Za-z0-9_]*(PASSW|SECRET|TOKEN|API_?KEY|ACCESS_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY|CREDENTIAL)[A-Za-z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["'"'"']?[A-Za-z0-9/+._@-]{8,}'
+placeholders='changeme|change[-_]|placeholder|redacted|example|sample|dummy|nokey|no[-_]key|not[-_]needed|your[-_]|localhost|xxxx|yyyy|\$\{|<[a-z]|\*\*\*|%s|null|false|true'
+
+# Exemptions: a variable naming a location (`…_FILE=`, `…_PATH=`) or a value
+# that is a filesystem path is a pointer, not a credential. Flagging those is
+# how a gate gets permanently overridden.
+assign_exempt='(_FILE|_PATH|_DIR|_URL|_ENDPOINT|_SOCKET)[[:space:]]*[:=]|[:=][[:space:]]*["'"'"']?(/|\.\./)'
+# Fail closed: a gate that cannot read the staged diff must not report success.
+#
+# `-z`, and the list lives in a file. Two traps decide this: git quotes any path it cannot print
+# as UTF-8 (core.quotePath is on by default), and a quoted name handed back to
+# `git diff -- <path>` matches nothing — the file is skipped, and a skipped file used to be a
+# silent pass. Command substitution cannot hold the list either, because $() deletes NUL bytes,
+# so the names go to a temp file and the loop reads them with a NUL delimiter.
+TMPD=$(mktemp -d) || TMPD=""
+if [ -z "$TMPD" ]; then
+  echo "SECRET GATE: cannot create a temp dir — refusing to commit." >&2
+  [ -n "${ALLOW_SECRETS:-}" ] && exit 0
+  exit 1
+fi
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMPD"' EXIT
+if ! git diff --cached --diff-filter=ACM --name-only -z > "$TMPD/files" 2> "$TMPD/err"; then
+  {
+    echo "SECRET GATE: cannot read the staged diff — refusing to commit."
+    sed 's/^/  /' "$TMPD/err"
+    echo "Override deliberately: ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit ..."
+  } >&2
+  [ -n "${ALLOW_SECRETS:-}" ] && exit 0
+  exit 1
+fi
+# git's stderr stays out of the name list on purpose: a `warning:` line mistaken for a path
+# becomes a file that "cannot be read", which is how a gate starts skipping the real ones.
+[ -s "$TMPD/files" ] || exit 0
+
+report=""
+exempt=""
+count=0
+while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
+  [ -z "$f" ] && continue
+  # Self-exemption, deliberately an exact filename list and not `tests/`: the
+  # gate's fixtures must contain credential-shaped strings or there is nothing to
+  # test against, and this hook documents the shapes it looks for. A secret parked
+  # in any other test file is still caught.
+  case "$f" in
+    .githooks/pre-commit|tests/secret-gate.bats) exempt="$exempt $f"; continue ;;
+  esac
+  diff=$(git diff --cached -U0 -- "$f")
+  [ -z "$diff" ] && continue
+  # Only ADDED lines can leak. Matching removals too blocks the very commit that
+  # deletes a credential — which is exactly what happened on 2026-10-20, when the
+  # gate refused the redaction of the password it exists to catch.
+  added=$(printf '%s\n' "$diff" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -vE '^\+\+\+' | sed 's/^+//' || true)
+  [ -z "$added" ] && continue
+  # Shape hits are judged on the MATCHED TOKEN, not on the whole line. Documentation about
+  # credentials quotes vendor placeholders — AWS publishes an all-zeros access-key id that ends
+  # in EXAMPLE for exactly this purpose — and
+  # a gate that blocks prose over an inert example gets worked around until it means nothing:
+  # the live-sync heartbeat failed three ticks on 2026-10-21 because a managed skill page quotes
+  # exactly that id. A line is exempted only when EVERY shape on it is inert, so one live token
+  # sharing the file with a documented fake still blocks.
+  hits=$(printf '%s\n' "$added" | while IFS= read -r line; do
+           live=0
+          while IFS= read -r m; do
+            # The shape regexes carry fixed quantifiers, so the match they return is TRUNCATED:
+            # `AKIA` + exactly 16 characters stops inside the word EXAMPLE and the placeholder
+            # disappears from what is judged. Judge the match plus what follows it instead.
+            ctx=$(printf '%s' "$line" | awk -v m="$m" '{ i = index($0, m); print (i > 0 ? substr($0, i, length(m) + 8) : m) }')
+            printf '%s' "$ctx" | grep -Eiq 'EXAMPLE|X{4,}|Y{4,}|Z{4,}|_{4,}|REDACTED|CHANGEME|PLACEHOLDER' || live=1
+          done < <(printf '%s\n' "$line" | grep -Eio "$shapes" || true)
+           [ "$live" = 1 ] && printf '%s\n' "$line"
+         done)
+  if [ "${f##*.}" != "md" ]; then
+    # The placeholder filter reads the VALUE, never the whole line. A trailing comment that
+    # says `# example` says nothing about the token the same line assigns; scoping the filter
+    # to what follows the separator is what keeps `API_TOKEN=<real>  # placeholder` a block.
+    assigns=$(printf '%s\n' "$added" | grep -Ei "$assign" | grep -Ev "$assign_exempt" \
+      | while IFS= read -r line; do
+          # The judged value is the assigned token alone: it ends at whitespace or `#`, so a
+          # trailing comment cannot vouch for it. Truncating a quoted value early only ever errs
+          # toward blocking, which is the safe direction for a gate that can be overridden.
+          value=${line#*[:=]}
+          value=${value#"${value%%[![:space:]]*}"}
+          value=${value%%[[:space:]]*}
+          value=${value%%#*}
+          printf '%s\n' "$value" | grep -Eiq "$placeholders" && continue
+          printf '%s\n' "$line"
+        done)
+    hits=$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$hits" "$assigns" | sed '/^[[:space:]]*$/d')
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$hits" ]; then
+    n=$(printf '%s\n' "$hits" | wc -l)
+    count=$((count + n))
+    report+="  $f"$'\n'"$(printf '%s\n' "$hits" | cut -c1-100 | sed 's/^/    /')"$'\n'
+  fi
+done < "$TMPD/files"
+
+# Say so out loud: an exemption that prints nothing is how a carve-out becomes
+# invisible, and invisible is the property a secret wants.
+if [ -n "$exempt" ]; then
+  printf 'secret-gate: self-test fixtures exempt:%s\n' "$exempt" >&2
+fi

-hits=$(printf '%s\n' "$staged" | grep -Ei "$patterns" || true)
 if [ -n "${ALLOW_SECRETS:-}" ]; then
-  [ -n "$hits" ] && printf 'secret-gate: ALLOW_SECRETS set, allowing %s secret-shaped string(s) through.\n' "$(printf '%s\n' "$hits" | wc -l)"
+  [ -n "$report" ] && printf 'secret-gate: ALLOW_SECRETS set, allowing %s secret-shaped string(s) through.\n' "$count"
  exit 0
 fi

-if [ -n "$hits" ]; then
+if [ -n "$report" ]; then
  {
-    echo "SECRET GATE: staged diff contains $(printf '%s\n' "$hits" | wc -l) secret-shaped string(s):"
-    printf '%s\n' "$hits" | sed 's/^/  /'
+    echo "SECRET GATE: staged diff contains $count secret-shaped string(s):"
+    printf '%s\n' "$report"
    echo "Fix it, or override deliberately: ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit ..."
+    echo "A credential that reaches a tracked file is already in history on every"
+    echo "machine that pulls this repo — deleting it later does not un-leak it."
  } >&2
  exit 1
 fi
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ auth.json
 **/auth.json
 .env
 **/.env
+*.env
+# `*.env` is the rule that matters: `.env` alone does not match `postgres.env`
+# or `frank-job-hunt.env`, and those are the files that actually carry
+# POSTGRES_PASSWORD / API keys on this fleet (issue #40).
 trust.json
 **/trust.json
 *.pem
@@ -74,3 +78,35 @@ wt/
 # A session run inside a git worktree mints a bucket named after the worktree
 # path; the worktree is deleted, the bucket is orphan state, not config.
 agent/memories/--home-blank-.omp-wt-*
+
+# --- theme media: content the pipeline consumes, not configuration ---------
+# 23 wallpapers, 80 MiB. Tracked until 2026-10-20: every clone of a config repo was
+# carrying a library no diff can review. The live library at
+# ~/.local/share/noctalia/wallpapers is a real directory of real files (measured
+# 2026-10-20), so this path in the repo was a duplicate of it, not its source — and
+# note that untracking deletes the copy in every other checkout regardless of
+# `git rm --cached` on the branch. A fresh box starts with an empty library; every
+# filename carries its wallhaven ID; `/w/<id>` answers `text/html`, so resolve the CDN URL at
+# `https://wallhaven.cc/api/v1/w/<id>` and download `data.path` — the recipe, with the reason it
+# is not a plain `curl -L`, is on omp-docs/tools/dotfiles-deploy.md
+dotfiles/noctalia/.local/share/noctalia/wallpapers/
+
+# --- generated theme output: machine-written, never reviewable, never deployed ---
+# noctalia/matugen rewrite these in place; a tracked copy is a stale snapshot that
+# deploy.sh would push back over a live palette. These patterns are the ignore half of the
+# exclusion list in `deploy_file` (scripts/deploy.sh): change one, change the other, or a
+# generated file becomes tracked-but-never-deployed — the fiction class #41 removed. The
+# capital-N rule is noctalia's own palette-directory naming, and it was in deploy.sh only.
+# Law: omp-docs/inventory/home-config-census.md, Refs #42, #60
+dotfiles/**/themes/noctalia*
+dotfiles/**/colors/noctalia*
+dotfiles/**/noctalia.*
+dotfiles/**/noctalia-*
+dotfiles/**/Noctalia*
+
+# --- harness natives: unpacked runtime payloads, never configuration ----------
+# 2.4 MB of tree-sitter grammars the harness unpacks into the repo root on first use (measured
+# on blankpad 2026-10-21). Regenerable, unreviewable, not config — every clause of AGENTS.md's
+# runtime-state doctrine applies, and it sat unnamed in the root, one `git add -A` away from
+# being committed as if it were configuration.
+natives/
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
---
-name: command-center-dotfiles-import
-description: Runbook for importing client env-layer configs into the command-center repo and deploying them via stow on new fleet machines; decisions agreed with Frank 2026-09-09 (pre-execution — verify execution state before assuming done).
---
-
-Design agreed with Frank for importing client application/environment configs into the `~/.omp` command-center repo and deploying them on fresh machines. **Status: plan agreed, not yet executed** — check repo state (does `dotfiles/` or `scripts/deploy.sh` exist?) before re-deriving; if already implemented, this becomes the operating model, not a to-do.
-
-## Agreed decisions (each was an explicit user choice)
-1. **Target**: unknown/TBD fresh machine → design stays host-agnostic; deploy derives overrides from `$(hostname)` at run time. Nothing hardcodes a target.
-2. **Scope**: environment layer only — niri (+cfg includes), gtk-3.0/4.0 settings, ghostty, alacritty, shell rc files (`.zshrc`, `.bashrc`, `.profile`, `.p10k.zsh`), fish, systemd user units, autostart, dconf. App *data* (browser profiles, vaults, DBs) never imported.
-3. **Layout**: stow-style package dirs `dotfiles/<pkg>/<home-relative path>` inside the repo; repo clones to `~/.omp` on every host that runs the harness (full command-center clone, not env-layer only).
-4. **Deploy mechanism**: symlink farm — `stow -t ~` from `~/.omp/dotfiles`; relative symlinks within `$HOME` work because repo root lives inside `$HOME`.
-5. **Dogfood order**: convert the workstation itself (real dirs → symlinks via adopt) BEFORE any target import; iterate where the compositor reload is observable.
-6. **Secrets policy**: never commit secret values. Split rc files into committed logic + untracked sourced-if-exists stub (`~/.config/environment.d/secrets.env` or `.zshrc.local`); real values provisioned out-of-band only on machines that need them. Pre-commit secret scanner stays as safety net, not gate of first resort.
-7. **Divergence**: `zz-<hostname>` override package stowed LAST with `--override`; only per-host diffs live there. (Stow descends into conflicting symlinked dirs — per-file overrides only work via this last-stowed `--override` pattern.)
-8. **Deploy trigger**: explicit `scripts/deploy.sh` invocation, human- or agent-invoked. NO auto-deploy on pull — pull and deploy are separate decisions; `--check` = drift report mode.
-9. **Ownership**: Frank is sole push authority; exactly one editing agent at a time → no multi-writer race machinery needed. Each host's agent edits only its own `zz-<hostname>` package.
-10. **Conflict policy**: pre-existing regular file that differs from repo truth → move to timestamped `.quarantine/` dir on the target (never `rm`, same convention as this repo's trash rule), symlink anyway, print every replacement in deploy output and `--check` report. Repo truth always wins; divergence recoverable from quarantine.
-11. **First-clone auth**: human types credential once console-side (URL-with-token or prompt); the new machine's secrets exist only there afterward.
-
-## Implementation gotchas baked into the design
- `core.hooksPath` is a per-clone local setting — does NOT survive clone; bootstrap/deploy must set it on every fresh clone or the secret-gate pre-commit hook silently doesn't run there.
- dconf/gsettings are databases, not files: import as `dconf dump /` text into repo; deploy runs `dconf load` instead of symlinking.
- p10k installer and toolchain hooks append to rc files at install time — expect conflicts on `.zshrc`-class files at first adopt; quarantine-and-replace handles it, but diff live-vs-repo before adopting so pre-existing drift is seen, not silently adopted.
- Known secret at import time: `GITEA_TOKEN` export lived in `.zshrc` (line ~22) on the workstation — quarantine BEFORE importing rc files; consider token rotation at cutover since it had been exposed in plaintext rc + remote URL.
-
-## Deploy script spec agreed
-`scripts/deploy.sh`: sets hooksPath → stows all base packages → stows `zz-$(hostname)` with `--override` → first run uses `--adopt` for pre-existing identical files → divergent files quarantined-and-reported; `--check` mode emits drift report (modified tracked files vs deployed symlinks) without mutating.
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
---
-name: stash-supersession-audit-before-drop
-description: "Before dropping a stale git stash, prove it's superseded by HEAD via per-file line-set diff of git show stash@{0}:file vs HEAD; archive as an annotated tag and drop only after auditing unique facts — zero-loss alternative to blind drop."
---
-
-# Stash Supersession Audit Before Drop
-
-Use when a repo (especially a live-deployment checkout where the working tree IS the deployment, e.g. `~/.omp` command-center) has an old stash whose content may have been superseded by later commits, and dropping blindly risks losing unique facts.
-
-## Procedure
-
-1. **Inventory the stash** — see which files it touches:
-   ```bash
-   git stash show --stat stash@{0}
-   ```
-2. **Probe for unique content per file.** For each touched file, diff stash version against HEAD and count lines that exist only in the stash version:
-   ```bash
-   git show "stash@{0}:<path>" > /tmp/stash_copy
-   # compare normalized line sets; report lines present in stash but absent from HEAD
-   ```
-   A file with `unique-vs-HEAD = 0` is fully superseded — safe to drop for that file.
-3. **Classify each unique-content hit**:
-   - *Stale fact* (superseded by a later refactor, e.g. old model/provider naming) → drop is correct.
-   - *Live durable fact* (e.g. an operational invariant never re-recorded) → extract it into the live memory/docs file or flag to the user before dropping.
-4. **Archive before dropping** — zero-loss: tag the stash commit, then drop from the stash list:
-   ```bash
-   git tag archive/stash-<YYYY-MM-DD>-<base-branch>-wip "stash@{0}"
-   git stash drop "stash@{0}"
-   ```
-   The tag pins the full stash object (including its index parent); recoverable later via `git show archive/stash-...` or `git checkout archive/stash-...^3 -- <path>` for the untracked-files third parent if present.
-
-## Why
-Stashes are invisible in normal history and expire from reflogs (~90 days). A stash that *looks* superseded can still hold the only copy of a durable fact; tagging converts "drop" into a reversible archive with zero workflow cost.
@@ -86,29 +86,61 @@ never committed, only surfaced. Conflicts abort and alert (ntfy); it never
 force-pushes, auto-resolves, or uses `--no-verify`. Details:
 [omp-docs/tools/live-sync.md](omp-docs/tools/live-sync.md).

+## Agent skills
+
+The engineering skills (`triage`, `to-tickets`, `to-spec`, `research`,
+`implement`, …) read their per-repo configuration from three pages in the
+knowledge base. Those pages own their facts; this is only the pointer.
+
+### Issue tracker
+
+See [`omp-docs/skills/issue-tracker.md`](omp-docs/skills/issue-tracker.md).
+
+### Triage labels
+
+See [`omp-docs/skills/triage-labels.md`](omp-docs/skills/triage-labels.md).
+
+### Domain docs
+
+ADRs: `omp-docs/decisions/`. `omp-docs/glossary.md` is intentionally not created.
+See [`omp-docs/skills/domain-docs.md`](omp-docs/skills/domain-docs.md).
+
 ## Secret gate (HARD rule)

 The pre-commit hook (`.githooks/pre-commit`, enabled via
-`git config core.hooksPath .githooks`) scans every staged diff for live-secret
-shapes (`sk-…`, `ghp_…`, `github_pat_…`, `glpat-…`, `xox…`, `AKIA…`, PEM headers,
-JWTs) and blocks the commit. Quarantine list — never tracked, ever: `auth.json`,
-`.env`, `trust.json`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `identity*`. Deliberate override:
+`git config core.hooksPath .githooks`) blocks the commit in two ways. Token
+**shapes** (`sk-…`, `ghp_…`, `github_pat_…`, `glpat-…`, `xox…`, `AKIA…`, PEM
+headers, JWTs, bcrypt hashes, `Authorization: Basic` headers) are scanned across
+the **entire** staged diff — every file type, because the first version of the
+gate whitelisted extensions and never read a `.env`, `.container`, `.ini`, or
+extension-less dotfile at all. Credential **assignments** (`PASSWORD=…`,
+`secret_key: …`) are scanned in non-prose files only; markdown keeps shape
+detection, because the auto-learned memory tier is prose *about* credentials and a
+gate that fires there gets overridden until it means nothing. The gate **fails
+closed**: if it cannot read the staged diff it refuses the commit rather than
+passing it. Quarantine list — never tracked, ever: `auth.json`, `.env` and
+`*.env` (`postgres.env`, `frank-job-hunt.env` are the ones that carry real
+values), `trust.json`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `identity*`. Deliberate override:
 `ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit …`. Remember why: a secret in a tracked file is a
-secret in every agent's context window on every machine that pulls this repo.
+secret in every agent's context window on every machine that pulls this repo, and
+redacting it later does not un-leak the history.

 ## Machine facts (verify before trusting)

 | box | role | GPU | notes |
 |-----|------|-----|-------|
-| Dev workstation | client box, never runs inference | laptop iGPU + dGPU (non-unified) | mainline llama.cpp at `~/GitPackages/llama.cpp/build/bin/`; this repo lives here at `~/.omp` |
+| Dev workstation (`blankpad`) | client box, never runs inference | Lenovo laptop, AMD Ryzen 5 PRO 5650U / Cezanne APU (**unified memory**, s2idle sleep only, no dGPU) | this repo lives here at `~/.omp`; the earlier "iGPU + dGPU / `~/GitPackages/llama.cpp`" description belonged to the sold `dankware` box |
 | Dankclaw | bench target, secondary models + service stack | Strix Halo APU (**unified memory**) + RTX 3090 (moved over from Dankserver 2026-09) | prod services `frank-dragoon` (halogen-flash-server, :7770, iGPU) and `frank-zealot` (llama.cpp PrismML fork, :7771, 3090); runbooks in the serverAppConfigs vault (`~/Projects/serverAppConfig/serverAppConfigs-docs/LLM/`); ssh: `ssh dankclaw` |
 | Dankserver | main-model box | 2× Radeon AI PRO R9700 — non-unified (was RTX 3090 until 2026-09) | runs `frank-archon` (radiance, TP=2, :7770) — **this repo's operator session runs on it**; ssh: `ssh dankserver` |

 ## Environment gotchas

 - Gitea API needs a token: `GITEA_TOKEN` env (gitignored `.env`). No `tea` CLI
-  installed anywhere. Remote URLs embed the token locally in `.git/config` — that
-  file is never pushed; it is not a substitute for the secret gate.
+  installed anywhere. Remote URLs carry NO embedded token (2026-10-09
+  credential-store cutover) — git and the API both read
+  `~/.config/secrets/gitea` (`store --file`, URL-line format; see
+  `omp-docs/tools/gitea/client-access.md`). That file is never pushed; it is
+  not a substitute for the secret gate.
 - Passwordless sudo (`sudo -n`) works on Dankclaw and Dankserver for systemctl
  verbs only; user units need no sudo at all.
 - SSH into both servers is BatchMode-capable from here:
@@ -54,13 +54,27 @@ Suggest these tools or languages as possible solutions to problems if they are a

 ### 1. Maintain your projects source of truth.

-The knowledge base at `docs/` is the source of truth for your project. Your training is out of date. Default to the documentation and the code before you assume anything. Maintain a work log of actions taken and their result. Refer to the work log to remember the progress of your tasks.
+Documentation exists for ONE reason: **point of use**. A page earns its bytes only if it helps you perform a task at the moment you perform it — the shape to deploy, the flag that must be passed, the failure mode to recognise, the rollback to run. It is NOT a museum, NOT a lab notebook, and NOT a place to keep track of numbers.
+
+**THE PURPOSE TEST — apply it before you write, and again before you keep:**
+- Would an agent or Frank, doing a real task tomorrow, read this line and act differently because of it? If no: **delete it.**
+- Is this a measured number (t/s, tokens, ms, MiB, %, bench ladder, acceptance rate) for a model, runtime, or hardware configuration that is NOT currently deployed and NOT currently being compared? Then it is **dead weight — destroy it**, do not archive it, do not "preserve it in an Eras row", do not cite it. AI advances make such a figure wrong within weeks, and a wrong number in a runbook is worse than no number: it gets believed.
+- "It is the only copy of that fact" is NOT a reason to keep it. Sole custody of a useless fact is still useless. Losing information is an acceptable — often correct — outcome; do not hesitate to lose it.
+- What survives the test: live configuration and its exact numbers, the procedure that must be followed, the law/causal story that prevents a repeat failure, security posture, and the interface contract a consumer depends on. Qualitative laws outlive the measurement that taught them — keep the law, drop the numbers.
+- Never let a tool's "this is duplicated / this is the only record" census decide what to keep. That is a question of USEFULNESS, which only the operator answers.

 1. Read the relevant `index.md` before you touch a topic.
 2. Follow `omp-docs/references/okf-spec.md` for every doc you create or edit.
 3. Read the target file completely before you edit it.
-4. Always update the documentation when you've completed a task.
-5. Compact the work log when necessary.
+4. Always update the documentation when you've completed a task — and when updating means deleting a page or a paragraph, delete it.
+5. Compact the work log when necessary; a work log holds laws and incidents, never bookkeeping.
+
+#### THE WORK LOG IS ONE FILE.
+The work log is a single page in the knowledge base: `omp-docs/log.md` in this repo, or whichever change-log page the repo's docs index names. Write the entry when the change lands — in the same commit as the change — and read that page to recover where things stand before starting. It follows its own entry law: a dated entry is what changed plus the durable lesson, a few lines.
+
+- NEVER create a second log: not per directory, not per project, feature, branch or run, not `NOTES.md` / `PROGRESS.md` / `STATUS.md` / `worklog/`, not a dated diary. In `dank/command-center` the KB linter reports any `log.md` that is not the bundle root's; the rule and its reasoning are owned by `omp-docs/references/okf-spec.md`.
+- A log holds laws and incidents, never bookkeeping: no per-file inventories, no run-by-run numbers, no transcripts. A number in a log still has to pass the purpose test above.
+- If a knowledge base has no log page, add one at its root and list it in the index. That is the fix — never a log somewhere else.

 #### USE PROGRESSIVE DISCLOSURE.
 Always ensure that all produced documentation is laid out in files following WIKI conventions: start with a top level README.md index file that provides a brief, concise introduction to the item being documented, and then SPLIT OFF individual aspects, features, or arguments into their own interlinked pages so that future agents can read the documentation in a piecewise fashion, only taking in the details they need. Where relevant, crosslink any created documentation with other relevant documentation. This structure may also be nested, if necessary.
@@ -90,6 +104,7 @@ Never assume the user reports correct information. He is human, and humans make
 - Before starting new work, `git pull` from the remote, and start a new branch in a separate worktree using `master` or `main` as the base branch.
 - Commit atomically: after every change that forms a complete functional unit, commit. Do so early and often.
 - When the work is complete, ask the user if they would like to open a pull request.
+- **Report a pull request as link AND title, every time.** A bare `#54` is not a reference: numbers are per-repository, so a number alone does not say which work, in which repo, is being reported. Give the PR's web URL on that forge — on the Dankclaw Gitea that is `https://gitea.franksdank.cloud/<owner>/<repo>/pulls/N` — together with the PR's title. Applies everywhere a PR is mentioned: chat replies, status summaries, issue and commit bodies, alerts. Another forge (GitHub, GitLab, …): the equivalent URL its web UI serves, same pairing.

 ### 5. Test Driven Development

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 providers:
  openrouterVariant: online
  fetch: auto
+  maxInFlightRequests:
+    llamacpp (dankserver): 3
+    llamacpp (dankclaw): 2
+    llamacpp (dankclaw-3090): 3
 modelRoles:
  slow: llamacpp (dankclaw)/frank-dragoon:medium
  vision: llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)/frank-zealot:xhigh
@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@ retry:
      - llamacpp (dankclaw)/frank-dragoon
  maxRetries: 10
 searxng:
-  endpoint: search.franksdank.cloud
+  endpoint: http://192.168.0.143:8081
 exa:
  enabled: false
 memory:
@@ -145,17 +149,25 @@ display:
  subagentLivePreview: true
 task:
  showResolvedModelBadge: true
-  maxConcurrency: 3
+  maxConcurrency: 2
  agentModelOverrides:
    designer: llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)/frank-zealot
    librarian: llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)/frank-zealot
    reviewer: llamacpp (dankserver)/frank-archon
-    scout: llamacpp (dankserver)/frank-archon
+    scout: llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)/frank-zealot
    security-reviewer: llamacpp (dankclaw)/frank-dragoon
    sonic: llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)/frank-zealot
    task: llamacpp (dankserver)/frank-archon
+    seance: llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)/frank-zealot
  eager: default
  enableLsp: true
+  maxRuntimeMs: 1800000
+  softRequestBudget: 120
+  maxRecursionDepth: 1
+  disabledAgents: []
+  isolation:
+    enabled: true
+  completionProbe: false
 snapcompact:
  systemPrompt: none
  toolResults: false
@@ -203,7 +215,7 @@ vault:
 tts:
  localVoice: bm_george
 speech:
-  enabled: true
+  enabled: false
  mode: all
  enhanced: true
  voice: am_fenrir
@@ -232,6 +244,7 @@ followUpMode: one-at-a-time
 tools:
  approvalMode: yolo
  format: auto
+  maxTimeout: 600
 marketplace:
  autoUpdate: notify
 bash:
@@ -1,626 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * dankvoice — cloned-voice vocalization for omp, served by frank-tts.
- *
- * The built-in speak-aloud feature (`speech.enabled` / `speech.voice`) and the
- * `omp say` CLI are gated to the bundled Kokoro voice enum, so the cloned
- * voices on frank-tts (Dankclaw :7772, the `speech` model role in
- * agent/models.yml) could only ever produce files. This extension adds the
- * missing path — the TUI speaks with the cloned voices:
- *
- *   /say                   open the options menu
- *   /say <text>            speak once through the speakers
- *   /say on | off          arm/disarm auto-speak of the assistant's final answer
- *   /say menu              the options menu (voice, output device, player, cap)
- *   /say voice <name>      choose a voice (empty = whatever the server defaults to)
- *   /say voices            list the voices frank-tts reports
- *   /say stop              cut off the current utterance
- *   /say status            voice, endpoint, player and device in use
- *   /say help              the command list
- *
- * The endpoint comes from agent/models.yml — the provider block carrying
- * `api: openai-speech`, i.e. the same row the speech role resolves — so this
- * file carries no host address and no secret. Menu choices persist to
- * ~/.omp/cache/dankvoice.json (runtime state, never tracked). Environment
- * overrides win over the file, which wins over defaults:
- *
- *   DANKVOICE_URL      speech base URL (…/v1) instead of models.yml
- *   DANKVOICE_MODEL    served model id (default: the id in that block)
- *   DANKVOICE_CONFIG   settings file (default ~/.omp/cache/dankvoice.json)
- *   DANKVOICE_PLAYER   player binary, skipping detection
- *   DANKVOICE_VOICE    voice name ("" = server default)
- *   DANKVOICE_MAX      spoken-character cap per utterance (default 700)
- *   DANKVOICE_AUTO=1   start with auto-speak armed
- *
- * Utterances are synthesized to a temp WAV in $TMPDIR; the file is removed
- * when its player process exits. A new utterance interrupts the previous one
- * instead of queueing behind it. Output routing: a saved sink becomes
- * `pw-play --target <sink>` or `paplay --device=<sink>` (ffplay has no device
- * concept and ignores it); with no saved sink the player's own default applies.
- */
-
-import { spawn, spawnSync, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
-import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-import type { ExtensionAPI, ExtensionContext } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent";
-
-const DEFAULT_MAX_CHARS = 700;
-const SYNTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;
-const VOICES_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
-/** A voice name the shim must reject; its 400 body carries the real list. */
-const VOICE_PROBE = "_dankvoice_probe_";
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------- pure logic
-
-export interface SpeechTarget {
-  /** POST target for OpenAI speech synthesis. */
-  speechUrl: string;
-  /** GET target for the voice roster (frank-tts answers a bare JSON array). */
-  voicesUrl: string;
-  /** GET target for the liveness route of the same host:port. */
-  healthUrl: string;
-  /** Served model id to name in the request body. */
-  model: string;
-}
-
-export interface Player {
-  command: string;
-  args: string[];
-}
-
-export type SayAction =
-  | { kind: "menu" }
-  | { kind: "help" }
-  | { kind: "speak"; text: string }
-  | { kind: "on" }
-  | { kind: "off" }
-  | { kind: "stop" }
-  | { kind: "voices" }
-  | { kind: "status" }
-  | { kind: "voice"; name: string };
-
-/** `/say <args>` grammar: subcommands win, anything else is spoken text. */
-export function parseSayArgs(raw: string): SayAction {
-  const args = raw.trim();
-  const lower = args.toLowerCase();
-  if (lower === "" || lower === "menu") return { kind: "menu" };
-  if (lower === "help") return { kind: "help" };
-  if (lower === "on") return { kind: "on" };
-  if (lower === "off") return { kind: "off" };
-  if (lower === "stop") return { kind: "stop" };
-  if (lower === "voices") return { kind: "voices" };
-  if (lower === "status") return { kind: "status" };
-  if (lower === "voice" || lower.startsWith("voice ")) return { kind: "voice", name: args.slice(5).trim() };
-  return { kind: "speak", text: args };
-}
-
-/**
- * Pull the speech endpoint out of agent/models.yml. The runner API lives on
- * the MODEL row (`api: openai-speech`), the base URL on its provider, so this
- * scan remembers the last provider base URL and model id seen and returns when
- * a model row claims the speech runner API. A new provider key (indent two)
- * resets both.
- */
-export function resolveSpeechEndpoint(modelsYml: string): SpeechTarget | undefined {
-  let base: string | undefined;
-  let id: string | undefined;
-  for (const line of modelsYml.split(/\r?\n/)) {
-    const trimmed = line.trim();
-    if (!trimmed || trimmed.startsWith("#")) continue;
-    if (/^ {2}\S.*:\s*$/.test(line)) {
-      base = undefined;
-      id = undefined;
-      continue;
-    }
-    const providerUrl = trimmed.match(/^baseUrl:\s*(\S+)/);
-    if (providerUrl) {
-      base = providerUrl[1].replace(/\/+$/, "");
-      continue;
-    }
-    const modelId = trimmed.match(/^-\s*id:\s*(\S+)/);
-    if (modelId) {
-      id = modelId[1];
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (/^api:\s*openai-speech\s*$/.test(trimmed) && base) {
-      return {
-        speechUrl: `${base}/audio/speech`,
-        voicesUrl: `${base}/audio/voices`,
-        healthUrl: `${base.replace(/\/v1$/, "")}/health`,
-        model: id ?? "frank-tts",
-      };
-    }
-  }
-  return undefined;
-}
-
-/** OpenAI speech body; `voice` is sent only when named — the shim carries its own default. */
-export function speechBody(model: string, text: string, voice: string): Record<string, string> {
-  const body: Record<string, string> = { model, input: text, response_format: "wav" };
-  if (voice) body.voice = voice;
-  return body;
-}
-
-/** Voice names as frank-tts reports them: the invalid-voice 400 body carries `available_voices`. */
-export function parseVoices(payload: unknown): string[] {
-  // frank-tts answers GET /v1/audio/voices with a bare array and an unknown voice with
-  // {error:{available_voices:[…]}}; a flat body is accepted too.
-  if (typeof payload !== "object" || payload === null) return [];
-  let list: unknown;
-  if (Array.isArray(payload)) {
-    list = payload;
-  } else if ("error" in payload && typeof payload.error === "object" && payload.error !== null && "available_voices" in payload.error) {
-    list = payload.error.available_voices;
-  } else if ("available_voices" in payload) {
-    list = payload.available_voices;
-  } else if ("voices" in payload) {
-    list = payload.voices;
-  } else if ("data" in payload) {
-    list = payload.data;
-  }
-  if (!Array.isArray(list)) return [];
-  const names: string[] = [];
-  for (const entry of list) {
-    if (typeof entry === "string") {
-      names.push(entry);
-    } else if (typeof entry === "object" && entry !== null) {
-      const name = "id" in entry ? entry.id : "name" in entry ? entry.name : undefined;
-      if (typeof name === "string") names.push(name);
-    }
-  }
-  return names.filter((name) => name.length > 0);
-}
-
-/** Known players, PipeWire first (the workstations run WirePlumber); first existing wins. */
-export function availablePlayers(lookup: (command: string) => string | null): string[] {
-  return ["pw-play", "paplay", "ffplay"].filter((command) => lookup(command) !== null);
-}
-
-/** One player invocation: the saved sink becomes each player's routing dialect. */
-export function playerFor(command: string, sink: string): Player {
-  const base = command.split("/").pop() ?? command;
-  if (base === "ffplay") return { command, args: ["-nodisp", "-autoexit", "-loglevel", "quiet"] };
-  if (!sink) return { command, args: [] };
-  if (base === "paplay") return { command, args: [`--device=${sink}`] };
-  return { command, args: ["--target", sink] };
-}
-
-/** What a speech engine should say: prose only, no fences, no markup, bounded. */
-export function stripForSpeech(text: string, maxChars: number = DEFAULT_MAX_CHARS): string {
-  let out = text;
-  out = out.replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, " ");
-  out = out.replace(/~~~[\s\S]*?~~~/g, " ");
-  out = out.replace(/`([^`]*)`/g, "$1");
-  out = out.replace(/!\[[^\]]*\]\([^)]*\)/g, " ");
-  out = out.replace(/\[([^\]]*)\]\([^)]*\)/g, "$1");
-  out = out.replace(/^\s{0,3}#{1,6}\s+/gm, "");
-  out = out.replace(/^\s*[-*+]\s+/gm, "");
-  out = out.replace(/^\s*\|[-: |]+\|\s*$/gm, " ");
-  out = out.replace(/\|/g, " ");
-  out = out.replace(/[*_]{1,3}([^*_]+)[*_]{1,3}/g, "$1");
-  out = out.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
-  if (out.length <= maxChars) return out;
-  const window = out.slice(0, maxChars);
-  const cut = Math.max(window.lastIndexOf(". "), window.lastIndexOf("! "), window.lastIndexOf("? "));
-  const clipped = cut > maxChars / 2 ? window.slice(0, cut + 1) : window.replace(/[,;:]\s*\S*$/, "");
-  return `${clipped.trim()} …`;
-}
-
-/** The text the assistant last actually said; tool-only messages do not count. */
-export function lastAssistantText(messages: readonly unknown[]): string {
-  for (let i = messages.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    const message = messages[i];
-    if (!message || typeof message !== "object" || !("role" in message) || message.role !== "assistant") continue;
-    if (!("content" in message)) continue;
-    const content = message.content;
-    if (typeof content === "string") return content;
-    if (!Array.isArray(content)) continue;
-    const parts: string[] = [];
-    for (const part of content) {
-      if (part && typeof part === "object" && "type" in part && part.type === "text" && "text" in part && typeof part.text === "string") {
-        parts.push(part.text);
-      }
-    }
-    const joined = parts.join("\n").trim();
-    if (joined) return joined;
-  }
-  return "";
-}
-
-/** Menu choices, persisted between sessions; every field optional. */
-export interface Settings {
-  voice?: string;
-  player?: string;
-  sink?: string;
-  maxChars?: number;
-  auto?: boolean;
-}
-
-/** Where menu choices live: DANKVOICE_CONFIG, else ~/.omp/cache/dankvoice.json. */
-export function settingsPath(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string {
-  return env.DANKVOICE_CONFIG?.trim() || join(env.HOME ?? "", ".omp", "cache", "dankvoice.json");
-}
-
-export function readSettings(path: string): Settings {
-  try {
-    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));
-    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) return {};
-    const raw = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
-    const settings: Settings = {};
-    if (typeof raw.voice === "string") settings.voice = raw.voice;
-    if (typeof raw.player === "string") settings.player = raw.player;
-    if (typeof raw.sink === "string") settings.sink = raw.sink;
-    if (typeof raw.maxChars === "number" && Number.isFinite(raw.maxChars) && raw.maxChars > 0) settings.maxChars = Math.floor(raw.maxChars);
-    if (typeof raw.auto === "boolean") settings.auto = raw.auto;
-    return settings;
-  } catch {
-    return {};
-  }
-}
-
-/** A sink row from `wpctl list audio sinks`: `116<TAB>alsa_output…<TAB>audio/sink<TAB>*`. */
-export interface SinkRow {
-  id: string;
-  name: string;
-}
-
-export function parseSinkList(output: string): SinkRow[] {
-  const rows: SinkRow[] = [];
-  for (const line of output.split("\n")) {
-    const cols = line.split("\t").map((col) => col.trim());
-    if (cols.length < 3 || !cols[2]?.includes("audio/sink")) continue;
-    const id = cols[0] ?? "";
-    const name = cols[1] ?? "";
-    if (!id || !name) continue;
-    rows.push({ id, name });
-  }
-  return rows;
-}
-
-// ------------------------------------------------------------- live wiring
-
-interface Config {
-  target?: SpeechTarget;
-  player?: Player;
-  sink: string;
-  maxChars: number;
-  auto: boolean;
-  voice: string;
-}
-
-function lookupOnPath(command: string): string | null {
-  const found = spawnSync("sh", ["-c", `command -v ${command}`], { encoding: "utf8" });
-  return found.status === 0 && found.stdout.trim() ? found.stdout.trim() : null;
-}
-
-function readModelsYml(): string {
-  const path = process.env.DANKVOICE_MODELS ?? join(process.env.HOME ?? "", ".omp", "agent", "models.yml");
-  try {
-    return readFileSync(path, "utf8");
-  } catch {
-    return "";
-  }
-}
-
-function loadConfig(): Config {
-  const env = process.env;
-  const settings = readSettings(settingsPath(env));
-  const overrideUrl = env.DANKVOICE_URL?.trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
-  const modelOverride = env.DANKVOICE_MODEL?.trim();
-  const fromYml = overrideUrl ? undefined : resolveSpeechEndpoint(readModelsYml());
-  const target: SpeechTarget | undefined = overrideUrl
-    ? {
-        speechUrl: `${overrideUrl}/audio/speech`,
-        voicesUrl: `${overrideUrl}/audio/voices`,
-        healthUrl: `${overrideUrl.replace(/\/v1$/, "")}/health`,
-        model: modelOverride || "frank-tts",
-      }
-    : fromYml
-      ? { ...fromYml, model: modelOverride || fromYml.model }
-      : undefined;
-  const playerCommand = env.DANKVOICE_PLAYER?.trim() || settings.player || availablePlayers(lookupOnPath)[0];
-  const sink = settings.sink ?? "";
-  const maxChars = Number(env.DANKVOICE_MAX);
-  return {
-    target,
-    player: playerCommand ? playerFor(playerCommand, sink) : undefined,
-    sink,
-    maxChars: Number.isFinite(maxChars) && maxChars > 0 ? Math.floor(maxChars) : (settings.maxChars ?? DEFAULT_MAX_CHARS),
-    auto: env.DANKVOICE_AUTO === "1" || (settings.auto ?? false),
-    voice: env.DANKVOICE_VOICE?.trim() ?? settings.voice ?? "",
-  };
-}
-
-/** PipeWire sinks via wpctl; empty when wireplumber is unreachable. */
-function listSinks(): SinkRow[] {
-  const probe = spawnSync("wpctl", ["list", "audio", "sinks"], { encoding: "utf8" });
-  return probe.status === 0 ? parseSinkList(probe.stdout) : [];
-}
-
-/** Synthesize one utterance into a WAV inside `dir`; throws with the endpoint's own message. */
-async function synthesize(target: SpeechTarget, body: Record<string, string>, dir: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<string> {
-  const res = await fetch(target.speechUrl, {
-    method: "POST",
-    headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
-    body: JSON.stringify(body),
-    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs),
-  });
-  const contentType = res.headers.get("content-type") ?? "";
-  if (!res.ok || contentType.includes("json")) {
-    let message = `frank-tts HTTP ${res.status}`;
-    try {
-      const payload: unknown = await res.json();
-      if (
-        typeof payload === "object" &&
-        payload !== null &&
-        "error" in payload &&
-        typeof payload.error === "object" &&
-        payload.error !== null &&
-        "message" in payload.error &&
-        typeof payload.error.message === "string"
-      ) {
-        message = payload.error.message;
-      }
-    } catch {
-      // keep the status-line message
-    }
-    throw new Error(message);
-  }
-  const bytes = new Uint8Array(await res.arrayBuffer());
-  if (bytes.byteLength === 0) throw new Error("frank-tts returned no audio");
-  const file = join(dir, `say-${Date.now()}.wav`);
-  writeFileSync(file, bytes);
-  return file;
-}
-
-/** frank-tts's roster route first; if it ever answers nothing, ask with a voice it must reject. */
-async function fetchVoices(target: SpeechTarget): Promise<string[]> {
-  const roster = await fetch(target.voicesUrl, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(VOICES_TIMEOUT_MS) })
-    .then((res) => res.json())
-    .catch(() => undefined);
-  const listed = parseVoices(roster);
-  if (listed.length > 0) return listed;
-  const probe = await fetch(target.speechUrl, {
-    method: "POST",
-    headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
-    body: JSON.stringify(speechBody(target.model, "voice list probe", VOICE_PROBE)),
-    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(VOICES_TIMEOUT_MS),
-  }).catch(() => undefined);
-  if (!probe) return [];
-  return parseVoices(await probe.json().catch(() => undefined));
-}
-
-/** Play a WAV and clean its temp directory up when the player exits. */
-function startPlayback(player: Player, file: string, dir: string): ChildProcess {
-  const child = spawn(player.command, [...player.args, file], { stdio: "ignore" });
-  const clean = () => {
-    try {
-      rmSync(file, { force: true });
-      rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    } catch {
-      // temp files are not worth a toast
-    }
-  };
-  child.once("exit", clean);
-  child.once("error", clean);
-  return child;
-}
-
-export default function dankvoice(pi: ExtensionAPI) {
-  const cfg = loadConfig();
-  const state: { auto: boolean; voice: string; child?: ChildProcess; lastCtx?: ExtensionContext } = {
-    auto: cfg.auto,
-    voice: cfg.voice,
-  };
-  const voiceLabel = () => state.voice || "server default";
-  const reflectStatus = () => state.lastCtx?.ui.setStatus("dankvoice", state.auto ? `🔊 ${voiceLabel()}` : undefined);
-
-  const stop = () => {
-    if (state.child && state.child.exitCode === null) state.child.kill("SIGTERM");
-    state.child = undefined;
-  };
-
-  const missingTarget = () => "dankvoice: no `api: openai-speech` provider in agent/models.yml (set DANKVOICE_URL)";
-
-  const persistSettings = (ctx: ExtensionContext) => {
-    const settings: Settings = {
-      voice: state.voice,
-      player: cfg.player?.command ?? "",
-      sink: cfg.sink,
-      maxChars: cfg.maxChars,
-      auto: state.auto,
-    };
-    try {
-      writeFileSync(settingsPath(process.env), `${JSON.stringify(settings, null, 2)}\n`);
-    } catch (error) {
-      ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: settings not saved: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, "warning");
-    }
-  };
-
-  const setVoice = (ctx: ExtensionContext, name: string) => {
-    state.voice = name;
-    reflectStatus();
-    ctx.ui.notify(name ? `dankvoice: voice = ${name}` : "dankvoice: voice = whatever frank-tts defaults to", "info");
-    persistSettings(ctx);
-  };
-
-  const setAuto = (ctx: ExtensionContext, on: boolean) => {
-    state.auto = on;
-    if (!on) stop();
-    reflectStatus();
-    ctx.ui.notify(
-      on ? `dankvoice: auto-speak armed (${voiceLabel()} @ ${cfg.target?.speechUrl ?? "no endpoint"})` : "dankvoice: auto-speak off",
-      "info",
-    );
-    persistSettings(ctx);
-  };
-
-  async function speak(ctx: ExtensionContext, text: string) {
-    const spoken = stripForSpeech(text, cfg.maxChars);
-    if (!spoken) return;
-    if (!cfg.target) {
-      ctx.ui.notify(missingTarget(), "error");
-      return;
-    }
-    if (!cfg.player) {
-      ctx.ui.notify("dankvoice: no audio player found (pw-play, paplay or ffplay)", "error");
-      return;
-    }
-    stop();
-    const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "dankvoice-"));
-    try {
-      const file = await synthesize(cfg.target, speechBody(cfg.target.model, spoken, state.voice), dir, SYNTH_TIMEOUT_MS);
-      state.child = startPlayback(cfg.player, file, dir);
-    } catch (error) {
-      stop();
-      try {
-        rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
-      } catch {
-        // ignore
-      }
-      ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, "error");
-    }
-  }
-
-  async function openMenu(ctx: ExtensionContext): Promise<void> {
-    const options = [
-      `Auto-speak: ${state.auto ? "on" : "off"} (toggle)`,
-      `Voice: ${voiceLabel()} (change)`,
-      `Output device: ${cfg.sink || "system default"} (change)`,
-      `Player: ${cfg.player?.command ?? "none"} (change)`,
-      `Spoken cap: ${cfg.maxChars} chars (change)`,
-      "Speak a test phrase",
-    ];
-    const choice = await ctx.ui.select("dankvoice — options", options);
-    if (!choice) return;
-    if (choice === options[0]) {
-      setAuto(ctx, !state.auto);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (choice === options[1]) {
-      if (!cfg.target) {
-        ctx.ui.notify(missingTarget(), "error");
-        return;
-      }
-      let voices: string[];
-      try {
-        voices = await fetchVoices(cfg.target);
-      } catch (error) {
-        ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, "error");
-        return;
-      }
-      const picked = await ctx.ui.select("dankvoice — voice", ["server default", ...voices]);
-      if (picked === undefined) return;
-      setVoice(ctx, picked === "server default" ? "" : picked);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (choice === options[2]) {
-      const picked = await ctx.ui.select("dankvoice — output device", ["system default", ...listSinks().map((sink) => sink.name)]);
-      if (picked === undefined) return;
-      cfg.sink = picked === "system default" ? "" : picked;
-      if (cfg.player) cfg.player = playerFor(cfg.player.command, cfg.sink);
-      ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: output device = ${cfg.sink || "system default"}`, "info");
-      persistSettings(ctx);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (choice === options[3]) {
-      const choices = [...new Set([cfg.player?.command, ...availablePlayers(lookupOnPath)].filter((c): c is string => Boolean(c)))];
-      if (choices.length === 0) {
-        ctx.ui.notify("dankvoice: no audio player found (pw-play, paplay or ffplay)", "error");
-        return;
-      }
-      const picked = await ctx.ui.select("dankvoice — player", choices);
-      if (picked === undefined) return;
-      cfg.player = playerFor(picked, cfg.sink);
-      ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: player = ${picked}`, "info");
-      persistSettings(ctx);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (choice === options[4]) {
-      const picked = await ctx.ui.select("dankvoice — spoken cap", ["300", "700", "1500", "3000"]);
-      const next = Number(picked);
-      if (!Number.isFinite(next) || next <= 0) return;
-      cfg.maxChars = next;
-      ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: cap = ${next} chars`, "info");
-      persistSettings(ctx);
-      return;
-    }
-    await speak(ctx, `dankvoice: ${voiceLabel()} through ${cfg.player?.command ?? "no player"}, checking.`);
-  }
-
-  pi.registerCommand("say", {
-    description:
-      "Speak with the fleet's cloned voices (frank-tts): /say (menu) | <text> | on | off | menu | voice <name> | voices | stop | status",
-    handler: async (args: string, ctx) => {
-      state.lastCtx = ctx;
-      const action = parseSayArgs(args);
-      switch (action.kind) {
-        case "menu":
-          await openMenu(ctx);
-          return;
-        case "help":
-          ctx.ui.notify(
-            "dankvoice: /say (menu) · /say <text> · /say on|off (auto-speak answers) · /say voice <name> · /say voices · /say stop · /say status",
-            "info",
-          );
-          return;
-        case "on":
-          setAuto(ctx, true);
-          return;
-        case "off":
-          setAuto(ctx, false);
-          return;
-        case "stop":
-          stop();
-          return;
-        case "voice":
-          setVoice(ctx, action.name);
-          return;
-        case "voices": {
-          if (!cfg.target) {
-            ctx.ui.notify(missingTarget(), "error");
-            return;
-          }
-          const voices: string[] = [];
-          try {
-            voices.push(...(await fetchVoices(cfg.target)));
-          } catch (error) {
-            ctx.ui.notify(`dankvoice: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`, "error");
-            return;
-          }
-          ctx.ui.notify(
-            voices.length
-              ? `dankvoice voices: ${voices.join(", ")} — using ${voiceLabel()}`
-              : "dankvoice: frank-tts reported no voice list",
-            voices.length ? "info" : "warning",
-          );
-          return;
-        }
-        case "status":
-          ctx.ui.notify(
-            `dankvoice: voice ${voiceLabel()} · ${cfg.target?.speechUrl ?? "NO ENDPOINT"} · player ${cfg.player ? cfg.player.command : "NONE"} · device ${cfg.sink || "system default"} · auto-speak ${state.auto ? "on" : "off"} · cap ${cfg.maxChars} chars`,
-            "info",
-          );
-          return;
-        case "speak":
-          await speak(ctx, action.text);
-          return;
-      }
-    },
-  });
-
-  pi.on("agent_end", async (event, ctx) => {
-    state.lastCtx = ctx;
-    if (!state.auto) return;
-    // `willContinue` means the harness already scheduled a continuation
-    // (auto-retry, empty-stop retry): this is not the user-visible terminal
-    // settle, so narrating it would speak an answer the model is about to redo.
-    if (event.willContinue) return;
-    if (ctx.mode === "print" || ctx.mode === "json") return;
-    await speak(ctx, lastAssistantText(event.messages));
-  });
-
-  pi.on("session_shutdown", () => {
-    stop();
-  });
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+name: amd-apu-vulkan-tenant-onboarding
+description: "Add a ggml/Vulkan inference tenant to an AMD APU (gfx1151 / Strix Halo iGPU) that already serves another engine: APU memory census, RADV heap gate, render-node resolution, build-side glslc/ICD deps, co-tenancy measurement."
+---
+
+Use when a ggml-based engine (llama.cpp, qwentts.cpp, anything built on ggml) must move from CPU to the **iGPU** of an AMD APU (gfx1151 / Strix Halo / Ryzen AI Max) that **already serves another engine on the same card**. Answers two questions only a booted host can: what gate the second tenant must clear, and which files the build needs to clear it.
+
+## 1. The usual VRAM reasoning is wrong on an APU
+
+`/sys/class/drm/cardN/device/mem_info_vram_total` reports a small **carve-out** (2 GiB class), and `rocm-smi`'s "dedicated" figure is not the working set either. The real working set lives in **GTT / system pages**: `/proc/meminfo` → `GTT` and `System pages`. A second GPU tenant therefore consumes host RAM from the same pool the first tenant's weights and the OS use — no supplementary groups, no separate aperture to reserve.
+
+- Price the tenant from a **booted** footprint, never from `weights + KV + buffers`: on an APU the compute buffers and any projector ride on GTT, which is host RAM; check `free` *after* the load, not before.
+- Never subtract a "dedicated" figure from it to find headroom.
+- Unheld fabric clock (`pp_dpm_mech` = `auto`) is a hazard only when the NPU joins too; a pure iGPU pair is unaffected — check it before adding a third tenant.
+- Swap on a host with GPU tenants protects co-tenants; paging a KV pool is worse than the OOM it prevents.
+
+## 2. The gate that decides feasibility: the RADV heap a container sees
+
+`rocm-smi` and `free` cannot see this number; only a container off the **engine's own base image** can:
+
+```bash
+# one-off container, no model, no load, no compute — safe beside production
+podman run --rm --device /dev/dri --group-add keep-groups <engine-base> bash -c \
+  'apt-get update -qq >/dev/null 2>&1; apt-get install -y -qq --no-install-recommends mesa-vulkan-drivers vulkan-tools glslang-tools >/dev/null 2>&1; vulkaninfo --text'
+```
+
+Read `VkPhysicalDeviceMemoryProperties` → the `DEVICE_LOCAL` heap size. On a hybrid Strix Halo box Mesa splits the aperture (~1/3 : 2/3), so `DEVICE_LOCAL` is the budget the ggml tool will actually allocate against — measured 77.33 GiB *with the first tenant loaded*, against a 2 GiB DRM carve-out. Two traps, both measured:
+
+- `vulkaninfo --batch` does not exist in Ubuntu 24.04's `vulkan-tools` (prints help, exits 1). Every `vulkaninfo` parse needs `--text`.
+- The container may have **no NVIDIA ICD**, so Vulkan index `0` *is* the iGPU — but do not trust ordering by index: `--text` and read `deviceName` + `driverID` (`RADV_GFX1151` vs `NVIDIA`). A hand-picked `/dev/dri/renderDN` is worse than useless on a hybrid host: **`renderD128` there is the NVIDIA card and `renderD129` the amdgpu iGPU**; resolve the node with `readlink -f /sys/class/drm/renderD*/device/driver` and pass `/dev/dri` wholesale, letting the driver pick by name.
+- A rootless container that drops its supplementary groups enumerates **nothing**. `--group-add keep-groups` (quadlet: `GroupAdd=keep-groups`) plus the host udev rule that makes the render nodes group-writable is the whole requirement; `--device /dev/dri` alone is not enough.
+
+## 3. Build-side deps: the configure fails before the device ever matters
+
+ggml's `src/ggml-vulkan/CMakeLists.txt` requires, in order: `find_package(Vulkan COMPONENTS glslc REQUIRED)` then `find_package(SPIRV-Headers CONFIG REQUIRED)`, and it compiles its shaders with **glslc**, never `glslangValidator`. On Ubuntu 24.04 (measured against the digest-pinned `ubuntu:24.04` base, 2026-10-19):
+
+- `glslang-tools` ships `glslangValidator` and **NOT `glslc`** → `command -v glslc` empty, `find_package(Vulkan … glslc REQUIRED)` fails, and the Vulkan backend silently never exists.
+- The package is the standalone **`glslc`** (universe, `2023.8-1build1`). Working build-stage set: `libvulkan-dev glslc spirv-headers` — `libvulkan-dev` provides `vulkan/vulkan.h` + the `VulkanHeaders`/`VulkanLoader` CMake configs `find_package(Vulkan)` resolves to, `spirv-headers` ships `/usr/share/cmake/SPIRV-Headers/SPIRV-HeadersConfig.cmake`. A configure probe in the pinned base prints `Found Vulkan: … found components: glslc` then `Including Vulkan backend`.
+- **The archive's glslc is old.** 2023.8 compiles `GL_KHR_cooperative_matrix` (the path ggml's vectored quantized matmul needs) but reports `cooperative_matrix2`, `integer_dot_product`, `bfloat16`, `float_e2m1/e4m3` as unsupported, so those shader families are compiled out. If a Vulkan prefill reads as inexplicably slow, suspect the **shader compiler before the device**; the fix is a pinned glslang build passed as `-DVulkan_GLSLC_EXECUTABLE=<path>`, not a different runtime.
+- Runtime stage needs the loader **and an ICD**: `libvulkan1` + `mesa-vulkan-drivers`. Loader-without-ICD enumerates zero devices, and ggml-based servers die in device lookup — often *after* reading the weights, so the journal reads like a model fault.
+- Ship **no NVIDIA ICD** on purpose: one Vulkan device in the enumeration is what makes the *name* `Vulkan0` safe to write into config. Prefer the name over an index in every flag.
+
+## 4. Prove enumeration without allocating anything
+
+Do not boot a scratch second engine beside production to ask which devices exist — a second model load is a real GPU tenant, and fleet law stops that. Instead run the binary with a device name that cannot exist and read its error; it names what it enumerated, with no allocation and no model resident:
+
+```bash
+podman run --rm --device /dev/dri --group-add keep-groups --entrypoint /app/tts-server <image> \
+  --model /dev/null --codec /dev/null --device NoSuchDevice 2>&1 | tail -20
+```
+
+## 5. The rollback must be a flag, not a rebuild
+
+Put the device in the env file as a value the entrypoint passes only when set, and make **set-but-empty** mean "pass no flag at all" — the binary's own default (CPU, always built) is the rollback. `: "${VAR:=default}"` is the WRONG form: `:=` fires on an empty value too, so the documented rollback line `VAR=` is silently rewritten back to the GPU and the only way out is a rebuild. Use:
+
+```bash
+if [[ ! -v QWENTTS_DEVICE ]]; then QWENTTS_DEVICE=Vulkan0; fi
+```
+
+(`podman`'s `--env-file` passes `VAR=` through as set-and-empty, and `source` does the same, so both readers agree.) Pin it in a test: empty device ⇒ the flag is absent from argv.
+
+## 6. Co-tenancy measurement (only after the tenant is live)
+
+The gate is the **first tenant's** performance with a real request from the second in flight — not the second tenant's own speed. And price the tenant from a booted footprint, never from weights+KV+buffers: on an APU the compute buffers and any projector ride on GTT, which is host RAM; check `free` after the load, not before.
@@ -1,61 +1,41 @@
 ---
 name: audit-subagent-deliverables
-description: "Integrate subagent-written code safely: line-by-line audit, mechanical gates (bash test/lint), adversarial-review-report triage, resource-safety pass (fd/memory), and cutover with running-process restarts."
+description: "Integrate subagent-written code safely: line-by-line audit, mechanical gates (bash test/lint), merge shared-function collisions, fix scope creep, verify env var propagation."
 ---

-# Audit subagent deliverables
+Integrating code written by subagents (fan-out implementation). The code is usually correct; the failures are structural — collisions between agents, scope creep, and assumptions that never reach the runtime.

-A subagent that wrote code is a source of plausible output, not a verified change. Integrate it the way you'd integrate an untrusted PR — with extra suspicion, because the author is an agent that shares your blind spots and its prose is more confident than its evidence.
+## Workflow

-Order of operations: read everything → gates → tests (as evidence, not proof) → resource-safety pass → fix in-place → cutover.
+1. **Read every deliverable line by line** before integrating — not the summary.
+2. **Run the mechanical gates immediately**, in parallel: `bash -n` on every script; `bats tests/ 2>&1 | grep "not ok"` for the failure list, never `tail` (tail shows a passing tail and hides the red in the middle).
+3. **Merge shared-function collisions.** When two agents add different versions of the same function, pick the superset and re-point the other's callers at it. (Real case: one agent's `fleet_base()` carried `-b`, the other's `resolve_fleet_base()` carried `--base-url`; resolve to the one flag set the tests use.)
+4. **Delete scope creep.** Code added for a goal nobody asked for — a new env var, a new CLI flag, a new output file — goes, with its docs, unless the operator asked.
+5. **Verify env var propagation.** A var the orchestrator computes must be exported before the `bash -c` / subshell that reads it, or the child silently takes a default. Check the export site, not the doc.

-## 1. Read every produced file, line by line
-Full file, not a diff skim. You are the reviewer who must catch the line the author never thought about.
+## Audit checks

-## 2. Mechanical gates before logic review
-```bash
-bash -n <script>                 # syntax (scripts)
-bunx tsc --noEmit                # types (TS)
-bun test                         # suite
-```
-Run the suite for information, not as the stopping point — it only proves the author's own scenarios.
+| Check | How |
+|---|---|
+| Flag names real | `bash script.sh --help` |
+| Paths exist | `test -e` each literal in the diff |
+| Env reaches the runtime | grep the export/inline-assignment site, then the read |
+| Tests assert behaviour | not `[[ -n "$X" ]]`, not `test -f <new file>` |
+| Tests not weakened | `git diff HEAD~ -- tests/` — a deleted assertion is a red flag |

-## 3. Hunt the three classic agent defects
- **Quoting bugs:** `set -e` + `"${@/$p/$r}"` = substitution regex containing user input (bash can't escape `/` in a `${var/re/pat}` pattern: `/` reads as the pattern/replacement separator). Fix with a separator absent from inputs (e.g. `%`) and `printf '%q'` for shell-interpolated values.
- **`cd` assumptions:** parallel `runShell` calls share one CWD (pool mode). Any command sequence that assumes CWD (e.g. `git -C .` after a sibling's `cd`) must use explicit absolute paths.
- **Unbounded resources:** every fd opened must be closed on ALL paths (success, throw, validation fail) — `using` for fs.sinks (closes on throw; sinks are `AsyncDisposable`, not `fs.FileHandle`, no `.close()`); bounded `Map` for caches (`MAX` + FIFO eviction); explicit caps (lines read, file sizes).
+## Red flags

-## 4. Check the test file is real
-Tests that assert internal state (`expect(wcwd).toBe(...)`) over output contracts; tests of mock echo; tautologies. Delete them per house rules, keep behavior contracts.
+- Test asserting a new file exists rather than behaviour.
+- Doc claiming a flag the script never defines.
+- Function added with no caller.
+- Doc example that contradicts the code it documents.
+- Same helper defined twice with different flag spelling.
+- New env var read but never exported.

-## 5. Cutover audit (repo-wide)
-`grep -r` the symbol namespace the subagent touched — `wcwd`-style globals are the classic blast radius. Grep every `cd`/`process.chdir` site and verify each paired command sequence uses explicit paths. Stale comments describing the old design must go — comments that lie are time bombs for the next reader.
+## Re-verify after the operator's own edits

-## 6. Cutover restarts running processes
-A code fix on disk is NOT live in any process that loaded the file at spawn (bun/node load-at-spawn). After shipping fixes: restart every long-running supervisor/daemon/UI-server that carries the affected code path; prefer takeover protocols (stale-pid detection) that make restarts cheap. Symptom of forgetting: "fixed" code producing old-code symptoms in production (observed: 812 poisoned ledger rows).
+Run the gates again — their edit may undo an integration (a re-typed helper, a reverted flag).

-## 7. Triaging an adversarial REVIEW report (not code)
-When a subagent produced findings, treat each finding as a hypothesis with a base rate ~40% (measured over 3 rounds, 2026-10):
-1. **Walk every finding end-to-end against the CURRENT tree** before accepting — cite file:line yourself. Reviewers frequently read a mid-edit snapshot; many findings are stale by construction.
-2. **Classification that kills most findings:**
-   - *Stale read* — code changed during review; verify against live lines.
-   - *Inverted logic* — "failed rows are skipped" when the filter makes failed rows RETRY. Re-read the filter.
-   - *Unreachable* — trigger requires breaking a stated design law (single-worker, append-only). Not a defect.
-   - *By-design* — the reviewer labels a spec law a bug (serial execution, non-stream client). Check the spec, not the reviewer's confidence.
-   - *Constant-trust* — "XSS via manifest field" where the field is git-pinned config; "path traversal via REMOTE_TMP" where it's a hardcoded const. Ask: what untrusted input reaches this sink?
-   - *Self-refuting* — the reviewer's own probe output disproves its claim (raw==dedup probe in a "dedup" finding). Quote it back.
-3. **Acceptance bar:** concrete trigger with real inputs + full path walked. Real accepts cluster in: resource caps (pids/timeout/awaited-cleanup), honest labels (default signatures), escaping discipline, self-healing probes.
-4. **One-line verdicts + evidence per finding**, shipped in the commit message; calibration section ("genuinely solid") accepted as free verification of past fixes.
+## Report

-## Verification (the non-negotiable)
-Build/run the real artifact with its real inputs. Observe behavior at the seams:
- concurrent calls → no CWD races;
- resource ceilings → caps enforced;
- cleanup → no fd/pid/dir leaks;
- security → injection probes inert (quotes, slashes, metachars);
- normal case → output identical to pre-audit.
-
-## Evidence (2026-10-07 + 2026-10-10/11 sessions)
- Shell-engine subagent: 426 LOC, `bun test` 39/39 green. Line-audit found: 5 leaked fds per call (`fd` sink never closed), CWD-race in `git -C .`, `set -e` + `${@/\/g\//}` slash-escaping bug, unbounded 10k-entry cache, 45s timeout on git-status.
- Review-triage census over 3 blind adversarial rounds (same repo, ~41 findings): accepted 9, rejected ~32 — rejects dominated by stale reads (protocol rewritten mid-review), inverted filter logic, unreachable-under-law triggers, base64-alphabet "quote injection" (charset has no quotes), SIGPIPE non-leaks, "no memory cap" quoting the `--memory 4g` line above the claim. Real accepts: fork-bomb pids cap, stalled-ssh upload cap, stale-flag self-heal probe, honest census label, freshness gate on pid reuse.
- Poison-law incident: sandbox fix shipped while supervisor ran old build → 812 rows graded by the dead protocol; takeover made recovery cheap. The restart step (#6) exists because of this.
+Per deliverable: correct / changed / removed, with file:line, plus the gate output that proves it (`bats` failure list before and after).
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+---
+name: authentik-rp-sso-login-diagnosis
+description: "Diagnose/repair a dead OAuth2 relying-party login against authentik (Grafana-style): authorize 500, missing email claim, Grafana /emails fallback. Live probe harness + ak-shell gotchas."
+---
+
+# Authentik OAuth2 relying-party (RP) SSO login diagnosis
+
+Use when a vhost authenticates through authentik via the OIDC authorization-code
+flow (Grafana, Seerr OIDC, any "Sign in with <authentik>" button) and the login
+fails — even though the guard-chain e2e (Anubis + outpost) passes green.
+
+## Key insight: the edge test lies
+
+The outpost-guard spec (e.g. `13-sso`) only proves an authenticated session
+reaches the app's *login page*. It never follows the RP OAuth button. So the RP
+login can be 100% dead and the suite still passes. **Always drive the real RP
+round-trip** to get ground truth (harness below).
+
+## Symptom → cause map (all verified live on 2026-10-20, grafana)
+
+| Signature | Root cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| Browser hits `…/application/o/authorize/?client_id=…` → "Server Error — Powered by authentik" (500), traceback `AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'slug'` in `flows/planner.py` | provider `authorization_flow` is NULL (raw `ak shell` `create()` leaves it unset) | set `authorization_flow = default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent` |
+| Grafana log `logger=oauth.generic_oauth level=error msg="Error getting email address" url=<api_url>/emails … 404/403` | the granted scope mapping returns a **bare string**, not a dict → no `email` claim emitted | fix the ScopeMapping expression to `return {"email": user.email, "email_verified": True}` |
+| authorize 500 on scope-overlap, log `Application requested scopes not configured` for a scope like `user:email` | client requested a scope authentik doesn't define (GitLab-ism) | client must request authentik's real scopes: `openid email profile` |
+| Grafana `?api=1` on API URL → GET `<…>/userinfo/?api=1/emails` → 403 | Grafana v13 appends `/emails` to a `?api=1` URL | use the standard `…/userinfo/` with **no `?api=1`** |
+
+Crucial causal note: **Grafana v13 GETs `<api_url>/emails` for the address ONLY
+when the token carries no `email` claim.** So the `/emails` 404 is a *symptom of
+the missing claim*, not a Grafana misconfig. Do NOT chase it with `USE_ID_TOKEN`
+or attribute paths; fix the claim. `USE_ID_TOKEN=true` does NOT stop the
+`/emails` fetch. Once the claim exists, standard userinfo carries `email` and no
+`USE_ID_TOKEN` is needed.
+
+## Live RP-login probe harness (ground truth)
+
+A `qa-e2e` authentik session storage state exists at
+`tests/e2e/.auth/qa-e2e.json` after an e2e run; the e2e node_modules live in the
+main checkout (`tests/e2e/`). Throwaway probe:
+
+```js
+// node _p.cjs  (run from a checkout with node_modules + .auth)
+const { chromium } = require('playwright');
+(async () => {
+  const b = await chromium.launch({ headless: true });
+  const ctx = await b.newContext({ storageState: '.auth/qa-e2e.json',
+    userAgent: "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/139.0.0.0 Safari/537.36" });
+  const p = await ctx.newPage();
+  await p.goto('https://<vhost>/', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' });
+  for (let i=0;i<30;i++){ const t=await p.locator('body').innerText().catch(()=>''); if(!t.includes('not a bot')) break; await p.waitForTimeout(3000);}
+  await p.goto('https://<vhost>/login/generic_oauth', { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' });
+  await p.waitForTimeout(9000);
+  const r = await ctx.request.get('https://<vhost>/api/user');
+  console.log(p.url(), r.status(), (await r.text()).slice(0,200));
+  await b.close();
+})();
+```
+
+Success = final URL on the app host (not `/login`) AND `/api/user` 200 with an
+email. Before the fix it is `/login` + 401. Move the throwaway to
+`~/.AGENTTRASH/…` after (never `rm`).
+
+## ak-shell census: operational traps (authentik 2026.8)
+
+- **Run it via `ssh dankclaw bash -s <<'EOF' … EOF`, NEVER direct
+  `ssh host '… "{{…}}"'`.** Direct ssh eats inner quotes locally; `podman inspect
+  --format '{{…}}'` and multi-line `ak shell -c "…"` only survive inside a quoted
+  heredoc. Authentik runs **rootless** (`podman exec authentik-server …`, no sudo).
+- `OAuth2Provider` has **no `properties` attribute** in 2026.8; scopes are derived
+  from `p.property_mappings`. Accessing `.properties` raises and silently aborts
+  the whole `-c` payload.
+- `ScopeMapping` is **not importable** from `authentik.core.models`. To read
+  scopes: iterate `p.property_mappings.all()`, then `m.scopemapping.scope_name`
+  (reverse one-to-one; the base `PropertyMapping` row has no `scope_name`).
+- Introspect before guessing: `[f.name for f in Model._meta.get_fields()]`. Don't
+  trial-and-error attribute names — that wastes turns.
+- Claims-into-id_token field is `include_claims_in_id_token`.
+- Provider census that works:
+```
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import OAuth2Provider
+for p in OAuth2Provider.objects.all():
+    af=p.authorization_flow
+    print(p.name, af.slug if af else None)
+# email mapping shape (the real bug):
+p=OAuth2Provider.objects.filter(name='grafana').first()
+for m in p.property_mappings.all():
+    print(m.name, getattr(getattr(m,'scopemapping',None),'scope_name',None), repr(getattr(m,'expression','')))
+```
+
+## Repair = idempotent script (DB state, not deployable)
+
+Authentik config lives in its DB, not in any repo file; a blueprint re-import or
+an `ak shell` re-creation reverts provider fields silently. Ship an idempotent
+`scripts/authentik-<svc>-sso-fix.sh` that `ssh HOST 'podman exec -i
+authentik-server ak shell' <<'PYEOF' … PYEOF` and re-applies each fact guarded by
+"already set?" checks. Match the style of
+`scripts/authentik-set-login-session-duration.sh`; add a header note "DB state —
+re-run after a rebuild". Reference it from the service page. Grafana's half
+(env) lives in `grafana.container` and deploys normally.
+
+## Repo test-seam gotchas this triggers
+
+- **literal-secret seam** (`observability_quadlet.bats`, "no literal secret")
+  globs keys `*_SECRET|*_PASSWORD|*_TOKEN|*_API_KEY` and demands a `${VAR}`
+  value. A boolean env ending in `_TOKEN` (`…_USE_ID_TOKEN=true`) is a **false
+  positive**. Prefer not to set such a key (drop `USE_ID_TOKEN`); otherwise the
+  seam must be refined (ask the owner before editing a pre-existing test).
+- Quadlet `Environment=` **word-splits on spaces** (systemd semantics) — a spaced
+  list must be quoted: `Environment="KEY=a b c"`, else it truncates to `a`. The
+  repo already uses this (`open-webui.container` OAUTH_SCOPES).
+- **OKF conformance gate** rejects a page frontmatter `timestamp` in the future.
+  The fleet host clock reads UTC (often a day ahead of local "today") — set the
+  timestamp to the repo's today, not the host's UTC date.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: authentik-session-ttl-query
+description: "Query or change authentik login-session TTL on Dankclaw via ak shell — the string-typed UserLoginStage.session_duration trap, the apply logic, and why SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST is unavailable."
+---
+
+Change or audit how long an authentik login session lives (Dankclaw `authentik-server`, build 2026.x). The real knob is a DB stage row, not env — and the field format will bite you.
+
+## Where the TTL actually lives
+- Run program through raw stdin: `ssh dankclaw 'podman exec -i authentik-server ak shell' <<'EOF' ... EOF 2>&1 | sed -n '/objects imported/,$p'`.
+- Get models by label, NOT import paths (`from authentik.core.models.setting import ...` fails; `authentik.core.models` is not a package; GlobalSettings is NOT a model in 2026.x):
+  `from django.apps import apps; ULS = apps.get_model("authentik_stages_user_login", "UserLoginStage")`
+- The password sign-in path is flow `default-authentication-flow` → stage `default-authentication-login` (FlowStageBinding FK is `target`, not `flow`). Other stages `default-source-authentication-login` / `default-source-enrollment-login` govern external-IdP/enrollment logins only.
+
+## THE FORMAT TRAP (will break login if wrong)
+`UserLoginStage.session_duration` is **string-typed** in authentik's own idiom: `"days=7"` / `"seconds=2"`.
+- Assigning a `datetime.timedelta` stores Python's `str(timedelta)` = `'7 days, 0:00:00'`, which authentik's parser `authentik.lib.utils.time.timedelta_from_string` **REJECTS** (`ValueError: not enough values to unpack`). Left like that, login crashes computing the expiry.
+- Correct write: `s.session_duration = "days=7"; s.save(update_fields=["session_duration"])`
+- Verify it parses: `from authentik.lib.utils.time import timedelta_from_string as P; P(s2.session_duration)` → `7 days, 0:00:00`. A single `key=value` token only; `"days=7 seconds=0"` also errors.
+
+## How it applies (stage.py:77-87, verified)
+`delta = timedelta_from_string(session_duration)`; `if remember: delta += remember_me_offset`; then `set_expiry(0) if delta==0 else set_expiry(delta)`. So any positive duration applies to EVERY login (remember-me only adds on top), and `set_expiry(<positive>)` overrides `SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE` → persistent cookie. Existing sessions keep their old expiry; new logins only.
+
+## SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST (sliding window) is NOT available
+`/authentik/root/settings.py` reads `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` from `CONFIG.get("sessions.unauthenticated_age","days=1")`, sets `SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE=True`, and references **`SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST` nowhere** → no `AUTHENTIK_*` env or config.yml key can flip it. Enabling a sliding window means patching the vendor image; instead raise the login-stage duration (absolute, supported).
+
+## Audit the rest of the expiry surface (live values)
+- framework: `settings.SESSION_COOKIE_AGE`, `SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST`
+- OAuth2 RPs: `apps.get_model("authentik_providers_oauth2","OAuth2Provider")` → `access_token_validity` / `refresh_token_validity` (this fleet: access 1h [embedded-outpost 24h], refresh 30d)
+- proxy claim cache: `authentik_providers_proxy.ProxySession.expires` (observed ~1–24h; silent re-auth, not a logout)
+- tenant: `authentik_tenants.Tenant.default_token_duration` (hand API tokens, not sessions)
+
+## Notes
+- These stage/provider rows are DB state, NOT repo-managed → a blueprint re-import or fresh rebuild reverts them; drop a setup script/blueprint in the repo if reproducibility matters.
+- Don't probe the guarded vhost for the agent API and don't confuse Anubis' 168h challenge cookie with the authentik login session.
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+---
+name: bash-cwd-drift-multi-worktree
+description: "Diagnose \"files keep reverting / phantom edits\" in multi-worktree sessions: the persistent bash shell's cwd silently reverted to another checkout, so probes and git commands ran against different files."
+---
+
+# Multi-worktree bash cwd drift
+
+## Symptom (all of these at once, in one session)
+- A file "keeps reverting" to an older version between edits (esp. test files).
+- `grep -n` line numbers disagree with the tool/test output (e.g. bats reports `line 637`, grep says the match is at 519).
+- `wc -l`/`md5sum` stable when sampled back-to-back, but state "flaps" across the session.
+- `git status` clean in one call, surprising in the next.
+- Probes against `src/` show code that doesn't exist in the branch you think you're on.
+
+## Root cause
+The persistent bash shell resets to the session's ORIGINAL cwd when a call omits `cwd` (e.g. after a shell respawn at a turn boundary). With several git worktrees of the same repo checked out, consecutive calls silently alternate between two full copies of the tree — half the reads land in the old branch's files. Nothing is rewriting anything; two files are being inspected.
+
+## Decision
+- In multi-worktree work, pass an **explicit `cwd` on EVERY bash call**. Never rely on persistence.
+- Use **absolute paths** for `read`/`edit`/`write` (already required) — file tools don't drift; only bash does.
+
+## Check
+When state seems to flap: `pwd` in the same call as the probe. If two calls to the same relative path report different content, `git worktree list` and census each checkout separately — you have two files, not a gremlin.
+
+## Repair pattern (if corruption got committed via the wrong tree)
+1. `git log --oneline --all -- <file>`; per candidate commit print `wc -l` + counts of a few marker strings to classify clean vs corrupted blobs.
+2. Restore the good blob with `git show <commit>:<path> > <path>` (no checkout — safe under worktree policies).
+3. Re-apply the intended additions as surgical edits; verify with targeted tests before the full suite.
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+name: bats-assertion-trust
+description: "When writing or reviewing bats shell tests, catch vacuously-passing assertions: grep -vq, sed range boundaries, unanchored section slices, and fixtures too small to trigger pipefail/SIGPIPE bugs."
+---
+
+Prove a bats assertion can actually fail before trusting that it passes. These four traps each made a green suite lie in real work.
+
+## 1. `grep -vq` proves nothing
+
+`some_list | grep -vq 'x'` succeeds when ANY line lacks `x` — nearly always true. To assert absence, capture the text and test it:
+
+```bash
+s="$(report_section)"
+[[ "$s" != *libfoo* ]]          # absence
+[[ "$s" == *bun* ]]             # presence
+```
+
+Same trap in reverse: bash `[[ $s == *A*B* ]]` — `*` crosses newlines, so a substring check spanning two lines matches the wrong lines. Slice to one line first, then assert.
+
+## 2. Section slicing helpers must have explicit boundary semantics
+
+A helper used to scope assertions to one report section must define, and comment, both ends. The default you want: **start inclusive** (labels carry the count/names), **terminator exclusive** (a `sed -n "/A/,/B/p"` range includes B and leaks the next section's first line):
+
+```bash
+# Call sites pass a bare anchored regex; both ends documented.
+section() { printf '%s\n' "$output" | awk -v s="$1" -v e="$2" '$0 ~ e {on=0} $0 ~ s {on=1} on'; }
+```
+
+Two bugs this shape hides:
+- Helper prepends `^` while call sites already pass `^name` → pattern `/^^name/` → never matches → empty slice.
+- An **unanchored start address** matches the first line and the range runs to end-of-output, so every absence assertion becomes a vacuous pass. Symptom: tests that "verify X is not in section A" pass while X is printed later in the same output.
+
+After fixing a helper like this, re-run the whole suite: tests that were passing vacuously suddenly fail, and that is the fix working.
+
+## 3. Fixtures too small hide pipefail bugs
+
+`set -euo pipefail` + `sort | head -1`: `head` exits, closes the pipe, `sort` dies of SIGPIPE, the command substitution returns `141`, `set -e` aborts the script. Small fixtures never overflow the 64 KiB pipe buffer, so the suite stays green and the first run against real data fails with no output.
+
+- Take a minimum in one pass: `awk '{ if (m=="" || $1<m) m=$1 } END { print m }' file`
+- `awk 'NR==1{print; exit}'` is **not** a fix — exiting early closes the pipe exactly like `head`.
+- Pin it with a fixture larger than the pipe buffer: `seq 1 20000 | awk '{print "[2026-01-01T10:00:00-0700] [ALPM] installed pkgfiller (1-1)"}' > big.log` (use `seq`, not `yes | head`, or the fixture itself SIGPIPEs).
+
+## 4. `tr` swallows the final newline and downstream tools preserve that
+
+`tr '\n' ' ' < file` emits no trailing newline; `fold`, `sed`, and `cat` faithfully preserve the absence, so the *next* output line gets glued on. Breaks any tool that later slices output by line-start labels.
+
+```bash
+{ tr '\n' ' ' < file; echo; } | fold -s -w 88 | sed 's/^/  /'
+```
+
+Pin with: assert the following section's label does NOT appear inside the preceding section's slice.
+
+## Debugging order when a bats assertion fails but the script output looks right
+
+1. Reproduce the exact command outside bats (`bash -x` against the script under test) — if it works there, the bug is in the *test helper*, not the script.
+2. Dump the constructed argument: `printf '%s' "$sed_script" | od -An -c` inside the helper. That is how `/^^ repo /` (double anchor) got found.
+3. Keep stubs faithful to the real interface: if the stub answers `-Sqq` but the script calls `-Sl`, the test measures nothing. Make the stub exit `64` on unhandled args so a new real query fails loudly instead of silently returning empty.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+name: bats-output-glob-red-proof-traps
+description: "Write red bats tests over command output: [[ ]] glob adjacency (quoted * is literal), run-capture vs test stdout in failure dumps, and proving red against pre-fix code before trusting green."
+---
+
+Three traps hit while writing red-then-green bats tests for `remote-job.sh` (Refs #60, `dank/command-center` PR #61). Each one cost a detour because it makes a test look like a bug report when it is an assertion bug.
+
+## 1. In `[[ $s == pat ]]` a quoted `*` is LITERAL — and it eats the wildcard beside it
+
+```bash
+s='  x*                   DONE   rc=0  1 lines'
+[[ "$s" == *"x*"DONE*"rc=0"* ]]   # NOMATCH — and it looks like the tool under test broke
+[[ "$s" == "  x*"*"DONE   rc=0"* ]]   # MATCH — quoted literals, UNQUOTED separators
+```
+
+`*"x*"DONE*` means: anything, then the literal substring `x*DONE`, then anything. Quoting only makes the `*` inside the quotes literal; it does **not** keep the next unquoted token from butting up against it. When the subject has whitespace between the two facts, the pattern must carry an **unquoted** `*` between the quoted literals:
+
+```
+"literal-a"*"literal-b"      # a, then anything, then b
+```
+
+Existing suites in the repo write `*"a"*DONE*rc=0*` — unquoted separators throughout — precisely for this reason. Copy that shape; do not quote for "clarity".
+
+Discriminate before believing the test: run the pattern against BOTH the expected line and the line the buggy code produced (`correct-red` / `NOMATCH` on the second is the pass condition). A pattern that matches the old output was never a regression test.
+
+## 2. A bats failure dump prints the TEST's stdout, not `$output`
+
+```
+not ok 1 status treats a job name as a name, not a pattern
+#   `[[ "$output" == *"x*"DONE* ]]` failed
+# started x*
+```
+
+`started x*` is the stdout the test body itself printed (from a `start` call several lines earlier), **not** what `run` captured. Reading it as the captured value sends you to debug the tool. To see the real capture, echo it:
+
+```bash
+run some-command
+echo "CAP:[${output}]"
+```
+
+in a scratch copy of the test (`/tmp/dbg.bats`, same `setup`/harness) rather than adding diagnostics to the committed test.
+
+## 3. Reproduce outside bats when green refuses to arrive
+
+When a test fails but the same command works by hand, replicate the *exact* bats call shape in `/tmp` with the same env exports (`REMOTE_JOBS_DIR` etc.) and the same `run bash -c '…' _ "$A" "$B" "$C"` argument mapping. If the scratch copy passes and the committed one fails, the difference is the assertion, not the system — go back to trap 1.
+
+## Red-proof rule
+
+Run the new test against the pre-fix code and read *why* it failed. Both traps above produced a failure that looked meaningful while proving nothing (one matched the buggy output; one printed the wrong stream). Keep the test only when the failure reason is the defect you set out to pin.
+
+Related: `bats-assertion-trust` (vacuous assertions), `red-verify-without-stash` (proving red in a shared worktree).
@@ -1,82 +1,32 @@
 ---
 name: bounding-subagent-runtime
-description: "Cap and diagnose runaway or hung omp subagents: task.maxRuntimeMs, softRequestBudget, agentIdleTtlMs, per-agent model overrides, the cfg save-approval quirk, and the finished-work-but-never-exits nested-fanout deadlock."
+description: "Cap and diagnose runaway or hung omp subagents: task.maxRuntimeMs, softRequestBudget, maxConcurrency, maxRecursionDepth (the 0-trap), per-provider in-flight ceilings."
 ---

-# Bounding subagent runtime (omp harness)
+## When
+Subagent runs long, fan out too wide, or you must (re)declare the fleet's subagent limit policy. Also when asked "what limits can subagents have".

-Use when a `task`/`eval` subagent runs absurdly long (tens of minutes on a small job),
-when it **finishes its deliverable and still never exits**, when you want a hard cap
-before spawning, or when you must tell a busy agent to stop.
+## Read first
+- Repo KB page `omp-docs/pi/subagent-limits.md` — the live policy of record (values + rationale + deliberately-not-set list). Do not re-derive; read it.
+- `cfg://task` and `cfg://providers/maxInFlightRequests` — effective values, not the stock defaults.

-## The knobs (`cfg://task/...`)
-
-| Key | Default | Meaning |
+## The knobs (cfg:// writes; `/save` suffix persists)
+| Knob | Effect | Gotcha |
 |---|---|---|
-| `maxRuntimeMs` | `0` (unlimited) | **Hard wall-clock limit per subagent (ms).** The only true time cap. |
-| `softRequestBudget` | `200` | Soft cap on assistant **requests** per run; force-stop at **1.5×**. |
-| `softRequestBudgetNotice` | `true` | Injects one "wrap up" steering message at the soft mark. |
-| `agentIdleTtlMs` | `420000` | Parks an **idle** agent after 7 min. Useless against a busy-but-slow agent. |
-| `completionProbe` | `true` | Asks a working subagent to self-report completeness at 2/5/10 requests. |
-| `maxConcurrency` | `32` (often lowered) | Concurrent subagents; sizes GPU/endpoint load. |
-| `agentModelOverrides` | `{}` | Per-agent model routing, e.g. `{"scout":"provider/model-id"}`. |
-| `tools.maxTimeout` | `0` | Caps the timeout the agent may set on a **tool**, not on the agent. |
+| `task.maxConcurrency` | session semaphore; excess queues | stock default 32 — "2" is not a default |
+| `task.maxRecursionDepth` | nesting cap | predicate is `depth < n`; **1 = children cannot spawn (correct for "no nesting"); 0 disables spawning for the MAIN session too — never reach for 0**; negative = unlimited |
+| `task.maxRuntimeMs` | hard wall clock, overrun = `aborted` | default 0 = off |
+| `task.softRequestBudget` | wrap-up notice at N, force-yield at 1.5N | scout/sonic may impose lower built-ins |
+| `task.agentIdleTtlMs` | park idle finished agents | `<= 0` disables parking |
+| `providers.maxInFlightRequests` | concurrent LLM requests per provider id | keys are the quoted block labels from `agent/models.yml` (e.g. `"llamacpp (dankclaw-3090)"`), flat map lookup; absent/≤0 = unlimited; scope = this machine's config root only — other workstations and non-omp clients are NOT counted; excess queues |
+| `tools.maxTimeout` | ceiling on any agent-requested tool timeout | kills `timeout: 0` runaways |
+| `task.isolation.enabled` | makes per-spawn `isolated` flag available | opt-in per spawn, not a blanket sandbox; needs git repo; off in plan mode |
+| `task.completionProbe` | periodic completeness side-requests | token sink on shared endpoints |

-Reasonable fleet defaults: `maxRuntimeMs = 900000` (15 min), leave the request budget
-alone unless the failure mode is a looping search agent (then lower it — request count,
-not the clock, is what bounds a 200-call research loop).
+## Verify semantics from the bundle, not the label
+Setting descriptions lie by omission. `~/.bun/install/global/node_modules/@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent/dist/cli.js`:
+- depth gate: `grep -o '.\{130\}xC\b.\{130\}'` finds `U_(n,s)`; `grep -o 'function U_(e,t){.\{0,60\}'` → `e<0||t<e` (n=cap, s=taskDepth).
+- in-flight lookup: `grep -o '.\{150\}axInFlightRequests.\{200\}'` → flat `[providerId]` lookup, non-number/≤0 = unlimited, clamp ≥1.

-**Verify the cap instead of assuming it.** `read cfg://task/maxRuntimeMs` at the start of
-any session that plans to rely on it. A session-only write is gone next session, and an
-unanswered `/save` approval means the value never persisted — so the fleet can run hours
-with the cap at `0` while everyone believes it is 15 minutes. Nothing else bounds a child.
-
-## Three failure modes, three different fixes
-
- **Runaway loop** (hundreds of sequential tool calls): lower `softRequestBudget`; the
-  clock cap only truncates it late.
- **Slow model, legitimate work** (dozens of calls on a low-t/s endpoint = an hour of wall
-  clock): fix routing, not the clock — check `cfg://task/agentModelOverrides` and move the
-  agent class onto a faster/shared endpoint. Watch the slot math: subagent endpoints share
-  KV slots with the interactive session, so `maxConcurrency + 1` sequences on an N-slot
-  endpoint degrades everyone's decode.
- **Finished work, no exit (nested fan-out deadlock).** A subagent that spawned **its own**
-  children blocks on their barriers. If those children die out-of-band (killed, starved, or
-  waiting on an answer whose subject changed mid-flight), the parent waits forever with its
-  deliverable already written. No instruction text prevents this — not the repo AGENTS.md,
-  not the task prompt; only the clock cap or a kill ends it.
-
-  Signature: parent and children report **the same elapsed wall clock**, and the parent's
-  on-disk output is complete. Census (agent registry + `ps`): group by elapsed time, look
-  for identical `etimes` across a parent/child set, then judge the **artifacts** instead of
-  the process — balanced code fences, no truncated tables, trailing newline, front matter or
-  the page's H1+status convention intact. Complete artifacts + still "running" = deadlock,
-  not work.
-
-  Repair: kill the **subtree** and confirm the children leave (a killed parent does not
-  cancel children that came from a separate `tasks[]` batch). Then **flatten**: the
-  top-level session does the fan-out and children never spawn children. Re-run only the
-  slices whose artifacts are missing — integrate from what is already on disk.
-
-## cfg write mechanics (bit me once)
-
- `write cfg://task/maxRuntimeMs 900000` → applies **session-only**, replies "NOT saved".
- Persist = `write cfg://task/maxRuntimeMs/save` with the same content, and that write
-  needs its **own interactive approval**. If the approval prompt is not answered in time
-  the value stays session-only and the tool says *NEVER retry unless the user asks* —
-  report it in the reply instead.
- Revert a session value by writing the old value back (e.g. `0`).
-
-## Order of operations when one is already running late
-
-1. `read proc://` → registry of running agents; `read proc://<id>` for status/output.
-2. `read agent://<id>` → live progress ("Latest assistant text") — often shows it is
-   mid-batch, not hung. If the latest text is already a wrap-up/summary, treat it as
-   **done** and collect its output instead of waiting for an exit event.
-3. `write agent://<id>` an explicit wrap-up order: stop searching, answer what is
-   sourced, mark the rest `NOT VERIFIED — needs <what>`, cap the report length.
-4. Only then `write proc://<id>/kill` — the cap does **not** retroactively bind agents
-   spawned before the change, so a long runner must be ordered or killed, never just
-   re-configured. After any kill, re-read the registry: unreaped children and orphaned
-   host-side processes (a scratch server holding GPU/RAM) are the expensive residue, and
-   `pkill -f` patterns that also match production services are forbidden — kill by pid.
+## Landing a policy change
+cfg `/save` writes persist immediately; `agent/config.yml` is machine-live tier (heartbeat commits it). Human-facing policy changes land as an `omp-docs` page update via branch → PR (docs tier), `git worktree add` from `origin/main` if the current checkout is branch-locked by workspace policy.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+name: browser-screenshot-disk-and-cookies
+description: Save omp managed-browser screenshots to real files (tab.screenshot path is silently ignored) and reset the shared Chromium cookie jar between persona captures.
+---
+
+# Screenshots to disk with the omp `browser` eval helper
+
+## Traps (both cost a full re-capture to discover)
+1. `tab.screenshot({ path })` **ignores `path` silently** — the option is not in
+   its schema (`{selector, fullPage, silent, annotate, format, quality, ifChanged, threshold}`).
+   The image attaches inline to the tool result and **nothing is written to disk**;
+   `ls` shows an empty dir. Inline images may also be dropped from transcript
+   archives later, so "attached to chat" is not "saved".
+2. The shared managed Chromium keeps **cookies across tabs and turns** (profile
+   persists after `tab.close()`). A second capture script that expects the
+   anonymous view lands signed-in and `waitForSelector("testid/…")` fails fast.
+
+## Procedure
+Write files via `tab.run`, which exposes the raw Puppeteer `page` — its
+`screenshot({path})` does write:
+
+```js
+const dir = "/tmp/<session-dir>";
+const tab = await browser.open({ name: "caps", url });
+const shot = (file) =>
+  tab.run(async ({ page }, f) => { await page.screenshot({ path: f }); return f; },
+          { args: [`${dir}/${file}.png`] });
+
+await tab.clearCookies();            // ALWAYS before an anonymous capture
+await tab.goto(url);
+await tab.waitForSelector("testid/first-state");
+await shot("1-anonymous");
+// ...drive states with direct helpers: click/fill("testid/<id>", ...) ...
+await shot("2-next-state");
+await tab.close();
+```
+
+Verify with `ls -la <dir> && file <dir>/*.png` — do not trust silent success.
+
+## Notes
+- Selectors accept `testid/<id>` handler; prefer it over CSS on `[data-testid]`.
+- `tab.run(fn, { args })`: functions receive `{tab, page, browser, wait, assert}`
+  first, then each arg; a bare code string runs in an **isolated runtime, not the
+  page** — `document` is undefined there. Use direct helpers or `tab.evaluate`
+  (page-global expression; top-level `return` invalid) for page access.
+- Byte-identical PNG sizes between two frames = same view; fine as proof of a
+  round-trip (state A → B → A).
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+name: command-center-bundle-lint-gate
+description: "Before committing docs in dank/command-center, lint the real omp-docs bundle directly — the bats suite only lints fixtures, so a green suite is not proof."
+---
+
+# The bundle lint gate (`dank/command-center`)
+
+Adding or editing pages under `omp-docs/`? `bats tests/` going green proves
+nothing about the pages you just wrote.
+
+## Why this exists
+
+`tests/kb-lint.bats` exercises `scripts/kb-lint.sh` against `mktemp -d` fixtures
+(`"conformant bundle passes"`, `"missing frontmatter is reported"`, …). For years
+nothing in the suite pointed the linter at the shipped tree, so a page with no
+frontmatter, an index that stopped listing a file, or a broken relative link
+committed under a green suite. (Two tests appended 2026-10-20 now run both
+checkers against `omp-docs/`; verify they are still present before assuming the
+suite covers it — `grep -n omp-docs tests/kb-lint.bats`.)
+
+The general law: **a lint suite that tests only the linter does not lint your
+content.** Check which one a suite runs before calling green a gate.
+
+## Gate a docs commit
+
+```bash
+cd <worktree>
+bats tests/ ; grep -E '^1\.\.' /tmp/…          # suite (count, failures)
+./scripts/kb-lint.sh omp-docs                  # want: kb-lint: 0 violation(s)
+python3 scripts/kb-coverage.py omp-docs        # want: index-coverage: 0 issue(s)
+```
+
+`kb-lint.sh <kb-dir>` (default `omp-docs`) = OKF v0.1 conformance **plus link
+integrity**, so it is the check that absolute bundle links like
+`/tools/gitea/client-access.md` resolve. `kb-coverage.py` = every page listed by
+its directory `index.md` (repo doctrine: nothing may appear in a directory its
+`index.md` does not list).
+
+OKF shape that passes: every concept page carries frontmatter with a `type`
+(`type: reference` + `title`/`description`/`tags`/`timestamp`/`verified`);
+`index.md` files carry **no** frontmatter; new pages get an entry in their
+directory index in the same commit, plus a dated entry in `omp-docs/log.md`
+(one entry = what changed + the durable lesson, a few lines, never a narrative).
+
+## Commit-message trap in this harness
+
+A multi-line message written as a heredoc inside a chained `bash` command
+(`git commit -q -F - <<'MSG' … && …`) fails with
+`pi-natives:command: syntax error at end of input`. Write the message to
+`/tmp/msg-<topic>.txt` with the write tool and `git commit -q -F /tmp/msg-<topic>.txt`.
+Keep the `&&` chain so a failed gate stops the commit — hooks (secret gate) stay armed,
+never `--no-verify`.
+
+## Land and reap
+
+Merge is form-encoded `do=merge&merge_style=no-ff` and answers `200` with an
+**empty body**; never read that as ambiguous — verify by landing. Then
+`git -C ~/.omp merge --ff-only origin/main` (the checkout *is* the deployment;
+dirty `agent/memories/`, `agent/config.yml`, `APPEND_SYSTEM.md` are machine-tier
+live state and do not block an ff whose diff misses them), fast-forward the
+session's `wt/*` scratch branch the same way, then `git worktree remove <build-wt>`
+and `git branch -d <type>/<issue>-<slug>` (`-d` succeeding is itself proof of
+merge).
+
+Stray files whose names start with `-` (e.g. `-c`, `-es` — vim takes a
+`--startuptime` flag name as the output filename) show as untracked dirt:
+`mv ./-c .AGENTTRASH/<date>-<meaning>.log`, never `rm`.
@@ -1,49 +1,62 @@
 ---
 name: dankclaw-pihole-lan-dns-record
-description: "Add/repair a LAN DNS record for a new *.franksdank.cloud service on Dankclaw's Pi-hole v6 (hosts/custom.list path), plus the public Porkbun A record step and client cache gotchas."
+description: "Add/repair a LAN DNS record for a new *.franksdank.cloud service on Dankclaw's Pi-hole v6 (hosts/custom.list + repo addn-hosts, plus the public Porkbun A record side) — and triage \"LAN names stopped resolving\" including the FTL boot-time record-load failure."
 ---

-Use when a new `*.franksdank.cloud` service resolves publicly/LAN-needs a local address, on Dankclaw (Pi-hole v6 container, quadlet `pihole.container`).
+# Dankclaw Pi-hole LAN DNS record

-## Ground truth layout (verified 2026-10-11)
+## What this fixes

- Quadlet: `~/.config/containers/systemd/pihole.container`; volumes `/home/dank/Containers/pihole/{etc-pihole,etc-dockers,addn-hosts}`.
- **LAN records live in `/home/dank/Containers/pihole/etc-pihole/hosts/custom.list`** — plain hosts format: `192.168.0.143 gitea.franksdank.cloud`. This is the boring, working path.
- `pihole.toml` `[[dns.records]]` array is EMPTY on this host — do not expect v6 UI-style records there.
- `gravity.db` exists but has NO `domain` table (v6 layout) — do not insert local records into SQLite.
+A new `*.franksdank.cloud` service resolves publicly (via Porkbun → `franksdank.cloud` A record → Caddy on Dankclaw `192.168.0.143`) but **does not resolve on the LAN**. Pi-hole is the LAN DNS server (`dankclaw_default` bridge, published port 53) and serves local records only from files it imports.

-## Procedure (30 s, proven)
+## Live truth

-```bash
-ssh dankclaw 'echo "192.168.0.143 <name>.franksdank.cloud" | sudo tee -a /home/dank/Containers/pihole/etc-pihole/hosts/custom.list >/dev/null \
- && podman exec pihole pihole restartdns'
-ssh dankclaw 'getent hosts <name>.franksdank.cloud'   # must resolve
-dig +short <name>.franksdank.cloud @192.168.0.143     # from any LAN box
+- **The repo owns the records.** `dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts` (hosts-style lines: `192.168.0.143 <name>`) is copied by `deploy-remote.sh` to `/home/dank/Containers/pihole/addn-hosts` and bind-mounted **read-only** into the container at `/etc/pihole/hosts/addn-hosts` (`Volume=/home/dank/Containers/pihole/addn-hosts:/etc/pihole/hosts/addn-hosts:ro` in `dankclaw/pihole/quadlet/pihole.container`). Add the name there, in the repo, then deploy — that is the durable path. `tests/pihole.bats` validates every line (IPv4, LAN range, name suffix, Caddyfile cross-check).
+- `/home/dank/Containers/pihole/etc-pihole/hosts/custom.list` also exists on the host (older mechanism, mode `640` owned by the container uid, root reads it with `sudo`). It is **not** the repo's owner file — do not hand-edit it as the fix.
+- `pihole.toml` carries a `dns.hosts = [ "192.168.0.143 …", … ]` array too (FTL's own in-config records). Both sources exist; if LAN names fail, neither is being applied.
+- Pi-hole runs as a rootless quadlet named `pihole` — query it with `podman exec pihole …`, never `sudo podman` (per-user storage law).
+- `pihole.franksdank.cloud` resolves through Pi-hole itself (loop/edge), so a vhost record pointing at `192.168.0.143` is correct for every Caddy-fronted service.
+
+## Procedure (repo-first)
+
+1. Append the line to `dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts`:
+   ```
+   192.168.0.143 <name>.franksdank.cloud
+   ```
+   One record per vhost; keep it in sync with the Caddyfile (the bats seam cross-checks the two).
+2. `./tests/run.sh` (the `pihole` seam validates the file), commit, push.
+3. Deploy so the copy step runs: `./scripts/deploy.sh dankclaw --service pihole`.
+4. Verify from the box: `getent hosts <name>.franksdank.cloud` → `192.168.0.143`.
+5. Public edge record (optional; skip when every subscriber is LAN-only): Porkbun `POST /api/v3/json` with `apikey`/`secretapikey`/`command=add`/`type=A`/`hostname=<name>`/`data=76.49.118.136` (see `dankclaw-porkbun-edge`).
+
+Client-side proof (avoid the resolver trap):
+
+```
+sudo resolvectl flush-caches        # systemd-resolved otherwise keeps the negative cache
+curl -sv --max-time 5 https://<name>.franksdank.cloud 2>&1 | grep 'Connected to'
 ```

-Hosts files are read-only-readable only via sudo (dir owned by uid 100999). `sudo -n` works on dankclaw.
+Expected: `Connected to <name>.franksdank.cloud (192.168.0.143)` — LAN route, not the public IP.

-## API maze — DON'T re-explore
+## Triage: every LAN name broke at once (2026-10-19 law)

- FTL API base is `/api` at the web port (8083) **with `Host: pi.hole` header**; `/admin/api/*` → bad_request hint; bare 127.0.0.1 without the vhost → 404 `not_found`.
- Login: `POST /api/login {"password": <WEBPASSWORD from /home/dank/Containers/pihole/env>}` → session in `X-Cors` header/cookie.
- `POST /api/apps/domains/custom` → **404 on this build** (FTL version predates it); `/api/customdns/custom` also absent. There is no container sqlite3. Use custom.list.
+Signature: **all** `*.franksdank.cloud` return NXDOMAIN / Playwright `ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED` while **external names still resolve**. The external-OK/local-fail split is the tell: FTL is answering external names from cache and holds **no local records at all** after a container/host restart — the mounts and files are intact and readable inside the container (`ls -l /etc/pihole/hosts/`, `grep -c . …/addn-hosts`), `dns.hosts` in `pihole.toml` is complete. The mechanism is unestablished; do not go hunting for a lost file.

-## Public record (off-LAN reachability)
-
-Porkbun API, keys in `/home/dank/Containers/caddy/env` (`PORKBUN_API_KEY`, `PORKBUN_API_SECRET_KEY`):
-
-```bash
-curl -sL -X POST https://api.porkbun.com/api/json3/domain/api/create/franksdank.cloud \
-  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d "{\"apikey\":\"$K\",\"secretapi\":\"$S\",\"name\":\"<name>\",\"type\":\"A\",\"content\":\"71.227.227.172\",\"ttl\":\"600\"}"
+```
+ssh dankclaw 'getent hosts grafana.franksdank.cloud'        # empty => FTL, not the client
+ssh dankclaw 'podman exec pihole pihole restartdns reload'   # fixes it in seconds
 ```

- `json3` path 302-redirects → **`-L` required**; no-`-s` to see status.
- Porkbun edge (openresty) intermittently 503s — transient; retry later, don't burn turns. Public record is OPTIONAL when LAN-only subscribers exist.
- Wildcard `*.franksdank.cloud` TLS is already covered: Caddy + Porkbun DNS-01 (caddy-porkbun image), so a new subdomain needs NO new cert work — just the Caddyfile site block + reload.
+Distinguish before acting: a **single** client failing while others work is FTL rate-limiting that client — `podman exec pihole grep Rate-limiting /var/log/pihole/FTL.log`; a `10.0.2.x` client address is a pasta container's DNS forwarder (SNAT), not a machine. Full causal page: `serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Pi-hole.md` (**Records** pitfall + Failure modes table).

-## Client-side cache gotchas
+## Gotchas

- Workstation (systemd-resolved): negative cache survives Pi-hole changes; `sudo resolvectl flush-caches` needs a TTY (faillock-sensitive — no `-S` guessing). Non-interactive proof: `curl --resolve <name>.franksdank.cloud:443:192.168.0.143 https://<name>.franksdank.cloud/...`; cache self-expires (SOA negative TTL).
- Dankclaw/Dankserver resolve via Pi-hole directly — verify there first.
+- Do NOT insert local records into SQLite. v6's `gravity.db` `domain` table has NO `type=2` custom-DNS rows in this build.
+- `pihole restartdns reload` re-imports the hosts files **and** `dns.hosts`; that is the remedy for the boot-load failure above. Plain `pihole restartdns` also restarts the resolver — brief LAN-wide DNS blip.
+- `dig @<ip> <name>` from the workstation bypasses systemd-resolved — use it to check FTL's answer directly (`+short @192.168.0.143`).
+
+## Cross-reference
+
+- Fleet DNS flow: `dankclaw/Caddyfile` (Caddy binds `:443` on the host, serves `*.franksdank.cloud` vhosts)
+- Pi-hole service page: `serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Pi-hole.md`, flow page `Infrastructure/LAN-DNS.md`
+- Public edge: managed skill `dankclaw-porkbun-edge`
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+name: dankvoice-bats-serialization
+description: "Run dankvoice bats suites without hangs or false failures: serialize dist rebuilds, never edit src mid-run, and rebuild before committing the tracked bundle."
+---
+
+Use when running the dankvoice `bats tests/` suite on the shared box, when a suite run hangs or times out, or when the "committed dist is byte-identical to a fresh build" pin test fails after a commit.
+
+## The two serialization hazards
+
+### 1. `setup()` rebuilds `dist/` from `src/`
+Every test runs `cd "$REPO" && bun run build` in `setup()`. Consequences:
+
+- **Never edit `src/` while a suite is running.** The next test's `setup()` compiles whatever is on disk at that instant, so an in-flight edit gets attributed to the run and produces a failure with no owner. Finish the gate, then write.
+- **Two suites on the same checkout race on `dist/`.** Serialize: run one, wait for its report, then start the next. Multiple worktrees of the repo each build their own `dist/` and do not collide.
+- Suite runtime is ~85 s for 55 tests; a backgrounded job with a 600 s deadline is the right shape (`timeout: 600`, `async: true`). Never poll it — `setup()` output lands in the conversation when the job ends.
+
+### 2. `dist/` is tracked, and a pin test enforces it
+One test rebuilds and compares against the committed bundle. Therefore the commit order is:
+
+```bash
+bun run build          # BEFORE staging
+git add -A && git commit -m '…'
+bats tests/            # gate AFTER the commit
+```
+
+Committing `src/` changes without rebuilding first fails the pin test (`not ok … byte-identical to a fresh build`) — the tracked bundle is the *previous* state. If that happens on an unpushed branch, fix it by amend rather than a follow-up commit:
+
+```bash
+bun run build && git add dist && git commit --amend --no-edit
+```
+
+Verify freshness any time the pin is in doubt:
+
+```bash
+bun run build >/dev/null 2>&1 && git status --porcelain dist   # empty = committed == fresh build
+```
+
+## If a backgrounded gate job vanishes
+A crash can kill the job before its report; `read proc://bg_N` returning "not found" means it is gone, not that it failed. Reconstruct what landed before resuming — `git log --oneline -3`, `git status --porcelain`, then the freshness check above — and rerun the suite; the commit may well have succeeded while the gate never ran.
+
+## Gotchas
+- `DV_HOLD` is seconds (`sleep "${DV_HOLD:-0.1}"`), so `DV_HOLD=3` really holds the stub for three seconds.
+- Isolation tests must not count shared state: any assertion that sweeps `$TMPDIR` or `~/.omp/cache` observes every other live session on the box (each narrating session creates `dankvoice-*` scratch dirs). Point `TMPDIR` at a private directory instead — see the `cutting off mid-utterance leaves no orphaned audio behind` test.
+- `bun run build` does not typecheck. Run `bunx tsc --noEmit` separately when moving code between modules; the bundler happily emits a bundle that references a deleted identifier.
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+---
+name: dankvoice-bundle-swap-red-proof
+description: "Prove a dankvoice behavior test is red against the pre-change bundle by pointing DV_EXT at git show HEAD:dist/index.js, with the driver extracted from the bats heredoc into a pinned scratch directory. Use before claiming a new bats assertion is red-capable."
+---
+
+Prove a new `tests/behavior.bats` assertion is **red-capable** — that it fails against the *previous* build, not just passes against the new one — without stashing, branching, or editing `src/`.
+
+## Why
+
+`tests/behavior.bats` is a black-box suite: the plugin bundle is loaded through `DV_EXT`, so a *different bundle* is the red side. Stashing the fix would break the `dist` byte-identity pin test and the shared worktree.
+
+## Working recipe
+
+```bash
+cd ~/Projects/dankvoice                      # or the feature worktree: ~/Projects/wt-dv-*
+bun run build                                 # current src = the green side
+git show HEAD:dist/index.js > /tmp/old-dist.js # the red side (pre-change bundle)
+
+W=/tmp/dv-redproof                            # PINNED name; see traps below
+rm -rf "$W" && mkdir -p "$W/bin"
+cat > "$W/player.sh" <<'SH'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$DV_STUB_LOG"
+for arg in "$@"; do case "$arg" in *.wav) cp "$arg" "$DV_COPY" ;; esac; done
+sleep "${DV_HOLD:-0.1}"
+SH
+chmod +x "$W/player.sh"
+ln -s "$W/player.sh" "$W/bin/pw-play"
+printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf "116\\talsa_output.usb-KT.0\\taudio/sink\\t*\\n"\n' > "$W/bin/wpctl"
+chmod +x "$W/bin/wpctl"
+# The driver lives inside the bats file as a heredoc: extract it verbatim.
+end=$(grep -n '^TS$' tests/behavior.bats | cut -d: -f1)
+sed -n "86,$((end - 1))p" tests/behavior.bats > "$W/driver.ts"
+
+export DV_EXT="$PWD/dist/index.js" DV_STUB="$W/player.sh" DV_STUB_LOG="$W/player.log" \
+       DV_COPY="$W/played.wav" DV_OMPCONFIG=/dev/null DANKVOICE_CONFIG="$W/settings.json" \
+       DV_MODELS="$W/models.yml" DV_WPCTL=x DV_SELECT=""
+for ext in /tmp/old-dist.js "$PWD/dist/index.js"; do
+  rm -f "$W/player.log" "$DANKVOICE_CONFIG"
+  DV_EXT="$ext" bun "$W/driver.ts" <scenario> 2>&1 | grep -E '^PLAYS|^CALLS|^NOTIFY|^SETTINGS'
+done
+```
+
+The scenario name is the driver's third argv (`speak`, `auto`, `repeat`, `humanizecycle`, `badurl`, …); the bats `-f` test body's env (`DV_PLAYER_BIN`, `DV_SETTINGS_JSON`, `DANKVOICE_VERBOSITY`, …) is passed the same way. `DV_SELECT` holds the menu answers, `|`-separated, consumed in order.
+
+## Traps, each one cost a turn
+
+- **The scratch directory must be pinned by name.** `ls -dt /tmp/tmp.*` picks up *other sessions'* temp dirs, and then `player.sh` and `driver.ts` live in different directories — the run silently does the wrong thing.
+- **The stub must append to `$DV_STUB_LOG`.** The driver counts player invocations from that file; a stub that only `sleep`s reports `PLAYS 0` for *both* bundles and the whole proof reads as "fix does nothing".
+- **`DV_EXT` is required.** Missing it yields `Cannot find package 'undefined'` from the driver, which looks like a broken driver, not a missing env var.
+- **`DV_SETTINGS_JSON` supports `__PORT__`** (the driver substitutes the fixture port), so a preseed can name a prefixed route — needed whenever the test is about *which* endpoint got resolved.
+- **Never run this while a `bats` run is in flight** in the same repo: `setup()` runs `bun run build`, so two runs clobber `dist/` and the pin test.
+
+## Reading the result
+
+Red side must show the *defect* (`PLAYS 0`, `644`, a chat `CALL` with the wrong prefix, `Invalid URL`), green side the fix — assert on printed markers only (`PLAYS`, `CALLS`, `CALL <url>`, `NOTIFY`, `SETTINGS`). `CALLS` counts `/audio/speech` calls only; the rewrite call appears as its own `CALL /…/chat/completions … sys=<full system prompt>` line, which is how prompt-level knobs (verbosity, heckle) are observed.
+
+Prefer this over a synthetic leak: if the check already caught a real leftover/failure once, that event *is* the sensitivity proof — say so in the commit message instead of faking one.
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+name: dankvoice-epithet-pool-audit
+description: "Grow or audit the dankvoice 1000-name epithet pool: gender classes, individual eviction, typo sweep, safe regeneration into framing.ts."
+---
+
+# Dankvoice epithet pool audit
+
+Use when adding names to, reclassifying, or cleaning `src/framing.ts` `EPITHETS_*` in `dank/dankvoice`. The pool is law: exactly 1000 distinct names, curated at build time, never user-editable, "the commons, never the characters".
+
+## Classification rules (proven traps in parentheses)
+- **man**: gendered lexicon (king, lord, priest, uncle...) + tokens ending `man|men|master` — but never `human|inhuman|nonhuman`. Compounds like `quartermaster`, `hangwoman` are single tokens: token-equality checks miss them, use suffix rules.
+- **woman**: lexicon (queen, sister, daughter...) + tokens ending `woman` + an EXPLICIT `-ess` title list (baroness, countess, prioress, canoness, chartress, heiress, priestess...). Never a bare `-ess` suffix match: `endless`, `harmless`, `fortress` all end in "ess".
+- **Possessives follow the head noun**: `lieutenant of the king's hull` is a lieutenant → neutral commons; `count's armsman` is an armsman → man. Do not gender by words inside `'s` phrases.
+- Modern-neutral offices stay commons: hero, governor, wizard. `witch/lass/bride` are female-coded; `warlock` male-coded.
+- Regex trap for absence checks: `he\b` matches inside `the`; token-split before matching.
+
+## Individual eviction law
+Evict: named fictional/historical individuals (duke caladan, uncle toby, pyrrhus, usul, endymion, skynet, moya-born, medusa), named protagonist ships (rocinante), and real authors in universe clothing (strugatsky, niven).
+Keep: species, orders, houses, orgs/companies (sardaukar, jedi, cyberdyne), places (kessel; `falconer of the caladan eyries` is fine — the person problem was only `duke caladan`), institutions (zekma, karass).
+Replace each eviction with the generic office beside it, class-stable, and unique against the pool.
+
+## Invariants tests pin (breaking any of these goes red)
+- 1000 names, all distinct.
+- Sentinel literals must survive: `hangman of the holiday` (man), `high priestess of the ear moon` (woman), `comrade operator` (other).
+- Pool firsts feed pool[0] probe tests — union order is MAN-first / WOMAN-first / OTHER; keep source order within classes so firsts stay: `chairman of the presidium of processors` / `hangwoman of the public convenience` / `comrade operator`.
+- Class counts (86/15/899 as of 2026-10) may churn but must be reported; tests never pin them.
+
+## Regeneration
+Pool lives as three generated arrays between markers `/** Male-coded` and `/** The unions` in `src/framing.ts`. Splice new arrays between those markers (python splice of a generated `const NAME = [ "x", ... ] as const;` block is fine; do not hand-edit 1000 lines). Then `bun run build` (dist pin test byte-compares), `bun run typecheck`, and the full `bats tests/` — the class sweeps are exhaustive `Math.random`-cycled walks (each ~200 s; suite ~17 min; never two bats processes at once).
+
+## Fleet cutover after merge
+main checkout ff-only → `omp plugin upgrade omp-dankvoice` → `cmp` `~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/omp-dankvoice/dist/index.js` against merged `dist/index.js`.
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+name: dankvoice-menu-knob-workflow
+description: "Add a persisted /say knob to dankvoice and test its menu row through the bats driver (DV_SELECT picks, INPUT stub, dist-pin rebuild gate)."
+---
+
+Adding a setting to `dankvoice` (`~/Projects/dankvoice`, omp speech extension) means five touchpoints plus one behavioral test. Skip one and TypeScript or a silent drop catches it; skip the test and the row ships dead.
+
+## The five touchpoints (order matters)
+
+1. `src/settings.ts` — field on `Settings` (optional) **and** a type-guarded line in `readSettings`. A field without a guard line is written to disk and never read back; tsc stays clean, so nothing else catches it.
+2. `src/config.ts` — `Config` field (required, defaulted), resolution line, entry in the returned object, and the knob documented in the file header comment (that header is the README's pointer for "full knob list").
+   - Convention: explicit env wins over settings (`env.X === "1" ? true : env.X === "0" ? false : (settings.x ?? false)`); booleans use `1`/`0`, enumerations use the literal value.
+3. `src/index.ts` — `persistSettings()` key list (a knob missing there never survives the session) **and** the getter in the `new Speaker({...})` deps object.
+4. `src/utterance.ts` — getter on `SpeakerSettings` if the Speaker reads it at speak time.
+5. `src/menu.ts` — the row. Rows carry their own `run`; never dispatch on `choice === options[N]`.
+
+Gate at the call site, not the prompt, when a mode must not apply to operator-typed text: `Speaker.speak(ctx, text, thinking, auto)` — `auto=true` only from `message_end`/`agent_end`; `/say <text>` passes nothing. Prompt-only gating leaks.
+
+## Test the row behaviorally, never as a config assertion
+
+`tests/behavior.bats` drives the built `dist/index.js` against a mock harness. Selects and typed text both come from one pipe-separated queue: `DV_SELECT="row label|sub choice|typed text"`, consumed in call order; a consumed-exhausted `select` returns `options[0]`, so always name the row by its **rendered label** (`"Verbosity: normal (change)"`, `"Intro: none (change)"`).
+
+- `ui.input(title, placeholder)` in the driver mock logs `INPUT <title> <placeholder>` and takes the next queue entry. If the mock lacks `input`, no typed value was ever testable — add the stub before writing the test.
+- Scenario pattern that proves a pick works (`case "knobs"`): `say.handler("menu")` → `say.handler("on")` → two `agentEnd(answer(...))` with `settle()` between. Then assert on observable output, not on the settings file:
+  - prompt-shaping knob: `[[ "$output" == *"ONE spoken sentence"* ]]` (directive reached the rewrite request)
+  - framing: `[[ "$output" == *"input=Update, chief!"* ]]`
+  - throttle/framing counting: `[[ "$output" == *"CALLS 1"* ]]`
+- A guard test whose negative case would pass trivially must also assert its premise, e.g. truncation: assert `CALLS 1` so "no outro" cannot be a green caused by nothing ever being cut.
+
+Red first, in a batch: write all the new `@test` blocks, run `bats tests/behavior.bats -f "<pattern>"`, confirm the new ones fail, then implement.
+
+## Gates and gotchas
+
+- **Two `bats` runs at once corrupt each other**: `setup()` runs `bun run build`, so a concurrent run rebuilds `dist/` mid-suite and the byte-identical pin test fails spuriously. Serialize.
+- **Edit `src/` → rebuild before commit**: the pin test compares committed `dist/` to a fresh build. Sequence is `bun run build && bunx tsc --noEmit && bats -f <pattern>`, then `git add -A` (dist included). A failure there is normally a stale bundle, not a bad assertion.
+- `VAR=value some_function args` in bats does reach the child process, so knob tests need no `export`.
+- `edit` tool: inserting after a line whose content you know but that the current tag never displayed gets refused — the refusal echoes the real line; if it matches intent, re-issue the identical edit instead of re-reading.
+- Ship: branch `feat/<issue#>-<slug>` off fresh `origin/main`, one commit per knob, PR targets `main`, merge only on Frank's explicit OK (`do=merge`, `merge_style=no-ff`), then `omp plugin upgrade dankvoice` and `cmp` installed `dist/index.js` against the merged one.
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+name: dankvoice-silence-triage
+description: "Triage silent or late dankvoice auto-speak on the fleet: arming key, /say grammar, endpoint/sink, event granularity, humanizer latency, plus the black-box bats driver."
+---
+
+# Triage "dankvoice is silent" on the fleet
+
+Symptom that recurs: auto-speak only speaks when `/say <text>` is typed
+explicitly. Work the gates in this order; each has an objective check.
+
+1. **Armed?** `cat ~/.omp/cache/dankvoice.json | jq .auto` — must be `true`
+   (or `DANKVOICE_AUTO=1`). Arming is read at **startup only** and `/say on`
+   never persists, so a session started before the key was added is silent even
+   though fresh sessions work. `/say start` is *not* a subcommand: unknown
+   arguments are spoken verbatim (it read out the word "start"). `/say on` is
+   the verb; `/say status` must print `auto-speak on`.
+2. **Endpoint + sink?** `/say status` must show a real endpoint (not
+   `NO ENDPOINT`) and the saved sink must exist:
+   `pw-dump | grep -o 'alsa_output\.[^"]*' | sort -u`.
+3. **Did it synthesize?** `pgrep -a pw-play` during a turn: one process per
+   segment, `--target <sink>`, wav under `/tmp/dankvoice-*/say-<epochms>.wav`.
+   One temp **directory per utterance chain** — count dirs to count utterances,
+   pids to count segments.
+4. **Event granularity (the structural cause).** `agent_end` fires once per
+   *prompt* when the loop settles and is skipped when the harness maps a
+   non-terminal settle (`willContinue`) — long runs with background jobs or
+   subagents therefore narrate nothing. Mid-run narration needs `turn_end`
+   (fires per assistant message + tool results). Verify delivery, don't infer
+   it: skill `omp-extension-event-probe`.
+5. **Latency is not silence.** Narration passes through the humanizer
+   (frank-zealot) before synthesis, so an utterance lands several seconds after
+   its turn; under endpoint load that stretches to tens of seconds.
+   `/say humanize off` = mechanical voice, near-instant. Judge cadence from
+   probe-log timestamps, never from when audio starts.
+
+## Design rules the plugin now encodes (dank/dankvoice#2→#3)
+
+- Narrate `turn_end` per turn **plus** `agent_end` for the settled answer;
+  dedupe identical text per run (reset on `agent_start`) so the answer speaks once.
+- A turn landing while the player is alive is **dropped** — no queue, no
+  interrupting; a tool loop would cut every sentence off after a word.
+  Busy test: `state.child !== undefined && state.child.exitCode === null`.
+- Tool-only turns (no prose, no narration-flagged thinking) stay silent.
+- `print`/`json` modes stay silent, so benches never chatter.
+- Settings writes must **round-trip the file** (`{...onDisk, ...owned keys}`).
+  Rebuilding from owned keys deleted `"auto"` on any menu choice and silently
+  un-armed every later session — the classic cause of "it worked yesterday".
+
+## Black-box test harness (repo `dank/dankvoice`)
+
+`tests/behavior.bats` drives the built artifact through an in-process driver:
+`const say = DV_EXT(ctx, cfg)[0]`, handlers via `const events = new Map();
+const pi = { on: (n,h)=>events.set(n,h) }`, then `events.get("turn_end")?.({
+turnIndex:0, message:{role:"assistant",content:[{type:"text",text:"…"}]},
+toolResults:[]}, ctx)`. Assert on `CALL`/`PLAYS`/`NOTIFY` lines and
+`SETTINGS <file contents>`; stubs are `DV_PLAYER_CMD` (logs voice+input, honours
+`DV_HOLD`) and `DV_REWRITE_URL` (404 → falls back to mechanical text). `setup()`
+runs `bun run build` per test → serialize suites on the shared `dist/`.
+`tests/packaging.bats` requires `dist/` **committed** (compares to HEAD), so
+build → commit → the drift pin goes green.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+name: docker-pin-latest-census
+description: "Prove a Docker Hub / lscr.io image pin is the latest version before bumping it: registry-API tag enumeration, the rolling-latest trap, digest pinning, and rollback proof."
+---
+
+Use when asked whether a Docker Hub / lshr.io image pin is the latest version before bumping it, or when a manifest claims an image is stale. Registry API is the answer; the `latest` tag is not.
+
+## The API
+
+```bash
+# hub: token then paginate (the list is 100 per page)
+tok=$(curl -s "https://auth.docker.io/token?service=registry.docker.io&scope=repository:${repo}:pull" | jq -r .token)
+for off in 0 100 200 300 400 500; do
+  curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $tok" \
+    "https://hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/${repo}/tags?page_size=100&ordering=last_updated&page=${page}" \
+    | jq -r '.results[] | "\(.name)\t\(.last_updated)"'
+done | sort
+```
+
+```bash
+# lscr.io (linuxserver): tags are semver, `latest` is a rolling alias
+curl -s https://images-api.github.com/v2/linuxserver/${repo}/tags/list  # wrong host for lscr
+curl -s "https://hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/linuxserver/${repo}/tags?page_size=100" | jq -r '.results[].name'
+```
+
+Docker Hub's own tag list (`hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/<repo>/tags`, ordered by `last_updated`) is the practical source. The registry API (`/v2/<repo>/tags/list`) needs the bearer token flow above; both return tags, neither sorts by semver.
+
+## The `latest` trap
+
+- `latest` is a **rolling alias**, not a version. "Pin is older than `latest`" says nothing about whether a *versioned* tag exists.
+- `latest` can lag or be rebuilt without a version bump; comparing a digest pin against it proves nothing.
+- For linuxserver images: `stable` is the rolling branch and version tags (`2026-09-30`) are what you pin; multi-arch manifest lists mean the same tag has per-arch digests — the pin must be the manifest-list digest (`RepoDigests[0]`) you actually pull, or a re-pull on another arch silently changes the image.
+
+## Verification recipe (before bumping a pin)
+
+1. Read the pinned tag and digest from the manifest/quadlet.
+2. Enumerate tags from the registry API (paginate; `last_updated` is not semver order).
+3. Compare **versions**, not recency: does a version greater than the pinned one exist?
+4. If bumping: pull the new tag and record `docker/podman inspect --format '{{index .RepoDigests 0}}'` as the new digest — pin the digest, not the tag.
+5. Prove the service: it starts, version endpoint answers the new version, no crash-loop, and the rollback is the previous digest.
+
+## Report
+
+"pinned: X (digest …), latest available: Y, upstream changelog: …" — or "pin is current: no version tag newer than X exists". Never claim staleness from the `latest` tag alone.
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+name: docs-dedupe-verify-campaign
+description: "Run an exhaustive docs dedupe + fact-verification campaign (command-center or any OKF vault, e.g. franksign): scout cluster ledgers, override scouts with evidence, gate every commit, and sweep scaffolding before PR."
+---
+
+# Exhaustive docs dedupe + verification campaign (dank/command-center; transplants to any OKF vault — proven on franksign 2026-10-21, #64 2026-10-21)
+
+## Frame
+- Read `omp-docs/references/okf-spec.md` (or the vault's vendored OKF contract, e.g. `franksign-docs/read-only/okf-v0.2-spec.md`) + root `index.md` first; inventory with `find <vault> -name '*.md' | wc -l`.
+- Run `scripts/kb-lint.sh omp-docs` baseline; index-coverage gate is `scripts/kb-coverage.py omp-docs` (each dir's `index.md` must link every sibling file/subdir). On franksign the whole mechanical gate is one seam: `bun tests/lib/okf-lint.mjs` (frontmatter, links, index coverage, version-once) — run it before and after.
+- Branch off fresh `origin/main` in a NEW worktree (`git -C ~/.omp worktree add ~/.omp/wt/<name> -b docs/<issue>-slug origin/main`) — workspace policy blocks `git checkout -b` in session worktrees. In a session worktree, `git checkout -b` is intercepted anyway: commit on the session branch, then named-ref push `HEAD:refs/heads/docs/<n>-slug` (verify `git log origin/main..HEAD` shows ONLY your commit first).
+- Open the Gitea issue first (multi-moving-parts law); branch name `docs/<issue#>-<slug>`.
+
+## Scout fleet (overlap detection)
+- One `task` call, `tasks[]` batch, agent `scout`, read-only; one cluster per task. **Fan out 2-3 clusters at a time, never seven**: `task.maxConcurrency` is 2 on this fleet, so the excess only queues, and `proc://` reports queued tasks as `running` — identical uptimes with zero deliveries means thrash, not progress (#64: seven scouts, nothing in 17 min; killing the five redundant ones let the two survivors land within minutes).
+- Do NOT scout a cluster you have already audited inline. Kill the redundant jobs early with `write proc://<id>/kill` — the endpoint is the scarce resource, and your own session shares it.
+- Ledger format per cluster: inventory rows (file | verdict KEEP|MERGE|DELETE|VENDOR|UPDATE | evidence line/command). **Demand the ledger as the yield TEXT, never a `local://` file reference**: #64 produced one 0-byte ledger plus three files whose names contained the scout's own serialized parameter block (`gitea-caddy-inventory.md` + newline + a parameter tag), recoverable only by `ls`-ing `~/.omp/agent/sessions/<session>/local/<dir>/`.
+- **Scouts lie.** Verified misses in the 2026-10-19 campaign: fabricated ledger entries ("peer-reviewed BrowseComp" claim that exists in no file), a DELETE verdict for a generated artifact that is checked in by design AND under test (`tools/niri/keybindings.md`, see `scripts/gen-keybinds.sh` + `tests/gen-keybinds.bats`), and a KEEP for a leftover the scout misread its own changelog about. Franksign 2026-10-21: 2 of 3 cluster scouts fabricated — "7 missing component stories" refuted by the pairing-law seam that runs green on every push, invented entry/page counts, DELETE verdicts on live-box census numbers the purpose test KEEPS; a third hit the 30-min runtime cap producing zero output. #64 same day: three pages "missing an H1" that have one on their first heading line; a 215-line `omp-docs/AGENTS.md` that does not exist; a "wikilinks + 700-char wall" defect in `core/settings.md` that a commit from that same morning had already removed; `core/subagent-limits.md` called superseded while `agent/config.yml` carries the cited `maxRuntimeMs` / `softRequestBudget` / `maxRecursionDepth` values verbatim.
+- **Four pre-checks before a scout row enters the diff**: (1) the file exists; (2) the named heading/marker is actually absent (`grep -c '^# '`, `grep -c '^# Citations'`); (3) `git log --oneline -3 -- <file>` — a same-day commit may already have fixed it; (4) if the claim is "config supersedes the doc", grep the config for the cited keys.
+- Cluster sizing: for a vault under ~20 pages, scout fleets are net-negative — audit inline yourself (reading 5 pages beats babysitting a scout). Reserve scouts for multi-hundred-page trees.
+
+## Mechanical sweeps that pay (run on every vault)
+- Empty-text links: `grep -rnE '(^|[ ,])\]\(' <vault>` — a generated "See Also" pass left five `- ](index.md)` links (#64); rendered, an empty bullet reads as style, never as a broken reference.
+- Citation convention census BEFORE adding anything: count `grep -rl '^resource:'` against `grep -rl '^# Citations'`. command-center's convention is `resource:` frontmatter (12 vs 3) — "add Citations to six pages" is a convention change, not a fix; only the pages missing `resource:` were real hits.
+- Long-line walls: `awk 'length>300 {print FILENAME":"NR"("length")"}'` — reflow prose to ~100 columns, wording intact; leave tables (they cannot wrap) and the text of verbatim blockquotes alone.
+- Dated log headings: three `## YYYY-MM-DD` sections for one day is three logs wearing one date. Collapse to one `##` plus one `###` per campaign, and write the shape into the spec page so nobody has to infer it.
+
+## Fact verification
+- Fleet facts: read-only probes over `ssh -o BatchMode=yes dankclaw|dankserver` (podman ps/inspect/top, stat, /etc/os-release, curl localhost APIs, `podman exec <c> <tool> --version`). Live state beats docs even when docs claim recent verification — the 2026-10-18 "audit" still drifted (zealot 27B→9B, build 10754→10777, container census 14→32; #64 then found `8C/16T` where SMT is off, a "masked" unit that is simply absent, Pi-hole missing from a DNS list, and a weekly-drifting engine count that became a size class with `/config` named as the only authority).
+- Local box facts too: `pacman -Qs <pkg>` / `command -v` before trusting a page's "installed tool" claim (#64: `wlr-randr` documented as available, never installed).
+- Unit health is not endpoint health: an `:7770` that answers `/v1/models` while its systemd unit sits inactive `Result=exit-code` means a container escaped its unit. Report the drift to the operator; never record transient state as docs, and never touch a production unit without a per-run OK.
+- Code-bound facts (franksign-style): every doc claim about routes/columns/shipped status gets grepped against `apps/*/src`, `packages/db/migrations/` — docs narrating features that never shipped ("page ships in the slice" while only the API landed) get truthed with a status pointer to the owning issue.
+- External claims: web_search/web read yourself (no subagents per Frank's rule). Kill fabrications outright (invented distro `FreeToken`, nonexistent `ornith-llama-cpp-setup` tree, unattributable "44.5% peer-reviewed CUA") — delete/drop with an explicit note, never keep "plausible" numbers.
+- Policy drift (live ≠ tuned docs): flag in the doc + PR body as an operator decision; NEVER silently re-apply policy.
+- Deletion proposals from scouts die by default: archived trees carrying an honest archive banner (`pi/**`, banner 2026-10-18) stay, a directory `index.md` cannot be deleted (index-coverage gate), and incident logs are laws, not bookkeeping. Deletion is a pruning session with Frank present.
+
+## OKF §9 / frontmatter audit (cheap wins, check every vault)
+- Log entries filed under the wrong ISO-date heading (crossed midnight): cut the entry (`CUT N.=M @reg`), insert the new date heading above the old one (newest-first headings), paste the entry under it.
+- Missing trust family (`generated` on machine-written pages) — lint may not catch it; grep every frontmatter block.
+- Laws living only in `log.md`: promote each to its owner page (mechanism law → architecture page owning the thing), leave the log entry as the incident record; the HANDOFF/README boundary then points at the vault instead of restating.
+- A law restated in two tiers (vault spec page + always-loaded `AGENTS.md`) is not a duplicate to cut: name the co-ownership in the spec page ("change one, change the other") instead of silently dropping one copy.
+
+## Log compaction (log.md)
+- Entry law: dated entry = what changed + durable lesson + concept-page pointer; narratives recoverable via `git log --follow`. Record the law at the top of the log. Tag historical-era entries.
+- One `## YYYY-MM-DD` per day, `###` per campaign. Put the fan-out and ledger-verification lesson in the entry — that is what stops the next campaign from trusting a scout.
+
+## Gates + landing
+- Gate every commit: `bash scripts/kb-lint.sh omp-docs && python3 scripts/kb-coverage.py omp-docs && bats tests/`. Pre-commit hook prints `error: command not found: caddy` on Caddyfile-touching commits — warning only, commit still lands. On franksign: kill the :3000 demo stack first (a live API hangs the gate ~10 min; law lives in `franksign-docs/architecture/testing.md`), then `bun tests/lib/okf-lint.mjs && tests/run.sh docs`.
+- Before opening the PR: `git diff --stat origin/main..HEAD | grep -i 'tmp\|scratch\|\.bak'` — scaffolding merged under a `.tmp-` name in the 2026-10-19 campaign and needed a follow-up PR to promote.
+- PR via API (skills `gitea-api-pr-operations`, `gitea-merge-form-encoded`): token through a 600-perm `-K` curl config, never `-H` (`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` is world-readable); create/PATCH = JSON WITH Content-Type, merge = form body with NO Content-Type, `do=merge&merge_style=no-ff`, success = HTTP 200 empty body verified by landed state, not by re-reading the PR. `shred -u` the cfg and payload afterwards. `xdg-open` the PR the moment it opens; comment the campaign ledger on the issue — ownership-move table, re-read facts with the command that read them, and rejected findings with their evidence.
+- After Frank's merge OK: propagate the deployment with `git -C ~/.omp fetch && git merge --ff-only origin/main`, but first prove the FF cannot touch live machine-tier state: `comm -12 <(git -C ~/.omp status --porcelain | grep -v '^??' | awk '{print $2}' | sort) <(git diff --name-only HEAD..origin/main | sort)` must print nothing, and re-check the dirty count after the merge.
+- Worktree reaping is the live-sync heartbeat's job (`wt/*` older than 7 days) unless Frank says otherwise — no `rm`, no deleting a session branch you did not create.
+
+## Line-edit op syntax trap (bit five times)
+- Valid ops: `PUT N.=M:` (body `+text` lines), `CUT N.=M` / `CUT N.=M @reg`, `PUT <N @reg`, `PUT >N:` / `PUT <N:`. There is NO `PUT N+=:` form — it lands in the file as a literal garbage line and shifts the insert to the wrong position. For gap-insert use a lone `PUT >N:` or `PUT <N:` per call; pre-compute line numbers against the file map (ops reference original lines within one call, but a failed op poisons positions).
+- **PUT with an empty body DELETES the range** (franksign 2026-10-21: a typo-fix `PUT 7-7:` with empty body deleted the whole entry). Bodyless deletes: use `CUT N.=M`.
+- A `CUT`/`PUT` range outside the file errors cleanly (`out of range (file has N lines)`) — that is the cheapest way to learn a body was shorter than assumed; re-read the tail rather than guessing offsets.
+- Bare body rows get auto-prefixed with `+` and a warning — harmless, but never rely on it: prefix every body row yourself.
+- Editing a PUT body that ends adjacent to the next original line can silently consume the closing frontmatter `---` — after any frontmatter-range PUT, re-read lines 1–10 of the result.
+- Recovery recipe when a literal op line lands: read exact bounds, `CUT N.=N` (junk), `CUT A.=B @block` (misplaced section), then `PUT <M @block` at the true anchor, re-read tail, add spacing blank if a `---` now abuts a list line.
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+name: docs-point-of-use-destruction
+description: "Documentation exists for point of use, not archival. Use before any dedupe/compact/verify-docs job, and whenever a census or \"only copy\" argument is being used to KEEP documentation: apply the purpose test and destroy obsolete measurements. Supersedes the preservation conclusions of vault-one-fact-one-owner-dedupe §3/§12."
+---
+
+# Documentation exists for point of use
+
+**Supersedes** `vault-one-fact-one-owner-dedupe` §3 ("port before cut") and §12
+("expect docs flat") wherever those conclude a page must be *kept*. Sole custody of a
+useless fact is still useless.
+
+## The test, before you write and again before you keep
+
+- Would the reader, doing a real task tomorrow, **act differently** because of this
+  line? No → delete it.
+- Is it a measured rate (t/s, tok/s, ms, MiB-of-pool, acceptance %, a bench ladder) for
+  a model / runtime / layout that is **not running now and not being compared now**?
+  Destroy it. Not "file it in an Eras row", not "preserve it for history". AI moves
+  faster than the vault: the number is wrong before anyone reads it, and a wrong number
+  in a runbook gets believed.
+- Keep the **law** the measurement taught; drop the measurement. Qualitative causal
+  stories survive; numbers do not.
+- What survives: live config and its exact numbers, procedures, failure signatures,
+  security posture, interface contracts, rollback pointers.
+- **Losing information is an acceptable, usually correct outcome.** Frank said so
+  explicitly on 2026-10-19 after rejecting a PR that had preserved 53 ledgers.
+
+## Traps that lead agents to preserve junk
+
+- **A census cannot decide what to keep.** `port-census.py`-style tools answer "where
+  does this fact live", never "does anyone need it". "14–63 sole-record lines per page"
+  was read as *irreplaceable* when the fact was *obsolete*. Ask usefulness, not custody.
+- **A census that includes the file under test proves the page is held by itself.**
+  Exclude it, print the corpus size, assert absence; treat `0 unheld` on a long page as
+  a tool bug until proven otherwise.
+- **"One fact, one owner" is a placement rule, not a preservation rule.** It says where
+  a surviving fact lives; it never says the fact must survive.
+- **A change diary (`log.md`) is the largest archive in most vaults** (this one: 2,380
+  lines, ~8 % of the vault). Git holds the chronology; a causal law belongs on the page
+  that owns the thing it governs. Retire the diary.
+
+## Execution that worked (2026-10-19, −13.7k lines)
+
+1. Write the kill list as a reviewed artifact, one path per line, grouped by *why it is
+   dead* — that list becomes the PR's argument and the trash manifest.
+2. Destroy whole pages first (`scripts/destroy-vault.py <list>`): move to
+   `.AGENTTRASH/<date>-destruction/`, then delete every reference from survivors, whole
+   line included when the dead link was its only content. Do not compare link targets
+   with `pathlib.Path.stem` — it strips real suffixes (`sd.cpp`).
+3. Then strip numbers from what remains (`scripts/axe-measurements.py`): delete ledger
+   sections (noun-LEDS the heading, nothing instructional after it), blank any table cell
+   reporting a rate, fold Eras older than the current one into a single row pointing at
+   git. Never touch a shape number or a Laws/Wire/Rollback section.
+4. Sweep indices (generator must exclude the trash dir, drop rows whose page cell became
+   empty), re-lint, re-check links.
+5. Rewrite the governing policy in the same PR, or the next agent re-grows the vault:
+   project `AGENTS.md` *Documentation Policy* + the global agent settings.
+
+## Report honestly, per area
+
+docs / scripts / operator-doc separately, measured against the merge-base. The tools are
+a cost that must be named, not hidden inside a headline "net" number — that is what got
+the previous pass rejected.
+
+## Verify the repair tools themselves
+
+One repair pass matched "line ends with a comma" and deleted the trailing comma from 660
+wrapped prose lines. Restore by matching lines that are byte-identical to `HEAD` except
+for trailing punctuation (`restore-punctuation.py`), keep the destructive rule out of the
+tool, and record the incident in its docstring.
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+name: docs-refresh-scout-summaries
+description: "Refresh a stale documentation cluster without delegating the writing: scout subagents produce per-line verdict tables (holder verified by comma-insensitive grep), the parent makes every edit, and a port-before-cut census proves nothing was lost. Use for dedupe-our-docs, fix-the-stale-runbooks, pointers-instead-of-copied-numbers jobs."
+---
+
+# Refresh stale docs with scout summaries, parent-side writes
+
+Use when a cluster of documentation pages is stale and/or restates facts another page owns, and
+the fix touches many files. **Scouts read and classify; the parent writes.** Sibling skill
+`vault-one-fact-one-owner-dedupe` covers collapsing era pages into owner pages - its section 3
+(orphan census), section 7 (edit-tool hazard) and section 9 (verify/PR) apply unchanged.
+
+## Why not writer subagents (measured cost)
+
+Writer agents produce plausible output and cannot be trusted on the one claim that matters - the
+owner page already holds this fact. In one run they asserted every cut was grep-confirmed while
+FOUR cuts left pointers to pages that did not contain the fact (118->238 GiB, 16,095 tokens,
+0.739/0.554/0.427/0.340, PR #23897). Each became a broken promise the next reader trusts.
+Classification is the only part that parallelizes; writing is where taste (ownership, era
+naming, what counts as a law) lives. So fan out read-only scouts and keep the pen.
+
+If writer agents were already spawned and are no longer wanted: `write agent://all` to stop
+them, then `git status` the target tree - `proc://` does not list agent jobs, and a finished
+worker may already have edited files.
+
+## Pipeline
+
+1. **Cluster** targets into groups of 3-4 pages sharing subject matter (one cluster per scout).
+   Know the owner map first (endpoint/service/host pages, plus the repo documentation law).
+2. **Wave of 2 scouts** (harness cap is `task.maxConcurrency`, usually 2). Scout contract:
+
+   > READ-ONLY, no writes of any kind. Per file, one table row per candidate fact:
+   > `| lines | verbatim figure + 6 words | holder elsewhere (file:line) or none | VERDICT |`
+   > Verdicts: `CUT -> [[Owner]]` (holder verified), `KEEP(owned here)` (no holder, this page is
+   > the record), `PORT(parent)` (rightful owner lacks it - name page and section), `STALE`
+   > (contradicted by current state; quote the contradicting line), `INDEX` (locator page).
+   > Verify every holder claim with a COMMA-INSENSITIVE grep: a holder writing 1,350,182
+   > satisfies a page writing 1350182 and vice versa; 16,095 does NOT satisfy a check for 16095
+   > unless commas are stripped. Never name a holder line you have not read.
+   > End with a per-file tally: kept / cut / port / stale.
+
+   Put the law, the owner map and the verification rule in the batch-level `context`, never per
+   task.
+3. **Write while the next wave runs**: edit cluster N from wave N, launch wave N+1 in the same
+   turn. Never launch a wave you have nothing to write.
+4. **Verify each CUT yourself** before cutting - read the holder line. A scout row is a
+   hypothesis, not evidence.
+5. **PORT items are your edits**: add the fact to the owner page section (Eras row / Laws / spec
+   table), then cut it from the technique page in the same commit.
+6. **STALE items: check live state**, not another document - `ssh <host> systemctl is-active
+   <svc>`, the endpoint `/health`, the env file. Then rewrite with a date, or drop transient
+   live state an owner page already records.
+
+## The ownership test that stops wasted ports
+
+Two pages carrying one figure is the defect - a figure with exactly one holder is fine wherever
+it lives. A technique page that is the sole record of a campaign owns that campaign's arm
+tables; do not port such ledgers into an endpoint Eras table. Write the clause into the repo
+documentation law so the next pass stops porting single-owner facts. Corollary: a worked example
+may repeat a live number if it declares itself dated and names the owner (a snapshot, not fleet
+state - recompute from the live files).
+
+## Census after each cluster (catches your own slips too)
+
+Run the sibling skill's section 3 census over `git diff -U0` for the cluster (deleted lines x
+distinctive numeric keys vs the whole vault **plus AGENTS.md**), comma-insensitively; drive the
+count to zero or list each accepted loss in the commit message.
+
+```python
+flat = corpus.replace(',', '')
+pres = lambda n: n in corpus or n.replace(',', '') in flat
+toks = lambda l: [n for n in re.findall(r'\d[\d,]*(?:\.\d+)?', l)
+                  if len(n.replace(',', '').split('.')[0]) >= 4
+                  or (len(n.split('.')[-1]) >= 2 and len(n.replace(',', '')) >= 5)]
+orphan = [l for l in deleted if toks(l) and not any(pres(n) for n in toks(l))]
+```
+
+## Verify and land
+
+- Vault link seam must print `0 unresolved links`; hard-wrapped `[[Two Word Page]]` links split
+  across lines are the usual cause - unwrap them.
+- Full suite once at the end, not per cluster; a docs seam running while scouts are live may
+  read half-written files, so re-run after the last edit.
+- Commit per cluster (docs-only means **no deploy**); push, open the PR through the API with a
+  600-perm curl config, `xdg-open` the PR URL immediately.
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+---
+name: dotfiles-adoption-audit
+description: "Use when deciding which userspace configs on a Dank box belong in the command-center dotfiles tier — separates tracked intent from generated expansion, app state, secrets, and config owned by another repo. Not for deploying one known file."
+---
+
+# Dotfiles adoption audit
+
+Decides, with evidence, which files under `~/.config` (and top-level dotfiles) belong in
+`dank/command-center`'s `dotfiles/` tier. The repo law being applied: **config in, state
+out**, and **one fact, one owner**.
+
+## The four gates (all four must pass)
+
+1. **Installed?** `command -v <prog>` — config for software absent from the box is a prune
+   candidate, never an adoption target. This eliminates most of the clutter.
+2. **Authored, or the expansion of something else?** Generated files must stay out even
+   though they look like config.
+3. **Does another repo or installer already write it?** If a script or package owns the
+   file, tracking it here creates a second owner that loses every argument.
+4. **Could a secret ever live in it?** If yes: template + quarantine, or leave it out.
+
+## Gate 2 is the one people get wrong — prove generation from mtime
+
+A generator walking the app list writes dozens of files in the same sub-second window.
+Compare timestamps across unrelated programs:
+
+```bash
+cd ~/.config && stat -c '%y  %n' */themes/noctalia* */noctalia.* */colors/noctalia* 2>/dev/null | sort
+```
+
+Identical seconds + microsecond progression across ten different programs = generated.
+Re-check one file days later: a new mtime with no human edit proves regeneration, so the
+tracked file must be the *source* (palette/config the generator reads), never its output.
+The correct pattern is a tracked config that *imports* the generated path.
+
+## Classify the whole tree per file, not per directory
+
+The tracked unit is the **file symlink**, so a directory can be "real" while containing only
+tracked symlinks. Never classify by directory:
+
+```bash
+cd ~/.config && for d in */; do d=${d%/}; tr=0; rl=0; rlfiles=""
+  while IFS= read -r f; do
+    case "$(readlink -f "$f" 2>/dev/null)" in
+      */.omp/dotfiles/*) tr=$((tr+1));;
+      *) rl=$((rl+1)); rlfiles="$rlfiles ${f#./}";;
+    esac
+  done < <(find "$d" -maxdepth 2 \( -type f -o -type l \) 2>/dev/null \
+           | grep -vE 'Cache|cache|Cookies|storage|sessions|Crashpad|Default|thumbnails|extensions')
+  [ $((tr+rl)) -eq 0 ] && continue
+  printf '%-22s tracked=%-3s box-only=%-3s %s\n' "$d" "$tr" "$rl" "$(echo $rlfiles | cut -c1-90)"
+done
+```
+
+Then read the headers of suspicious files — installers often confess ("Installed by
+`infra/setup-dev.sh` into `~/.config/containers/systemd/`") and unit files name another
+project's `WorkingDirectory`/`ExecStart`, which means that project owns them.
+
+## Ownership before adoption
+
+```bash
+git -C ~/.omp ls-files dotfiles                  # packages deploy.sh sees
+grep -rl "<unit-or-file-name>" ~/Projects/<proj> # does a project repo own it?
+systemctl --user is-active <unit>                # dead config is not load-bearing
+```
+
+## Secret-gap check (do this before adopting anything env-shaped)
+
+The ignore list may cover only `.env`, so `frank-job-hunt.env` / `postgres.env` fall
+through, and a token-shape secret gate (`sk-`, `ghp_`, PEM, JWT) does not match a
+low-entropy `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=…`. Test both explicitly:
+
+```bash
+cd ~/.omp && git check-ignore -v --no-index 'dotfiles/x/postgres.env' || echo "NOT IGNORED"
+sed -n 's/^patterns=//p' .githooks/pre-commit
+```
+
+Fix = add `*.env` to the quarantine block **and** a password-assignment pattern to the gate,
+with a red test that stages a fake `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=` file.
+
+## Land it
+
+Packages are home-relative trees under `dotfiles/<pkg>/`; per-host overrides go in
+`zz-$(hostname)` (stowed last). `dconf` is loaded via `dconf load /`, `systemd-user` gets
+`daemon-reload` + conditional `enable --now`. Sequence: `scripts/deploy.sh --check` (dry run,
+reports divergents) → adopt → `deploy.sh` → confirm live paths are symlinks into the repo →
+`bats tests/` (includes the real-bundle `kb-lint`/coverage gate) → branch off `origin/main`,
+PR to `main`, never merge without Frank's OK.
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+name: dotfiles-deployment-truth-audit
+description: "Answer \"is my X config actually tracked and deployed?\" per package: classify every file by readlink, expose tracked-then-ignored debt, and re-derive census numbers from the command printed on the page."
+---
+
+Answer to "does this repo still track my <pkg> settings?" must be a measurement, never a remembered count. The tracked unit is the **file**, not the directory: a live directory can be a real directory and still be fully tracked, because every file inside it is a symlink into the repo.
+
+Run in the deployment checkout (the checkout IS the deployment).
+
+## 1. Tracked set, per package, both tiers
+
+```bash
+cd ~/.omp                      # or the repo that owns dotfiles/
+git ls-files dotfiles/<pkg>    # base tier
+git ls-files dotfiles/zz-$(hostname) | grep <pkg>   # host override tier — counted separately
+```
+
+The `zz-*` tier overrides base files by the same relative path, so a per-package count
+that ignores it under-reports what a machine actually runs.
+
+## 2. Live wiring — classify every tracked file (never by directory)
+
+```bash
+for f in $(git ls-files dotfiles/<pkg>); do
+  rel=${f#dotfiles/<pkg>/}; live="$HOME/$rel"
+  if [ -L "$live" ]; then printf 'link %-50s -> %s\n' "$rel" "$(readlink "$live")"
+  elif [ -e "$live" ]; then printf 'REAL %-50s (NOT a link)\n' "$rel"
+  else printf 'absent %s\n' "$rel"; fi
+done
+```
+
+- `REAL` = the repo copy is a fiction: live state diverged, deployment never reached it.
+- `absent` = tracked relic, nothing consumes it (candidate for `git rm --cached`).
+- Spaces in filenames break the `for` loop (`palettes/Gruber Red.json` splits into two
+  rows). Use `git ls-files -z | tr '\0' '\n'` + `while read -r` when names can hold spaces.
+- Reverse direction finds untracked-but-load-bearing files:
+  `find ~/.config/<pkg> -maxdepth 2 \( -type f -o -type l \) | while read -r p; do case "$(realpath "$p")" in $PWD/dotfiles/*) ;; *) echo "not from repo: $p";; esac; done`
+
+## 3. Live state that must stay untracked
+
+Generated palette output and app state are expansion, not authorship. Distinguish by
+mtime cluster, not by name: `find ~/.local/state/<app> -type f -printf '%TY-%Tm-%Td %p\n'` —
+a same-second mass write is a generator; single later re-stamps are re-runs. Pointers a
+switcher script writes (e.g. `cfg/display.kdl -> desk-1-home.kdl`) are machine state too.
+
+Then check the hazard this creates: grep the entrypoint for includes of those generated
+files. A **non-optional** include of a correctly-untracked generated file bricks a fresh
+box (`include "noctalia.kdl"` with no `optional=true` = niri cannot start until the theme
+pipeline has run once). Report it as a fresh-box failure, not a style note.
+
+## 4. Tracked-then-ignored debt (invisible to every normal check)
+
+```bash
+git ls-files dotfiles | grep AGENTTRASH         # trash committed inside the tree
+git check-ignore --no-index -v <that path>      # does an ignore rule match it?
+```
+
+`.gitignore` patterns without an interior slash (`.AGENTTRASH/`) match at **any depth**, so
+the rule was fine all along — the file simply entered history *before* the rule existed, and
+an ignore rule never reaches an already-tracked path. Only repair: `git rm --cached <path>`
+plus moving the working copy to the root `.AGENTTRASH/` (never `rm`). `git check-ignore`
+without `--no-index` prints nothing for tracked paths and reads as "not ignored" — that
+false negative is the trap.
+
+## 5. A census number is only valid with its command
+
+If a page prints a classifier command, every number on it must be reproducible by running
+that command. A row that the command does not reproduce was written from memory — wrong, not
+merely stale. Fix the row, and state the correction in the commit message rather than
+silently editing the number.
+
+## Verification before landing
+
+`bats tests/`, `scripts/kb-lint.sh omp-docs`, `scripts/kb-coverage.py omp-docs`, and
+`scripts/deploy.sh --check` **from the worktree** — `--check` is read-only; never run the
+real deploy from a worktree, it repoints live symlinks into the worktree the heartbeat reaps.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+name: dotfiles-tier-live-audit
+description: "Audit the command-center dotfiles tier before running deploy.sh: prove per-file tracked/deployed state, refuse generated theme output, catch stale zz overrides, wrong-box dconf keys, and unresolvable systemd ExecStart specifiers."
+---
+
+# Deploy-tier audit (`~/.omp` command center)
+
+Run **before** any real `scripts/deploy.sh` on a box with a live session, and whenever a
+symlink, palette, wallpaper or unit behaves oddly. Facts and laws live in
+`omp-docs/tools/dotfiles-deploy.md` + `omp-docs/inventory/home-config-census.md` — this page
+is only the probe order. Do not restate the laws in new files; the vault owns them.
+
+## 0. Classify per file, never per directory
+
+```bash
+cd ~/.omp
+for f in $(git ls-files dotfiles/<pkg>); do t=$(readlink -f "$HOME/${f#dotfiles/<pkg>/}")
+  printf '%-50s %s\n' "${f#dotfiles/<pkg>/}" "$([ -L "$HOME/${f#dotfiles/<pkg>/}" ] && echo LINK || echo real)"
+done
+```
+A live directory can be real and still fully tracked (every file a symlink). `niri` 8/2,
+`gtk-3.0` 3/0. `zz-$HOST` files count in the `zz` tier's row, not the base package's.
+
+## 1. The plan, and how to read it
+
+```bash
+./scripts/deploy.sh --check    # writes nothing; read the last line, not the RELINK lines
+```
+`--check` prints `RELINK` for **every** path the `zz` tier carries even when the live link
+already points at the override (base is walked first, intermediate owner change reported).
+Only `actions=0` is a real summary; confirm a pending change with `readlink`.
+
+## 2. Generated theme output must never be tracked or deployed
+
+```bash
+git ls-files dotfiles | grep -Ei 'noctalia\.(kdl|toml|json|conf|css)|themes/noctalia'
+```
+Hit = generated palette output (same-millisecond mtime cluster proves it). Untrack
+(`git rm --cached` + `.gitignore` patterns); `deploy.sh` refuses the class (`SKIP … generated
+theme output`). Tracking one means the next sync quarantines the user's live palette and
+restores the committed colours.
+
+## 3. Stale `zz` overrides
+
+For each path present in both base and `zz-$HOST`: `diff` them, then compare each file's
+`git log -1 --date=short`. A `zz` copy older than the base change is a time bomb — sync
+relinks cross-package owners **silently** (`nothing to quarantine`). Delete the `zz` copy in
+the same commit that base absorbed.
+
+## 4. dconf: compare key by key, never with `diff`
+
+`dconf load /` writes only keys present, so a text diff misleads both ways. Parse both sides
+into `[section]/key → value` and report: value conflicts, keys the dump would newly write,
+and any value containing `/home/` (foreign-box state). File-chooser `last-folder-path`,
+`window-state`, `picture-uri*` are state, not preferences — delete them from the dump and
+clear the live keys if they were already deployed here.
+
+## 5. Units: state, then resolvability
+
+```bash
+for u in <units in dotfiles/systemd-user>; do printf '%s %s %s\n' "$u" \
+  "$(systemctl --user is-enabled $u)" "$(systemctl --user is-active $u)"; done
+```
+`is-enabled` exits **1** for `linked` exactly as for `disabled` — read the printed word.
+Never start a unit that is already installed: `swayidle-lock` sits `enabled`/`inactive` and
+`--now` arms a screen lock mid-session. Specifiers are systemd's, not the shell's: probe
+`command -v "${bin//%h/$HOME}"` before believing `ExecStart … absent on this host` — the
+literal `%h/…` string made this repo's own heartbeat look foreign on every box.
+
+## 6. Landing it
+
+`bats tests/` (deploy contract runs `scripts/deploy.sh` in a scratch repo with `DEPLOY_REPO`,
+`DEPLOY_HOST`, stub `HOME`, stub `systemctl` on `PATH`) + `scripts/kb-lint.sh omp-docs` +
+`scripts/kb-coverage.py omp-docs`. Branch off `origin/main`, PR, never merge without Frank's
+OK (`gitea-merge-form-encoded`: form-encoded `do=merge`, `merge_style=no-ff`).
+
+Then deploy from the **deployment root** `~/.omp` only — never from a worktree (live symlinks
+would point into a checkout the heartbeat reaps in 7 days). Acceptance: `actions=N
+quarantined=0`, two consecutive `--check` runs both `actions=0`, no `ENABLE … started` for a
+unit that was already installed.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: e2e-port-squat-triage
+description: "When an e2e seam on a fixed port fails weirdly (404s on routes that exist, stale behavior, health probe passes but app seems ancient), audit for leftover dev/debug servers squatting the port before believing any red or green."
+---
+
+# E2E fixed-port squat triage
+
+## Symptom classes (all seen with a stale server squatting the seam's fixed port)
+- Routes that exist in current `dist`/source return 404 ("Cannot POST /api/...") while unit tests through the same app factory pass.
+- A seam that is *green* but exercises old code: its setup curls `http://host:PORT/health` and gets a response from **whoever owns the port** — a leftover server, not the one it just spawned (the spawned one dies or idles with EADDRINUSE, sometimes still showing in `pgrep`).
+- Behavior matches an older build (missing mounts/guards) despite a fresh build step.
+
+## Triage recipe (before touching code)
+1. Who owns the port:
+   ```bash
+   ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep :PORT
+   ```
+2. List every server process with **start times**:
+   ```bash
+   for p in $(pgrep -f "path/to/server-entry"); do ps -o pid,lstart,cmd -p $p --no-headers; done
+   ```
+3. Compare start times against the build artifact timestamps (`ls -la dist/...`). A server older than the dist you just built is a liar — its in-memory modules predate the code under test.
+4. Kill all leftovers, then re-check: `pgrep -f "server-entry" || echo all-dead`.
+5. Rerun the seam. Only now is red/red and green/green meaningful.
+
+## Why it happens
+- `kill %1` in **non-interactive** bash fails silently (no job control) — use explicit PIDs or `pkill -f <pattern>`.
+- Seam setups that "wait for health" cannot distinguish their own server from a squatter on the same port; a pre-flight "port must be free" assertion is the permanent fix (assert *before* spawn).
+
+## Hardening (if you own the seam)
+Add to setup, before spawning: fail fast if the port is already listening — turns the silent liar into a loud error:
+```bash
+ss -tln "sport = :PORT" | grep -q LISTEN && { echo "port PORT busy — kill leftovers first" >&2; return 1; }
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+name: fixture-delay-window-race-test
+description: Pin a race/abort bug in a fixture-server test by delaying only the Nth request so the interruption lands inside the in-flight window; assert via a driver-installed unhandledRejection reporter.
+---
+
+# Reproducing a timing-window bug against a fixture server
+
+Use when a defect only appears in a window — a promise created before it is awaited, a kill/abort landing mid-flight, a prefetch interrupted — and a fixture HTTP server answers instantly, so the window never opens. Earned in `dankvoice` issue #7 (`[Unhandled Rejection] AbortError` from `/say stop` during a pipelined synthesis).
+
+## Why naive attempts pass vacuously
+
+1. **Uniform delay on the fixture route** (`DV_LATENCY_MS` for every request) makes *all* requests resolve at the same time, so by the time the interruption fires nothing is in flight. The test goes green against the broken code — worse than no test.
+2. Asserting on a log line count that also counts interruption noise: `dankvoice`'s driver prints `PLAYS <n>` as the number of **player log lines**, and the stub appends `KILLED` on SIGTERM — so a single playback with one interrupt reports `PLAYS 2`. Count the payload lines instead (`grep -c 'PLAYER .*\.wav$'`).
+
+## The shape that works
+
+- **Delay only requests after the first.** The first response gets the pipeline into playback; the second stays in flight, which is the window:
+  ```ts
+  const spoken = received.filter((c) => c.url?.endsWith("/audio/speech")).length; // already pushed
+  const delay = spoken > 1 ? Number(process.env.DV_SYNTH_MS ?? 0) : 0;
+  if (delay > 0) setTimeout(answer, delay); else answer();
+  ```
+- **Make the interruption land inside it.** Player holds long (`DV_HOLD=2`), interruption at a fixed offset (`DV_STOP_AT=400`) with the delayed response far later (`DV_SYNTH_MS=1200`): margins wide enough that the abort is neither before the request nor after the response.
+- **Turn unhandled rejections into observable output** in the test driver instead of letting the runtime crash on them — that is also exactly what the real harness does to the user:
+  ```ts
+  process.on("unhandledRejection", (reason) => {
+    console.log(`UNHANDLED ${reason instanceof Error ? `${reason.name}: ${reason.message}` : String(reason)}`);
+  });
+  ```
+  Then assert `[[ "$output" != *"UNHANDLED"* ]]` plus the concrete behavior (segments actually played, player killed).
+- **Leak checks measure a delta, not an absolute:** count `dankvoice-*` temp dirs before and after the run and compare; an absolute `== 0` fails on another test's leftovers.
+
+## Order
+
+Write the scenario first and watch it fail **on the rejection assertion specifically** — if it fails on some other assertion (a count, a kill line), the window is wrong, not the bug. Then fix, then confirm red→green on that one assertion before running the full suite.
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+name: fleet-host-process-service-wiring
+description: "Add a host-process (non-quadlet) systemd USER service/exporter to serverAppConfigs — every file that must change together, with the signal-relay precedent and the Prometheus gateway/LAN reach rules."
+---
+
+A host-process service (runs `python3`/a binary on the host, NOT a container) is the right shape when the thing must read host-only state (DRM/cgroup sysfs, `shells to nvidia-smi`, signal-cli) that a container cannot reach without passthrough. Precedent to mirror: `scripts/signal-relay.{py,service}` + `install_signal_relay` in `deploy-remote.sh`. A new one landed 2026-10-20: `scripts/gpu-exporter.{py,service}` + `deploy_gpu_exporter`.
+
+## The unit is a USER unit, not a quadlet
+- Hand-written `scripts/<svc>.service`: `[Service]` `ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/scripts/<svc>.py` (runs straight from the git checkout — a pull updates it, no copy step), `Restart=always`, `[Install] WantedBy=default.target`.
+- It CAN be `systemctl --user enable`-ed (generated quadlet units cannot on this host's podman generator). With `Linger=yes` for `dank`, `[Install]`+`enable` is the whole boot story.
+
+## Every file that MUST change together (a lone change on one side fails silently)
+1. `scripts/<svc>.service` — the unit. Base binds **loopback only**; the LAN address is added by a deploy **drop-in**, so the checked-in unit is never a wildcard.
+2. `scripts/deploy-remote.sh`:
+   - a `deploy_<svc>()` function: `cp` the unit to `~/.config/systemd/user/`, write a `<svc>.service.d/bind.conf` drop-in with the per-host `Environment=..._BINDS=127.0.0.1,<lan>` (map LAN from `$TARGET`: dankclaw=192.168.0.143, dankserver=192.168.0.235 — do NOT hardcode one host if it runs on both), `daemon-reload`, `systemctl --user enable`+`restart`, then a **loop health gate** (`for i in $(seq 1 15); curl -fsS -m5 http://127.0.0.1:<port>/metrics && return; sleep 1`) — a one-shot curl races the bind and once failed a healthy deploy.
+   - a dispatcher branch `<svc>) deploy_<svc> ;;` in the central `case "$service"` (near the observability branch).
+   - an **allowlist entry on EVERY target** it runs on: `dankclaw:<svc>` and/or `dankserver:<svc>` (the allowlist `case` around the top of the file).
+3. `scripts/deploy-plan.py`: add `"<svc>"` to `SERVICE_ORDER`, to `DANKCLAW_SERVICES`/`DANKSERVER_SERVICES` (whichever it runs on), and a `scripts/<svc>.*` path-map in the `parts[0] == "scripts"` block: `if name in {"<svc>.py","<svc>.service"}: _add(services, "<svc>")`. `target_services` then filters per target.
+4. `scripts/test-changed.sh`: a `case` routing `scripts/<svc>.py|scripts/<svc>.service` → its seam + `deployment_scoping.bats` (place before the generic fallbacks). `tests/run.sh` runs all `*.bats` regardless, so the mandatory gate is covered even if this route is missing — but add it for focused runs.
+5. `shared/prometheus/prometheus.yml`: one scrape job per host, using the **reach rules** (below).
+6. Dashboard JSON + the owning page under `serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Observability.md` (one owner per fact).
+
+## Prometheus reach rules (the whole cross-file contract)
+Prometheus is a **bridge container**. On this netavark host a bridge container CANNOT dial the host's own LAN IP at a host-bind (only at a *published* port). Therefore:
+- **Same host (Dankclaw):** scrape `host.containers.internal:<port>` (netavark delivers it to the host LAN bind). Scraping `192.168.0.143:<port>` reads DOWN forever even though the endpoint is healthy.
+- **Different host (Dankserver):** plain LAN `192.168.0.235:<port>` reaches it.
+- Never target a `*.franksdank.cloud` vhost — Prometheus cannot solve an Anubis challenge; it is red by construction.
+- The exporter must bind BOTH loopback and the host LAN (like `node-exporter`/`cadvisor`), so `host.containers.internal` and the LAN both land.
+
+## Firewall
+Leave it LAN-open like node-exporter/cadvisor (unauthenticated metrics on the LAN is the repo's exporter posture). Only signal-relay gets an iptables allowlist (loopback+host+`10.89.0.0/16`+DROP) because it is an unauthenticated message-SENDING webhook — do not copy that lock onto a read-only exporter.
+
+## Seam test (tests/<svc>.bats) pattern
+- Black-box the binary with injectable inputs (fixture dirs / stub commands), assert only consumer-visible output; assert **absent means absent** (anchor guards to a sample line `^metric{`, not the always-emitted `# TYPE` header — grepping the bare family name matches the header and false-fails).
+- Cross-file contracts (grep the other files): the unit's `ExecStart`/bind posture, the deploy function + allowlist + dispatch + health gate, the planner selection (run `deploy-plan.py --target T --paths scripts/<svc>.py`, assert output == `<svc>` per target), the prometheus targets, the dashboard `json.load` + that its `targets[].expr` reference the emitted families.
+
+## Gotchas hit while building gpu-exporter
+- Values are float-normalised (`397.40`→`397.4`); a test pinning the literal fails — assert the normalised value. Derive expected byte counts from real units (MiB×1048576, sysfs µW/1e6, temp1_input/1000), don't guess the multiply.
+- `xdg-open <PR-URL>` after opening the PR (repo law) — don't make Frank hunt in Gitea.
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+name: fleet-service-runtime-census
+description: "Answer \"what is service running right now?\" for a dank-fleet service: unit state, container image/digest, endpoint contract, loaded env — machine over repo, in that order."
+---
+
+Answer "what is service running right now?" for a dank-fleet service without trusting the repo. Repo state is intent; the machine is truth, and they differ by however long since the last deploy.
+
+## Order of operations (cheap → expensive)
+
+1. **Unit state on the host** (rootless quadlet ⇒ `--user`; some units are root):
+   `ssh -o BatchMode=yes host 'systemctl --user show S -p ActiveState -p SubState -p ExecMainStartTimestamp -p NRestarts'`
+   Boot-loop tell: `NRestarts` climbing with a short `ExecMainStartTimestamp`.
+2. **The container's own view**: `podman ps --filter name=S --format '{{.Image}} {{.Status}} {{.Names}}'`, then `podman inspect` for `Image` (tag **and** `RepoDigests`) and `Env`.
+3. **The endpoint contract, from the service itself** — this is the only answer that matters to a consumer:
+   `curl -s host:port/v1/models` (served model id), `curl -s host:port/props` (`n_ctx`, `n_ctx_train`, caps), `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' host:port/health`.
+4. **Effective flags**: the live process is the truth. `systemctl --user cat S` shows `EnvironmentFile=`; read that file. A repo `scripts/S.env` can be ahead of, or behind, what the running unit loaded — and a unit restart is what re-reads it.
+5. **Logs last**: `journalctl --user -u S -n 80 --no-pager` for the boot ledger / refusal messages, after you know whether it is even up.
+
+## Facts that bite
+
+- **A service is up ≠ configured how you think.** llama.cpp's `/v1/models` reports `max_model_len`, not the engine's per-slot ceiling; halogen reports `n_ctx` per slot. Read `/props` before quoting any window number.
+- **`systemctl is-enabled` answers enablement, not activity.** A timerless service reports `linked`/`static`; `deploy.sh` that prints `ENABLE` for it is lying. Read `systemctl is-enabled --quiet` exit status, not the text.
+- **`NRestarts: 0` with `ActiveState=activating` is a crash-loop only if the timestamps move**; check `ExecMainStartTimestamp` twice, 5 s apart.
+- **Read-only is always allowed** from the dev box (`ssh -o BatchMode=yes`); state changes on remote boxes are not, without a per-run OK. Production services (`frank-archon`, `frank-dragoon`, `frank-zealot`) are never stopped/restarted to "see what happens".
+- **Digest-pinned images**: "when was this image updated?" is answered by `podman inspect` `RepoDigests` + the registry API, not by the unit's start time (a restart re-uses the local digest).
+
+## Report
+
+One line per layer with the evidence: unit (`active (running)`, since, restarts), container (image + digest), endpoint (served id, `n_ctx`, health code), loaded env (file path + the knobs that matter), and explicitly which of those came from the machine versus the repo — that gap is the answer to most "why is it behaving like that" questions.
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+name: fleet-status-daily-report
+description: "Answer \"status update / what happened yesterday\" for the dank fleet: git-window record on origin/main plus a live per-host census (endpoints, units, RAM, DNS), with the reboot-attribution check that stops false incident causes."
+---
+
+# Fleet status report (Dankclaw + Dankserver)
+
+Use for "what's the state of the fleet", "what happened yesterday", or a post-incident sweep. Read-only.
+For one service's live state, prefer `fleet-service-runtime-census`; this is the fleet-wide sweep.
+
+## 1. The day's record (repo is the ledger)
+
+```bash
+git fetch origin --quiet
+git log --no-merges --since="YYYY-MM-DD 00:00" --until="YYYY-MM-DD+1 00:00" \
+        --date=format:'%H:%M' --pretty='%ad %h %s' origin/main
+git log --merges  --since=... --pretty='%ad %h %s' --date=format:'%H:%M' origin/main   # PR numbers
+```
+Merge lines carry the PR number — that is the review trail; the non-merge log is what actually changed.
+Group commits into streams (endpoint names lead the subject) rather than listing 20 subjects.
+
+## 2. Live census (parallel: one call per host + one endpoint sweep)
+
+Endpoint sweep from any LAN box — `/health` is honest on all four (archon binds only after full load):
+
+```bash
+for u in 192.168.0.143:7770 192.168.0.143:7771 192.168.0.235:7770 192.168.0.143:7772; do
+  printf "%s %s\n" "$u" "$(curl -s -m 12 -w ' [%{http_code}]' http://$u/health | head -c 160)"; done
+curl -s http://192.168.0.143:7770/v1/models    # dragoon lists EVERY engine it serves, incl. NPU-lane models
+```
+
+Per host: `uptime -s; uptime -p`; `systemctl show <llm units> -p ActiveEnterTimestamp -p NRestarts -p DropInPaths`
+(`sudo` for the root LLM units, `--user` for the quadlets); `list-units --failed`; `free -h`;
+`journalctl -k --since "<evening>" -p err`; the host's own engine log tail.
+
+## 3. Attribution rules (where reports go wrong)
+
+- **Never call a host reboot from a container's start timestamp.** Check `uptime -s` first; if uptime spans the
+  event, the trigger was a **container restart** — find it with
+  `journalctl --user -u <name>.service --since … --until …` + `podman inspect <c> --format '{{.State.StartedAt}}'`.
+  (This exact mistake mislabelled a 2026-10-19 Pi-hole incident as boot-caused; the law's remedy belongs after
+  *any* restart, which is a different action item.)
+- `podman stats` is a 28-container wall — sort/limit it; RSS of the LLM tenants is what matters.
+- This podman's inspect template has **no `.Config.PodName`, no `.Config.GroupAdd`, and `.HostConfig.Devices`
+  can read `[]` even when a quadlet `AddDevice=` worked**. Prove GPU use from the engine's own log
+  (`ggml_vulkan: Found 1 Vulkan devices: … Radeon 8060S (RADV GFX1151)`), not from inspect.
+- Kernel lines: **count** occurrences (`journalctl -k --since '7 days' | grep -c "NETDEV WATCHDOG"`) before
+  calling a one-off a trend.
+- Failed units: `systemctl show <u> -p ExecMainExitTimestamp -p ExecMainStatus --value` separates
+  "broken since boot" from "broke yesterday" — and a nightly failure (e.g. logrotate) is a live risk, not noise.
+
+## 4. Report shape
+
+Stream table (what landed) → live-state table (what is true now) → **corrections to my own earlier record** →
+open items that need Frank's decision, each with the evidence line and the one action. Flag anything that would
+touch host config outside the repo as a decision, never a silent fix.
@@ -1,35 +1,37 @@
 ---
 name: frank-job-hunt-maintenance
-description: "Maintain frank-job-hunt agents: live-census gate hardening loop, registry locator verification, and the workstation/Dankserver/Dankclaw deploy-sync ritual."
+description: "Maintaining frank-job-hunt: the census gate's fail-closed rules, ATS locator token derivation, and the two-host deploy-sync verification."
 ---

-# frank-job-hunt maintenance
+Use when maintaining `frank-job-hunt`: the live-census gate, the registry locator, or Dankserver/Dankclaw deploy-sync. The repo is built and deployed; agents live on Dankserver, ntfy on Dankclaw.

-Repo `~/Projects/frank-job-hunt` (Gitea `dank/frank-job-hunt` on Dankclaw 192.168.0.143:3000). Production: Dankserver user timers `frank-job-sweep.timer` 07:30, `frank-job-digest.timer` 08:15 (`Linger=yes`). ntfy relay: Dankclaw quadlet `ntfy.service`, route `ntfy.franksdank.cloud` (no anubis), LAN record in `hosts/custom.list` (Pi-hole v6 file at `/home/dank/Containers/pihole/etc-pihole/hosts/custom.list`; v6 API paths are hostile — edit the file, then `podman exec pihole pihole restartdns`). Secrets: `~/.config/frank-job-hunt.env` (600, workstation + Dankserver).
+## The two rules that caused every bug here

-## Law (validated 2026-10-11)
- The fleet judge (`frank-zealot`, dankclaw:7771) is a **ranker, never a gate** — it inflates anything reaching it (non-technical roles scored 88-91). All discrimination lives in deterministic gates (`agents/lib/gates.ts`); zealot only ranks survivors.
- Thinking-model fault: verdict lands in `reasoning_content` with `content:""` → judge sends `chat_template_kwargs:{enable_thinking:false}` (0.7s clean JSON).
- **Family beats topic**: role family (recruiter/sales/finance/PM/designer/people-ops/revops/…) gates `gate:scope` unconditionally — no infra-token override ("DevOps Recruiter" is recruiting). Compound technical titles keep the `INFRA_TITLE` override via `NEG_TITLE` branch.
- **gate:region**: remote is US-only (visa reality). "Remote - Bangalore" = onsite abroad → gate; `US` regex pass wins over `NONUS` match ("U.S. & Canada" passes).
+1. **A URL is data.** The census gate and the registry locator treat portal URLs as opaque strings; nothing may template a URL from a company name. `jobs.dankclaw.example` is a fixture host (RFC 2606) — never derive a real domain from a company name, and never click a link the pipeline constructed.
+2. **A stale row is worse than a missing row.** Every gate must fail closed: an unverifiable posting is reported as unverifiable, not kept as live. Deleting is allowed; asserting is not.

-## Gate hardening loop (live-census, TDD)
-1. `bun agents/sweep.ts --dry` (full lane ≈ 30–90 s; 852 postings ≈ 62 pass / 790 filed).
-2. Classify leaks in the top-10: family gap / region gap / scoring tail. Accept long tail (Director/Founder edge cases) — digest + human curation is the design.
-3. Token fix in `gates.ts` regexes (`NEG_FAMILY` = no override; `METRO`/`US`/`NONUS` for arrangement). NEVER dedupe-check by memory — read file first; the file has bitten line-offset edits repeatedly.
-4. Pin every leak with a named regression test in `agents/test/gates.test.ts` before/with the fix.
-5. `bun test agents/test/ && bun x tsc --noEmit` — hooks re-run these at commit.
-6. Ship: `git commit` (pre-commit = tests + tsc + docs-link + secret scan) → `git push` → `ssh dankserver 'cd ~/Projects/frank-job-hunt && git pull'` (timers pull from master; Dankserver drift = tomorrow's run is stale).
+## Census gate

-## Registry verification (monthly, `agents/verify-registry.ts`)
-Scouts' `ats`/`ats_identifier` are guesses (14/84 were wrong). Ritual:
-1. `bun agents/verify-registry.ts` (dry, ~70 s serial) → REPAIR census.
-2. `--write` applies; repairs with live jobs preferred over empty boards (0-job boards 404 later).
-3. Unresolved = honest manual lane (vanity Workdays, self-built ATS incl. majors, neogov) — NOT a code bug; per-entry error census in sweep output is the same signal.
-4. Update `targets/README.md` census lines + `docs/log.md`; commit/push/pull (same ship step).
+`scripts/census-gate.sh` decides keep / stale / unverifiable per row.

-## Pitfalls
- `--ats=<x>` smoke filters the census line — "N API-sweepable" reflects the filter, not the registry; don't diagnose a phantom bug.
- Workday vanity careers URLs (`careers.uw.edu`) are NOT CXS-API-resolvable; tenant-only identifiers are (site path required).
- Root `README.md` vs `targets/README.md` name collision in edit anchors: use full path headers.
- Zealot endpoint probe: `curl http://192.168.0.143:7771/v1/models`.
+- Live proof = HTTP GET on the posting URL against the ATS API or the page itself; `404`/`410` ⇒ stale, non-200 with no body ⇒ unverifiable. Never infer from age alone.
+- The gate runs against the *live* registry, so a row that passes here and then fails in production means the registry drifted — re-run before blaming the gate.
+- Test seams: fixture ATS server + `…_BASE_URL` env. Tests assert the row's fate (kept / dropped / flagged), never internal state.
+
+## Registry locator
+
+Resolves which ATS a company uses (Greenhouse `boards-api.greenhouse.io/v1/boards/<token>/jobs`, Lever `api.lever.co/v0/postings/<token>`, Ashby `api.ashbyhq.com/posting-api/job-board/<token>`, Workable, SmartRecruiters).
+
+- Token ≠ company name: it comes from the discovered posting URL, so a locator change must keep the derivation (URL → token), not substitute a slug.
+- Unknown ATS ⇒ unverifiable, not "no jobs". "Zero jobs" is a strong claim; only a successful API answer with an empty list may say it.
+- Rate limits: 429 ⇒ back off and mark unverifiable for this pass, never stale.
+
+## Deploy-sync (Dankserver agents, Dankclaw ntfy)
+
+- Two hosts, two roles: inference/agents on Dankserver, notification sink on Dankclaw. A deploy that only touches one leaves the pair inconsistent — the agent can post to a sink that no longer accepts its token, silently.
+- Deploy is `scripts/deploy.sh` from the correct checkout (dev side, clean tree); it pushes the branch first, so a stale local `main` makes the push fail — `git merge --ff-only origin/main` before deploying after any externally merged PR.
+- Verify after deploy on the *served* surface: the agent answers a probe, and a test ntfy message arrives on the phone. "The unit is active" is not the proof.
+
+## Tests
+
+Black-box, fixtures over network: fake ATS servers on localhost, fake ntfy sink, temp registry file. Assert output rows and exit status. Never assert that an env var is set or that a helper was called.
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+---
+name: frank-tts-repoint-voice-consumers
+description: "Rotate/rename a frank-tts voice across all consumers (repo DEFAULT_VOICE, Open Notebook speaker profiles over REST, docs) after packs change."
+---
+
+## When
+frank-tts voice packs on `/home/dank/voices` (Dankclaw) changed — packs added, removed, or renamed — and old voice names (e.g. `narrator1/2/3`) no longer resolve. Consumers still sending a dead name now 400 with `unknown voice 'x'; available voices: ...`. This is a maintenance sweep, NOT a bug; confirm with the operator whether the change is intentional before "fixing".
+
+## Facts that make this non-obvious
+- frank-tts (:7772) resolves a voice as a **directory**: `<name>/reference.wav` must exist. `model` field is ignored; the voice comes solely from `voice`/`voice_id`.
+- Live census: `curl -s http://127.0.0.1:7772/v1/audio/voices` (and `/health` returns the same list). This is the truth; the vault docs may be stale.
+- Two consumers carry voice names, in **different stores**:
+  - **repo**: `scripts/frank-tts.env` `DEFAULT_VOICE=` — answers a voice-less request (the omp harness's normal shape). Deploy via git.
+  - **app-side**: Open Notebook speaker profiles (SurrealDB) and OpenWebUI `audio.tts` voice — NOT repo files.
+
+## Step 1 — repo: DEFAULT_VOICE
+Edit `scripts/frank-tts.env` `DEFAULT_VOICE=<new real voice>`. Trunk-based: this worktree can't `git checkout -b` (shared-workspace policy); commit on HEAD and `git push origin HEAD:refs/heads/<branch>`, open PR vs `main`. No bats test pins the DEFAULT_VOICE value (the tts bats use `narrator1` as a self-contained fixture that builds its own `reference.wav` — mechanism test, leave it).
+
+## Step 2 — Open Notebook speaker profiles (REST, host-side, takes effect immediately)
+Voice ID is **free text passed to the TTS request untouched** (no enum/whitelist). The active fleet profile is `dank-duo` (episode profile `dank-daily` → speaker_config). PW is the host `OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD`.
+
+```bash
+ssh dankclaw bash -s <<'REMOTE'
+PW=$(grep -m1 '^OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD=' /home/dank/Containers/open-notebook/env | cut -d= -f2- | tr -d '"')
+cfg=$(mktemp); chmod 600 "$cfg"; printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$PW" > "$cfg"
+base=http://127.0.0.1:5056/api/speaker-profiles
+# census: name -> speaker/voice_id
+curl -s -K "$cfg" "$base" | jq -c '.[]|{name,speakers:[.speakers[]|{name,voice_id}]}'
+# repoint by NAME (GET-by-name returns full record incl id; PUT whole transformed object to /{id})
+curl -s -K "$cfg" "$base/dank-duo" > /tmp/s.json
+id=$(jq -r .id /tmp/s.json)
+jq '(.speakers[].voice_id) |= ({"OLD1":"NEW1","OLD2":"NEW2"}[.] // .)' /tmp/s.json > /tmp/s2.json
+curl -s -K "$cfg" -X PUT -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @/tmp/s2.json "$base/$id" -w ' HTTP %{http_code}\n'
+curl -s -K "$cfg" "$base/dank-duo" | jq -c '[.speakers[]|{name,voice_id}]'   # verify
+rm -f "$cfg" /tmp/s.json /tmp/s2.json
+REMOTE
+```
+- A duo has only 2 speakers — an extra voice is available-but-unassigned, not missing.
+- Upstream's seeded profiles (`business_panel`, `solo_expert`, `tech_experts`) use OpenAI names + `voice_model:null`; they aren't wired to frank-tts — leave them.
+
+## Step 3 — OpenWebUI (check before touching)
+`curl -s http://127.0.0.1:<webui-port>/api/config | jq '.audio.tts'` (port from `podman ps`). If `engine`/`openai.*` are null, the active path is `browser-kokoro` (synthesizes in-browser) and the stored voice is **dormant, not broken** — flag, don't edit a live UI unasked.
+
+## Step 4 — docs (point of use, one owner)
+Update the census + speaker-mapping lines in `serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Frank TTS.md` and `Open Notebook.md` to the live packs. Leave DATED measurement logs (e.g. a `2026-10-19` `/health` probe) as history. Do NOT chase `scripts/voice-packs.env` / `Voice Packs.md` narrator builder defs — ask the operator whether those packs are being rebuilt or retired.
+
+## Verify (behavior, not config text)
+Synthesize each new voice and expect 200 + distinct bytes:
+```bash
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{size_download}B\n' -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7772/v1/audio/speech \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"model":"voxcpm2","input":"test","voice":"<name>"}'
+```
+`tests/run.sh` EXIT=0 before commit. `DEFAULT_VOICE` only lands after merge + `./scripts/deploy.sh dankclaw --service frank-tts`; run that from the dev `main` checkout (`/home/blank/Projects/serverAppConfig`), NOT the agent worktree (deploy.sh refuses a non-`main` branch and pushes `main` forward — it must run on the dev box, not the target).
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+name: frank-tts-voice-locate
+description: "Answer fleet-voice questions (where voices are stored, add a voice) by jumping straight to the serverAppConfig vault pages and the live 7772 roster probe, instead of re-searching Gitea for a frank-tts repo that does not exist."
+---
+
+# Frank-TTS voice facts: skip the search, go to the owners
+
+Questions like "how do I add a voice?", "where are voices stored?", "why is narratorN missing?" are already answered elsewhere. The frank-tts code does NOT live in a Gitea repo named frank-tts (repo search finds nothing; it is `dank/serverAppConfigs`), and the engine repo is upstream qwentts.cpp pinned at `5916bf7c`.
+
+## Resolution order (one grep, no repo search)
+
+1. **Vault pages (canonical, all of it lives here)** in the local checkout `~/Projects/serverAppConfig`:
+   - `serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Voice Packs.md` — pack anatomy, the builder, the 10-second source invariant, "Adding a fourth voice" steps, engine-bump arithmetic.
+   - `serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Frank TTS Engine.md` — registry law (memory-only; warm hook), routes, Vulkan device law, troubleshooting table.
+   - `serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Frank TTS.md` — the 7772 facade contract.
+   - Code/seam: `dankclaw/voiceservice/`, `scripts/build-voice-pack.sh`, `scripts/voice-packs.env`, `tests/voice_pack_unit.bats`.
+2. **Live roster** (authoritative over any doc census): `curl -s http://192.168.0.143:7772/v1/audio/voices` (bare JSON array; `/health` also echoes `voices`). A missing name = its dir lacks `reference.wav` or the name is not lowercase — check `/home/dank/voices/<name>/` via `ssh dankclaw`.
+
+## Facts that cost turns to re-derive
+
+- Voice storage: `/home/dank/voices/<name>/` on Dankclaw (host state, never git; RO mount at `/voices`). Files: `reference.wav` (24 kHz mono, 18–25 s, existence gate), `reference.spk` (8192 B), `reference.rvq` (5456–6864 B), `manifest.json`.
+- Roster = facade directory scan; engine registry is in-memory, filled by `podman exec frank-tts-engine /app/warm-voices.sh` (boot `ExecStartPost`; re-register replaces, restart costs 6–8 s/voice).
+- Clients (omp-dankvoice, OpenWebUI) store NO voices — they GET `/v1/audio/voices`; only the chosen name persists client-side (`~/.omp/cache/dankvoice.json` `voice`).
+- Crop law: past first 10 s (hard invariant), 20–25 s preferred, floor 19.84 s for `.rvq`; sources pinned by sha256 in `scripts/voice-packs.env`; sample media live on workstations (`/home/blank/audiosample*`) and must be copied to `/home/dank/voice-sources` before a build.
+- Engine `GET /v1/audio/voices` returns `{}` at the pinned commit — always ask the 7772 facade, never 8880, for the list.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+name: frank-tts-voice-pack-audit
+description: Census live frank-tts voice packs against scripts/voice-packs.env to catch name-drift (renamed/retired packs) and untracked CLI-built packs; use after any voice add/rename when reconciling the builder recipe with what is actually on disk.
+---
+
+# frank-tts voice-pack audit (builder ↔ live census)
+
+Read-only census answering: *does `scripts/voice-packs.env` still describe the packs that actually exist, and is every live pack reproducible from the repo?* Run it after anyone adds or renames a voice. The runtime being healthy (all voices synthesize) does NOT mean the builder is honest — the gap is reproducibility, not serving.
+
+## Why this exists
+Packs are host state under `/home/dank/voices` (never in git). A voice can be:
+- **built by the env** (a `VOICE_PACK_<NAME>_*` block exists), or
+- **built by CLI override** (`build-voice-pack.sh <name> <dir> --source --offset --duration --sha256` with NO env block) — then its only provenance is `/home/dank/voices/<name>/manifest.json`, and `--all` silently skips it.
+
+Renaming a pack directory (e.g. `narrator1` → `wilwheaton`) preserves the crop bytes and its source sha256, so the env recipe stays *correct but keyed under a dead name*. `build-voice-pack.sh --all` then rebuilds the dead names and skips the live ones.
+
+## Procedure (on Dankclaw)
+
+1. **Live set + which builder made each** — the manifest `kind` field tells them apart:
+   - `kind: "voice-pack"` → built by `scripts/build-voice-pack.sh` (env or CLI override).
+   - `kind: "voice-reference-pack"` → the older trial `pipeline.sh`.
+   ```
+   for d in /home/dank/voices/*/; do n=$(basename "$d"); [ -f "$d/reference.wav" ] \
+     && printf '%-16s %8sB  %s\n' "$n" "$(stat -c%s "$d/reference.wav")" "$(stat -c %y "$d/reference.wav" | cut -d. -f1)"; done
+   ```
+2. **Per-voice provenance** — `manifest.json` is the sole record for CLI-built packs. Read `name/voice`, `kind`, `source.path`, `source.sha256`, `crop.offset_seconds`, `crop.duration_seconds`. Use `python3 -c 'import json,...'`, NOT a `jq '{a,b,c}'` object — the brace form gets brace-expanded by the remote zsh and errors.
+3. **Builder tracked list**:
+   ```
+   grep -E '^VOICE_PACKS=|^VOICE_PACK_[A-Z0-9_]+_(SOURCE|OFFSET|DURATION|SHA256)=' /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/scripts/voice-packs.env
+   ```
+   Diff the names in `VOICE_PACKS` against the live dirs. Three findings to report:
+   - env keys that have **no live dir** (renamed/retired),
+   - live dirs with **no env block** (CLI-built, unreproducible from repo),
+   - matching source **sha256** between a dead env key and a live dir = that live pack is the renamed crop (safe to re-key the env, don't recompute).
+4. **Distinguish CLI-built from uncommitted env drift** — check the deployed env matches the repo:
+   ```
+   cd /home/dank/serverAppConfigs && git diff --stat HEAD -- scripts/voice-packs.env   # empty = no drift
+   ```
+   Empty diff + a `kind: "voice-pack"` manifest with no env block ⇒ built via CLI overrides (correct, just untracked), NOT a rogue remote edit.
+
+## Repoint the consumers (separate concern)
+If voices were renamed/retired, the runtime consumers still point at dead names — see the `frank-tts-repoint-voice-consumers` skill. Consumers that name a voice: `scripts/frank-tts.env` `DEFAULT_VOICE`, Open Notebook `dank-duo` speaker profile (`voice_id`, app-side REST), OpenWebUI `audio.tts.voice` (config DB). A voice-less request to frank-tts 400s naming `DEFAULT_VOICE`, so a dead default is a live break, not just cosmetic.
+
+## Gotchas
+- **A published port is reachable at `host.containers.internal` too.** OpenWebUI's docs say use the LAN IP because that name "doesn't resolve on the bridge" — true only for *non-published* ports. frank-tts 7772 IS published, so `host.containers.internal:7772` answers 200 from the open-webui container. Verify before calling a URL the cause; the real break is usually the dead voice name.
+- **Source custody is split**: `audiosample*.mp3/m4b` live on the workstation (`/home/blank`), newer sources on Dankclaw (`/home/dank/voice-sources`). `--all` is only reproducible once each env SOURCE path points at where the file actually is.
+- Do NOT edit `voice-packs.env` to add CLI-built voices without confirming each source path + offset + sha against its manifest, then run `./tests/run.sh` (the pack-list invariant in `voice_pack_unit.bats` walks `VOICE_PACKS`).
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+name: franksign-demo-inspection-stack
+description: "Boot franksign's prod-shaped stack, seed all assignment lifecycle states through the real API, and open a headed inspection tour (platform + storybook) without squatting the e2e port."
+---
+
+Visual-inspection recipe for the franksign repo (Dank boxes). Proven 2026-10-20; use when asked to "show/open the platform" or tour a new slice.
+
+## Boot (do NOT squat :3100 — the e2e seam curls whoever owns that port)
+```bash
+node --env-file=.env apps/api/dist/cli.js        # binds :3000 by default; use named service
+cd apps/web/storybook-static && python3 -m http.server 6007   # gate seam 12 already built it
+curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/health              # {"status":"ok","db":"up"}
+```
+
+## Seed lifecycle states through the real API (cookie jar, NOT bearer)
+better-auth sign-up returns a bearer `token`, but the org routes resolve sessions
+from **cookies only** (`Authorization: Bearer …` → get-session null → 401). Use
+`-c /tmp/jar` at sign-up and `-b /tmp/jar` after; state-changing calls need an
+`origin:` header. Keep auth headers out of argv via `curl -K <file>`.
+
+1. `POST /api/auth/sign-up/email` `{"email","password"(>=8 chars),"name"}` → save cookies (`-c`)
+2. `POST /api/orgs` `{"name"}` → `org.id`
+3. `POST /api/orgs/:org/templates` `{"name","baseTemplateId":"sample"}` → `template.id`
+4. `POST /api/orgs/:org/templates/:tpl/assignments` `{"email"}` → `{token, signUrl}` (repeat per demo signer)
+5. signed state: `POST /api/releases/:token` `{"values":{"name":…,"date":…,"agreement":true},"signatureName":…}` — no auth needed (token seam)
+6. voided state: `POST /api/orgs/:org/assignments/:assignmentId/void` (cookie session)
+Remaining pending assignment → three inspectable pages: `/app/sign/:token` renders form / already-signed / cancelled.
+
+## Byte-identity spot check (reconstruction contract, issue #18)
+Fetch `GET /api/releases/:token/pdf` twice with `sleep 1.5` **between** fetches
+and sha256-compare, plus the org door `GET /api/orgs/:org/assignments/:aid/pdf`
+(cookie jar). Same-second-only comparisons are blind to clock leaks
+(pdf-lib's `PDFDocument.load` restamps `/ModDate` unless `updateMetadata:false`).
+To see printed text: inflate the content streams and unescape `\(`, `\)` —
+pdf-lib writes hex-string `Tj` operands.
+
+## Inspection browser (managed Chromium via browser eval)
+- `viewport` must be `{width, height}` — string fails
+- `tab.waitFor(ms)` does NOT exist (ms is parsed as selector) → `await Bun.sleep(900)`
+- open with `headed: true, persist: true`; window lands on the desktop — confirm with `niri msg windows | grep -i chrome`
+
+## Teardown (hard gate hazard)
+A live demo API on :3000 **hangs the full `tests/run.sh` gate for ~10 minutes**
+(observed 2026-10-21: >600s kill with the service up; 14/14 in ~15s without
+it). Always `proc://franksign-demo-api/kill` BEFORE running the gate; verify
+`pgrep -f apps/api/dist/cli.js` is empty so the next `tests/run.sh` e2e seam
+owns :3100 honestly.
+
+## Adjacent Gitea quirk (same fleet)
+Closing an issue/PR: `PATCH {"state":"closed"}` → 201; `POST` → 405. Merging needs form-encoded lowercase `do=merge` (see gitea-merge-form-encoded). Label assignment: `PATCH /issues/N` with `labels:[id]` silently clears labels — use `POST /issues/N/labels` `{"labels":[id]}`.
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+name: franksign-worktree-db-cred-trap
+description: "Diagnose franksign e2e seam 5 / health 503 db:down in a fresh worktree: setup-dev.sh minted a password that mismatches the shared franksign-db container."
+---
+
+# franksign fresh-worktree DB credential trap
+
+## Symptom
+`tests/run.sh` in a fresh franksign worktree fails seam 5 ("e2e server did not
+become healthy") while the server log says `franksign-api listening on :3100`.
+Manual probe shows the server IS up:
+
+```bash
+PORT=3100 node --env-file=.env apps/api/dist/cli.js >/tmp/manual-e2e.log 2>&1 &
+sleep 2; curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3100/health
+# -> 503 {"status":"degraded","db":"down",...}
+```
+
+Not a regression, not a :3100 port collision (check `ss -tlnp | grep 3100` to rule that out).
+
+## Root cause
+`infra/setup-dev.sh` mints a fresh `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` per checkout
+(`if [ ! -f infra/postgres.env ]`), but `franksign-db` + `franksign-pgdata`
+are shared box state owned by the main checkout
+(`~/Projects/franksign`). The new worktree's `.env` DATABASE_URL then fails
+TCP auth against the initialized volume.
+
+The setup script masks it: its readiness gate is
+`podman exec franksign-db pg_isready`, which uses the in-container local
+socket and passes regardless of password — so setup prints "postgres ready"
+while the checkout is dead on arrival.
+
+## Fix (git-ignored files, no commit needed)
+Copy the shared credentials from the owning checkout:
+
+```bash
+grep DATABASE_URL /home/blank/Projects/franksign/.env   # source of truth
+# PUT that exact DATABASE_URL line into this worktree's .env
+# PUT the matching POSTGRES_PASSWORD into this worktree's infra/postgres.env
+```
+
+Gotcha: the shared password may contain literal `$$`. Keep it byte-for-byte —
+systemd `EnvironmentFile` and `node --env-file` both read values literally,
+so `$$` in the file IS `$$` in the password. No escaping, no de-escaping.
+
+## Verify
+```bash
+PORT=3100 node --env-file=.env apps/api/dist/cli.js &  # then
+curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3100/health   # -> {"status":"ok","db":"up"}
+tests/run.sh                             # 14/14
+```
+
+## Permanent fix (proposed, not yet landed)
+`setup-dev.sh` should reuse `~/.config/containers/systemd/postgres.env`
+(symlink to the owning checkout) when present instead of minting new creds.
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+name: gguf-lora-adapter-fit-census
+description: "Read-only census before applying a GGUF LoRA/adapter to a llama.cpp (or fork) endpoint: Hub metadata, declared base provenance, runtime flag support, and the behavioural probe that proves the effect."
+---
+
+# GGUF LoRA / adapter fit census (read-only, before you promise a file to a payload)
+
+A 3 MB adapter is a payload change: it edits the compute graph at load. Do the census
+before editing an endpoint's trio, and prove the EFFECT behaviourally — no metadata,
+card table, or health gate can see it.
+
+## 1. Census the Hub repo first (no auth for public repos)
+
+```bash
+curl -sS "https://huggingface.co/api/models/<org>/<repo>?blobs=true" | python3 -c "
+import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin)
+print(d.get('pipeline_tag'), d.get('library_name'))
+print([t for t in d.get('tags',[])][:20])          # base_model / base_model:adapter rows matter
+for s in d['siblings']: print(s['rfilename'], s.get('size'), (s.get('lfs') or {}).get('oid'))"
+curl -sS "https://huggingface.co/<org>/<repo>/raw/main/README.md" > /tmp/card.md   # grep for --lora flags
+```
+
+- `base_model` / `base_model_relation: adapter` name the pack the adapter was built for.
+- **A file with `lfs.oid = None` is a plain git object**: pin the sha256 of the Hub's bytes,
+  not an LFS oid. Fetcher law still applies: `curl -fsSL --fail-with-body`, byte count,
+  sha256, `--verify-only`, no resume.
+
+## 2. Read the adapter's own GGUF KV section (settles provenance in one read)
+
+Small python read of the KV pairs — no torch, no download beyond the adapter itself:
+magic `GGUF`, `u32 ver`, `u64 n_tensors`, `u64 n_kv`; key = `u64 len` + bytes; type `u32`
+(0 u8,1 i8,2 u16,3 i16,4 u32,5 i32,6 f32,7 bool,8 str,9 array,10 u64,11 i64,12 f64);
+array = `u32 elem_type` + `u64 count`.
+
+Keys worth printing: `general.type` (`adapter`), `adapter.type` (`lora`),
+`adapter.lora_alpha`, and whatever provenance the publisher wrote — e.g. PrismML/abliteration
+packs carry `prism.abliterate.base_gguf`, `base_sha256`, `direction_row`, `target_layers`,
+`target_embedding`, `sites`, `basis`.
+
+**Provenance is metadata, not a gate.** The loader matches **tensor names, not hashes**, so an
+adapter fit against a sibling quantization of the same model still applies — which is a
+decision to surface to the operator, not a failure to hide. Compare `base_sha256` against the
+sha the endpoint's own fetcher pins; if they differ, say so in the PR body, the env header and
+the endpoint page, and prove the effect behaviourally instead.
+
+Two publisher facts that decide whether a fork can carry the file at all: the build it was
+verified on, and what it deliberately does NOT touch (an embedding rank is the usual crash —
+`token_embd` left alone is a graph constraint, not an omission).
+
+## 3. Ask the runtime binary, not your memory
+
+```bash
+<llama-server> --help | grep -iE "lora|adapter"
+```
+Expect `--lora FNAME`, `--lora-scaled FNAME:SCALE,...`, `--lora-init-without-apply`
+(+ `POST /lora-adapters` for runtime scale). Prefer `--lora-scaled <file>:<scale>` as ONE
+argv token so a scale can never reach the engine without its file, and follow the endpoint's
+existing opt-out convention (the `MMPROJ_FILE=` shape: `:`-less default so an explicitly empty
+value means "off, on purpose"). Gate the deployer on the file's existence with the adapter's
+OWN fetcher named in the error text.
+
+## 4. Prove the effect: refusal/behaviour probe, before AND after
+
+The probe is not a bench, so the no-bench law does not block it — and the **before** half must
+be captured while the old shape is still live.
+
+- Same prompts, `temperature` low, both before and after; classify with a refusal-marker regex
+  and print only the opening characters, never the generated body.
+- **Budget ≥ 2 048 tokens on a thinking model.** A 600-token request can be swallowed whole by
+  the reasoning channel: `content` comes back empty with `finish_reason: length` and
+  `reasoning_content` full — which reads exactly like a refusal that never happened.
+- A leading `⚠️ Disclaimer`/hedge after the adapter is style, not the circuit: judge the marker
+  sentence, not the tone.
+
+## 5. Post-deploy reads (the ledger is the instrument)
+
+- Boot log shows `llama_adapter_lora_init_impl: loading lora adapter from '<file>'` and then
+  **dumps the adapter's KV block** — the provenance mismatch is printed at every start, so the
+  runbook should point at the journal instead of restating it.
+- Confirm the flag on argv: `tr '\0' ' ' < /proc/$(systemctl show <svc> -p MainPID --value)/cmdline`;
+  confirm `systemctl show <svc> -p DropInPaths --value` is empty (a leftover bench drop-in outranks
+  everything you just deployed).
+- Shape must be untouched by an adapter: `n_slots` / `n_ctx_slot` / KV lines unchanged, and
+  `/metrics` still answering (a llama.cpp endpoint is invisible to Prometheus without `--metrics`).
+- Root units log to the journal; rootless podman storage is read WITHOUT sudo (`sudo podman
+  inspect` sees a different storage namespace and reports "no such object").
+
+## Yields
+
+One sentence per question: does the file exist and at what size/sha; which pack it declares as
+its base and whether that matches the served payload; which flag the runtime actually offers;
+what the before/after probe classified. Anything else is a decision for the operator, and the
+rollback should be one env line on a file the endpoint already loads.
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ for p in (home/".config/secrets").iterdir():
    if m: vals.add(m.group(1))
    known[p.name] = {v for v in vals if len(v) >= 12}
 ```
+Also add every secret the repo itself embeds (e.g. credentials living in a *test helper*)
+by concatenating its quoted fragments, then search for the joined value.
 Report ONLY `value[:4] + len + sha256[:10]`. Never print a value, and never quote a
 secret-shaped literal in a doc/commit message — the pre-commit gate will (correctly) block it.

@@ -41,6 +43,19 @@ git status --porcelain -uall --ignored=matching   # !! lines: on-disk ignored fi
 git config --list --show-origin                   # local/global/system credentials
 git ls-files | grep -E '(auth\.json|trust\.json|\.env|\.pem|\.key|identity)'   # quarantine
 ```
+**Invocation forms that actually work** (each of these cost a wasted round-trip):
+- `git grep --all -F '<fragment>'` — the options MUST precede the pattern; `git grep -l -F '<frag>' --all`
+  treats `--all` as a pathspec and silently returns 0 lines. Grepping a *fragment* (not the full
+  value) is what catches split-concatenation disguises like `"Assf.""1234"`.
+- `git ls-tree -r --format=... <rev>` works for ONE rev; pass several revs and it emits nothing,
+  no error. For sha→path across all refs use `git rev-list --objects --all`, which yields
+  `"<sha> <path>"` lines directly.
+- `git cat-file --batch` fed with `rev-list --objects` lines echoes `sha path` headers, so naive
+  header parsing misaligns and content is lost. Feed bare SHAs in chunks, or use
+  `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch` and parse `"<sha> blob <size>\n<content>\n"` records.
+- Check every worktree/checkout: `git -C <other-checkout> rev-parse HEAD` often differs from the
+  audited worktree, so the leak may exist on `main` while the audited tree looks clean.
+
 LFS: scan `.git/lfs/objects/**` as BYTES (`decode("latin-1")`) — a screenshot is a classic
 secret carrier and the tracked tree holds only pointers.

@@ -53,6 +68,9 @@ Flag every one whose value is in `known` as a LIVE leak; list the rest for triag
 - prose: `Set password: user.set_password(...)`, `authenticate(user, password)`
 - 40-hex hits that are git object ids / packfile names (`pack-<40hex>.pack`)
 - memory/KB records that *describe* a secret operation
+- length-threshold gates that miss short passwords: a check like
+  `len(val) >= 24 and re.fullmatch(...)` clears a real 12-char password, so a passing
+  secret-scan test proves nothing about short credentials
 A hit is a leak only when the value matches a live secret, decodes to a real credential, or
 sits in a field a program reads.

@@ -61,8 +79,12 @@ Check file modes of the secret dir (`0600`, dir `0700`) — world-readable secre
 most common real finding. Then grep the live values across shell rc files, `~/.gitconfig`,
 `~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, `~/.curlrc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.cache/huggingface/token`,
 `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/config` and report filenames only.
+Also check files the deployer *generates* on hosts: a script that writes a credential file
+without `chmod 600` (while sibling writes in the same script do chmod) is the same class.

 ## 6. Report
 Per layer: scope numbers + verdict. Every hit: path:line, redacted value, verdict
 (leak / benign + why). Name the gate's coverage gap if the project's own hook misses shapes
 you matched. Fix modes/chmod on the spot; changes to a security hook are the operator's call.
+A secret in git history is only removable by rotation or history rewrite — say so, don't
+imply an edit fixes it.
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+name: git-secret-gate-hook
+description: "Write a fail-closed pre-commit secret-gate hook (staged-content scan) with the grep/ERE traps that kill naive versions, plus its bats fixture test."
+---
+
+# Git secret-gate pre-commit hook
+
+Use when a repo promises a "pre-commit secret gate" but none exists, or when porting the gate to another dank repo. Ships with three traps already paid for.
+
+## Shape
+
+- Track the hook at `hooks/pre-commit` (chmod +x). Git never self-installs hooks — wire per clone:
+  `git config core.hooksPath hooks` — run it in the MAIN checkout once; `core.hooksPath` lives in the
+  **common** git dir config, so every linked worktree inherits it.
+- Do NOT put `hooks` in `package.json` `files` — an installed plugin under node_modules never runs git.
+- Scan **staged** content (`git show ":$f"`), not the working tree: that is what lands in history.
+- Denylist by path (README, docs/, tests/, `.env.example`) — files whose job is naming secrets or holding
+  fixture dummies produce theatre, not safety.
+- Never echo the matched secret; print file + line number only.
+- Red-first test: fixture repo + `cp` the real hook in + `git config core.hooksPath hooks`, then drive
+  REAL `git commit` attempts: credential-shaped file must exit non-zero AND `git log` must show no new
+  commit (block, not warn); clean commit passes; hook must survive committing itself.
+
+## The three traps (each cost a red test)
+
+1. **`--` is a ONE-SHOT end-of-options marker.** `grep -nE -- 'p1' -- 'p2'` treats everything after the
+   first `--` as FILE NAMES: `grep: --: No such file or directory`, rc=2. Multi-pattern = repeat `-e`:
+   `grep -nE -e 'p1' -e 'p2'`.
+2. **`if hits=$(grep ...)` is fail-OPEN on rc>=2** (rc=2 is truthy, hits empty). Capture `rc=$?`
+   explicitly: `rc>=2` must BLOCK with "pattern error, refusing to pass unchecked" — a gate whose regex
+   silently dies is worse than none.
+3. **POSIX ERE (`grep -E`) gotchas:** no `(?:...)` groups (use plain `(...)`); a `[:-]` inside a bracket
+   starts a collating element `[:` and dies with "repetition-operator operand invalid" — put `-` FIRST
+   in every class (`[-A-Za-z0-9/+=_.:+]`). Also `-----BEGIN` literals: prefer printf-safe fixtures in tests.
+
+## Pattern set (shapes, not entropy — say so in the header comment)
+
+```
+-----BEGIN[ A-Z0-9]*(OPENSSH|RSA|DSA|EC|PGP)? ?PRIVATE KEY-----
+AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}
+gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{50,}
+xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}
+https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Za-z0-9/]+
+(aws_secret_access_key|secret(_access)?_key|(api|access|auth)[_-]?key|[a-z_]*token|passwd|password|credential)[[:space:]"']?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["']?[-A-Za-z0-9/+=_.:+]{16,}
+(Bearer|token|authorization)[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["']?[-A-Za-z0-9._+/]{20,}
+```
+
+## Test fixture hygiene
+
+Fake secrets must be inert (RFC 2606 domains, all-zero ids, `AKIA0000000000000EXAMPLE`) AND must not
+match the hook's own self-scan. Single quotes in ERE patterns: write `'"'"'`.
+
+## Wiring gotcha (dank worktree policy)
+
+Set `core.hooksPath` AFTER the merge that lands `hooks/` into main — with the config set but the path
+missing, git fails every commit in worktrees lacking `hooks/` ("cannot run hooks/pre-commit: No such
+file or directory"). Order: merge -> land -> `git config core.hooksPath hooks` from main checkout.
+
+Reference implementation: `dank/dankvoice` `hooks/pre-commit` (PR #19), pinned by `tests/gate.bats`.
@@ -1,21 +1,27 @@
 ---
 name: gitea-api-pr-operations
-description: "Open, list, merge, and diagnose issues/PRs on the Dankclaw Gitea API (192.168.0.143:3000, repo dank/command-center) with the token stored in ~/.config/secrets/gitea — incl. the required merge payload and where review comments actually live on 1.27.3."
+description: "\"Open, list, merge, and diagnose issues/PRs and manage labels on the Dankclaw Gitea API (192.168.0.143:3000) with the token stored in ~/.config/secrets/gitea — incl. the token-only write auth (Basic reads but 422s on POST/PATCH), the required merge payload, where review comments actually live on 1.27.3, and how to recover the session id for the mandatory body footer.\""
 ---

-# Gitea API PR operations (Dankclaw `dank/command-center`)
+# Gitea API operations (Dankclaw `dank/command-center`, `dank/serverAppConfigs`)

 ## Where
- Token: `~/.config/secrets/gitea` (`http://user:TOKEN@192.168.0.143` single line).
+- Token: `~/.config/secrets/gitea` (`http://user:TOKEN@192.168.0.143` single line — git-credential URL form, NOT `username=`/`password=` lines).
  Extract WITHOUT echoing:
  `tok=$(sed -nE 's#^http://[^:/@]+:([^@]+)@192\.168\.0\.143.*#\1#p' ~/.config/secrets/gitea | head -1)`
 - Build a 600-perm temp curl config and use `curl -K`:
  `cfg=$(mktemp) && chmod 600 "$cfg" && printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$tok" > "$cfg"`
  Delete `$cfg` after use. NEVER pass `-H "Authorization: token $tok"` (the literal
  header lands in transcript + logs). NEVER echo the token.
- Base URL: `http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/command-center`.
+- Base URL: `http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/<repo>`.

-## Recipes (all verified live 2026-10-18)
+## Auth: reads tolerate Basic, writes DO NOT (measured 2026-10-20)
+GETs succeed with an HTTP Basic header built from the same credential, but every
+POST/PATCH/DELETE with Basic returns `407/422 {"message":"token is required"}`.
+Always use the `Authorization: token <tok>` header for everything — never debug
+"permissions" when the header shape is the fault.
+
+## Recipes (all verified live)
 - **Open PR** (token only needed for private repos; this one reads publicly but
  POST needs auth): `POST /pulls` JSON `{title, head, base:"main", body}`.
 - **PATCH PR title/body**: `PATCH /pulls/<n>` with JSON body `{title}` and/or
@@ -25,15 +31,23 @@ description: "Open, list, merge, and diagnose issues/PRs on the Dankclaw Gitea A
  fold footers into the --arg string instead.)
 - **List open PRs**: `GET /pulls?state=open` → `jq -r '.[] | "#\(.number) \(.head.ref) \(.title)"'`.
 - **Read PR**: `GET /pulls/<n>` (no token; public repo) → `jq -c '{state,merged,mergeable,head:.head.ref}'`.
+  `mergeable:false` is often Gitea's *not-yet-checked* state, not a conflict — prove a real
+  conflict locally with `git merge-tree --write-tree HEAD origin/main` before believing it.
 - **MERGE**: `POST /pulls/<n>/merge` with `-H 'Content-Type: application/json'`
  and body **`{"Do":"merge"}`** — this build REQUIRES the `Do` field:
  `{}` or `{"DoNotMerge":false,...}` → 422; `{"Do":"merge"}` → 200 +
-  `{"state":"closed","merged":true,"merge_commit_sha":"..."}`. Verify with a
-  plain GET /pulls/<n> afterwards (merge endpoint's own stdout may not parse).
+  `{"state":"closed","merged":true,"merge_commit_sha":"..."}`. Verify with a plain
+  GET /pulls/<n> afterwards (merge endpoint's own stdout may not parse).
  Merge is the `--no-ff` merge commit on main; then `git -C ~/.omp fetch && git
  merge --ff-only origin/main` propagates the live deployment.
 - **Issues**: same shape at `/issues` (`POST {title, body}`), `/issues/<n>/comments`
  (`POST {body}`, `PATCH .../comments/<id>`) — both work with the temp-cfg auth.
+- **Labels**: `GET /labels` (list incl. numeric `id`); `POST /labels`
+  `{"name":"<name>","color":"#rrggbb"}` to create; attach by ID with
+  `POST /issues/<n>/labels {"labels":[<id>,...]}` (names are rejected);
+  detach with `DELETE /issues/<n>/labels/<id>`. serverAppConfigs gained
+  needs-triage / needs-info / ready-for-agent / ready-for-human / wontfix
+  (2026-10-20) alongside the older `human-only`.

 ## Review comments: the API lies on 1.27.3 (learned 2026-10-18)
 - `GET /pulls/<n>/comments` (inline review comments) → **404 `not found` on every
@@ -51,6 +65,13 @@ description: "Open, list, merge, and diagnose issues/PRs on the Dankclaw Gitea A
 Every issue/PR body ends with `---` line then `cwd: <wd> · session: <id>`. Keep
 it inside the --arg string (not a `---` CLI arg).

+`cwd` is THIS session's own working directory (note a build worktree separately if they
+differ). When `/status` is unreachable (headless/subagent context), recover the session id
+from the session store instead of inventing one:
+`ls -t ~/.omp/agent/sessions/<cwd-slug>/ | head -2` → `<timestamp>_<uuid>` (the same uuid as
+`<uuid>.jsonl`); the slug is the cwd with `/` replaced by `-`. Subagent files live under the
+**parent** session's directory, so the newest entry there is the parent id.
+
 ## Gotchas
 - Content-Type: POSTs with `-d @file.json` MUST carry
  `-H 'Content-Type: application/json'` on the command line. `-H` entries put in
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+name: gitea-credential-store-url-format
+description: "Auth to the Dankclaw Gitea API without the empty-header trap: ~/.config/secrets/gitea is a git-credential-store URL file, so awk '/^password=/' returns empty; resolve the token via git credential fill, and Gitea writes need Authorization: token (reads pass anonymously on a public repo)."
+---
+
+# Gitea auth on Dankclaw: the URL-format credential store
+
+`~/.config/secrets/gitea` is `git config credential.helper = store --file ~/.config/secrets/gitea`, i.e. a **git-credential-store URL file**:
+
+```
+http://dank:<40hex-token>@192.168.0.143:3000
+```
+
+It does NOT contain `username=`/`password=` lines. So:
+
+```bash
+# WRONG — silently returns empty string
+p=$(awk -F= '/^password=/{print substr($0,10)}' ~/.config/secrets/gitea)
+```
+
+An empty `$p` makes every curl send `Authorization: token ` (blank) → Gitea replies `{"message":"token is required"}` on **writes**, while **reads still return 200** (the repo is public-readable, so a green `GET /labels` or `/issues` proves nothing about auth). Symptom: PR-create returns `token is required` even though a `GET` just "worked".
+
+## Resolve the real token via git
+
+```bash
+p=$(printf 'protocol=http\nhost=192.168.0.143:3000\n\n' \
+     | git credential fill 2>/dev/null \
+     | awk -F= '/^password=/{print substr($0,10)}')   # 40-hex token
+```
+
+## Write auth = token scheme, via a 600-perm -K file
+
+```bash
+cfg=$(mktemp); chmod 600 "$cfg"
+printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$p" > "$cfg"
+curl -s -K "$cfg" http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/user   # confirms identity
+curl -s -K "$cfg" -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data @body.json "$API/pulls"
+```
+
+- Never pass the token with `-H` — it lands in `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, world-readable.
+- Confirm identity with `GET /user` before trusting a write path; a `token is required` there means the token never authenticated.
+- Merges are a separate shape (form-encoded `do=merge`, auth-only cfg, NO `Content-Type` header) — see the gitea-merge-form-encoded skill.
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+---
+name: gitea-issue-labels-and-pr-curl-traps
+description: "Dankclaw Gitea API curl traps: PR create needs Content-Type application/json (fake \"[Head]: Required\"), issue labels only via POST /issues/N/labels (PATCH labels silently dropped), token from URL-format secret file."
+---
+
+Operate Dankclaw Gitea (`http://192.168.0.143:3000`, repo `dank/franksign` and siblings) with curl without the three traps that produce misleading errors.
+
+## Token extraction (URL-format store, NOT key=value)
+
+`~/.config/secrets/gitea` is one line: `http://user:TOKEN@192.168.0.143:3000`. `cat`-ing it yields the whole URL, not the token.
+
+```bash
+TOK=$(sed -n 's|.*://[^:]*:\([^@]*\)@.*|\1|p' ~/.config/secrets/gitea | head -1)
+```
+
+Never pass the token as a `-H` argument (world-readable in `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`). Write a 600-perm curl config:
+
+```bash
+printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$TOK" > /tmp/g.cfg
+```
+
+## Trap 1 — PR create answers `"[Head]: Required"` when the body is the problem
+
+Two independent causes, both look like a missing field:
+
+1. No `Content-Type: application/json` header → Gitea parses the raw JSON as form data, sees no `head`, returns 422 `[Head]: Required`.
+2. Putting `data = "@/tmp/body.json"` inside a `-K` curl config does **not** expand the `@`.
+
+Fix: add `header = "Content-Type: application/json"` to the config and pass `--data @/tmp/body.json` on the command line:
+
+```bash
+curl -s -K /tmp/g.cfg -X POST --data @/tmp/pr.json \
+  "http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/franksign/pulls"
+```
+
+## Trap 2 — issue label assignment via PATCH /issues/N is silently dropped
+
+`PATCH /api/v1/repos/{o}/{r}/issues/{n}` with `{"labels":[id]}` returns **200/201 with the issue JSON**, yet a follow-up GET shows `labels: []` (it can even clear existing labels). Labels are a subresource:
+
+```bash
+curl -s -K /tmp/g.cfg -X POST --data '{"labels":[4]}' \
+  "http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/franksign/issues/18/labels"
+```
+
+200 returns the assigned label array. Resolve label names→ids via `GET /repos/{o}/{r}/labels` (franksign canonical five: ids 2–6; `ready-for-agent` = 4).
+
+## Verification law
+
+Both traps fail *successfully*. After any label/PR write, GET the resource and check the field changed; never trust the status code alone.
+
+## Cleanup
+
+`rm -f` the temp config + body files (config holds the token).
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+name: gitea-merge-form-encoded
+description: "Merge a Dankclaw Gitea PR with form-encoded do=merge — and the two body failures: 422 [Do]: Required (JSON body) and jsontext invalid character 'd' (form body with Content-Type: application/json header)."
+---
+
+# Gitea merge on Dankclaw: form-encoded, and nothing else
+
+`POST /api/v1/repos/<owner>/<repo>/pulls/<n>/merge` with `-d 'do=merge&merge_style=no-ff'`.
+
+## The two body failures
+
+1. **JSON body** → `422 {"message":"[Do]: Required"}`. The endpoint reads FORM fields, not JSON.
+2. **Form body but a `Content-Type: application/json` header** (e.g. left over in the curl `-K` config file from an earlier PR-body PATCH on the same request setup) → `422 {"message":"[]: jsontext: invalid character 'd' at start of value"}` — Gitea tries to parse `do=merge...` as JSON.
+
+## Working pattern
+
+Keep TWO curl config files when a session both patches PR bodies (JSON) and merges (form):
+```
+# merge.cfg — auth ONLY, no Content-Type
+header = "Authorization: token $TOKEN"
+```
+`curl -s -K merge.cfg -X POST -d 'do=merge&merge_style=no-ff' http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/<o>/<r>/pulls/<n>/merge`
+
+- Success = **HTTP 200 with an empty body**; verify by landing a checkout (`git ls-remote origin main`), never by re-reading the PR.
+- PATCH `/pulls/<n>` (title/body) is the opposite: JSON body WITH the Content-Type header.
+- Token from `~/.config/secrets/gitea` via a 600-perm `-K` file, never `-H` (`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` is world-readable).
@@ -1,29 +1,86 @@
 ---
 name: gitea-pr-api-cycle
-description: "Open/update/merge PRs and issues on the Dankclaw Gitea API (192.168.0.143:3000, dank/command-center) with the token-safe curl+jq sequence, including the {\"Do\":\"merge\"} merge payload and post-merge live-checkout fast-forward."
+description: "\"Open/update/comment/merge PRs and issues on the Dankclaw Gitea API (192.168.0.143:3000) with the token-safe sequence (POST /pulls rejects Basic with 'token is required'), numeric label ids, the form-encoded merge field, the async 405 'try again later' merge trap, the empty-token-returns-404 trap, and post-merge live-checkout fast-forward plus the plugin-package-name upgrade gotcha.\""
 ---

-# Gitea PR/issue cycle — dank/command-center
+# Gitea PR/issue cycle — Dankclaw API

-Friction-earned 2026-10-18 across PRs #15–#20 and issue #18: three separate fumbles (jq trailer flag, 422 merge payload, silent -o/-w swallowing) codified once.
+Friction-earned 2026-10-18 (PRs #15–#20, issue #18), re-earned 2026-10-19 on `dank/dankvoice` PRs #4–#6 (the merge payload claim was wrong; an empty token masqueraded as a missing repo), and re-earned 2026-10-20 on `dank/command-center` PRs #55…#57 (the 405 recalculation trap). Re-earned again 2026-10-20 on `dank/dankvoice` #25 (merge gate loop worked; suite verdict delivered as an issue comment). Re-earned 2026-10-21 on `dank/command-center` issue #58 / PR #59 (issue labels are numeric ids; the `<type>/<issue#>-<slug>` branch name has to be right *before* the first push). Same day on `dank/serverAppConfigs` #64: the Basic-vs-token split below cost two wasted POSTs.

 ## Where
- API base: `http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/command-center/{pulls,issues}`
- Token: never inline, never echoed. Extract from the git credential file into a 600-perm temp curl config:
-  `tok=$(sed -nE 's#^http://[^:/@]+:([^@]+)@192\.168\.0\.143.*#\1#p' ~/.config/secrets/gitea | head -1)`
-  `cfg=$(mktemp); chmod 600 "$cfg"; printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$tok" > "$cfg"` → `curl -K "$cfg"`; `rm -f "$cfg"` when done.
- Unauthenticated GET works for state reads (`GET /pulls/N` → `jq -c '{state,merged,merge_commit_sha}'`).
+- API base: `http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/<repo>/{pulls,issues}` — repo varies (`command-center`, `dankvoice`, `serverAppConfigs`); numbering is per-repo, so a footer citing `#36` means nothing without the repo.
+- Web UI pages under `/dank/<repo>/pulls/N` are session-auth private: a plain URL fetch answers **404** even when the API and `xdg-open` work. Merge state questions go through the API (`GET /pulls/N` → `state`, `merged`, `merge_commit_sha`) — never conclude from a failed page fetch.
+- **Basic vs token split**: the `username=`/`password=` fields of `~/.config/secrets/gitea` as `Authorization: Basic …` work for **reads and issue/PR comment writes**, but `POST /pulls` refuses them with `403 token is required`. Pull-request lifecycle writes need the **token** header. Use the token for everything PR-shaped; never conclude "API is broken" from a Basic 403 on `/pulls`.
+- Token: never inline, never in argv (`-H "Authorization: token …"` lands in `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, world-readable). Extract into a 600-perm curl config and hand it to curl with `-K`:
+  ```bash
+  tok=$(sed -nE 's#^https?://[^:/@]+:([^@]+)@192\.168\.0\.143.*#\1#p' ~/.config/secrets/gitea | head -1)
+  echo "tok len ${#tok}"   # 40 — assert before use
+  cfg=$(mktemp); chmod 600 "$cfg"; printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$tok" > "$cfg"
+  curl -sS -K "$cfg" http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/<repo>/labels
+  rm -f "$cfg"
+  ```
+- **Empty token answers `404 {"message":"not found"}`, NOT 401** — Gitea hides the private repo. A 404 on a path you have used before means auth, not a typo'd repo. The trap that produces the empty token: `awk -F'/' … '{print $NF}'` on the store line (`scheme://user:token@host/`) — the host is in `$3`, the match never fires, you get a silent empty variable. Always assert the length before POSTing.
+- Multi-line bodies: build JSON in python (`json.dumps({"title":…, "body":open(f).read(),…})`) or `jq -n --arg b "$(cat b.txt)"`. NEVER pass `---` as a bare jq argument (parsed as a flag). Escaped quotes inside `python3 -c '…'` break on `\"` — write the script to a file or use a heredoc.
+- Always capture status: `-o r.json -w '%{http_code}'`; a bare `-o` hides failures. A `201` response piped straight into `python3 -c` that prints `None None` means you parsed an **error** body (missing `number`) — print `message` too.

-## Body construction (the two traps)
- Build JSON with `jq -n --arg t <title> --arg b "$(cat b.txt)" '{title:$t, head:<branch>, base:"main", body:$b}'`; write the body to a temp file first (`printf '%s' … > b.txt`). NEVER pass `---` as a bare jq argument — jq parses it as a flag (`unknown flag: ---`). The AGENTS.md attribution trailer (`---` + `cwd: … · session: …`) goes INSIDE the body string.
- Always capture status explicitly: `-o r.json -w '%{http_code}'` and print it; a bare `-o` hides failures (a 422 looked like success-with-no-output once).
+## Create
+`POST /pulls` with `{title, body, base:"main", head:<branch>}` — JSON is accepted here (unlike merge). Plain `<branch>` works; the `owner:branch` fork form is unnecessary on same-repo branches.
+- **409 `pull request already exists for these targets [issue_id: N, …]`** — a PR for that head/base exists already. Common cause: the push message printed `/pulls/new/<branch>` and someone (Frank, or an `xdg-open` you ran) clicked Create. `GET /pulls?state=all`, find it, then `PATCH /pulls/N` with your title+body instead of re-posting.
+- `GET /pulls?state=all` on this Gitea omits `head`/`base` per entry — read `/pulls/N` for those, or key off `number`/`user`.
+- Issues: same shape, `POST /issues` `{title, body}`; `PATCH /issues/N` fixes a body retroactively (works for PRs too, since a PR is an issue) — used to correct a false verification claim in a PR that had already been merged. Body update returns **201**, not 200; confirm by reading `body` back, not by status code.
+- **Issue labels are numeric ids, not names.** `POST /issues` with `"labels":["ready-for-human"]` answers `422 {"message":"[]: json: cannot unmarshal JSON string into Go int64 within \"/labels/0\""}`. Resolve first: `GET /labels` → pick `id` by `name` → post `"labels":[20]`. (PRs take no `labels` field on create; label afterwards via `/issues/N/labels` with `{"labels":[id]}`.)
+- Comments (the channel for late-arriving evidence, e.g. a test-suite verdict posted after PR creation): `POST /issues/N/comments` with JSON `{body}` — works for PRs too, returns **201**.
+- **Open the issue before the first commit**, so `Refs #N` fits the message, and get the branch name right before the first push. `git branch -m <new>` + `git push -u origin <new>` + `git push origin --delete <old>` is a clean rename with no PR yet; do it rather than ship a branch that violates `<type>/<issue#>-<slug>` (a `docs/…` branch carrying a `fix:` commit is the common slip, and `git grep` on the old name still shows it).

-## Merge (the 422 trap)
-`POST /pulls/N/merge` requires body `{"Do":"merge"}` — `Do` is the Required field on this Gitea. `{}`, `{"DoNotMerge":false}`, `{"merge_style":…}` all return 422 (`"[Do]: Required"`). Success may return an EMPTY body — verify by GET afterwards (`state=closed, merged=true`), not by the POST response.
- Merge only with Frank's explicit per-PR OK (repo law).
- Post-merge the live deployment must follow: `git -C ~/.omp fetch -q origin && git -C ~/.omp merge --ff-only origin/main` (the checkout IS the deployment; branch is `main`).
+## Merge (the 422 trap) — corrected
+`POST /pulls/N/merge` needs **form-encoded** fields; the merge form field name is lowercase **`do`**:

-## PR etiquette per AGENTS.md
- Immediately after opening: `xdg-open <PR-URL>` lands it in Frank's Firefox.
- Redesign mid-review: amend + `git push -f` the branch, then PATCH the PR body (`/pulls/N`, `{"body":…}`) so title/body match the net diff — verify `{number,state,mergeable}` in the response.
- Issue creation identical shape: `POST /issues` with `{title, body}`, expect 201; PATCH same endpoint `/issues/N` to fix bodies retroactively, then GET-readback verify.
+```bash
+curl -sS -X POST -K "$cfg" \
+  --data-urlencode 'do=merge' --data-urlencode 'merge_style=no-ff' \
+  http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/command-center/pulls/N/merge
+```
+
+JSON `{"Do":"merge"}` (what this skill used to claim) and header variants all return `422 {"message":"[Do]: Required"}`. `merge_style` ∈ `no-ff|merge|rebase|squash`. Success returns **200 with an empty body**; verify by landing a checkout rather than re-reading the PR. Merge only with Frank's explicit per-PR OK.
+
+### The async 405 when several PRs merge in a row
+Merge #55, then #56 and #57 back-to-back, and #56/#57 answered:
+
+```
+405 {"message":"Please try again later","url":"http://dankclaw:3000/api/swagger"}
+```
+
+That is not a failure and not rate limiting: merging one PR moves `main`, which invalidates every other PR's cached mergeability, and Gitea recalculates it asynchronously. A merge attempt during recalculation is refused. Remedy — bounded poll on the PR, merge when the flag is true:
+
+```bash
+for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10; do
+  m=$(curl -sS -K "$cfg" "$api/pulls/$n" | python3 -c \
+      'import json,sys;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get("mergeable"),d.get("merged"))')
+  case "$m" in *True*) <merge POST>; break ;; *) sleep 4 ;; esac
+done
+```
+
+All three landed within ~5 s of retrying. Treat `mergeable` as a readiness gate, not a report. Match `*True*` on the pair defensively: `False True` means already merged — stop, don't merge again.
+
+### Verifying a merge without touching the deployment
+`GET /pulls/N` → `state: closed`, `merged: true`, `merge_commit_sha`. Then prove content from the bare repo, not the working tree: `git fetch -q origin && git show origin/main:<path> | grep -n <key line>` and `git log --oneline --graph -4 origin/main` (two parents = the `--no-ff` Frank asks for). A number you deliberately destroyed can legitimately reappear once — quoted in `omp-docs/log.md` as the wrong value; `git grep -c <badvalue> origin/main` naming only the log page is the pass condition, not a leftover. `Closes #N` in the PR body auto-closes the issue; confirm with `GET /issues/N` → `state`.
+
+## Stacked PRs (no rebase)
+When two open branches edit the same section of the same file, merge the sibling branch into the later one (`git merge docs/other-branch`) instead of rebasing — Frank rejects the history rewrite. Consequences to state in the PR body: merging the lower PR first reduces the upper diff to just its own work; merging the upper first makes the lower an already-contained no-op. Either order is clean; `git branch -d` on the lower branch refuses until its commits reach `main`, because `-d` checks against the current HEAD.
+
+## Post-merge landing
+- Command-center: the checkout IS the deployment — `git -C ~/.omp fetch -q origin && git -C ~/.omp merge --ff-only origin/main`. This refuses if **any** incoming path is dirty in the worktree — see `land-merged-pr-with-blocked-tree-ops` for the shared-workspace case where `checkout` and `stash` are both policy-blocked.
+- serverAppConfigs: `deploy.sh` pushes the dev checkout's branch first — if the checkout's `main` is behind a merge you just made (via the API), the deploy dies with `error: failed to push some refs`. `git merge --ff-only origin/main` in the deploy checkout BEFORE running `deploy.sh` after any externally-merged PR.
+- **A PR that changes a path you edited live adds that path to the discard list.** Tonight: the live dotfile fix was dirty *and* incoming, so landing needed `git -C ~/.omp checkout -- <that file>` as well as the usual file. Discard is content-free only when you proved byte identity first (`cmp` the branch file against the live one before merging) — say so in the PR body, and note that if `live-sync.sh` commits the dirty file first the merge stays clean because both sides hold identical bytes.
+- Package repos (`~/Projects/<pkg>`): same `--ff-only`, then reinstall (`omp plugin upgrade <name>`) and `cmp` the installed `dist/index.js` against the repo `dist/index.js` to prove the live artifact is the merged one. Check `ls -ld node_modules` after landing anything that touched it.
+- **`omp plugin upgrade` takes the npm package name, not the short name.** `omp plugin upgrade dankvoice` fails with `Failed to upgrade dankvoice: dankvoice is not installed` while the plugin is plainly installed; the package is `omp-dankvoice`. Find the truth with `ls ~/.omp/plugins/node_modules` or `find ~/.omp -path '*<name>/dist/index.js' -not -path '*/Projects/*'` — the installed tree is unscoped (`~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/omp-dankvoice/dist/index.js`), not `@dank/dankvoice`.
+- **`cmp` exiting 1 BEFORE the upgrade is the expected state** (installed bundle is the pre-merge build, diff reported at some char/line). Do not treat it as a failed deploy and do not "fix" the build; run the upgrade, then `cmp` again for byte identity, and grep the new bundle for a string only the merged code contains (e.g. `grep -c "Heckle instead of summarizing"`) as a second, semantic confirmation.
+- Prune: `git worktree remove --force <path>` (force: untracked deps link), `git branch -D`, `git push origin --delete <branch>` (allowed: local Gitea). Before removing a worktree, check no live process has a cwd inside it (`ls -l /proc/*/cwd | grep -c "wt/<name>"`) — same guard `live-sync.sh` uses — and copy any file you moved into a gitignored `.AGENTTRASH/` there to its permanent home first, or the removal destroys the only copy.
+
+## Attribution footer (AGENTS.md)
+Every issue/PR body ends with `---`, then `cwd: <session cwd> · session: <session id>`. Read the real values, never invent an id.
+- **The session id is the UUID suffix of the LIVE transcript `.jsonl`, not the session directory name.** Transcript dirs are keyed by cwd (e.g. `-.omp-wt-wt-20261019-020309-6d1fc1f`) and ONE cwd can hold several sessions (resume / continuation forks), so `ls -t ~/.omp/agent/sessions/` cannot tell you which is yours and `ls -t <dir>` is equally blind. Pick the file being appended to right now: `ls -l --time-style=+%H:%M:%S <dir>/*.jsonl` beside `date +%H:%M:%S` — the mtime that equals the current second is the live session. The id is the part after `_` in `<timestamp>_<uuid>.jsonl`.
+- A `history.db` query for `session_id` filtered by `cwd` usually agrees, but it is not authoritative for WHICH of several sessions in this cwd is live — use the jsonl mtime test.
+- `local/` does NOT disambiguate: a forked transcript dir carries copies of the same `local://` artifacts, so matching artifact names proves nothing about which session is live.
+- `cwd` is that session's own working directory (the path the harness states), **not** the build worktree you committed in — when they differ, name the build worktree inside the body and keep `cwd` the session's.
+- Resolve `local://<name>.md` with `read local://<name>.md` (its header prints the absolute path) instead of guessing the directory.
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+name: gitea-silent-ignore-patch-trap
+description: "Gitea API answers success codes while silently ignoring mutation bodies: labels in PATCH /issues/N, and any JSON body sent without Content-Type: application/json. Verify mutations with a follow-up GET, never the status code."
+---
+
+# Gitea silent-ignore family (issue mutations)
+
+Two verified failure modes on the Dankclaw Gitea API (1.27.3, verified live 2026-10-21 on `dank/franksign`); both **return a success code and change nothing**:
+
+1. **`PATCH /repos/{o}/{r}/issues/{n}` with `{"labels":[...]}`** — 200, labels untouched, even *with* a proper JSON Content-Type. Labels move only via the dedicated endpoints:
+   - add: `POST /issues/{n}/labels` with `{"labels":[<id>]}`
+   - replace: `PUT /issues/{n}/labels` with `{"labels":[ids]}` (works without Content-Type)
+   - remove: `DELETE /issues/{n}/labels/{id}`
+2. **Any JSON body without `header = "Content-Type: application/json"` in the curl config** — e.g. closing with `PATCH {"state":"closed"}` returns **201 and no-ops**; identical request with the header closes. curl's default `-d` type (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`) makes this silent.
+
+## Rules
+- Mutating JSON calls: always send `Content-Type: application/json` alongside `Authorization: token` in the same `-K` config file.
+- **Never trust the status code for mutations — follow up with `GET` and read the field** (`labels`, `state`). Both traps look like success otherwise.
+- Token stays out of `-H` args (world-readable `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`): extract from `~/.config/secrets/gitea` into a 600-perm curl config, use `-K`.
+
+## Quick verification idiom
+```bash
+curl -sK "$cfg" "http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/repos/dank/franksign/issues/22" \
+  | jq '{state, labels: [.labels[].name]}'
+```
+
+Franksign's vault page `franksign-docs/agents/issue-tracker.md` owns the repo-local copy of this law; this skill exists so other repos (serverAppConfigs, command-center) don't re-burn the cycle.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+name: gitea-token-from-http-credential-store
+description: "Extract the Dankclaw Gitea token from ~/.config/secrets/gitea (it is the URL password, not key=value lines) for API calls, and diagnose the silent empty-token trap that makes public-repo reads pass while writes fail."
+---
+
+The Gitea credential store line on Frank's boxes is **http** (not https) with a percent-encoded port, and the **token is the URL password** — there are NO `username=`/`password=` lines:
+
+```
+http://dank:<40-char-token>@192.168.0.143%3a3000
+```
+
+## Extraction that actually works
+
+```bash
+tok=$(sed -nE 's#^[a-z]+://[^:]+:([^@]+)@.*#\1#p' ~/.config/secrets/gitea | head -1)
+echo "tok len ${#tok}"          # must be 40 — assert before any call
+cfg=$(mktemp); chmod 600 "$cfg"; printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$tok" > "$cfg"
+curl -s -K "$cfg" http://192.168.0.143:3000/api/v1/<path>
+rm -f "$cfg"                    # in the SAME session: the file holds a live token
+```
+
+## `git credential-store --file … fill` answers EMPTY — do not debug it
+
+Tried 2026-10-21 while opening `dank/command-center` PR #61: the obvious extraction
+
+```bash
+printf 'protocol=http\nhost=192.168.0.143\nport=3000\n\n' | git credential-store --file ~/.config/secrets/gitea fill
+```
+
+prints **nothing**, with no error. Not permissions, not a wrong path: the stored line encodes the port inside the host field (`@192.168.0.143%3a3000`), so a `host=`+`port=` query can never match it. Add `path=` or drop `port=` and it still answers empty. Read the file with `sed` (recipe above) and move on — the chain `TOKEN=$(…) && [ -n "$TOKEN" ] && …` fails silently at the test, which reads like a curl failure because the `&&` hides which link broke.
+
+## The silent-empty-token trap (bit 2026-10-21, cost a debug detour)
+
+An `awk -F= '/^username=/{...}'` parse of this file yields `tok=""` **silently** — and reads still appear to work when the repo is **public**: `dank/serverAppConfigs` and `dank/command-center` return real issue/label data unauthenticated, so every census "passes" until the first **write** (issue comment, label, PR create/merge) fails with `{"message":"token is always required"}`-style errors or 404s (private repos 404 on an empty token — that is an auth problem, NOT a missing repo).
+
+- `echo "tok len ${#tok}"` (must be 40) before believing ANY API result — reads included.
+- Prove auth once per session: `GET /api/v1/user` → `"login":"dank"`.
+- `curl -s -K <600-perm file>` carrying `header = "Authorization: token $tok"` — never `-H` on argv (`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` is world-readable; this leaked an HF token once).
+- `jq -n --arg t … --arg h … --arg b "$(/bin/cat /tmp/pr.md)" '{…}'` — `$(cat file)` gets optimised away in this harness, so use `--rawfile b /tmp/pr.md` instead.
+
+## Other notes
+
+- `git credential fill` fails headless here (`could not read Username … terminal prompts disabled`); read the store file directly instead.
+- Never print the token: mask when inspecting the file —
+  `sed -E 's#(://[^:]+:)[^@]+@#\1REDACTED@#' ~/.config/secrets/gitea`
+- Merge writes need form-encoded fields, not JSON — see `gitea-pr-api-cycle`.
+- Issue/PR numbers are **per repo**: `dank/dankvoice` #8–#11 (refactor, hardening, AbortError fix, menu defects) are unrelated to `dank/command-center` #8–#11 (SDLC, trunk-law). Read the body from the repo the work targets before referencing an issue in a commit message.
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+name: gitignore-trailing-slash-symlink-contamination
+description: "Trailing-slash gitignore rules don't match symlinks, so worktree dependency symlinks get tracked and pushed as 1-line blobs; same-name rules silently match worktree dirs, and .deploy-stale pollutes. Three fixes with tests."
+---
+
+Gitignore semantics trap with three real-world consequences (serverAppConfigs, 2026-10-19):
+
+## The rule
+
+`.gitignore` patterns ending in `/` match directories only. Worktree-relative: `**/node_modules/` is `**/node_modules/` → a symlink named `node_modules` does NOT match, so it is "untracked" no more — it gets added, committed, and pushed as a 1-line blob containing its target path.
+
+## Consequence 1: worktree symlink contamination
+
+- `git add -A` then commit then push in a worktree whose root holds `node_modules -> ...` (the worktree convention symlink) commits it.
+- The repo then holds `package/frontend/node_modules` as a text file containing the absolute path on the author's box.
+- The receiving worktree gets that 1-line file instead of the symlink → "module not found" and "why is this a 30-byte file?".
+- Detection: `git ls-tree -r origin/main | awk '$1=="120000"'` (mode 120000 = symlink) or `git ls-files -s | grep 120000`.
+- Fix: ignore rules WITHOUT trailing slash (`**/node_modules`, `**/.venv`) so symlinks match too.
+
+## Consequence 2: same-name worktree rules silently matching worktree dirs
+
+A root rule like `wt-*` (meant to ignore local worktree checkouts) matches every path whose last segment starts with `wt-` — so legitimate content under such a directory goes untracked. `git status --ignored` is the only visible trace; detection: `git check-ignore -v <path>` prints the owning rule + line number. (Repo-specific: `dank/command-center`'s `.gitignore` carries a "per-worktree memory buckets" block ignoring `agent/memories/sharpshooter/wt-*/` and `agent/memories/summaries/wt-*/` — intentional there.)
+
+## Consequence 3: `.deploy-stale`
+
+`deploy.sh` renames a stale tree to `<path>.deploy-stale` before recreating it. Without an ignore rule those directories land in `git status` as untracked and get swept into `git add -A` commits; they accumulate on every server.
+
+## Fixes with tests
+
+```gitignore
+**/node_modules
+**/.venv
+.deploy-stale/
+```
+
+Black-box test against the real rules, not a fixture: `git check-ignore -v <symlink-target>` must name the rule. `git check-ignore` takes hypothetical paths — nothing needs to exist on disk:
+
+```bash
+git check-ignore -v natives/x.wasm dotfiles/x/.config/noctalia/Noctalia.json
+```
+
+Two ignore surfaces must be kept in sync (deploy exclusions vs ignore rules): if a deployer excludes `*/Noctalia*` but the ignore list has only the lowercase class, generated files become tracked-but-never-deployed — test both halves with `git check-ignore`.
+
+## Recovery (if contamination already pushed)
+
+1. `git rm --cached <path>` on the symlink blob, commit, push.
+2. Fix the ignore rule first (else the next `git add -A` re-adds it).
+3. Untracked ≠ deleted from history: the blob stays in every old commit. Only a rewrite removes it; that is the operator's call, not a cleanup run alone.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+name: grafana-provisioned-dashboard-verify
+description: "Author and verify repo-provisioned dashboards on Dankclaw live: Grafana 13 has no unauthenticated API and no local admin, so prove through the e2e SSO browser path, and close the copier gap that hides never-provisioned boards."
+---
+
+## When to use
+You changed `shared/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/*.json` (or panel PromQL) and must prove the LIVE boards actually receive data — or a panel/whole board reads empty and you must classify: dead expression vs never-provisioned vs legitimately-empty.
+
+## The two gaps this skill exists for
+1. **The copier gap.** A repo dashboard JSON is NOT a live dashboard until the deployer carries it. Until 2026-10-21 `copy_grafana_provisioning` in `scripts/deploy-remote.sh` named `llm-fleet.json` alone: the `containers` board was merged, seam-tested, and documented as "working" yet had NEVER been provisioned; the other boards existed on disk (`/opt/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/`) only via one-time hand-copies, and one had silently gone stale. Fixed: copier globs `dashboards/*.json`; `GRAFANA_PROV_ROOT` is the test seam; a bats case executes the copier for real into a sandbox.
+2. **The API-proof illusion.** The vault used to say "verify through the APIs". On Grafana 13.2.2 that is dead: `/api/health`, `/api/frontend`, `/api/org`, `/login` all 404 **unauthenticated**, and there is NO local admin password (root `.env` sets no `GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_*`; the only account is the Authentik RP login). Do not hunt for credentials; use the browser path below.
+
+## Procedure
+### 1. Mechanical expression census (over SSH — Prometheus binds loopback)
+Extract every panel `expr` from the repo JSONs with python, substitute template vars (`$host`,`$container`,`$job` → `.*`, `$__auto`/`$interval` → `5m`), and run each as an instant query against `http://127.0.0.1:9090/api/v1/query` via `ssh dankclaw`. `curl` to `127.0.0.1:9090` from the dev box is blocked; keep queries on-host. Watch zsh globbing on `?`/`[` — quote the remote command.
+Empty result ≠ defect automatically:
+- `ALERTS` panel empty = **healthy** (ALERTS carries only firing/pending series).
+- Zero by design: no cgroup limits exist on the fleet → a memory-vs-limit panel is dead by premise (rewrite as % of host total, don't delete).
+- Real join defects: cadvisor `host` label vs node-exporter `job` label sets are incompatible — fix with `group_left label_replace(node_memory_MemTotal_bytes{job=~"node-.*"}, "host", "$1", "job", "node-(.*)")`, and `count by (job) (expr) / on(job) count by (job) (...)` needs the `on(job)` matcher when label sets differ. Parens around `on(host)` after `group_left` are **illegal**; `group_left label_replace(...)` without them parses fine.
+
+### 2. Prove the provisioned files (filesystem = installation proof only)
+```
+ssh dankclaw 'for f in /opt/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/*.json; do \
+  cmp -s "$f" "/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/shared/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/$(basename "$f")" \
+  && echo "$(basename $f) same" || echo "$(basename $f) DIFFERS"; done'
+```
+Missing file or DIFFERS ⇒ the copier (or an unmerged branch) is the bug, not the JSON.
+
+### 3. Browser proof (the real surface)
+Throwaway `.mjs` placed **inside `tests/e2e/`** (`@playwright/test` resolves from `node_modules` there; a script in `/tmp` fails with `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND`). Node on this box is Zig-rewritten v26: `readFileSync(p,"text")` throws `ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE` — use `readFileSync(p).toString()`.
+Sequence, exactly as `specs/20-grafana-sso.spec.ts` drives it:
+1. `newContext({storageState: ".auth/qa-e2e-admin.json", userAgent: REAL_UA})` — state is bound to the homepage origin; on the grafana vhost it is only the Authentik session cookie, so you MUST:
+2. `goto https://grafana.franksdank.cloud/` and poll until body lacks `"Making sure you're not a bot"` (Anubis PoW warm-up).
+3. `goto .../login/generic_oauth` and poll until `url` host is the vhost and path ≠ `/login` (RP round-trip). Landing on `/login` = auth flow broken, not the dashboard.
+4. `goto /d/<uid>?orgId=1&from=now-1h&to=now`, wait ~10 s, then read panels: titles via `.panel-title,[class*='panel-title']`; a panel is `NO-DATA` iff its container text contains `"No data"`, `RENDERED` iff a descendant matches `svg:not(:empty),canvas,img`. Panels lazy-render; scroll (`mouse.wheel`) before judging.
+Classify: `PANEL-NOT-FOUND` for a whole board ⇒ board not provisioned (step 2). `NO-DATA` with a proven-live expression ⇒ variable/label mismatch — re-run the expression with template vars expanded.
+Throwaway scripts → `~/.AGENTTRASH/<date>-topic/` after use; never `rm`.
+
+## Sandboxed deployment-function tests (bats)
+To behaviorally test a deploy-remote.sh copier: extract with `sed -n '/^func()/,/^}/p'`, `eval` it, stub `run_privileged() { "$@"; }`, point the function's `*_ROOT` seam env var at a sandbox, execute, assert files. Traps:
+- `VAR=x func` prefix assignments do NOT bind for shell **functions** — `export VAR=...` first.
+- `mktemp -d` + `trap 'rm -rf' RETURN` races bats' trap machinery: the sandbox vanishes mid-function and bats blames the `trap` line. Use `$BATS_TEST_TMPDIR` (auto-cleaned).
+- Prove red on the OLD body by patching a `mktemp -d` copy of `tests/ shared/ scripts/` and running bats there — no checkout mutation.
+- Full suite must run from the repo root (`./tests/run.sh`), not from a subdirectory.
+
+## Land flow (repo law)
+Branch off fresh `origin/main`; merge needs Frank's explicit current OK; Gitea merge endpoint wants **JSON** `{"Do":"merge"}` (form-encoded `Do=merge` 422s with `[Do]: Required`); then `deploy.sh dankclaw --service grafana` and repeat steps 2–3 as the post-deploy gate.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+name: grep-secret-gate-hook-traps
+description: "Write a zero-dependency grep-based pre-commit secret gate that fails closed: the GNU grep -- one-shot trap, POSIX ERE limits, bracket collating elements, and rc=2-as-success in command substitution."
+---
+
+# Fail-closed grep secret gate (pre-commit hook)
+
+Use when writing/auditing a bash pre-commit hook (or any CI tripwire) that scans
+staged content with `grep -E` for credential shapes — no gitleaks available.
+
+## The four traps (all personally earned; each silently PASSES bad content)
+
+1. **`--` is a ONE-SHOT end-of-options marker.** `grep -nE -- 'p1' -- 'p2' 'p3'`
+   takes the later `--` and patterns as FILE names → rc=2, errors on stderr.
+   Correct multi-pattern form: repeat `-e` for every pattern; never `--`.
+2. **`if hits=$(... | grep ...)` treats rc=2 as success.** Any non-zero-but-not-1
+   (broken pattern, unreadable file) enters the `then` branch with EMPTY output.
+   Never branch on the substitution's truthiness. Capture rc explicitly:
+   `hits=$(...); rc=$?` then: `rc>=2` → BLOCK (fail closed — a dead regex is
+   worse than none), `rc==1` → clean, `rc==0` → hits.
+3. **POSIX ERE (`grep -E`) has no `(?:...)` groups.** Use plain `(...)`.
+4. **`[:-]` inside a bracket expression starts a collating element** →
+   `grep: repetition-operator operand invalid` (rc=2, see trap 2). Put `-` FIRST
+   in every class: `[-A-Za-z0-9/+=_.:+]`.
+
+## Gate structure that works
+
+- Scan **staged content**, not the working tree: `git show ":$f"` over
+  `git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM`.
+- Denylist doc/fixture paths (`README`, `docs?/`, `tests?/`, `*.example`) — else
+  the hook blocks its own patterns and every test fixture.
+- Report `BLOCKED <file>:<line>` only — never echo the matched secret.
+- Wire with tracked `hooks/pre-commit` + `git config core.hooksPath hooks`
+  (lives in the COMMON git dir config → one set in the main checkout covers
+  every worktree). Fresh clones are unprotected until it's set; document it.
+- Worktrees lacking `hooks/` while `core.hooksPath` is set: git dies on commit
+  (`cannot run ... No such file or directory`) — merge main in, don't unset.
+- Do NOT ship the hook in an npm plugin artifact (`files`): node_modules never
+  runs git; pin its ABSENCE in the pack test instead.
+
+## Test it red-first through the real seam (bats)
+
+`git init` a fixture repo, `cp` the real hook in, `git config core.hooksPath hooks`,
+then drive REAL `git commit` and assert:
+- credential-shaped `.env` (RFC-2606 domains / all-zero ids as inert fixtures) →
+  non-zero AND `git log` count unchanged (blocks, not warns);
+- PEM header line → blocked;
+- clean prose → passes;
+- the hook committing ITSELF → passes (trap 1/3/4 usually die here);
+- exit-code masking: `bats ... | tail` returns tail's rc — never `&& commit`
+  behind a piped suite, or you commit on red.
@@ -1,48 +1,53 @@
 ---
 name: halogen-npu-feasibility-census
-description: "Census whether halogen-flash-server's NPU small-model path can run on a Strix Halo host: image gate, amdxdna/XRT presence, IOMMU and fabric-clock blockers, enablement deltas."
+description: "Census whether halogen-flash-server's NPU small-model path can run and swap models on a Strix Halo host: image gate, amdxdna/XRT presence, IOMMU and fabric-clock blockers, enablement deltas, boot-set-only model loading (no live reload), and the silent-fallback-to-Flash trap for unarmed chat-class NPU models."
 ---

-Use when asked whether halogen/halogen-flash-server can use the XDNA2 NPU (embeddings, rerank, moderation/guard, decider, `qwen3.5-2b` generation, `flux2-klein-4b` images, `qwen3-asr-*`) on a Ryzen AI Max / Strix Halo host, or before proposing to enable it.
+Use when asked whether halogen/halogen-flash-server can use the XDNA2 NPU (embeddings, rerank, moderation/guard, decider, `qwen3.5-2b` generation, `flux2-klein-4b` images, `qwen3-asr-*`) on a Ryzen AI Max / Strix Halo host, before proposing to enable it, or when asked whether it can **hot-swap / live-reload** NPU models like FastFlowLM does.

 ## What the feature is (not a speed knob)

-The Flash trunk stays on the iGPU. `HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS=<names>` starts a second engine in the SAME container and on the SAME API port; the request's `model` field picks the executor. Unset → server identical to before. Each NPU model is a precompiled AIE-ML program (`devices/devices.hnpm`, per-partition `devices/u<N>.elf`, `devices/consts.hnpb`, `<id>.hnpw` weights, `tokenizer/tokenizer.json`), loaded via the HOST's XRT → kernel `amdxdna` → `/dev/accel/accel0`. One pass at a time; `HALOGEN_NPU_QUEUE` 64, overflow queues server-side, then `503 engine_busy`. Entry `entrypoint.sh` validates every file's bytes + sha256 against `/opt/halogen/npu/models.txt` before anything starts. NPU models run only in single-container "all" mode, NOT the `engine`/`api` split.
+The Flash trunk stays on the iGPU. `HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS=<names>` starts a second engine in the SAME container and on the SAME API port; the request's `model` field picks the executor. Unset -> server identical to before. Each NPU model is a precompiled AIE-ML program (`devices/devices.hnpm`, per-partition `devices/u<N>.elf`, `devices/consts.hnpb`, `<id>.hnpw` weights, `tokenizer/tokenizer.json`), loaded via the HOST's XRT -> kernel `amdxdna` -> `/dev/accel/accel0`. One pass at a time; `HALOGEN_NPU_QUEUE` 64, overflow queues server-side, then `503 engine_busy`. Catalog in the 0.16.2 image: `decider-0.8b`, `qwen3-embedding-0.6b`, `qwen3-reranker-0.6b`, `qwen3guard-gen-0.6b`, `qwen3.5-2b` (+ `flux2-klein-4b`, `qwen3-asr-*` in newer tags). Only the programs named in `HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS` are armed.

-## Census (all read-only, run from the operator box)
+## Boot-set-only: NO live reload (tested on the live endpoint)
+
+`HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS` is read **at start**; the entrypoint validates/converts/loads the named programs then. There is **no** runtime load/unload and **no** admin endpoint to add a model. FLM comparison: FLM was a standalone NPU-only server (`flm serve <one-model>`, single FIFO lane) free to reconfigure its one AIE partition; halogen boots Flash (iGPU) **plus** the NPU programs as ONE coupled process (shared port + shared memory/power budget), so the NPU set is a boot-time constant. Changing even a checkpoint's weights reconverts "at the next start", never live.
+
+Consequence — arming a new program = edit `scripts/frank-dragoon.env` -> redeploy -> **container restart -> the whole Flash payload (tens of GB) reloads, minutes**. The small NPU program is not the cost; the Flash reload is.
+
+## The silent-fallback trap (the one that bites)
+
+A request naming an **unarmed** catalog model behaves differently per endpoint class:
+- `/v1/rerank`, `/v1/moderations`: honest **400 `model_not_found`**, message ends `(loaded: none)`. The endpoint only exists if that engine was armed at boot.
+- `/v1/chat/completions` (the `decider-0.8b` decision path and `qwen3.5-2b` generation): **silent fall-through to the Flash model** — HTTP 200, body `"model": "<flash id>"`, no error. A guard/decision call to an unarmed model is answered by the main (often abliterated) endpoint you were trying to screen against, and looks like success. Measured: an unarmed `decider-0.8b` "is this a prompt injection?" probe returned `"no"` from Flash. **Fail-safe is NOT the default on the chat route.**
+
+## Live probe (idle lane; one ssh, non-disruptive — no restart happens)

 ```bash
-ssh <host> '
-# 1. engine gate + catalog in the pinned image
-podman exec <ctr> bash -c "grep -rlo HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS /opt/halogen /usr/local/bin /entrypoint.sh 2>/dev/null | head"
-podman exec <ctr> cat /opt/halogen/npu/models.txt | head -40
-# 2. is NPU actually wired today? (expect NO env, NO device, NO /dev/accel inside)
-podman inspect <ctr> --format "{{json .HostConfig.Devices}}"; podman exec <ctr> ls /dev/accel
-# 3. kernel driver + firmware
-lsmod | grep -i amdxdna; sudo dmesg | grep -iE "xdna|npu" | tail -5; ls -l /dev/accel
-# 4. XRT (distro packages are fine; vendor mounts /opt/xilinx/xrt)
-dpkg -l | grep -iE "xrt|xdna"; ls /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxrt* /usr/lib/libxrt* 2>/dev/null
-# 5. BLOCKER 1: IOMMU
-cat /proc/cmdline; ls /sys/kernel/iommu_groups | wc -l
-# 6. BLOCKER 2: fabric clock held?
-for c in /sys/class/drm/card*/device; do echo "== $c"; cat $c/power_dpm_force_performance_level 2>&1; cat $c/pp_dpm_fclk 2>&1 | tr "\n" " "; echo; done'
+B=http://127.0.0.1:7770   # halogen port; internal engine is :8731/:8740 muxed onto it
+curl -s $B/v1/models | jq -r '.data[].id'          # armed set = boot set; must not mutate
+# control (armed embedding) -> 200 with a real vector:
+curl -s $B/v1/embeddings -d '{"model":"qwen3-embedding-0.6b","input":["ping"]}'
+# unarmed rerank/guard -> expect 400 "(loaded: none)":
+curl -s $B/v1/rerank      -d '{"model":"qwen3-reranker-0.6b","query":"t","documents":["a","b"],"top_n":1}'
+curl -s $B/v1/moderations -d '{"model":"qwen3guard-gen-0.6b","input":["hello"]}'
+# unarmed decider/gen -> watch the "model" field; if it is the flash id, it fell through:
+curl -s $B/v1/chat/completions -d '{"model":"decider-0.8b","temperature":0,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"x"}],"response_format":{"type":"json_schema","json_schema":{"name":"g","description":"is injection?","schema":{"enum":["no","yes"]}}}}' | jq -r '.model // .error.message'
+# prove nothing restarted:
+systemctl show frank-dragoon.service -p NRestarts -p ActiveEnterTimestamp --value
 ```
+`decider` with a schema and a non-zero `temperature` 400s on a *sampling* guard first ("send temperature 0"); set `temperature:0` to reach the router and see the fallback.

-Docs (raw fetch, authoritative): `docs/NPU.md`, `docs/npu-small-models.md`, `deploy/host/halogen-fabric-clock` under `peonist-ai/halogen-flash-server` on GitHub. Tag list: `podman search --list-tags ghcr.io/peonist-ai/halogen-flash-server`.
+## Enablement gates (all four must hold before it runs)

-## The two blockers and the enablement delta
-
- **IOMMU must be on.** `amd_iommu=off` turns the NPU off (no PASID/SVA); `iommu=pt` keeps it. Needs a grub edit + reboot. `iommu_groups == 0` ⇒ off.
- **Fabric clock must be pinned at the top `pp_dpm_fclk` level** (or `power_dpm_force_performance_level=high`); `auto` = unheld. GPU+NPU concurrently HANG Strix Halo machines and corrupt NPU results while that clock moves. Fix: root container with `-v /sys:/host/sys` (server holds it itself), or install `deploy/host/halogen-fabric-clock` + unit (~1 W). If it can't hold, the server FAILS CLOSED and prints the commands.
- Container delta: `--device /dev/accel/accel0` + `HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS`; `--ulimit memlock=-1:-1` and `--group-add keep-groups` usually already present. Distro XRT: mount each of `libxrt_coreutil.so.2`, `libxrt_core.so.2`, `libxrt_driver_xdna.so.2` TWICE (once at `/opt/xilinx/xrt/lib/`, once at its own path) — never mount an `/opt/xilinx/xrt` holding only symlinks.
-
-## Costs to price before proposing
-
- Upstream A/B: IOMMU translation ON costs **13–16 % prefill** (460 → 385 tok/s at 2,048 tokens, Ryzen AI Max+ 395); decode unaffected. Whether `iommu=pt` specifically costs that on a given box is a local measurement, not a published fact — run the image's own `sweep` after the reboot.
- A few GB host RAM per NPU model (+8 GB FLUX, +1.6/4 GB ASR), and trunk decode drops while the NPU works (shared bus + power).
+1. Kernel `amdxdna` loaded + `/dev/accel/accel0` present; the node must be world-open (`0666` via a udev rule) or a **rootless** container cannot open it — `serve-frank-dragoon.sh` refuses if the mode bit 02 is clear.
+2. Host XRT with the NPU plugin (`libxrt_coreutil.so.2`, `libxrt_core.so.2`, `libxrt_driver_xdna.so.2`); on Arch/CachyOS mount each lib twice (image XRT path + its own `/usr/lib` path), never an `/opt/xilinx/xrt` of dangling links.
+3. **Fabric clock held at top** (`halogen-fabric-clock` root unit) — GPU+NPU at once can hang Strix Halo / corrupt NPU results while that clock changes; the server refuses to start if it can't hold it.
+4. **IOMMU on**: `amd_iommu=off` kills the NPU; `iommu=pt` keeps it.

 ## Laws / traps

- Never probe the NPU beside the live service: stop + mask first (fleet benchmarking policy); this host class has a precedent of a concurrent GPU experiment needing a power cycle. Distinguish off vs wedged with `ip neigh show <ip>` from a peer.
- `/dev/accel/accel0` existing and `amdxdna` probing cleanly does NOT mean the NPU works — with IOMMU off the failure is at context/PASID creation, not at the device node. Do not trust older notes claiming the node itself is missing.
+- Never probe the NPU beside the live service: stop + mask first (fleet benchmarking policy); this host class has a precedent of a concurrent GPU experiment needing a power cycle. Distinguish off vs wedged with `ip neigh show <ip>` from a peer. A single embedding/decision request on an already-armed idle production lane is a normal request, not a benchmark — safe.
+- `/dev/accel/accel0` existing and `amdxdna` probing cleanly does NOT mean the NPU works - with IOMMU off the failure is at context/PASID creation, not at the device node. Do not trust older notes claiming the node itself is missing.
 - `dmesg` lines like `Failed to alloc dev bo memory, ret -28` while large NPU models take turns at NPU memory are benign (vendor-documented); the server recovers.
+- NPU model RSS is host-side, bypassing the container cgroup (GTT/shared pool), like all Strix Halo GPU memory — container stats under-report the true footprint.
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+name: halogen-npu-lane-boot-loop-triage
+description: "Triage a frank-dragoon (halogen-flash-server) unit crash-loop caused by the NPU lane: signature classification, restart-debris trap, XRT mount-path census, and the transient env-file proof boot."
+---
+
+Triage when `frank-dragoon` (or any halogen-flash-server unit with `HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS` armed) sits in `activating (auto-restart)` with `ExecStart … code=exited, status=1/FAILURE` seconds after start, while `/health` stays dark.
+
+## 1. Classify the exit BEFORE touching the config
+- `NRestarts` climbing + exit in <5 s = refusal, not an engine fault. Read `journalctl -u frank-dragoon --since "-30m"` AND the engine log `/home/dank/logs/frank_dragoon.log` (engine stdout never goes to the journal).
+- Lane signature: log ends with `halogen npu: … <name>: N files checked against this image's record` then `halogen-npu: No such library '<path>'` + `the NPU engine exited before it was ready (rc=1)` → **the NPU lane exit is fatal to the whole container** (supervisor kills the Flash engine with it). Chat-down is the lane's fault even though chat code never changed.
+- KV/pre-flight lines present but no `locked in RAM` line = died before weight pinning.
+
+## 2. The restart-debris trap
+`Restart=always` re-runs the failing boot every ~10 s; each attempt leaves GPU/NPU handles being released, and the next boot logs `GTT in use before this start: N GiB … held by 1 process(es)`. That NOTE is debris from your own crash-loop — do not chase it as a foreign co-tenant (real co-tenants: ComfyUI `python` on `/dev/kfd`, find with `sudo fuser -v /dev/dri/renderD128 /dev/kfd`). `sudo systemctl stop <unit>` FIRST, then any diagnosis.
+
+## 3. XRT path census (the `No such library '/opt/xilinx/lib/<multiarch>/libxrt_*.so.2'` case)
+- The image ships NO XRT at all (`find / -xdev -name "libxrt*"` inside the image = empty); the NPU child `dlopen`s the host's libs through the serve script's mounts, which land at TWO destinations only: `/opt/xilinx/xrt/lib/<L>` and `$XRT_DIR/<L>`. A child searching `/opt/xilinx/lib/<multiarch>/` names a THIRD prefix nobody mounts.
+- The serve loop resolves `REAL="$(readlink -f …)"` and mounts resolved files — if a host package upgrade retargets the symlinks (check `grep libxrt /var/log/dpkg.log` + `ldconfig -p | grep xrt` mtimes vs the last good boot), the file set the child expects can change under byte-identical mounts.
+- Rootless gotcha: `podman mount` fails outside `podman unshare` and leaves `$M` EMPTY — `grep -r pat "$M/opt"` then greps your CWD = HOST tree (false hits like `/opt/fastflowlm`). Always `podman unshare bash -c 'M=$(podman mount $C); …'` or `--entrypoint ls|cat` probes instead, and distrust hits that name host-only paths.
+
+## 4. Proof boot without touching production
+The serve script honors `FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE` (sanctioned seam). Throwaway script on the host:
+1. scratch env: `source /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/scripts/frank-dragoon.env` + the knob under test.
+2. `sed` the serve script to inject the candidate extra mounts into the `NPU_ARGS+=(--device …` line — mount RESOLVED real files (`.so.2.25.00`), never symlinks (vendor: dangling links inside the container).
+3. `export FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE=/tmp/… FRANK_DRAGOON_LOG=/tmp/…; FRANK_DRAGOON_CONTAINER=<scratch-name> timeout 1200 /tmp/serve-test.sh` — the container still publishes 7770, so `systemctl stop` the unit first (port binds at CREATE, exit 126 on race).
+4. Retire same session: `podman rm -f <scratch-name>`, trash `/tmp` scripts; the unit stays stopped until the real fix deploys.
+
+## 5. Restore chat while the lane is unfixed
+`HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS=` (blank) is the documented one-line lane-off switch — lane absent = endpoint exactly as before the lane existed. Land through git + `deploy.sh dankclaw --service frank-dragoon`; never hand-edit the remote env.
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+name: halogen-npu-mount-prefix-proof
+description: "Prove and fix a halogen frank-dragoon NPU-lane mount failure: crash-loop where a dead lane kills the whole container, dlopen-prefix census, and the sanctioned FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE proof-boot."
+---
+
+# Halogen NPU lane: dead lane kills the container — prove the mount prefix, don't guess
+
+Applies when a `frank-dragoon` unit crash-loops in seconds (`exit 1` in ~200 ms,
+`NRestarts` climbing) and the engine log's last lines are:
+
+```
+halogen npu: <model>: 15 files checked against this image's record
+halogen-npu: No such library '<some/prefix>/libxrt_core.so.2'
+halogen npu: the NPU engine exited before it was ready (rc=1)
+```
+
+## Laws this incident wrote (2026-10-21, frank-dragoon, 88-restart loop)
+- **A dead NPU lane is fatal to the whole container**: the flash-server supervisor
+  exits with the lane. Chat dies beside a healthy GPU preflight — do not read the
+  GTT/weights lines as "engine fine, side feature broken".
+- The NPU child `dlopen`s distro XRT from **three** container prefixes per library:
+  `/opt/xilinx/xrt/lib/`, the library's own install path, **and
+  `/opt/xilinx/lib/<multiarch>/`**. The missing one is exactly what the error names.
+- Host state can flip this under a byte-identical container: the lane ran for days
+  with two prefixes, then a host `libxrt2`/`libxrt-npu2` reconfigure (check
+  `grep libxrt /var/log/dpkg.log`) made the child demand the third. Image digest,
+  serve script, payload all unchanged ⇒ suspect HOST package state, not the deploy.
+- Fastest discriminator vs engine faults: exit in <1 s with the engine's preflight
+  lines present = serve/lane gate failure, not model load. Model-load failures take
+  minutes and print pin/KV lines.
+
+## Proof procedure (sanctioned seam, no scratch ports)
+1. Read the error's path verbatim — it names the missing prefix.
+2. `sudo systemctl stop frank-dragoon` (unit must be down: the proof binds :7770
+   at container CREATE).
+3. Scratch env file on the host using the bench-sanctioned seam:
+   ```
+   /tmp/dragoon-nputest.env:
+     source /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/scripts/frank-dragoon.env
+     HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS=qwen3-embedding-0.6b
+   ```
+4. Scratch serve copy that appends the candidate mount to the `NPU_ARGS+=(--device`
+   line (`sed`), REAL files only (`readlink -f`; vendor forbids dangling symlinks
+   under /opt/xilinx), and run with:
+   `FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE=/tmp/... FRANK_DRAGOON_LOG=/tmp/... timeout 1200 /tmp/serve-nputest.sh`
+5. Success = boot ledger (`… in all`) **plus** `npu_api: <model> … buckets u0…u9`
+   plus `/health` `npu.status ok`. Then codify the mount in the serve script, pin
+   it in `tests/frank_dragoon_unit.bats` (the fixture XRT dir's basename IS the
+   multiarch name — name it `x86_64-linux-gnu`), update the endpoint page's NPU
+   prerequisite to the three-prefix law, and cut over via PR +
+   `deploy.sh dankclaw --service frank-dragoon`.
+6. Retire scratch: the `timeout` kills the proof container; `podman rm -f`,
+   move /tmp scripts to `~/.AGENTTRASH/<date>-<topic>/`. A proof instance
+   serving production while you wait is drift — deploy the merged fix promptly.
+
+## Traps
+- Greping image contents rootless: `podman mount` fails (needs `podman unshare`)
+  and leaves `$M` EMPTY, so `grep -r $M/opt` silently greps the HOST cwd — that
+  is how host `/opt/fastflowlm` masqueraded as image content. Always check `$M`
+  non-empty, or use `podman unshare bash -c 'M=$(podman mount C); …'`.
+- The entrypoint swallows `podman run IMG sh -c …` as a mode name; use
+  `--entrypoint sh/cat/ls`.
+- The proof container inherits production name/port unless the override is set
+  AFTER sourcing the env (the env file re-exports `FRANK_DRAGOON_CONTAINER`).
+- `Restart=always` re-runs the lane into its own GPU/NPU debris; stop the unit
+  before any manual boot, don't fight the loop.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+name: halogen-npu-xrt-third-prefix
+description: "Triage a halogen frank-dragoon (flash-server) unit crash-loop caused by the NPU lane: signature \"No such library /opt/xilinx/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxrt_core.so.2\", dead-lane-kills-container law, third-prefix mount fix, and the FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE scratch-boot proof recipe."
+---
+
+# Halogen NPU lane: dead lane kills the container; XRT needs THREE mount prefixes
+
+Friction-earned 2026-10-21 on `frank-dragoon` (Dankclaw): unit boot-looped 88× (`activating`, exit 1 in ~200 ms) with the GPU/serve_api lines looking healthy; chat dead beside a fine-looking ledger.
+
+## Signatures (in order of appearance)
+
+```
+halogen-npu: No such library '/opt/xilinx/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxrt_core.so.2'
+halogen npu: the NPU engine exited before it was ready (rc=1; ...)
+```
+then `systemctl show <svc> -p ExecMainStatus` = 1, `NRestarts` climbing, and `/home/dank/logs/frank_dragoon.log` truncated at ~10 lines each boot (serve script truncates the log per start).
+
+**Laws:** a dead NPU lane is NOT survivable — the engine supervisor takes the WHOLE container down on it. And `Restart=always` makes each restart race its own GPU/NPU debris: the FIRST failure's message is the only real evidence; later loop entries are noise. Stop the unit immediately (`sudo systemctl stop frank-dragoon`) before probing.
+
+## Root cause class
+
+The NPU child `dlopen`s XRT from `/opt/xilinx/lib/<multiarch>/` IN ADDITION to `/opt/xilinx/xrt/lib` and the install path. Host package churn (dpkg.log reconfigure of `libxrt2` the previous day) made the child demand the third prefix; our mounts filled only two. A lane that worked for days with byte-identical mounts can die purely from host package changes — diff the mounts last, check `grep libxrt /var/log/dpkg.log` first.
+
+Fix: mount each REAL file (never a symlink) at all three prefixes; derive the multiarch name from `FRANK_DRAGOON_XRT_DIR`'s basename (`MULTIARCH="${XRT_DIR##*/}"`).
+
+## Proof recipe (production-shaped, no scratch port)
+
+One card holds one server — never bench on a side port; use the sanctioned env-file seam:
+
+1. Scratch env on the host: `source /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/scripts/frank-dragoon.env` + knob overrides (e.g. `HALOGEN_NPU_MODELS=...`).
+2. Copy the serve script with the candidate change applied via `sed` into `/tmp` (or edit + `FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE`); export `FRANK_DRAGOON_ENV_FILE=<scratch>` and `FRANK_DRAGOON_LOG=/tmp/<name>.log`; run under `timeout 1200`. The seam exists precisely for this.
+3. Judge from `/tmp/<name>.log`: `npu_api: <model> ... buckets u0…u9` = lane alive; `No such library` = still broken. Then `curl :7770/health` → `npu.status`.
+4. Retire the same session: `podman stop -t 60` (weights unpin slowly), `podman rm -f`, kill wrapper procs BY PID (`pgrep -f` the scratch serve script — `pkill -f` a pattern containing your own ssh line kills the session), move scratch files to `~/.AGENTTRASH/<date>-<topic>/`, then prove `pgrep -f serve-<scratch>` is empty. Leftover scratch state silently hijacks the next deploy (same class as leftover bench drop-ins).
+
+## Traps hit en route
+
+- Rootless `podman mount` fails ("cannot run in rootless mode") and leaves `$M` EMPTY — a later `grep -r "$M/..."` then reads the HOST cwd and "finds" the answer in Loki WAL files. Never grep an unverified mount var; `podman unshare` or `--entrypoint` probe instead.
+- Image ships NO `/opt/xilinx` at all: all XRT comes from host mounts; `docs/NPU.md` is not inside the image.
+- `ssh host 'tail <log>'` runs on the DEV box if you forgot `ssh` — a missing-file error is not "the engine wrote nothing".
+- Health `context` field echoes the RUNNING engine's ceiling — use it to prove which shape is live, unlike `/v1/models` name echo.
+
+## Verification that the fix landed
+
+`systemctl show frank-dragoon -p DropInPaths` empty; boot ledger shows `reserving the KV pool … (about 11.0 GiB)`, `… in all`, an `npu_api:` line, no clamp line; deployer prints `NPU lane verified — <model> embedded`.
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+name: harden-precommit-secret-gate
+description: "Fix or build a pre-commit secret-scan hook that actually blocks: the -z path hole, line-wide placeholder exemptions, inert doc placeholders, glued report lines, self-test fixture paths — each with a red-first bats case."
+---
+
+A pre-commit secret gate that fails open is worse than no gate: it teaches the operator that scanning happened. Four defect classes, each with a black-box test that goes red against the broken version (serverAppConfigs PR #70, command-center #59 — 4 holes closed same night, all red first).
+
+## 1. Non-ASCII paths fail open
+
+`git diff --cached --name-only` quotes non-ASCII paths (`"docs/\303\251.md"`), so `git diff` on that name returns **empty**, and a loop that `continue`s on an empty diff skips the file silently. Fail closed with NUL delimiting:
+
+```bash
+git diff --cached -z --name-only | while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do ...
+```
+
+Test: a tracked file whose name contains a non-ASCII character, holding a fake key on an added line, must be blocked.
+
+## 2. Placeholder filters must be value-scoped
+
+`if echo "$line" | grep -q "$placeholders"` exempts the whole line, so a comment word vouches for the credential beside it:
+
+```python
+token = "sk-…"  # example config for the docs
+```
+
+Filter only the captured value (the `sk-…` group), never the line. Two directions to test: `key = "example"` stays allowed; `token = "sk-<real>" # example` is blocked.
+
+## 3. Inert placeholders in documentation
+
+A skill/README that *documents* a secret gate quotes the vendor's placeholder ids (`AKIA0000000000000EXAMPLE`, all-zero JWTs). Exempt them by value shape (all-zero / `EXAMPLE` suffix / RFC 2606 domain), or the machine tier stops committing — and the refusal usually lands on a heartbeat commit, where it looks like infrastructure failure, not policy. Also note: an unlanded fix means the checkout runs the **old** hook, so a landing can be blocked by the very bug the PR corrects; audit the staged diff and use the documented override (`ALLOW_SECRETS=1`, never `--no-verify`), recording the audit in the commit message.
+
+## 4. Report-line assembly
+
+`report+=("  $file: $line")` inside a loop that keeps only the last hit per file glues the next filename onto the previous line when a second hit exists — the report attributes the finding to the wrong file. Test a two-file staged set where both match, and assert each report line names exactly one existing path.
+
+## 5. Self-test fixtures in the hook itself
+
+The hook's own fixtures contain fake keys by necessity, so the gate would refuse any commit touching the hook or its tests (or a docs page quoting a key as documentation). Pin the bypass to specific paths and to added lines only, and print what was exempted:
+
+```bash
+case "$f" in .githooks/pre-commit|tests/secret-gate.bats)
+    echo "secret-gate: self-test fixtures exempt: $f" >&2; continue;; esac
+```
+
+## The scan rule
+
+Scan **added content only** — `git diff --cached -U0 | grep '^+[^+]'` — or every commit touching a file with an old key in context gets blocked, and the operator's response to a gate that blocks everything is to override it always.
+
+## Test harness (fixture repo, never the real checkout)
+
+`git init` a temp repo, `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, copy the hook in, `git add` a payload, then run it with the env overrides the hook honours (point its cache/notify paths at `$TMP` so tests never touch the user's config). Pin, in order:
+
+| Case | Expect |
+|---|---|
+| fake key on an added line | exit 1, message names the file |
+| `key = "example"` | pass |
+| real key + `# example` comment | exit 1 |
+| non-ASCII filename with a key | exit 1 |
+| two files with hits | report names both |
+| self-test fixtures | pass, with the exempt line printed |
+
+`bats -r` after each edit. `--no-verify` is forbidden on Frank's boxes: the hook IS the control.
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+name: harness-model-config-wire-capture
+description: "Verify what the omp harness actually sends to a local inference endpoint (reasoning_effort, sampler keys, thinking-off) by pointing a scratch HOME at a logging proxy, instead of inferring it from models.yml comments."
+---
+
+A `models.yml` comment claiming "the wire sends X" is a claim about the harness, not the engine, and the harness rewrites between the two: compat maps pass unmapped values through, effort ladders clamp before the map applies, and a "disable reasoning" role flag can be implemented as *send the lowest effort* rather than a switch. Read only the wire.
+
+## Recipe (minutes, no production state touched)
+
+1. **Logging proxy** — python `ThreadingHTTPServer` on `127.0.0.1:7799` forwarding body+path to the real engine and appending the request body's interesting keys (`model, reasoning_effort, max_tokens, temperature, top_p, top_k, chat_template_kwargs`) as one JSON line per request. Run it as a named bash service with `ready.port` so the port is proven before use.
+2. **Scratch HOME** — `mkdir -p /tmp/omph/.omp/agent`, copy the *candidate* `models.yml` + `config.yml` there, rewrite that provider's `baseUrl` to `http://127.0.0.1:7799/v1`. Never edit `~/.omp/agent/` — in `dank/command-center` the checkout is the deployment.
+3. **One-shot runs** — `HOME=/tmp/omph omp --model '<provider>/<id>:<effort>' --no-tools --no-session --no-skills --no-rules --no-extensions --no-pty --no-lsp -p 'Reply with exactly: OK'`, once per effort (`off minimal low medium high xhigh max`). Add `--print-thoughts` when the question is "did thinking actually happen".
+4. Read the log, and assert the value **after** the change. A config edit that never engaged is the failure mode this exists to catch.
+
+## Traps found doing this on frank-dragoon (2026-10-21)
+
+- `--model X:off` does **not** mean `reasoning_effort: off` on the wire. Reasoning is switched through `compat.reasoningDisableMode` (enum includes `lowest-effort`, `none-effort`, `qwen-enable-thinking-false`, `qwen-template-false`, `chat-template-thinking-false`); the default derives from `thinkingFormat`, and `lowest-effort` quietly keeps thinking alive (`:off` arrived as `"minimal"`, with a canned 26-token thinking block on every "off" request). `none-effort` sent `"none"` → `reasoning_tokens: 0`.
+- Effort levels are clamped to the harness's per-model ladder **before** `reasoningEffortMap` applies, so a map row for a level the ladder lacks is inert (`:max` arrived as `xhigh` even with `max: max`). Capture before promising a level works.
+- Map lookup is `compat.reasoningEffortMap?.[effort] ?? thinking?.effortMap?.[effort] ?? effort` — removing a row is a pass-through, never a 400. Claims about rejection must be proven against the engine.
+- Engine-side claims: ask for a deliberately bad value and read its 400 — the engine prints its own accepted set (`reasoning_effort 'maximum' unsupported; use minimal|low|medium|high|xhigh|max|none`).
+
+## Engine-side probes that transfer to any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
+
+- **Accepted parameters**: `{model, messages, max_tokens:1, <param>:<value>}` → status + `error.message`. Acceptance is not honouring: report it as acceptance.
+- **Level honoured?** same prompt at `max_tokens 2048` per level, compare `usage.completion_tokens_details.reasoning_tokens`. Equal values across levels = the parameter is ignored; `reasoning_closed_at` reveals a per-level thinking ceiling.
+- **Thinking off**: `chat_template_kwargs {"enable_thinking": false}` and top-level `enable_thinking: false` → expect `reasoning_tokens: 0`.
+- **Vision**: build a solid-colour PNG in-script (`zlib`+`struct`, no PIL), 512×512, ask for the colour in one word **with thinking disabled** — otherwise the answer is cut off by the thinking block and the probe is inconclusive. A 1×1 image only proves token accounting.
+
+## Teardown
+
+Kill the proxy service, remove the scratch HOME, the proxy script and its log. Never leave copies of `config.yml`/`models.yml` in `/tmp`: they carry provider endpoints and sometimes tokens.
@@ -1,48 +1,49 @@
 ---
 name: html-report-ground-truth-audit
-description: "Audit a self-generated HTML report: ground every numeric/code/diagram claim against the repo, fix, and prove structure + render"
+description: "Audit a self-generated HTML report: ground every numeric/code/diagram claim against the repo, fix wrong values, delete filler that restates git, verify the served artifact byte-identical, and flag unverifiable content to the operator."
 ---

-Use after generating a large HTML report (e.g. via `repo-change-html-report`) whose claims were partly reconstructed from session memory. Fabricated numbers, invented code blocks, and silently-swallowed sections are the failure modes; the audit makes each traceable to the repo, a live command, or a recorded run.
+Ground-truth audit of an HTML report (generated by an agent, for a human). Three defects hide in a plausible report: **wrong numbers, unverifiable claims, and filler that restates git for a reader who has git.**
+
+## Law
+
+Every numeric claim must be re-measured against the repo, not the narrative that produced it.

 ## Procedure

-### 1. Enumerate every checkable claim
-Grep the report for numerics, file paths, symbol names, and code blocks:
- line counts (`wc -l` the real file)
- test counts (`grep -c '@test' tests/<f>.bats` — NOT suite-run totals: conditional skips make raw counts differ; run-observed totals are legitimate run history, keep them labeled as such)
- diff stats (`git diff --shortstat main..HEAD` — the footer's files/insertions/deletions)
- commit hashes (`git log --oneline`)
- "verbatim" code blocks (see 3)
- diagram node lists and captions (see 4)
+1. **Dump claims with file:line anchors.**
+   `sed 's/<[^>]*>//g' report.html | grep -vE '^\s*$' | grep -nE 'commit|file|line|fix|refactor' > /tmp/claims.txt`
+   Then enumerate the ground truth: `git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD` for commits; `git diff --stat origin/main..HEAD` for the per-file census — **sort it**: `--sort=-deletions` and `--sort=-creations` give the top movers, so the "largest single change" and "largest net code change" are computed facts.

-### 2. Ground numeric claims with one command each
-Fix every mismatch in place. Record the was/now pair — the audit table IS the evidence.
+2. **Check code blocks compile.** Write every snippet to a temp file and `bash -n` each. Common breakages from HTML generation: `&quot;`/`&amp;` entities leaking into code, and `<br>` line breaks that split a line mid-pipe.

-### 3. Verbatim code blocks: prove them
-For a block labeled verbatim, the exact string must exist:
- live code: `grep -n '<distinctive line>' <file>`
- historical: `git show <sha> -- <file> | grep -E '^[+-].*(<token1>|<token2>)'`
-If the block was fabricated (plausible-looking pseudo-code), replace it with the real excerpt. If condensed, the block header must say "condensed" and every shown line must be real.
+3. **Check the diagrams carry information.** A mermaid `flowchart LR` whose nodes merely restate the bullet list above it is decoration — delete it.

-### 4. Diagram claims: run the engine
-Behavioral diagrams (plan traces, closure graphs) must be re-derived by running the actual CLI:
-`python3 scripts/service-map.py plan --host <h> <path>` — then edit node labels, captions, and the prose count ("four services") to match output. Cross-check derived-set diagrams against the source relation (e.g. `grep -rl 'Network=gluetun.container' */**/*.container` for who rides a tunnel).
+4. **Check counts.** Commit and file counts must match `git rev-list --count` and `--name-only | sort -u | wc -l`. A report whose sections were written by different subagents drifts: each counts its own slice ("4 commits / 14 files" vs the true 11 / 25).

-### 5. Check for swallowed sections
-Large prior-session PUT ranges silently overwrite neighbors. Grep for headings/captions the plan promised; re-insert any that vanished, anchored on a fresh `read` of the region.
+5. **Flag what cannot be verified.** Test pass claims, external tool output, runtime behaviour — if the repo can't confirm it, say so to the operator instead of asserting it.

-### 6. Structural balance
-Python tag-balance pass over the file:
- per-tag open/close counts (`div`, `pre`, `figure`, `svg`, `table`, `span`, `figcaption`)
- running-div-depth scan printing per-section balance to localize stray closers
-Common defect: `.ln`/`.nt` pair emitted without its `.cg` wrapper → stray `</div>`; fix by opening `<div class="cg">` before the pair.
+## Filler test (delete on failure)

-### 7. Render proof
-`file://` is blocked on the shared browser — serve the dir: `bash` service `python3 -m http.server <port> --bind 127.0.0.1 --directory <dir>`, ready on that port. Then:
- `browser.open({name, url: 'http://127.0.0.1:<port>/<file>'})`
- DOM assertions via `tab.evaluate(() => …)` — NOT `tab.run` (that runs in Bun; no `document`). Sections are `<h2 id>` + siblings: scope queries to `document.body`/`document.querySelectorAll`, not `#ch5 …`.
- screenshot the repaired regions (scroll via `tab.evaluate(el.scrollIntoView())`), then `tab.close()` and kill the server proc (`write proc://<name>/kill`).
+- A `file → line-count → description` table restating `git diff --stat`? Delete — the reader has git.
+- A "what this means" / "conclusion" / "key takeaways" section? Delete — it is the same facts in softer prose. (Same rule as vault pages: point of use or gone.)
+- Keep only what a reader cannot rebuild from `git log` + `git show`.

-## Deliver
-A was/now table of every fix with its ground command, plus the list of claims verified intact. State honestly which numbers are run-history and not recomputable.
+## Serve and verify the artifact
+
+**Verify the file that is served, not the source.** If a `public/` copy is byte-identical, edit both or the served artifact stays wrong. Then re-fetch:
+
+```bash
+base=http://host:port/reports/x.html
+for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl -fsS -o /tmp/got.html "$base" && break; sleep 1; done   # service may still be activating
+for i in 1 2; do curl -fsS "$base" | md5sum; done    # stable across refetches
+diff <(curl -fsS "$base") /path/to/source.html && echo "served == source"
+```
+
+## Voice drift
+
+If the operator asked for a tone ("no filler", "terse"), the audit must enforce it too — marketing phrasing ("ships the", "This means:") is a style defect, fix it in the same pass, not a later one.
+
+## Report
+
+Fixes grouped by defect class (wrong number / unverifiable / filler / style), then what stays unverifiable and why, with the measured ground truth quoted.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: infra-repo-security-review
+description: "Full-repo security review of an infra/config repo (serverAppConfigs-shaped: shell deployers, quadlets, systemd, Caddy edge, bats/Playwright) — slice fan-out, mechanical censuses, and subagent-claim verification."
+---
+
+# Whole-repo security review (infra/config repo)
+
+For "full security review of this repo" on a deployment-config repo (shell scripts + podman quadlets + systemd units + Caddy + tests). NOT for a diff review — that is `code-review`. NOT for a secrets-only question — that is `git-repo-secret-audit`.
+
+## 1. Slice, then fan out in ONE `task` batch
+Five `security-reviewer` slices, each with the repo's own laws pre-injected in `context` so no agent re-derives them (AGENTS.md policy text + exclusions: docs prose, `.AGENTTRASH/**`, binaries, `package-lock.json`):
+
+1. **Shell** — all `*.sh` + `.githooks/` + `tests/run.sh`: injection, quoting, `mktemp` vs `/tmp/fixed`, `set -e`, `curl -f`, secrets in argv, `rm`/`git clean`/`systemctl disable`.
+2. **Python** — every `*.py`: `subprocess(shell=True)`, `verify=False`, unbounded `read()`, path traversal on request-supplied filenames, fixed `/tmp` writes, **which HTTP servers exist and which are unauthenticated**.
+3. **Container + systemd posture** — every `*.container`/`.network`/`.service`/Containerfile.
+4. **Edge + web** — Caddyfile vhost inventory, Anubis/Authentik chain, response headers, static-asset XSS sinks, service configs (`limiter.toml`, `prometheus.yml`, `alertmanager.yml`).
+5. **Tests** — vacuous assertions + credentials/secrets in fixtures + harness safety.
+
+**Set a yield deadline in the prompt.** Subagents here get killed at `task.maxRuntimeMs` (30 min) and the dead ones produced **zero** output. When one runs long, write early: `write agent://<id>` "yield now, unconfirmed items prefixed UNVERIFIED" — the resumed agent returns its partial report instead of losing it. Two of four needed this.
+
+## 2. Verify every citation before reporting
+`verify-subagent-review-findings` applies in full: re-grep each cited `file:line` and compare text. Expect ~40% of lines to be off (e.g. an agent described a 13-line hook; the file is 6) and several files to be hallucinated entirely (`.githooks/compose/*.container` did not exist). Discard mismatches; publish a **Discarded subagent claims** section. Re-grep your own citations too — two of mine were off by two lines and had to be corrected in an addendum.
+
+## 3. Mechanical censuses (cheap, high yield — run these yourself)
+- **Port binding**: every `^PublishPort=` line, classify `127.0.0.1:` / `192.168.0.x:` / **no address prefix** (= implicit `0.0.0.0`). The unprefixed set is the auth-bypass surface: a LAN client hits the container port directly and skips the Caddy→Anubis→Authentik chain that the vhost enforces. Report as one consolidated finding listing all unprefixed lines, and cite the repo's own correct examples (`127.0.0.1:9090`, `192.168.0.143:8080`) as the fix pattern.
+- **Image pinning**: count `^Image=` lines with vs without `@sha256:` (this repo: 4 of 54 pinned) — floating tags + `Pull=never` = unreproducible edge.
+- **Secret modes**: grep every `chmod 600` in the deployer and diff against every file it writes from an `.env`; a `>` redirect without the `chmod` is the finding (the Caddy/Porkbun env file).
+- **Systemd hardening**: `User=`/`ProtectSystem`/`PrivateTmp`/`NoNewPrivileges` per unit, and `ExecStartPre=+` lines — a `+` hook on a root unit running a checkout-writable script is a local privesc.
+- **Vhost table**: vhost → upstream → guarded? → exemption documented? Cross-check each upstream against the quadlet `PublishPort` list; unguarded vhost with no exemption comment is a policy violation even when the service self-authenticates.
+- **Hook wiring**: `git config core.hooksPath` + `ls "$(git rev-parse --git-path hooks)"`. A repo can ship `.githooks/pre-commit` that git never executes — and its own test can assert the *file* is executable and still miss that it isn't installed.
+- **Secret sweep**: `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch` (all history + dangling), match known values read from `~/.config/secrets`; report `prefix…(len N, sha 10)` only, never the value. Watch for the **split-concat disguise** (`PW="as""set"`): their own regex can't see it, but `grep -F` on a fragment finds it and history keeps it forever → rotation required.
+
+## 4. Report
+Severity-ranked table (Critical→Low, one line each: location + flaw), then prose detail for Critical/High only, then the Discarded-claims section, then remaining coverage gaps, then an ordered fix set and an offer to branch. Do not create a report file unless asked — chat is the deliverable.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+name: land-branch-without-checkout
+description: "Open a PR from a shared worktree when workspace policy blocks git checkout/restore: push a named branch ref from HEAD without switching branches."
+---
+
+# Landing a branch when `git checkout` is policy-blocked
+
+Shared-workspace policy blocks `git checkout` and `git restore` (working-tree
+switches could strand concurrent agents' uncommitted work). You still must ship
+the commit on the current worktree branch as a named `chore|feat|fix/<issue>-<slug>`
+branch. Never work around the block — go around it via refs.
+
+## Sequence
+
+```bash
+# 1. commit only your files (atomic); leave other dirty paths alone
+git add <your-files> && git commit -m "..."
+
+# 2. branch ref at HEAD — no working-tree change, stays on wt/<...>
+git branch <type>/<issue>-<slug> HEAD
+git push origin <type>/<issue>-<slug>          # pre-push hooks still run
+
+# 3. PR via tracker API with head = pushed ref (see gitea-pr-api-cycle / gh)
+```
+
+- The worktree stays checked out on `wt/<timestamp>`; the new branch exists
+  only as the pushed ref (plus a local ref that merges cleanly later).
+- `-u` upstream tracking on the wt branch is misleading — skip it; set
+  `git config branch.<name>.remote origin` + `.merge` only if you will
+  later check the branch out.
+- Dirty regenerated fixtures left behind (e.g. `gen:sample` PDFs rewritten
+  by setup/gate runs): `git restore` is also blocked — do NOT edit-forward
+  to revert them; report them. They are regenerated on every bootstrap, so
+  dirt is expected and harmless.
+
+## Verify
+
+- `git ls-remote --heads origin <branch>` prints the same sha as `git rev-parse HEAD`.
+- PR API returns 201 with `head.sha` equal to that sha.
+
+## Do NOT
+
+- `git checkout -b`, `git stash`, `git restore`, `git reset --hard` here —
+  all working-tree mutations the policy can block, and stashes in a shared
+  checkout are a cross-agent footgun.
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+name: land-merged-pr-with-blocked-tree-ops
+description: "Use when a merged PR must land in a checkout whose working tree is dirty and workspace policy blocks git checkout/restore/stash: commit-the-dirt pattern, the secret-gate false positive that blocks the landing commit, conflict resolution proven settings-vs-comments, and heartbeat (live-sync) handoff."
+---
+
+Landing a merged trunk into a checkout that IS the deployment (dank/command-center `~/.omp`), when tracked files are dirty and policy forbids `checkout`/`restore`/`stash` on shared state. Re-earned 2026-10-21 landing PRs #61 + #63 into `~/.omp` (27 commits behind, two conflicts, one gate refusal).
+
+## 1. Classify the dirt before touching it
+
+`git status --porcelain` then compare against what the merge brings in — only overlap blocks the merge:
+
+```bash
+{ git diff --name-only; git diff --cached --name-only; } | sort -u > /tmp/dirty.txt
+git diff --name-only HEAD origin/main | sort -u > /tmp/incoming.txt
+comm -12 /tmp/dirty.txt /tmp/incoming.txt     # these paths must be clean
+```
+
+Note the first column of porcelain: `M ` = **staged**, ` M` = unstaged. A staged file shows nothing in `git diff` — look at `--cached` too, or you will "verify" a file is unchanged while it is staged. `comm` needs both inputs sorted; unsorted input prints "file is not in sorted order" and a partial answer.
+
+## 2. Prove a dirty file content-free before resolving
+
+`cmp` it against the trunk blob, never against memory:
+
+```bash
+git show origin/main:$f > /tmp/incoming
+cmp -s "$f" /tmp/incoming && echo "IDENTICAL to trunk"   # commit/discard is content-free
+```
+
+If identical, the dirt is a sync artifact, not user work. Say so in the commit message with the `cmp` result — that is what makes a direct commit on `main` defensible for a prose-tier file.
+
+## 3. Commit rather than discard (policy-blocked verbs)
+
+With `checkout`/`restore`/`stash` unavailable, the only non-destructive unblock is a commit. Two separate commits, and order matters:
+
+1. Prose-tier dirt proven byte-identical to trunk — commit alone, message states `cmp` proved no prose change.
+2. Machine tiers (`agent/memories/**`, `agent/managed-skills/**`, `agent/config.yml`, `agent/models.yml`, `dotfiles/`) — let the heartbeat do it: `LC_ALL=C scripts/live-sync.sh` stages allowlist only, commits, merges trunk, pushes, and **exits 0 even when it aborts the merge on conflict** (the alert goes to stderr + ntfy). `exit 0` does not mean landed — check `behind=` afterwards.
+
+Do NOT `git add -A`: the index may already hold dozens of staged machine-tier files, and `git add <one file>` does not clear them — they ride along into your commit.
+
+## 4. The gate refusal that blocks the landing commit
+
+The pre-commit secret gate scans the **staged** diff, so a single-file commit still trips on previously staged content. It fires on inert placeholders inside the skill docs that document the placeholder (e.g. `AKIA0000000000000EXAMPLE` — the AWS all-zero example id in `git-secret-gate-hook` / `harden-precommit-secret-gate`). If the checkout is behind, it is running the **pre-fix** hook while the fix sits unlanded in trunk: the landing is blocked by the very bug the PR corrects.
+
+Audit first, then override deliberately — never `--no-verify`:
+
+```bash
+git diff --cached | grep -nE 'AKIA[A-Z0-9]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}|BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}'
+git diff --cached | grep -oE 'AKIA[A-Z0-9]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' | sort | uniq -c   # what exactly, how many
+ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit -F msg    # message records the audit + that the gate ran
+```
+
+Record in the message: the hits are inert placeholders, which files they sit in, that this checkout runs the pre-fix hook, and that the refusal dies with this landing.
+
+## 5. Merge conflicts: resolve by proving settings identical
+
+```bash
+git merge --no-commit --no-ff origin/main
+git diff --name-only --diff-filter=U
+```
+
+For each conflicted file, get all three blobs (`HEAD`, merge base, `origin/main`) and ask what the local side uniquely holds:
+
+- **Prose / doc pages**: diff ours vs trunk; if ours only lacks the incoming trim, take trunk.
+- **Real settings files (kdl/yaml/env)**: strip comments and diff — `diff <(grep -v '^\s*//' ours) <(grep -v '^\s*//' theirs)`. Empty output ⇒ only comments differ ⇒ taking trunk changes no deployed behaviour, and you can say that in the merge message. (2026-10-21: `desk-1-home.kdl` — modes byte-identical, trunk's comment corrected the false "no 240 Hz mode exists".)
+
+Resolve without the blocked verbs by writing the trunk blob: `git show origin/main:$f > $f && git add $f`. Then validate the live artifact (`niri validate`, the suite) before committing the merge, and push.
+
+## 6. Verify the push actually landed
+
+`git push` output can be swallowed when wrapped in command substitution inside a batch — verify from the remote, not from the push:
+
+```bash
+git fetch -q origin && printf 'HEAD=%s origin/main=%s behind=%s\n' \
+  "$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)" "$(git rev-parse --short origin/main)" "$(git rev-list --count HEAD..origin/main)"
+```
+
+## 7. Close and prune
+
+- Close the issues with a comment giving merge SHA + PR link + title (numbers are per-repo; a bare `#N` is not a reference).
+- Prune guards, all three before `git worktree remove --force`: `ls -l /proc/*/cwd | grep -c '<wt-name>'` must be 0; `git -C <wt> status --porcelain | wc -l` must be 0; `git rev-list --count main..<branch>` must be 0. Check for `.AGENTTRASH/**` inside the worktree first — removal destroys the only copy.
+- `git branch -d` (not `-D`) once the branch is reached by main; `git push origin --delete <branch>` is allowed on the local Gitea.
+- Delete the temp `-K` token config file in the same session that created it.
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+name: line-edit-anchor-discipline
+description: "Avoid the recurring edit-tool line-op traps: empty PUT deletes lines, PUT ranges swallowing multi-line block delimiters, and anchors landing mid-expression. Use whenever issuing CUT/PUT line edits on tagged files."
+---
+
+# Line-edit anchor discipline (CUT/PUT ops on tagged files)
+
+Five self-inflicted syntax wounds in one session (franksign, 2026-10-21) all trace to three rules.
+
+## Rules
+1. **An empty PUT body DELETES the targeted lines** (tool warns: "Interpreted an empty PUT body as deletion"). Twice it ate a whole log entry / a closing `}`. For no-ops use nothing; for deletes use explicit `CUT`.
+2. **Never PUT a range whose endpoints cut through a multi-line block.** If a `| {`-style union variant, a frontmatter `---` fence, or a `test(...)` closer straddles the range boundary, the replacement swallows the opener/closer and strands the body. Pre-condition: line N-1 and M+1 must be block-complete. Fix-after-the-fact pattern: read the broken region raw, then `PUT k.=k:` to restore the single swallowed line (e.g. the missing `---`, the orphaned `  | {`, `}` → `});`).
+3. **Search-hit reads do not authorize PUT.** A grep/folded-summary read marks lines as "never displayed"; the edit tool refuses and echoes actual content. That refusal is a free verification — re-check the echoed lines match intent, then straight-retry with the same tag.
+
+## Costly mistakes seen
+- Empty `PUT 7-7:` deleted a just-written log entry; restoring required re-issuing the full entry text.
+- `PUT 6.=7` replacing `timestamp`+`---` dropped the frontmatter close fence → lint-breaking file silently.
+- `PUT 10.=11` on a union type swallowed `  | {` opening a 12-line variant → cascade of LSP "unexpected label" warnings.
+- `CUT` of a stranded opener left its dangling `.json())` behind; balance errors surface only at EOF (`expected ')' but file ends`) — locate by reading regions raw, not by widening the payload.
+
+## Discipline
+- After any edit that reports a syntax error or a warning: read the touched region with `:raw` before the next op; fix the single wrong line, do not resend the block.
+- "no change: byte-identical" means your anchor math is off — re-read, don't append more content.
+- Prefer replacing whole coherent blocks (start line = block start, end line = block end) over edits that end mid-statement.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+---
+name: llamacpp-adapter-swap
+description: "Add or roll back a GGUF LoRA adapter on a dank-fleet llama.cpp endpoint (e.g. frank-zealot): provenance census, fork-flag gate, fetcher+env+deployer surface, seam tests, and the behavioural before/after probe that is the only real proof."
+---
+
+# Applying a GGUF LoRA adapter to a fleet endpoint
+
+An adapter is **payload, not shape**: it changes what the endpoint answers and nothing in
+the KV/budget equation. Fleet law still applies — no benchmarks unless Frank orders one,
+rollback is one env line, `./tests/run.sh` before commit, deployer health gate + e2e gate.
+
+## 1. Census the artifact BEFORE writing any code
+
+```bash
+curl -sS "https://huggingface.co/api/models/<repo>?blobs=true"   # size + LFS oid (None => plain git object)
+curl -sSL -o /tmp/a.gguf "https://huggingface.co/<repo>/resolve/main/<file>" && sha256sum /tmp/a.gguf
+```
+
+Parse the GGUF KV section (15 lines of struct.unpack) and read **provenance**: abliteration
+adapters carry `prism.abliterate.base_gguf` / `base_sha256`, `adapter.type`, `sites`,
+`target_layers`, `target_embedding`. Compare the declared base against the file the endpoint
+actually serves (its sha is in the endpoint's own fetcher script). A mismatch is normal for
+sibling quantizations — the loader matches **tensor names, not hashes** — but it must be
+stated in the docs, because it means the card's measured numbers are not this endpoint's
+numbers.
+
+## 2. Gate the runtime, from the binary's own `--help`
+
+On the host: `/home/dank/GitPackages/<build>/llama-server --help | grep -iE 'lora|adapter'`.
+Confirm `--lora-scaled FNAME:SCALE` exists (and `--lora-init-without-apply` + `POST
+/lora-adapters` if a runtime toggle is ever wanted). Vendor forks gate adapters by metadata
+version too — e.g. PrismML builds older than `prism-b10777` refuse packs with `unsupported
+prism.hadamard.version: 2`. Read the card for the build it verified on and put that in the
+fetcher header.
+
+## 3. Surface (five files, copy the mmproj convention)
+
+- `scripts/<svc>.env`: `LORA_FILE=<path>` + `LORA_SCALE=1`; document that **`LORA_FILE=` (empty)**
+  is the rollback and `LORA_SCALE=0` is the inert-but-present mode. Use `${VAR=default}` (no
+  colon) so an explicitly empty value survives — same reason `MMPROJ_FILE`/`PRESENCE_PENALTY` do.
+- `scripts/serve-<svc>.sh`: `EXTRA_ARGS+=(--lora-scaled "${LORA_FILE}:${LORA_SCALE}")` — **one
+  argv token**, so a scale can never arrive without its file; refuse a missing file by name
+  (`Restart=always` turns an unfinished fetch into a crash loop that reads like a runtime fault).
+- `scripts/download-<svc>-<adapter>.sh`: copy the sibling fetcher (`-fsSL --fail-with-body`, byte
+  count, sha256, `--verify-only`, idempotent). No LFS oid => pin the content sha. Header carries
+  the provenance finding.
+- `scripts/deploy-remote.sh`: `LLM_<SVC>_LORA="${LLM_<SVC>_LORA:-<path>}"` + a check whose error
+  names **this** fetcher, not the payload's.
+- `scripts/deploy-plan.py` needs nothing: fetchers are host-side state and select no service.
+
+## 4. Seam tests (argv is the contract)
+
+Stub-engine harness: create the adapter stub from the **shipped env's basename**, emit
+`LORA_FILE`/`LORA_SCALE` in the generated test env, then assert on output only —
+`--lora-scaled` value equals `<path>:<scale>`; a distinctive `LORA_SCALE` (0, 0.75) changes the
+token; `LORA_FILE=` yields **absence** of the flag (`! grep -qxF -- '--lora-scaled'`); a missing
+file exits non-zero naming that path; extend the env↔deployer anti-drift pair list.
+
+## 5. Deploy and prove it behaviourally
+
+Capture the **before** state on the live endpoint first, then: merge → on host `git pull` +
+run the fetcher → `./scripts/deploy.sh <host> --service <svc>`.
+
+```bash
+sudo systemctl show <svc> -p DropInPaths --value          # must be empty (bench-drop-in law)
+sudo tr '\0' ' ' < /proc/$(sudo systemctl show <svc> -p MainPID --value)/cmdline
+sudo journalctl -u <svc> --since <boot> | grep -iE 'adapter|lora'   # llama_adapter_lora_init_impl prints prism.* keys
+```
+
+Refusal probe (the only proof of an abliteration adapter): same prompts, `temperature 0.1`,
+**`max_tokens >= 2048`** — on thinking models a short budget is consumed by
+`reasoning_content` and `content` comes back empty with `finish_reason: length`, which reads
+as a refusal that never happened. Classify with a marker regex and report refusal-vs-complied;
+do not paste generated harmful content into chat. Also run the standing trio: exact-phrase
+chat, `tool_calls` with valid JSON, and a >=256 px solid-colour vision probe. A residual
+`⚠️ Important Disclaimer` heading after the swap is style, not the refusal circuit.
+
+## Docs
+
+Endpoint page (`serverAppConfigs-docs/LLM/<svc>.md`): Adapter row, Fetch row, Flags row, one
+Era row whose rollback is the env line, and a measured before/after paragraph. Laws worth
+adding: provenance is metadata not a gate; an `token_embd` rank would crash, so an adapter is
+not inert; the runtime pin may gain a second reason. Never restate the card's benchmark table.
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+---
+name: locale-c-multibyte-awk-silent-loss
+description: "Debug generated output that silently loses data under LC_ALL=C — a regex quantifier on a multibyte character in awk/grep, plus the locale-dependent red test it produces."
+---
+
+# LC_ALL=C kills multibyte regex quantifiers — silently
+
+Symptom: a generator emits a **complete, exit-0, missing-a-third-of-the-page** artifact in
+cron / systemd user units / agent shells, and the same command looks perfect in the user's
+terminal. Companion symptom: a repo test is red for the agent and green for the operator.
+
+## Probe (do these in order, they are 5 seconds apart)
+
+```bash
+echo "LANG=[$LANG] LC_ALL=[$LC_ALL]"   # LC_ALL overrides LANG — en_US.UTF-8 + LC_ALL=C is byte-wise
+locale -a | grep -iE 'utf-?8' | head    # which UTF-8 locale actually exists on this box
+```
+
+Then test the suspect pattern alone, under both locales, with the literal character:
+
+```bash
+printf '%s\n' '    // ─── Applications ───' | awk '/─+ / { print "QUANT MATCHED" }'
+printf '%s\n' '    // ─── Applications ───' | awk '/─/    { print "LITERAL MATCHED" }'
+printf '%s\n' '    // ─── Applications ───' | LC_ALL=C.utf8 awk '/─+ / { print "QUANT MATCHED under UTF-8" }'
+```
+
+Literal matches everywhere; the quantifier matches only under a UTF-8 locale. That asymmetry IS
+the bug: gawk under `LC_ALL=C` matches bytes, so `─+` means "the last byte of U+2500, repeated" —
+a byte sequence that never occurs. mawk/busybox/Go regexp have the same class of failure
+(quantifier or bracket class spanning a multibyte char).
+
+## Fix
+
+Match and strip the multibyte literal with no quantifier:
+
+```awk
+/^[[:space:]]*\/\/[[:space:]]*─/ {          # literal gate
+  s = $0; sub(/^[[:space:]]*\/\/[[:space:]]*/, "", s); sub(/[[:space:]]+$/, "", s)
+  if (s ~ /─ .*─/) { gsub(/─/, "", s); gsub(/[[:space:]]+/, " ", s); sub(/^ /, "", s); ... }
+  next
+}
+```
+
+**Never pin `LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8` to "fix" it** — that locale often does not exist (a CachyOS box
+here shipped only `C.utf8`), so the script then breaks on another machine. Make the matcher
+byte-safe instead.
+
+## Pin it with a test
+
+`run env LC_ALL=C "$GEN" "$IN"` + assert the lost content is present. The operator's UTF-8 terminal
+can never catch this class of bug, so the explicit C-locale run is the only durable guard.
+
+## Suite-verification law (how this got missed)
+
+NEVER judge `bats tests/` from `tail` output — a failure at test 28 is invisible in a 25-line
+window ending at test 109. Always:
+
+```bash
+out=$(bats tests/ 2>&1); echo "$out" | grep -cE '^ok'; echo "$out" | grep -E '^not ok' || echo GREEN
+```
+
+Run it under `LC_ALL=C` too: that is the environment every automated caller inherits. Same rule
+for `| grep -c` on a multi-line JSON field — count what you claim to have counted.
+
+## Related, do not confuse
+
+- `bats-assertion-trust` — vacuously-passing assertions (green that proves nothing). This skill is
+  the mirror case: correct assertions that are only red in one locale.
+- `gitea-pr-api-cycle` — unrelated; landed here only because the PR work is where this surfaced.
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+name: monolith-split-under-dist-pin
+description: "Use when cutting a monolithic source file into modules behind a black-box test suite whose committed build artifact (dist) must stay byte-identical to src; one verified commit per cut, red-proof against the previous bundle. Not for feature work or doc-only edits."
+---
+
+# Monolith split under a committed-bundle pin
+
+Procedure that landed a 1354-line `index.ts` as 9 modules + 301 lines of wiring across 9 commits with zero red commits. Assumes: black-box test suite (tests drive the built bundle, not internals) and a pin test asserting the committed `dist/` equals a fresh build of `src/`.
+
+## Per-cut loop (one commit per cut, always in this order)
+
+1. `bun run build` (or project equivalent) **before** staging — commit `dist/` in the same commit as the moved `src/`, otherwise the pin test fails ("committed dist is byte-identical to a fresh build") and you must amend. Amending is fine only while the branch is unpushed.
+2. `tsc --noEmit`, then run the full suite async (`bats tests/ > /tmp/x.log 2>&1; grep -E '^1\.\.'`).
+3. **Never write to `src/` while the suite runs.** `setup()` rebuilds the bundle from `src/`, so a concurrent edit attributes someone else's half-written state to your run. Read-only prep (planning the next cut's exact line ranges) is the correct thing to do while waiting.
+4. Gate green → next cut. Gate red → fix, rebuild, amend, re-gate.
+
+## Cutting mechanics
+
+- Cut leaf/pure modules first (grammar, transcript rules, URL resolution, pure segmenter), then stateful ones (config, IO, pipeline, UI). Never let a module import `index` — if the new module needs something from `index`, that thing is a leaf and must move too (this is what forced `segment.ts` out early).
+- Extract in **verbatim** bodies: read the exact ranges, write them into the new file, then delete the same ranges. Only module docs, export keywords, and injected dependencies change. Keeps each commit reviewable as a move.
+- Edit tools that require "displayed lines" from the latest read snapshot: re-read the exact ranges under the current tag, then issue one edit call with all ops listed **bottom-up** (original line numbers throughout). Adjacent ranges merge into one `CUT a=b`; leaving a doubled blank line is the usual scar — one extra `CUT` next turn.
+- Mutable config must reach a long-lived object as **getters**, not a construction-time snapshot: menu handlers mutate `cfg` after construction, and a snapshot freezes the settings the UI exists to change.
+- After moving code, grep the old file for the moved names: stale call sites compile under bundlers that skip typechecking (`stop()` vs `speaker.stop()` was caught only by `tsc`, not by `bun build`).
+
+## Proving a new assertion is red-capable (before trusting it green)
+
+Build the old bundle and point the test harness at it — no stash, no worktree juggling:
+
+```bash
+git show HEAD:dist/index.js > /tmp/old-dist.js   # bundle is self-contained
+# rebuild the throwaway harness by extracting the driver the suite writes
+sed -n "<heredoc-body-range>p" tests/behavior.bats > "$W/driver.ts"
+DV_EXT=/tmp/old-dist.js <same env as the test> bun "$W/driver.ts" <scenario>   # expect RED
+DV_EXT="$PWD/dist/index.js" <same env> bun "$W/driver.ts" <scenario>           # expect GREEN
+```
+
+Copy the project's real player/server stub verbatim — a simplified stub (e.g. one that skips writing the log file the driver counts) prints a false `PLAYS 0` and looks like a failing fix. Pin the scratch dir to a fixed path; `ls -dt /tmp/tmp.*` picks up another session's directory.
+
+## Black-box test hygiene learned the hard way
+
+- A test that counts artifacts in the **shared** temp directory observes every other process on the box (live agent sessions synthesize into the same `dankvoice-*` dirs). Give the run a private `TMPDIR="$WORK/scratch-tmp"` and assert there; the assertion's sensitivity is proven by the fact it caught a real leftover while scoped globally.
+- Let preseeds reference the ephemeral fixture port with a placeholder (`__PORT__`) substituted by the driver, so a test can preseed a URL pointing at its own fixture server.
+- Refactor-only commits get **no new test**: re-asserting unchanged labels/order after a commit whose point is that they are unchanged is a tautology; the existing suite is the gate. New tests belong to behavior changes, red-first.
+- Tests must observe **output**, never internals: assert `PLAYS`/`CALLS`/`CALL <url>`/`NOTIFY <text>`, not that a variable was set.
+
+## Docs after a split (same branch, own commit)
+
+Move each explanation to the file that now owns it (knob list → the module that reads env; state-machine prose → the module that implements it) and leave the entry point a one-line-per-module map. Then grep for pointers into the old file — a README saying "see header of `src/index.ts`" becomes a lie the moment the knobs move.
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+name: new-fleet-service-checklist
+description: "Add a new deployable service to serverAppConfigs: the four registration touch-points (two allowlists, planner, router) whose drift breaks the first-ever deploy."
+---
+
+# Adding a new service to the serverAppConfigs deployer
+
+A new `--service <name>` target must be registered in **four** files or the first deploy fails at a gate. Two fleet services (cadvisor, gpu-exporter) shipped with the client gate missed within a day of each other; the failure mode is `Service 'X' is not deployed on <target>` from `deploy.sh`, exit 2 — before SSH.
+
+## The four touch-points (per target host)
+
+1. `scripts/deploy.sh` → `valid_service()` case: add `<target>:<svc>`. **Client gate** — the one people forget.
+2. `scripts/deploy-remote.sh` → `service_is_allowed()` case: add `<target>:<svc>`, **and** the dispatcher `case` branch `<svc>) deploy_<svc> ;;`.
+3. `scripts/deploy-plan.py`: the name in the target's service set (`DANKCLAW_SERVICES` / `DANKSERVER_SERVICES`) + `SERVICE_ORDER`, plus a path map so edits to the service's own files select it (for `scripts/<svc>.*` host processes, map the exact filenames like the signal-relay/gpu-exporter maps do).
+4. `scripts/test-changed.sh`: route the service's files to its seam, else focused test runs skip it (full `tests/run.sh` still covers).
+
+Sanctioned exception: `dankclaw:searxng-network` is client-only (network unit, no remote handler) — the drift test exempts it.
+
+## Enforcement + local verification
+
+`tests/deployment_flow.bats` test "the client and remote allowlists agree per target" diffs the two extracted lists. Verify before pushing:
+
+```bash
+grep -oE 'dank(claw|server):[a-z0-9-]+' <(sed -n '/^valid_service()/,/^}/p' scripts/deploy.sh) \
+  | grep -v dankclaw:searxng-network | sort -u > /tmp/cli
+grep -oE 'dank(claw|server):[a-z0-9-]+' <(sed -n '/^service_is_allowed()/,/^}/p' scripts/deploy-remote.sh) \
+  | sort -u > /tmp/rem
+diff /tmp/cli /tmp/rem   # must be empty
+```
+
+Also: a `# comment` after a trailing `\` inside a bash `case` pattern list **breaks line continuation** (syntax error) — annotate on its own line above.
+
+## Gotchas
+
+- Merge ≠ deploy: `deploy.sh <host> --service <svc>` must still be run per host; a merged service is dead code until then (GPU stats "not showing" was exactly this).
+- `deploy.sh` refuses to run anywhere but a clean `main` checkout: the canonical dev checkout is `/home/blank/Projects/serverAppConfig` (not the session `~/.omp/wt/...` worktree, not the build worktree).
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+name: niri-monitor-flap-refresh-triage
+description: "Diagnose niri/amdgpu monitor failures on blankpad — panel dropping, wrong refresh rate, black/flickering output — and fix the refresh without reloading the compositor or logging Frank out."
+---
+
+# niri monitor triage: flaps, phantom modes, 60 Hz fallback
+
+Frank's reaction to a broken display is immediate and loud; the fix must never log him out.
+Box: `blankpad` (Cezanne APU, `card1`, s2idle only), compositor `niri --session` as a user unit.
+
+## Step 1 — separate three different diseases (do this before touching anything)
+
+```bash
+niri msg outputs                          # name, mode, position, full mode list per output
+for c in /sys/class/drm/card*-*/status; do echo "$(basename $(dirname $c)) $(cat $c)"; done
+systemctl --user show niri.service -p ExecMainStartTimestamp -p NRestarts   # did niri restart?
+journalctl --user -b --no-pager | grep -iE 'disconnecting connector|new connector|Page flip commit failed|DMCUB|falling back to preferred'
+journalctl -k -b --no-pager  | grep -iE 'amdgpu|PM: suspend exit|\*ERROR\*'
+```
+
+Reading it:
+
+- `disconnecting connector: "X"` then `new connector: X` → **link-level drop** (cable/dock/monitor/driver). Count them: `grep -c 'disconnecting connector'`.
+- `Page flip commit failed … EINVAL` bursts + kernel `dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data: DMCUB error` right after `PM: suspend exit` → **amdgpu display-engine state broken by s2idle resume**. Only a reboot clears it; never reboot without an explicit per-run OK.
+- `configured mode M could not be found, falling back to preferred` → **config asks for a mode the panel does not offer**; the panel silently runs at EDID-preferred (usually 60 Hz). This is the one you can fix instantly.
+- Config mtimes older than the symptom + no `niri` restart ⇒ the config did not cause it. Say so explicitly; agents get blamed for display problems they didn't cause.
+
+## Step 2 — the phantom-mode trap (niri fails soft, so it looks like hardware)
+
+`output { mode "…" }` with a refresh the EDID never advertised does **not** error. niri logs a WARN and drops to `preferred` on every connect → janky 60 Hz ultrawide, blamed on the monitor.
+
+Compare the requested mode against the panel's real list:
+
+```bash
+niri msg outputs | sed -n '/<monitor name>/,/^$/p' | grep -E '^\s+[0-9]+'
+```
+
+## Step 3 — apply the mode WITHOUT a config reload (the no-logout path)
+
+```bash
+niri msg output "<EDID output name from niri msg outputs>" mode "WxH@refresh"
+niri msg outputs | grep -A1 '<monitor>'      # confirm the new mode
+pgrep -c niri                                # compositor still alive, same PID
+```
+
+`niri msg output …` is documented as temporary ("not saved into the config file") — it changes one output and cannot log the session out. Avoid `niri action reload-config` when Frank is working: it reloads his whole config.
+
+## Step 4 — persist, and check you edited the file that is actually live
+
+Live niri config is a symlink chain: `~/.config/niri/config.kdl` → `cfg/display.kdl` → `cfg/desk-<profile>.kdl`, and `cfg/desk-*.kdl` are symlinks into the repo:
+
+```bash
+ls -l ~/.config/niri/cfg/display.kdl          # -> desk-1-home.kdl
+grep -n '239\|180' ~/.config/niri/cfg/display.kdl   # prove YOUR edit is in the live chain
+niri validate                                  # parses the live config; touches nothing
+```
+
+`dotfiles/` is on the `live-sync.sh` heartbeat allowlist, so an edited tracked dotfile stays dirty until the hourly heartbeat commits it — that is the designed state, do not commit it on `main` yourself.
+
+Desk config law (its own header): panels keyed by **EDID identity**, not connector name — but connector-keyed leftovers (`DP-1`, `DP-2`) survive in `desk-1-home.kdl`, and a reconnect that comes back without an EDID string hits those instead. Align them to the same mode, or a flap silently changes your refresh rate.
+
+## Escalate honestly
+
+Reboot clears DMCUB/EINVAL state → schedule it, don't take it. Persistent drops after a reboot → cable / dock / monitor DP-version setting, i.e. hardware, not config. Report which of the three diseases you found and which you did **not** fix.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+name: observability-stack-live-census
+description: "Census the Dankclaw observability stack (Prometheus/Grafana/Loki/Alloy/Alertmanager/signal-relay) live and audit per-endpoint alert coverage; reconcile against the owner page and rule-file comments, which go stale."
+---
+
+# Observability stack — live census + alert-coverage audit
+
+Use when asked "status of the observability stack" on Dankclaw, or before claiming a service is/isn't monitored. Everything runs rootless on Dankclaw: `ssh dankclaw bash -s <<'EOF' … EOF`. Verify live; the owner page (`serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Observability.md`) and `shared/prometheus/rules/llm-fleet.yml` comments go stale.
+
+## Loopback ports (do NOT probe the wrong one)
+- Prometheus `127.0.0.1:9090` · Alertmanager `127.0.0.1:9093` · Loki `127.0.0.1:3100` · Alloy `127.0.0.1:12345` · signal-relay `192.168.0.143:18093`
+- **Grafana host port is `127.0.0.1:3002`** (→ container :3000). Host `:3000` is a `rootlessport` for some *other* rootless container and answers 200-on-`/` but 404-on-`/api/health`. Probing :3000 and seeing 404 is a false alarm — always use 3002 for Grafana. `GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL=https://grafana.franksdank.cloud`.
+
+## Units + containers
+`for u in prometheus grafana loki alloy alertmanager node-exporter blackbox signal-relay; do systemctl --user is-active $u.service; systemctl --user is-enabled $u.service; done`
+- Quadlet units report `generated` (healthy), not `enabled`; signal-relay is a real host unit (`enabled`).
+- `blackbox` = `not-found`/inactive → the known gap (no blackbox exporter).
+- `podman ps` for `Up N days (healthy)`.
+
+## Prometheus — targets / rules / alerts
+- Targets: `GET :9090/api/v1/targets` → `.data.activeTargets[] | .health, .labels.job, .lastError`. Expect ~8 up / 4 down. **The 4 downs are structural, not outages:** `comfyui` + two `services` (HTML content-type, no real /metrics) and `gitea` (404, metrics disabled). Root remedy = deploy a blackbox exporter (not yet present).
+- Rules: `GET :9090/api/v1/rules` → count `.data.groups[].rules`. The `llm-fleet` group is **4 alert + 2 recording** (6 total). **AGENTS.md saying "5 alert + 1 recording" is wrong** — trust the rule file.
+- Firing: `GET :9090/api/v1/alerts`; Alertmanager: `GET :9093/api/v2/alerts` and `/api/v2/silences`.
+
+## Alert-coverage per runtime — the sharp step (catches real blind spots)
+The `llm-fleet` perf alerts (`LlmRequestsQueueing`/`LlmPrefixCacheCollapse`/`LlmSpecDecodeOff`) key on the **`llamacpp:*`** family. Which endpoints actually emit it:
+```
+GET :9090/api/v1/query?query=count by (job)({__name__=~"llamacpp:.+"})
+GET :9090/api/v1/query?query=up{job=~"frank-.*"}
+GET :9090/api/v1/query?query=count by (__name__)({job="frank-archon"})   # what archon really exports
+```
+Ground truth (2026-10-20):
+- **frank-zealot** (llama.cpp) → `llamacpp:*` (17 series) → perf alerts cover it.
+- **frank-dragoon** (halogen) → still emits `llamacpp:*` (10 series; halogen re-uses the names) → perf alerts cover it.
+- **frank-archon** (radiance) → exports the **`vllm:*`** family (`vllm:num_requests_waiting`, `vllm:gpu_prefix_cache_hit_rate`, `vllm:num_preemptions_total`, **`vllm:time_to_first_token_seconds_bucket`** = a real latency histogram), **not `llamacpp:*`** → **NO perf alert fires on archon**; only `LlmEndpointDown` (`up{job=~"frank-.*"}`) catches it. Up/down yes, perf/queueing/prefix/p95 = collected but unalerted.
+- The rule-file header comment claims "frank-archon LEFT the scrape set 2026-10-05, FreeToken exports no /metrics" — **stale/false**: archon (radiance) is `up` and exports `vllm:*`. `LlmEndpointDown`'s description repeats the same stale claim. Never assert coverage from a comment; query the families.
+
+## Log pipeline emptiness test
+Loki is "configured, healthy, empty": `GET :3100/loki/api/v1/labels` → `{"status":"success"}` with **no `data` array** = 0 label names = 0 streams. Confirm: `find /opt/loki/data -name '*.tsm' -o -name 'chunks-*' | wc -l` → 0 chunks (≈8 WAL/bookkeeping files only). Alloy ships 0 lines (journal counter 0, both file globs refused per the page — a config bug, not capacity). No Loki datasource in Grafana. Report the log half as non-functional, not merely "healthy."
+
+## Reporting posture
+- Metrics half works (up/down for all 3 endpoints + node-exporter + self-scrape); log half dead-on-arrival; blackbox + archon-perf-alerts + Loki-datasource + Alertmanager-vhost are the open gaps.
+- Grafana provisioning is file-based — check `podman exec grafana ls /etc/grafana/provisioning/{datasources,dashboards}` (expect `prometheus.yml`, `llm-fleet.json`) rather than fighting the API for creds.
+- Alertmanager has no persistence: a reboot re-stamps `startsAt` on long-firing alerts.
+- Flag stale facts (AGENTS.md rule split, archon-rejoin comments) but let the user decide whether to fix docs.
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+name: okf-small-bundle-docs-audit
+description: "Audit + dedupe a small repo's docs bundle for OKF conformance when the kb-lint/kb-coverage toolchain does not exist: inline conformance and link-audit scripts, owner-per-fact cuts, index trio, one log."
+---
+
+# OKF docs audit for a small repo bundle (no kb-lint toolchain)
+
+Use for a repo whose KB is one docs directory (e.g. `dankvoice` → `dankvoice-docs/`), where `scripts/kb-lint.sh` / `kb-coverage.py` do not exist. For the big `dank/command-center` campaign see skill `docs-dedupe-verify-campaign`; same frame, no scouts — a corpus under ~1500 lines gets read fully yourself (scouts lie).
+
+## Frame
+- OKF spec lives at `~/.omp/omp-docs/references/okf-spec.md` (the command-center deploy checkout). v0.1 conformance = every non-reserved `.md` has parseable frontmatter with non-empty `type`; `index.md` = listing with NO frontmatter; `log.md` reserved, exactly one, bundle root.
+- Branch off `origin/main` in a fresh worktree; docs-only + src-comment changes still need the repo's normal gate.
+
+## Procedure
+1. Inventory `wc -l` every page; read all fully. Ledger per fact: which page OWNS it (laws page owns laws, decisions own rationale, contributing owns process, README owns user-facing, GLOSSARY owns terms). Everything else becomes a pointer.
+2. Hunt the rot classes that repeat: dead test citations (name in docs not in `grep -c tests/` — verify with `git log --all -S`), hand-maintained censuses (test counts, scenario lists) — replace with a pointer to the authoritative source, never refresh the copy; deleted doc lines for live env vars (compare `git show <fixed>:file | grep -c VAR` vs HEAD); sections contradicting the page's own head; open items already resolved in live state (check the live settings file, not the doc).
+3. Frontmatter: `type` + one-line `description` + `tags` + `timestamp`. On edit-rejection the tool prints the file's current `#TAG` — reissue with it, no re-read needed.
+4. Conformance check (inline python): walk bundle dirs, regex `^---\n(.*?)\n---` then `^type: \S` on each non-reserved `.md`.
+5. Link audit (inline python): per md file, `\]\(([^)#]+)`; skip http; `os.path.normpath(join(dirname, target))` must exist. Report `N checked / ALL RESOLVE`.
+6. Create `index.md` at bundle root + each subdir (listing, no frontmatter, relative links) and `log.md` at the bundle root seeded with laws/incidents only.
+
+## Gotchas
+- Src docstring fixes are artifact-free only if the bundler strips comments — prove with `bun run build; cmp dist/... old` before claiming no rebuild needed.
+- README must NOT enumerate design records; point at `decisions/index.md` so new records need no README edit.
+- Mark superseded decision records in their frontmatter `description` ("its X design is superseded by the Y record") — never rewrite history bodies.
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+name: omp-background-job-deadline-debug
+description: "Diagnose a background bash job/service killed mid-run (\"Command timed out after Ns\") in omp: find which deadline owned it (tools.maxTimeout cap vs async default), prove it from the bundle, and launch long jobs uncapped as ready-log services."
+---
+
+# Omp background-job deadline forensics
+
+Symptom: an async `bats`/build job dies with `[Command timed out after 300s|600s]`
+while the same launch once ran 18+ min ("no deadline").
+
+## Cause map (proven against the pinned bundle)
+Resolver in `dist/cli.js`: `let v=n??300, R=v===0, k=R?void 0:ep("bash",v,x)` where
+`qx.bash={default:300,min:1,max:3600}` and `x` = config key `tools.maxTimeout`
+("Maximum timeout in seconds the agent can set for any tool", default 0).
+- Request absent → `qx.bash.default` 300 s.
+- Request > 0 → clamped by `tools.maxTimeout` when set (e.g. 600 caps a 1800 request).
+- Request 0 → meant "no deadline", but `0` sometimes arrives as missing (falsy drop
+  upstream of the resolver) → silently 300 s. Filed as tool issue; treat any
+  async job over ~5 min as untrustworthy.
+
+## Diagnose in three moves
+1. `grep -o 'qx={bash:{[^}]*}' <omp bundle>` — policy table (`command -v omp` →
+   `readlink -f` → `dist/cli.js`).
+2. `read cfg://tools` — live `maxTimeout` (value ≠ 0 explains any hard cap).
+3. Compare kill notices: the number in "killed once it has run Ns" is the resolved
+   deadline; 300 = default reached (request dropped), other values = your request
+   or the config cap.
+
+## Launching jobs longer than the cap
+- Named **services are not deadline-capped**: `bash(name:"x", pty:false, command:"…; echo DONE >> log", ready:{log:"DONE", timeout:900})`.
+  Readiness fires on the log pattern; result does NOT auto-deliver — `wait` on it or read `proc://x` after the supervisor notice.
+- NEVER end the service command with `echo "EXIT $?" >> log` and trust the
+  supervisor's exit code — the trailing echo masks it (supervisor reports 0 while
+  the log says EXIT 1). The log line is the truth; grep the log for the recorded
+  code and `^not ok` before believing any "exit code 0".
+- Do not raise `tools.maxTimeout` unasked: session-scoped `write cfg://tools/maxTimeout`
+  needs user approval and may be declined — respect it, use the service route.
+
+## Multi-suite hazard
+Suites that rebuild shared artifacts per test (e.g. dankvoice bats rebuilds `dist/`)
+must not run concurrently — one suite at a time, or per-worktree copies only.
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+name: omp-bundle-implementation-port
+description: "Extract and port a working implementation from omp's minified dist/cli.js bundle (copy-not-invent requests); anchors, python slicing, regex-constant sweep, trace-driven test prediction."
+---
+
+# Porting built-in omp behavior out of the minified bundle
+
+Use when Frank says "copy the omp implementation / work off known-working code" — i.e. port a built-in feature (vocalizer segmentation, retry logic, formatting rules) into our own file instead of hand-rolling a heuristic. For merely *auditing behavior claims*, use `omp-bundle-claim-audit`; this skill is extraction-for-porting.
+
+Bundle: `~/.bun/install/global/node_modules/@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent/dist/cli.js` (minified; single-letter names, private `#x` fields survive).
+
+## Extraction recipe
+
+1. **Find the setting/entry strings first.** `grep -o 'ce({id:"<area>[^"]*"[^}]\{0,200\}' cli.js` — setting descriptions state semantics verbatim (e.g. `speech.enhanced` = "Rewrite assistant output into natural spoken prose with the tiny/smol model"). Descriptions are quotable ground truth.
+2. **Anchor to code with a distinctive token**, not guesses: a method name (`pushDelta`), a state init, or a string. Then slice generously with python (bash heredoc), NOT grep -o which truncates:
+   ```python
+   src = open('cli.js').read()
+   i = src.index('pushDelta'); print(src[i-1500:i+3000])
+   ```
+3. **Follow the constructor**: pipeline classes instantiate collaborators there (`this.#t ??= new fHe` → `fHe` is the real worker; `#g()` returned `{speakable:new fHe, pending:[]…}`). Dump `class fHe{` +4000 chars.
+4. **Regex/helper sweep**: minified code declares shared constants in a trailing `var a,b,c,…` list and initializes them elsewhere (`Xyr=`, `Pwc=function`). Loop the names with `re.search(rf'{name}=', src)` and print ~400 chars each — the actual boundary/cleanup rules live in these one-liners.
+5. Write slices to `/tmp/*.txt` and `read` them; don't eyeball megabyte greps.
+
+## Port rules
+
+- Rename fields/methods to readable names but keep logic **1:1** — the value is behavioral fidelity (Frank's "known-working set of code").
+- Private `#x` fields port cleanly: TS classes in Bun extensions support `#`.
+- Global-regex `.lastIndex=0` before each scan loop — minified code relies on it; keep it.
+
+## Verification shortcut
+
+Before running tests, **hand-trace** each test input through the ported rules (boundary indices, state transitions) and predict exact segment counts/strings; then run — predicted-vs-actual mismatch localizes port errors faster than test output alone. Worked example (2026-10-19, dankvoice PR #26): traced `"First stop here. Second one goes!!! Really? Third ... done"` → predicted 3 segments incl. `"Third ... done"` merged via flush (10-char boundary < 24-char started-min) → bats green first run.
+
+## Known anchors (2026-10-19 bundle)
+
+- Speak-aloud vocalizer pipeline: class `I6o` (gating on `speech.enabled`, suspend counter, enhancer, `#g()` per-message state).
+- Utterance segmenter: class `fHe` + helpers `Pwc` (line-head classify), `Iwc`/`_wc`/`b6o`/`w6o` (boundary search), `Cwc`+`y6o` (cleanup: links→label, URL→host, path→basename). Regex consts: `Xyr` sentence-end runs, `pHe` weak breaks, `mwc` abbreviations, `hwc` undecided line-heads, `g6o` horizontal rules.
+- Port already living in `agent/extensions/dankvoice.ts` (`SpeechSegmenter`) — when the bundle updates, re-extract `fHe` and diff against it before assuming our copy still matches.
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+---
+name: omp-extension-event-probe
+description: "Prove which lifecycle events the omp harness actually dispatches to extensions, with a throwaway timestamping probe plugin, instead of inferring delivery from side effects."
+---
+
+# Prove harness→extension event delivery with a probe plugin
+
+Use when an extension handler seems never to fire, or when you must know *when* an
+event arrives relative to another (mid-run vs settle). Never infer dispatch from
+the feature's side effects: async work in the handler (LLM rewrites, synthesis,
+network) lags seconds and destroys the timing signal.
+
+## Shape (no build step needed)
+
+`/tmp/probe/package.json` — the installer validates the declared entry on disk:
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "event-probe",
+  "version": "0.0.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "exports": "./index.js",
+  "pi": { "extensions": ["./index.js"] }
+}
+```
+
+`/tmp/probe/index.js` — append arrival times, not counts:
+
+```js
+import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs";
+const LOG = "/tmp/probe.log";
+const stamp = (line) => appendFileSync(LOG, `${new Date().toISOString().slice(11, 23)} ${line}\n`);
+export default function probe(pi) {
+  pi.on("agent_start", () => stamp("agent_start"));
+  pi.on("turn_end", (e) => stamp(`turn_end turn=${e.turnIndex} toolResults=${(e.toolResults ?? []).length}`));
+  pi.on("agent_end", (e) => stamp(`agent_end messages=${(e.messages ?? []).length} willContinue=${String(e.willContinue)}`));
+}
+```
+
+## Run
+
+1. `cd ~/.omp/plugins && omp plugin link /tmp/probe` (link, never edit
+   `node_modules`), then `omp plugin doctor` → expect a `✔ plugin:event-probe` line.
+2. Launch a **fresh** TUI session in a pty (`omp --cwd /tmp/probe-run`, `pty: true`).
+   Extensions load at startup only — an already-running session never sees the probe.
+3. PTY gotcha: input sent before the splash clears is swallowed. Read the screen
+   first, then submit text and finish with a separate write containing a bare
+   `\r` (LF alone left the text sitting in the composer).
+4. Drive a task with ≥2 tool rounds so turns and settles separate in time
+   (sequential reads work and need no approval; ask for steps "strictly one
+   after the other" or the model parallelises them into one turn).
+5. Wait for a terminal line with an async bounded loop (`grep -q agent_end`,
+   `sleep 1` inside one backgrounded bash call) — never poll across turns.
+
+## Read
+
+`turn_end` timestamps strictly earlier than `agent_end` ⇒ per-turn delivery
+works. `willContinue=true` on `agent_end` marks a non-terminal settle (harness
+maps `isTerminal === false` to it) — handlers that `return` on it never speak.
+
+## Teardown (mandatory)
+
+`omp plugin uninstall event-probe`; `omp plugin doctor`; delete `/tmp/probe*`.
+The link writes into `~/.omp/plugins/package.json` (tracked, live tier) —
+uninstall restores it; confirm with `grep` for the probe name returning nothing.
+
+## Ground truth read for free
+
+Event union + payloads: `~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent/dist/types/extensibility/shared-events.d.ts`;
+the session→extension mapping lives in `src/extensibility/extensions/lifecycle-mirror.ts`
+(`extensionEventFromSessionEvent`). Extension-level `turn_end` carries
+`turnIndex`/`message`/`toolResults` but **no `willContinue`** — that field exists
+only on `agent_end`, so "is this the last turn" cannot be decided from `turn_end`.
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+name: omp-extension-stale-module-audit
+description: "Diagnose omp extension misbehavior (handler timeouts/silence, cross-instance arbitration failures like simultaneous speech) when the on-disk fix is already deployed: running sessions hold pre-upgrade in-memory bundles; compare ps lstart against artifact mtimes and merge dates."
+---
+
+# Stale in-memory omp extension bundles
+
+Symptom class: an extension behaves as if unfixed even though the disk artifact
+contains the fix — recurring handler timeouts, silence, or (multi-instance
+coordination features) arbitration failures that look like code bugs. Root
+cause: **omp loads the bundle at session start; `omp plugin upgrade` on disk
+does not touch the code already running in live sessions.**
+
+## Recipe 1: date the sessions against the artifact
+
+```bash
+date
+stat -c '%y %n' ~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/<pkg>/dist/index.js   # last upgrade
+ps -eo pid,lstart,etime,args | grep 'omp' | grep -v grep          # each session's boot
+```
+
+Any session whose START predates the artifact mtime holds an older bundle —
+for it, the "fix" never shipped. When the feature landed in git, compare
+against the merge date, not the last upgrade (`git log --format='%h %cI %s'
+main | grep -i <feature>`): a session can predate the feature *existing*.
+
+Fix is always: restart (`/quit`, then `omp --resume <id>`) — resume is
+lossless. It is the user's live session; never kill it yourself.
+
+## Recipe 2: cross-process arbitration — a bypasser explains "simultaneous X"
+
+When a feature serializes across sessions via files (e.g. dankvoice stage:
+`~/.cache/dankvoice/stage/` with `lease.json` = `{holder,pid,expires}`, one
+`<ISO>-<session>.json` entry per queued item, FIFO = filename order, lease TTL
+6 s), overlap between two actors proves **at least one actor never consults
+the directory** — the mechanism can't serialize against a bypasser. Census the
+queue live (`watch -g -d 'ls <dir>; cat <dir>/lease.json'`): a live, renewing
+lease proves the new sessions coordinate; then Recipe 1 finds the bypasser.
+
+Known residual hazard to note, not silently fix: a lease heartbeat is a timer
+on the holder's own event loop; a stall longer than the TTL lets a peer steal
+the lease mid-action. Mitigation = pid-liveness check in the steal path.
+
+## Verification
+
+After restarts, the symptom must vanish while the queue shows traffic. If it
+persists, look for actors on OTHER hosts (file arbitration is per-box), or
+the TTL-steal hazard above.
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+---
+name: omp-lifecycle-event-selection
+description: "Pick the right omp harness lifecycle event for narration/telemetry: agent_end is a settle, turn_end waits for tool results, message_end is earliest with content, after_provider_response carries no content."
+---
+
+# Choosing an omp lifecycle event (narration, telemetry, hooks)
+
+Re-derived twice from the installed typings/sources (`@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent`, `@oh-my-pi/pi-agent-core`) while fixing dankvoice. Read this before wiring a handler; verify against the installed version's `src/extensibility/extensions/types.ts` and `pi-agent-core/src/agent-loop.ts` when precision matters.
+
+| event | payload you can use | when it fires | traps |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `after_provider_response` | `status`, `headers`, `requestId`, `metadata` **only** | response headers arrive, **before the stream body is consumed** | No message content at all: useless for anything that speaks or summarizes text. Right for latency telemetry, non-200/abort detection, `requestId` correlation. |
+| `message_end` | full `message` (assistant, user, tool-result, gate-stop, error) | the moment that message is built (`agent-loop.ts`, assistant case) | Earliest event carrying assistant text. Fires for non-assistant messages too → gate `message.role === "assistant"`. Payload is cloned for extensions. |
+| `turn_end` | `turnIndex`, `message`, `toolResults` | after that turn's **tool results** come back | Stale by the tool duration: a 14 s tool delays a `turn_end` trigger 14 s. Extension event has **no `willContinue`** (the `turnIndex` is numbered by the lifecycle mirror), so you cannot tell the terminal turn from here. |
+| `agent_end` | `messages`, `willContinue`, `awaitingAsyncWork` | once per user prompt, when the loop settles | `willContinue: true` = the harness scheduled a continuation (auto-retry / empty-stop), not a user-visible settle — narrating it speaks an answer the model is about to redo. Silence-prone on long-running sessions. |
+| `agent_start` | — | run begin | Use to reset per-run dedupe state, so a later answer with identical text is not swallowed. |
+
+## Narration cadence pattern (what dankvoice ships)
+
+- `turn_end` (or `message_end` if the tool-time lag matters) for mid-run commentary; `agent_end` only for the settled answer.
+- Drop a mid-run trigger while audio/IO is busy — never queue, never interrupt.
+- Dedupe the terminal text per run (`agent_start` resets), because the last turn and the settle carry the same string.
+- Skip `ctx.mode === "print" | "json"` so benches stay silent.
+
+## Prove delivery, don't infer it
+
+Audio/UI timing cannot show which events arrive. Link a throwaway extension that appends timestamps per event and run one real session: `omp plugin link /tmp/probe` (package.json with `"pi": { "extensions": ["./index.js"] }`), prompt a task with a slow tool, read the log, then `omp plugin uninstall probe`. Confirmed live 2026-10-19: extensions receive `agent_start`, `turn_end`, `agent_end`; `turn_end` landed seconds before `agent_end`.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+name: omp-local-artifact-path
+description: Resolve a local:// artifact to a real filesystem path (for scripts/curl) without guessing the session-slug directory.
+---
+
+`local://<name>.md` artifacts live in a per-cwd, per-session directory whose name you cannot guess. Three invented paths failed before this worked (2026-10-19).
+
+Actual layout:
+
+```
+~/.omp/agent/sessions/<cwd-slug>/<timestamp>Z_<session-id>/local/<name>.md
+```
+
+`<cwd-slug>` is the working directory with `/` replaced by `-`, **keeping the leading dash** — `/home/blank/.omp/wt/wt-20261019-125509-7c8a99d` under `/home/blank` becomes `-.omp-wt-wt-20261019-125509-7c8a99d`. Dropping the leading `-.` is the mistake that produces `FileNotFoundError`.
+
+## Get the real filesystem path
+
+Ask the tool, don't reconstruct it — a ranged read of the artifact reports the resolved path in its header:
+
+```
+read local://pr-body-msgend.md:1-1     ->  [~/.omp/agent/sessions/-.../local/pr-body-msgend.md#TAG]
+```
+
+Or locate it by basename (needs enough depth; `maxdepth 5` misses it — the file sits 6–7 levels down):
+
+```bash
+f=$(find ~/.omp/agent/sessions -maxdepth 7 -name 'pr-body-msgend.md' | head -1)
+cp "$f" /tmp/prbody.md      # stable path for the python/curl step
+```
+
+Copy to `/tmp` before handing the content to a script: one cheap command, and every later tool call stops depending on session-scoped paths.
+
+## Related lookups in the same directory tree
+
+- Session id for the current cwd — `~/.omp/agent/history.db` (prompts table has `session_id`, `cwd`; the column is `prompt`, **not** `text`, and raw `?q=` queries cannot be combined with a table selector or pagination):
+  ```
+  read history.db?q=SELECT session_id, cwd, substr(prompt,1,50) AS p FROM history WHERE cwd LIKE '%wt-20261019%' ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT 3
+  ```
+  Use the real id in issue/PR attribution footers; never reuse an id remembered from a compacted transcript.
+- Transcript dir for the same session sits beside `local/`.
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+name: omp-search-provider-fallback-debug
+description: "Diagnose why the omp harness web_search silently uses a fallback provider (e.g. Kagi) instead of the configured primary (SearXNG): the fallbackChains masking pattern, the searxng.endpoint base-URL scheme/guard-chain trap, and the cli.js + content-type probes that prove it."
+---
+
+# omp web_search silently using the wrong provider
+
+Symptom: agent searches return results from a fallback provider (e.g. **Kagi**) even though
+`modelRoles.web` is set to the intended primary (e.g. `web/searxng`). The primary errors
+every time and the failure is invisible because a fallback answers successfully.
+
+## The masking mechanism (always check this first)
+
+`~/.omp/agent/config.yml`:
+- `modelRoles.web:` is the primary (e.g. `web/searxng`).
+- `retry.fallbackChains.web:` is an ordered list tried when the primary throws. The FIRST
+  entry silently serves whenever the primary errors. In this fleet it is `web/kagi`, so any
+  SearXNG error == Kagi answers and you never see an error.
+
+So "searches go through Kagi" almost always means "SearXNG is failing", not a routing mistake.
+
+## The SearXNG endpoint trap (the usual root cause here)
+
+`searxng.endpoint` in config.yml must be a **full base URL pointing at the direct JSON port**,
+used **verbatim** by omp (no scheme auto-added, no normalize — confirmed in `cli.js`). Two ways
+it breaks:
+
+1. **Bare host** (e.g. `search.franksdank.cloud`, no scheme): omp does `new URL(\`${endpoint}/search\`)`
+   → **throws** immediately (URL needs a scheme). SearXNG never contacted.
+2. **The guarded vhost** (`https://search.franksdank.cloud`): returns Anubis' **"Making sure
+   you're not a bot!"** challenge page at HTTP **200 `text/html`**. omp calls `o.json()`
+   unconditionally regardless of content-type → throws on the leading `<`. There is
+   deliberately NO API path through the guard chain (JS challenge + UA denylist).
+
+**Correct value** (direct published port, http scheme preserved — reachable from the LAN only):
+
+```yaml
+searxng:
+  endpoint: http://192.168.0.143:8081   # Dankclaw; NOT the vhost, NOT schemeless
+```
+
+The published port source (192.168.x/loopback/LAN) is in SearXNG's `pass_ip`, so it bypasses
+the JSON rate limiter (hardcoded `API_MAX=4`/IP/hr, not settable except via `pass_ip`).
+
+## Prove it (don't guess)
+
+1. Content-type probe, both paths — the decisive check:
+   ```
+   curl -sk -o /tmp/vh -w "vhost ct=%{content_type}\n" "https://search.franksdank.cloud/search?q=test&format=json"   # expect text/html (Anubis)
+   curl -s  -o /tmp/dp -w "direct ct=%{content_type}\n" "http://192.168.0.143:8081/search?q=test&format=json"          # expect application/json
+   ```
+   vhost = `text/html` + direct = `application/json` confirms the trap.
+2. Code path, in the installed omp dist (NOT a worktree):
+   `/home/blank/.bun/install/global/node_modules/@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent/dist/cli.js`
+   (find install: `dirname $(readlink -f $(which omp))`). Grep the SearXNG provider:
+   - `searxng.endpoint` config def → description "Base URL of a self-hosted SearXNG instance".
+   - the request builder `...=e.replace(/\/+$/,""),new URL(\`${r}/search\`)...` → endpoint is
+     verbatim, scheme NOT added.
+   - `X2c`/`J2c` → `if(!o.ok)throw` then `return await o.json()` → HTML 200 passes `.ok` and
+     blows up in `.json()`.
+
+## Apply + verify
+
+- Fix is a harness config edit (`cfg://searxng/endpoint` prompts the user, or edit config.yml).
+  Confirm with the user first — it is their live harness config.
+- Verification after applying: fire a real `web_search` and confirm it returns
+  `provider:"searxng"` (not `"searxng"`-then-fallback / not `"kagi"`).
+
+## Related gotcha (same masking, different cause)
+
+If SearXNG answers JSON but returns empty `results` with `unresponsive_engines` (VPN-exit-IP
+CAPTCHA/429 on google/brave), omp's `vcs` throws a 503 → Kagi again. That's an engine-health
+problem, fix in `[[SearXNG]]`/`[[SearXNG Providers]]`, not the endpoint.
+
+## Hardening option
+
+Drop or reorder `web/kagi` / `web/perplexity` in `retry.fallbackChains.web` so primary failures
+surface instead of silently spending a paid Kagi credit. Flag to user before editing.
@@ -1,49 +1,22 @@
 ---
 name: omp-worktree-path-gotchas
-description: "Use in ~/.omp (or any multi-worktree repo) when an edit lands in the wrong checkout, git checkout is policy-refused, or an omp session id is needed — relative-path tool resolution, shared-worktree branch law, session-id lookup, edit auto-prefix trap."
+description: "Multi-worktree edits/tests land in the wrong checkout: bash persistent-cwd drift, phantom file reverts, which tree a tool really touched"
 ---

-# Multi-worktree gotchas in ~/.omp-style repos
+## Purpose
+Answer "why did my file/tests revert or behave differently than what I just wrote?" in repos with several worktrees (e.g. `~/.omp`, `~/Projects/wt-*`, `~/.omp/wt/*`).

-Measured 2026-10-18 building PR #12/#14 in `dank/command-center` worktrees.
+## Failure modes and fixes

-## 1. Relative paths resolve to the SESSION worktree — always edit by absolute path
-`edit`/`read`/`write` with a relative `path` resolve against the session CWD
-(the harness worktree you were spawned in), NEVER the worktree you `cd`'d into
-via bash. Identical file content in sibling worktrees yields identical
-`[path#tag]` hashes, so an edit can "succeed" against the WRONG checkout with
-no warning; only a rejected stale-hash edit reveals it.
+1. **Bash tool persistent-cwd drift** (the expensive one): the persistent shell keeps its cwd across calls; a call *without* an explicit `cwd` runs in whatever the *previous* call left, which after interleaved work may be a DIFFERENT worktree. Result: reads/greps/appends hit tree A while `git`/`bats` hit tree B — symptoms are "file keeps reverting to HEAD", duplicate test names at shifting line numbers, scenario `CALLS 0` for scenarios that exist, mismatched `grep -n` vs tool-reported line numbers.
+   - **Diagnose:** `pwd` in the same call as the failing command; `wc -l <file>` in BOTH candidate worktrees; compare md5s. The file is not flapping — two files exist and commands alternate between them.
+   - **Fix/prevent:** pass an explicit `cwd` on EVERY bash call once two or more checkouts are in play; never trust a read taken without one as evidence about "the" file.

- When working in a second worktree, ALL file-tool paths: absolute.
- Symptom seen: edit rejected "hash #X is not from this session" while the
-  bash-side `git status` showed the file clean — two different files, two
-  worktrees. Recovery: revert the stray edit (CUT the inserted lines) in the
-  wrong tree, re-read the right tree, redo with absolute header.
+2. **Symlinked or stale `git` state**: `git status` in a worktree shows a clean tree while the disk file differs from what you intended — the corruption is already committed. Audit committed blobs (`git log --oneline -- <file>`; per-commit `git show <c>:<path> | grep -c <sentinel>`) instead of re-reading the disk copy repeatedly.

-## 2. Branching: shared worktrees refuse git checkout
-Workspace policy blocks `git checkout` (branch switches AND `--` discards) in
-harness-managed worktrees — concurrent agents depend on them. To start a
-branch off fresh trunk:
+3. **Same-name files across worktrees** (`tests/behavior.bats` exists in each): a `find`/`grep` rooted above the worktrees mixes copies; anchor the search path to one worktree root.

-```bash
-git -C ~/.omp worktree add -q -b <type>/<issue#>-<slug> ~/.omp/wt/<name> origin/main
-```
-
-Never force past the refusal; the new-worktree route is strictly safer.
-Custom worktrees not matching `wt/wt-*` are invisible to the live-sync reaper —
-prune them by hand after merge (`git worktree remove`, `git branch -d`).
-
-## 3. omp session id for attribution footers
-Fleet law requires `session:` in issue/PR bodies. Authoritative source:
-`~/.omp/agent/sessions/<cwd-slug>/<timestamp>_<UUID>.jsonl` — the `<UUID>` is
-the session id. Pick the newest file whose first `{"type":"title"}` line names
-this conversation to prove the id is yours. The `wt/<ts>-<hash>` dir suffix is
-NOT the session id (it persists across sessions per cwd).
-
-## 4. edit-tool auto-prefix trap (recurring)
-A body row written bare (intending it as the "original line" anchor or as
-context) is AUTO-PREFIXED with `+` and INSERTED — leaving the old line plus a
-duplicate. `PUT n.=n:` therefore behaves like insert, not replace, whenever
-the anchor row lacks an explicit marker. After any `PUT` where the response
-warns "Auto-prefixed bare body row(s)", immediately `CUT` the stale line number
-shown in the response (descending order for multiple CUTs).
+## Repair recipe for a corrupted-but-committed test file
+- Inventory both versions: `grep -o '@test "[^"]*"' | sort` and `grep -o 'case "[a-z]*":' | sort -u`; `comm` the sets to find lost scenarios and duplicate tests.
+- Rebuild from the committed copy (`git show HEAD:<path> > <path>`, no checkout), then re-apply only the true deltas: restore missing scenario blocks from the last clean base, dedupe imports, rename scratch-dir mkdtemp prefixes that collide with a test's own orphan-census glob (e.g. `dankvoice-stage-` matching `dankvoice-*`).
+- Re-run the targeted tests, then the full suite single-process.
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+name: open-notebook-provision-model-rest
+description: "Provision or repair an open-notebook model (LLM/TTS/embedding) over its REST API on Dankclaw: credential→model→defaults order, the defaults-store-the-ID trap, the /api/embed 500-that-succeeds, and the two-note ranking proof for embeddings."
+---
+
+# open-notebook model provisioning over REST
+
+Use when adding/repairing a model row (embedding, LLM, TTS) in open-notebook on Dankclaw, when semantic
+search is dead, or when an embed error appears in the worker log. Config lives in the **database**
+(encrypted with `OPEN_NOTEBOOK_ENCRYPTION_KEY`) — no repo file mirrors it, REST or the UI are the only doors.
+
+## Access (never put the bearer in argv)
+
+The API bearer IS `OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD`; the API publishes on loopback `127.0.0.1:5056` only, so run
+from Dankclaw over ssh. `ssh dankclaw 'curl -H "Authorization: Bearer …"'` leaks the secret into
+`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` — use a mode-600 curl config:
+
+```bash
+PW=$(grep -m1 '^OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD=' /home/dank/Containers/open-notebook/env | cut -d= -f2- | tr -d '"')
+cfg=$(mktemp); chmod 600 "$cfg"; printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$PW" > "$cfg"
+B=http://127.0.0.1:5056   # not 5055: seerr holds the host's 5055
+```
+
+## Order, and the address rule
+
+`POST /api/credentials` → `POST /api/models` (`credential: <credential id>`) → `PUT /api/models/defaults`
+→ any profile that names a model (speaker `voice_model`, episode `speaker_config`/`outline_llm`).
+
+- Credential provider for any in-house OpenAI-compatible server: **`openai_compatible`** (not `openai`),
+  with a dummy `api_key` when the upstream does not authenticate.
+- The app's URL guard refuses base URLs resolving in `169.254.0.0/16`, so `host.containers.internal`
+  cannot be stored; a **container name on `dankclaw_default`** (e.g. `http://frank-dragoon-halogen:8731/v1`)
+  or another machine's RFC1918 IP both pass.
+
+## The two traps that eat the most time
+
+1. **`PUT /api/models/defaults` takes the model ID, never the name.** `"default_embedding_model":
+   "qwen3-embedding-0.6b"` is accepted and echoed back, then every job dies in the worker with
+   `Model with ID qwen3-embedding-0.6b not found`. Use the row's `model:…` id (GET defaults first, change
+   one key, PUT the whole object back — the other keys in that response are ids and must be preserved).
+2. **`POST /api/embed` answers 500 *after* the work succeeds.** Upstream `EmbedResponse.command_id`
+   declares `str` and the worker returns a `RecordID`, so FastAPI raises in serialization only. The truth is
+   `podman logs open-notebook | grep "Successfully embedded"`, never the HTTP code. Note saves
+   (`POST /api/notes`) submit `embed_note` themselves; `/api/embed` is only for backfills.
+
+## Proof it actually works
+
+- Per row: `POST /api/models/<id>/test` → `Embedding dimensions: 1024` (embeddings) or a real completion.
+- Embeddings, discriminating test: create **two** unrelated notes, then
+  `POST /api/search` `{"query": "...", "type": "vector", "search_notes": true, "limit": 5}` — the enum is
+  `text|vector` (not `semantic`) and the score field is `similarity`. Each query must rank its own note
+  high and the other low (measured 0.659/0.292 vs 0.906/0.318). One note proves nothing: `total_count` is 1
+  either way. Delete the probe notes afterwards (`DELETE /api/notes/<id>`).
+- Confirm which engine served it: `podman logs <engine container> | grep "POST /v1/embeddings"`.
+
+Owner pages: `serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Open Notebook.md` (app-side shapes), and the endpoint's own
+page for whatever serves the model.
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+name: parallel-suite-shared-db-flake
+description: "Diagnose test suites that pass isolated but fail only under concurrent/uncached runs against a shared database: cross-file teardown wipes, FK-cascaded sessions, wildcard LIKE deletes."
+---
+
+# Flaky only under concurrency on a shared DB
+
+Symptom: a suite passes `vitest run <file>` alone, fails under `turbo run test --force`
+(or any concurrent uncached runner) with impossible errors — 401 where 404 was
+expected, rows vanishing mid-test, sessions dying between two awaited requests.
+
+## Procedure
+
+1. **Reproduce the concurrency, not the file.** Isolated runs prove nothing.
+   `bun x turbo run test --force --output-logs=errors-only` (or run the two suspect
+   files simultaneously). Never conclude "flake" from one green isolated run.
+2. **Map the impossible state to a vanished row.** 401/auth failures where the
+   session was created milliseconds earlier = the session/user row was DELETED
+   under the test, not expired. Look for writers, not readers.
+3. **Grep every suite's teardown for shared-namespace deletes:**
+   `grep -rn "TRUNCATE\|DELETE FROM\|LIKE" <pkg>/src/*.test.*`
+   The classic killer: two test files sign users up under the same domain
+   (`%@studio.test`) and each `afterAll` runs a wildcard `DELETE ... LIKE '%@...'`.
+   With parallel files on one DB, whichever file finishes first cascades away the
+   other's live rows (user FK cascades kill sessions mid-flight).
+4. **Fix = scope, never coordinate.** Each suite deletes only rows it created:
+   per-file email/id prefixes (`auth*` vs `rel*`), or track created keys and
+   `WHERE email = ANY(...)`. Timing tricks (sleeps, retry) hide the collision.
+5. **Prove stability:** 3 consecutive `--force` uncached runs green, then the
+   full gate. Cache makes everything look green; only uncached concurrent runs
+   re-exercise the collision window.
+
+## Gotchas
+
+- Error signatures lie: `expected 401 to be 404` reads as an auth bug but is a
+  deleted-row cascade.
+- Supertest `cookieOf`-style helpers that THROW on missing cookies prove signup
+  succeeded — so the session died after creation; keep hunting for the deleter.
+- Shared dev DBs (one Postgres for all workspaces/worktrees) make every wildcard
+  teardown a cross-suite weapon. Suite teardowns on a shared box MUST scope to
+  rows the suite created.
@@ -1,68 +1,34 @@
 ---
 name: parallel-worktree-path-hazard
-description: "\"Use when several agents edit the same repo in different git worktrees at once, or when an edit/read may have landed in the wrong checkout: which path forms bind where, how to detect with git -C status, and the repair protocol (cp + git show HEAD blob write-back) because git checkout/restore is policy-blocked in a shared workspace.\""
+description: "Use when several agents edit the same repo in different git worktrees at once, or when an edit lands in the wrong checkout: relative tool paths resolve to the session cwd, not the shell cwd."
 ---

-# Concurrent-worktree path hazard (shared repo, many agents)
+Use when several agents (or you across two checkouts) edit the same repo in different git worktrees at once, or when an edit/query lands in the wrong checkout.

-Measured 2026-10-18 on `serverAppConfigs` with two agents live at once. The
-failure is **silent**: the tool reports success, the diff looks right, and the
-change lives in a *different* worktree.
+## The silent failure: relative tool paths resolve to the SESSION cwd

-## Which path form binds where
- **Parent/top-level session**: a **relative** `path` resolves against the
-  session CWD — its own worktree — never against the worktree named in the
-  prompt. This is how a change meant for `wt-tts-trial-docs` landed in
-  `wt-20261017-…`.
- **Subagent**: an **absolute** path to its own assigned worktree can resolve
-  into the parent's worktree when the same *relative* path exists there
-  (`edit` twice onto `dankclaw/.env.example`). Its `write` with the same
-  absolute path was fine — the bug is `edit`/`read` path resolution, not `write`.
+`read` / `edit` / `write` / `grep` resolve a **relative** `path` against the **session working directory** — never against the `cd` inside a neighboring `bash` call, and not against a `../other-worktree/...` prefix either (that gets normalized back into the session tree). So after `cd ../wt-B && grep …` you can `read path="docs/page.md"` and get **wt-A's** copy.

-Rules that hold:
-1. A subagent passes paths as `../<its-worktree>/<rel>` (relative to the parent
-   worktree) for `read` **and** `edit`; the parent passes **absolute** paths to
-   any worktree that is not its own CWD.
-2. After every edit batch, prove the landing site, do not trust the tool's echo:
-   `git -C <intended-worktree> status --short` must list the file. A file you
-   edited that is missing from that list went somewhere else.
-3. Keep each work item on its own branch/worktree, and keep ONE integration
-   owner (the parent) for shared files — `scripts/deploy-remote.sh`,
-   `scripts/deploy-plan.py`, `tests/`, `serverAppConfigs-docs/index.md`,
-   `AGENTS.md` are the collision hot spots in this repo. Never rebase a
-   sibling's branch.
+Why it survives "I just read it to check": the returned path is printed workspace-relative and the file name is identical in every checkout, so the output looks like a correct read of the tree you meant. Only content that differs between the checkouts betrays it.

-## Repair protocol (no `git checkout`, no `git restore`)
-`git checkout -- <path>` and `git restore <path>` are **policy-blocked** in a
-shared workspace ("overwriting working-tree files … discards changes other
-concurrent agents rely on"). Unstaging (`git reset [<path>]`,
-`git restore --staged <path>`) is allowed but does not undo content. So:
+Rules:
+- **Absolute paths for every tool call that targets a worktree other than the session's.** No exceptions for quick reads.
+- Confirm the checkout from content you know differs (a heading, a status line), not from the echoed path.
+- A `read` error like "Did you mean .AGENTTRASH/<name>" is a signal the relative path resolved into the session tree — re-issue absolute.
+- Same trap for `bash`: it starts each call in the session cwd, so `cd` twice per call or use absolute paths there too.

-```bash
-F="path/with spaces if any"
-# 1. move the change to the worktree that should own it (both at the same base commit)
-cp "<wrong-wt>/$F" "<right-wt>/$F"
-# 2. undo in the wrong worktree by writing the committed blob back
-git -C "<wrong-wt>" show "HEAD:$F" | tee "<wrong-wt>/$F" > /dev/null
-# 3. prove both sides
-md5sum <(git -C "<wrong-wt>" show "HEAD:$F") "<wrong-wt>/$F" "<right-wt>/$F"
-git -C "<wrong-wt>" status --short          # must be empty for that file
-git -C "<right-wt>" diff --stat             # must show the intended delta
-```
+## Landing a change when the session worktree is stale

-Never fix it blind: if the wrong worktree had its own uncommitted edits to that
-file, `cp`/blob-write-back would destroy them — check
-`git -C <wrong-wt> status --short` FIRST and reconcile content, don't overwrite.
+`git diff --name-only HEAD origin/main` first. If main moved a file you are editing, your edit's base is wrong even though the file "looks fine" — do not commit on the stale base.

-## Tidy after a cancelled sibling
-A killed subagent can leave a worktree plus an empty branch. Removing them is
-safe only when verified empty: `git -C <main> log --oneline -3 <branch>` (no
-unique commits) and `git -C <wt> status --short` (clean), then
-`git worktree remove <wt>` + `git branch -D <branch>`. An orphan worktree at a
-stale commit is the same class of trap as a leftover bench drop-in: the next
-agent reads it as unfinished work.
+1. `git worktree add ../wt-clean -b <type>/<slug> origin/main`; copy the new files in.
+2. Re-apply the edit against the clean tree's version **with absolute paths**, then read it back absolutely to prove which tree changed.
+3. Run the suite inside the clean worktree; commit there.
+4. Remove your own duplicate edit from the session worktree by editing it away (`CUT`/`PUT`). `git checkout -- <path>` and branch switches are policy-blocked in shared workspaces and should stay blocked — they discard edits other agents rely on.
+5. Never carry the same uncommitted edit in two worktrees at once; if you must keep both trees, keep a task that reconciles them.

-## Report it
-File the misresolution to `xd://report_issue` (false positives are fine) and
-record the incident in the repo worklog — a repair nobody wrote down looks like
-a hijack later.
+## Multi-agent hazards in one shared worktree
+
+- Another agent can stage, commit, or check out files under you; re-read a file immediately before editing it if any tool result hinted at intervening change.
+- Untracked scratch you drop in a shared tree (reports, notes, `.AGENTTRASH/` entries) is visible to everyone and can be committed by them. Put throwaway artifacts outside the checkout.
+- Never `git clean -f`, `rm -rf`, or branch switching to "get a clean state" in a tree another agent is using.
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+---
+name: pdf-lib-determinism-moddate-leak
+description: "Diagnose pdf-lib output that isn't byte-identical across fetches: PDFDocument.load restamps /ModDate; fake-clock determinism test; inflate object streams to diff."
+---
+
+# pdf-lib byte-identical output: the /ModDate clock leak
+
+## Symptom
+A "reconstruct-on-read, byte-identical forever" PDF endpoint passes its back-to-back refetch test but returns **different bytes when fetches cross a wall-clock second**. Same-second fetches match; a fetch 1s later differs (often a different stream `/Length`, e.g. object stream 411→420 bytes).
+
+## Root cause
+`PDFDocument.load()` has its own `updateMetadata` option (**defaults true**) and stamps `/Info /ModDate` from the wall clock **at load time**, not just at save. `doc.save({updateMetadata:false})` on its own is not enough (and in pdf-lib 1.17 `updateMetadata` isn't even in the `SaveOptions` type — only in `PDFOptions` on `load`); passing it to `save` also fails typecheck.
+
+## Fix
+```ts
+const doc = await PDFDocument.load(templateBytes, { updateMetadata: false });
+// ... fill, stamp print layer ...
+return doc.save(); // save never stamps when load didn't
+```
+Output becomes a pure function of (template bytes, values).
+
+## Determinism test law
+A determinism test MUST straddle a time boundary. Back-to-back fetches/fills are structurally blind to per-second stamping.
+- Unit: fake the clock (`@sinonjs/fake-timers` or `vi.useFakeTimers`) → fill → jump +2 months → re-fill → `expect(Buffer.from(second)).toEqual(first)`. No sleeps, no flake window. Faking `Date` outside a test framework requires patching `globalThis.Date` BEFORE the module import that uses it.
+- Prove it red first against the old code (expect the byte/length drift).
+
+## Byte-diff forensics (when lengths differ)
+1. Dump the differing region raw: `Buffer.subarray(idx-60, idx+60)` rendered latin1 with non-printables stripped — locate the exact field (`D:YYYYMMDDHHmmss` = clock leak).
+2. If the diff is inside a compressed object stream, inflate and compare streams:
+```ts
+import { inflateSync } from "node:zlib";
+// find /Type /ObjStm ... stream chunks, inflateSync each, string-compare
+```
+3. pdf-lib escapes text-show operands — inflate + unescape `\\(\\[()\\\\]\\)` before substring-asserting printed values.
+
+## Live proof recipe
+Seed a submission, then fetch both retrieval doors at t, t+1.5s, t+3s; `sha256sum` all three → one hash. Same-second comparisons prove nothing. And kill any long-running dev service holding the app port first — a live :3000-style stack can hang or false-fail an e2e gate.
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+name: pdf-widget-layer-census
+description: "Census a real-world \"flat\" PDF before assuming it needs field injection: Quartz/Preview exports often already carry an AcroForm widget layer under underscore rules; also audits pdf-lib flatten residue."
+---
+
+# Real-PDF census (widget-first, then judge)
+
+A PDF that *looks* flat (`pdftotext` shows `____` fill rules) may already contain a
+full AcroForm widget layer — macOS Preview/Quartz exports write widgets with
+transparent rects under drawn underscores. Injecting fields into such a file
+duplicates/shadows widgets. Always census before touching the pipeline.
+
+## Steps
+
+1. **Surface facts** (host):
+   ```bash
+   pdfinfo file.pdf            # "Form: AcroForm" hints at a widget layer
+   pdftotext -layout file.pdf -  # label lines + underscore rules = intended fields
+   ```
+2. **Widget census** — authoritative check. With the franksign sidecar image,
+   the image ENTRYPOINT *is* `inject_fields.py`; override it:
+   ```bash
+   podman run --rm --entrypoint python -v ~/Downloads:/in:z \
+     localhost/franksign-pdf-field-sidecar:local -c "
+   import pymupdf
+   d = pymupdf.open('/in/file.pdf')
+   for p in d.pages():
+       for w in p.widgets():
+           print(w.field_name, w.field_type_string, [round(v) for v in w.rect])
+   print('widgets:', sum(1 for p in d.pages() for _ in p.widgets()),
+         'annots:', sum(1 for p in d.pages() for _ in p.annots()))
+   "
+   ```
+3. **Fill test**: if widgets exist, `fillTemplate()` (pdf-lib) consumes the file
+   AS-IS — spec.json + sidecar are unnecessary for it. Flatten-verify below.
+
+## Flatten audit gotchas
+
+- `pdfinfo` prints `Form: AcroForm` even on correctly flattened pdf-lib output —
+  pdf-lib `flatten()` removes every *widget/annotation* but leaves the field
+  *dictionary*. Truth = MuPDF widget enumeration (0), not the pdfinfo line.
+- `describeForm(bytes, specJson)` in `packages/pdf` parses the SPEC, not the
+  PDF, for the field list — pass a spec or skip it; calling it spec-less throws
+  `JSON Parse error`.
+
+## Decision rule
+
+- widgets > 0 → the widget layer IS the spec (names/types/rects, flip y to
+  bottom-left origin); NEVER run `inject_fields.py` over it.
+- widgets = 0 → genuine flat form: sidecar injection with a spec (position
+  detection = issue #14 territory: underscore-run rects, label-derived names).
+- Missing signature widget is normal ("please sign" is prose); franksign
+  decision 19: the typed full name is the signature.
+
+## Privacy
+
+Real documents are personal: scratch copies in /tmp, placeholder fill values,
+destroy scratch (`rm /tmp/*` is fine OUTSIDE the repo; repo deletions still go
+to `.AGENTTRASH/`). Never commit the document, a spike script touching it, or
+its extracted text into the vault.
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+name: plugin-git-install-committed-artifact
+description: "Use when shipping or landing an omp/pi plugin (omp plugin install/upgrade git): install validation fails on a missing build artifact, a stale bun git-mirror cache is reused, the live bundle needs proof it is the merged build, or upgrade says \"not installed\"."
+---
+
+# Plugin install from git: committed artifact + fresh mirror
+
+`omp plugin install git:<url>` (and `pi install git:`) **clone the repo and validate the manifest's declared extension entry WITHOUT running a build step**. Two failure classes seen live (dank/dankvoice, 2026-10-19):
+
+## 1. Declared entry missing from the clone
+
+Symptom: `Plugin <name> extension validation failed: ./dist/index.js: declared extension entry not found on disk`.
+
+Cause: build output (`dist/`) is gitignored; the manifest points at it; the clone has only `src/`.
+
+Fix — ship the artifact:
+- Remove `dist/` from `.gitignore`, `bun run build`, commit `dist/`.
+- Prove build determinism first: build twice, `cmp` the outputs (bun esm builds are byte-reproducible without sourcemaps).
+- Pin the contract in a small bats suite so it can't rot:
+  1. the manifest's declared entry is tracked in git (`git ls-files -- "${entry#./}"` non-empty — this is the installer's exact contract, not a config assertion);
+  2. committed bytes equal a fresh build (`bun run build` then `git diff --name-only -- dist` is empty → red on drift).
+
+## 2. Stale bun git-mirror cache
+
+Symptom: fix pushed, retry **still** fails identically, and the retry is suspiciously fast (seconds).
+
+Cause: bun keeps bare mirrors in `~/.bun/install/cache/<hash>.git` and may reuse them at an old commit — even after the fix is pushed and the default branch is correct.
+
+Diagnose + fix:
+```bash
+find ~/.bun/install/cache -maxdepth 2 -iname "*<repo>*"
+git --git-dir ~/.bun/install/cache/<hash>.git log --oneline -3 --all   # stale HEAD?
+rm -rf ~/.bun/install/cache/<hash>.git                                  # it is a cache; safe
+```
+Prove the fetch path independently first (also validates credentials for private Gitea repos):
+```bash
+GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 git clone -q <url> /tmp/x && git -C /tmp/x log --oneline -1 && ls /tmp/x/dist
+```
+
+## Order of investigation (don't skip)
+1. Gitea default branch correct? (`GET /api/v1/repos/<o>/<r>` with token — private repos 404/None unauthenticated.)
+2. Plain unattended clone contains the entry? If yes, the installer's view is cached → purge mirror.
+3. Only then suspect the installer itself (validation code lives in the minified bundle; `grep -oE '.{600}<error string>' "$bunfile"` on `readlink -f $(which omp)` shows the exact check).
+
+## Landing a merged PR on the live box
+
+After the merge and the `--ff-only` on the dev checkout (`ls -ld node_modules` after landing anything that could have touched it):
+
+- **`omp plugin upgrade <name>` takes the PACKAGE name, not the install alias.** `omp plugin upgrade dankvoice` fails `dankvoice is not installed` while the live copy sits in `~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/omp-dankvoice/`. Read the directory name (or `package.json` `"name"`) and upgrade that.
+- Then close the chain of custody with one command — the deployed bytes are the merged bytes:
+  ```bash
+  cmp ~/Projects/<repo>/dist/index.js ~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/<pkg>/dist/index.js
+  ```
+  If only docs/tests changed, `dist/` is untouched and this should already match; if `src/` changed, the plugin must be upgraded first or this fails with `char <n>` — which is a real finding (stale live bundle), not a test bug.
+- The session that did the merge keeps the OLD bundle in memory: it is still running pre-merge code. Never conclude "the change does not work" from the merging session.
+
+## After install — proof without a TUI
+- `omp plugin doctor` → per-plugin ✔ line.
+- Audible/behavioral chain when TUI input is unusable (update-banner modal freezes pty submits): run `omp --mode=rpc --no-session` with the feature env armed (dankvoice: `DANKVOICE_AUTO=1`, gate is print/json-only) and watch for objective side effects, e.g. PipeWire: `pw-dump | grep -q "say-<ms>.wav"` proves synth+playback end-to-end.
+- When pty submits DO work (no modal), the strongest instrument is a stub player plus a clip count, not ears or pixels: `DANKVOICE_PLAYER=/tmp/stub.sh` where the stub appends `$1` to a log and exits 0. Launch the DEPLOYED bundle by path (`omp --no-extensions --no-session -e ~/.omp/plugins/node_modules/<pkg>/dist/index.js`) in a neutral cwd with `DANKVOICE_CONFIG` pointed at a scratch file so the operator's settings are untouched.
+- **Count clips per narration EVENT, not per turn.** One turn can fire several narrations (dankvoice: `message_end` carries prose+thinking, `agent_end` the settled answer; the dedupe only skips byte-identical text, so thinking-on means both speak). A "too many clips" result is usually correct behaviour — check the harness transcript for the turn count before believing a bug. The player deletes each temp wav, so the log line count is the only surviving evidence: park it in `~/.AGENTTRASH/<date>-<topic>/` if it becomes evidence for an issue.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+name: radiance-decode-prefill-interference-census
+description: "Diagnose decode collapsing while another session prefills on a radiance endpoint: phase-ratio step counters, lag test, metric-prefix and scrape traps, and which knob acts on the measured mechanism."
+---
+
+Read `core/config.cpp` (help table + validator) in the PINNED image source before writing any radiance flag, enum member, or metric name into a runbook: `config_parse` refuses unknown enum values at boot, so a remembered name can make the recorded arm undeployable. Enumerate members from the validator's error string, never from memory.
+
+**Run the census on the pinned build's own metric set.** An older pin ranks the wrong mechanism: on radiance 1.0.13 the bucket table put a "collapse" on a shape whose counters did not exist yet, because every counter resets at a restart and the metric set changes with the build. Prove the window is one shape (`up`, or the first sample of a counter only the current build exports) before ranking buckets.
+
+## Step ledger first, knobs second
+
+Three counters decide which mechanism you are looking at, and none of them is a rate:
+
+- `radiance:engine_step_seconds_decode_total / engine_steps_decode_total` = mean **decode-only** step.
+- `(engine_step_seconds_total - engine_step_seconds_decode_total) / (engine_steps_total - engine_steps_decode_total)` = mean **chunk step** (a chunk alone, or a chunk with decode rows beside it).
+- `engine_steps_held_total` — if it is zero, nothing is protecting decoders.
+
+If decode-only steps stay ~15 ms while the rate collapses, the mechanism is **step-time sharing** (a decode row in a chunk step waits the chunk's whole time), and any eviction/residency story is worth ~10 % of one step. The residency half is not censusable: the arena / expert slab / heat engine / prefill stager have **no metric at all** — they are read from the boot ledger, `/stats`, and `/diagnostics`.
+
+## Bucket, then lag-test, before believing a cause
+
+Bucket `radiance:decode_tokens_per_second` by `radiance:prefill_tokens_per_second` from the *same* scrape, step ≤ 30 s (a 15 s scrape against a 120 s step samples one in eight). Per-stream rate = decode gauge ÷ `vllm:num_requests_running`; the tps gauges are ~1 s decayed batch-pooled windows.
+
+Then shift the prefill series by lags and re-bucket:
+
+- lag-0-only ⇒ step-time sharing — the chunk is holding the device.
+- a lagged tail (2–14 min) ⇒ something evicted (arena loan, expert slab, KV).
+- bursts in `vllm:num_preemptions_total` ⇒ a preempted sequence stopped and is re-prefilling from token 0: a stall, not sludge.
+
+Also bucket TTFT (`histogram_quantile` over `vllm:time_to_first_token_seconds_bucket`) by the same series: the decode gauge only sees sequences already running, so an arriving request pays the same steps and shows in no decode number.
+
+## Metric traps
+
+- **Latency is `vllm:`, cadence is `radiance:`.** TTFT / inter-token / per-output-token / e2e / decode-time histograms and the running/waiting gauges exist only under the vLLM compatibility prefix. Preemption is `vllm:num_preemptions_total` (counter); `radiance:num_requests_preempted` is the *instant* depth. A `radiance:`-only query finds no latency and no preemption and reads as "the endpoint never stalls anyone".
+- **A 2-minute mean step time dilutes the chunk** — if ~5 % of steps carry a third of the step time, `step_seconds/steps` cannot move. Use the phase ratio.
+- **`prefix_hit_cut_tokens_total` is prefill load you created yourself**: on a hybrid (linear + paged) model a hit reuses only to the last linear-state checkpoint, so cached tokens replay as prefill. A high prefill rate is not always a client sending new tokens.
+- Radiance's own step-detail histograms (`prefill_steps_duration`, `prefill_step_tokens`, `token_queue_wait`) may be exported but unscraped; per-request forensics then mean `curl localhost:7770/stats` on the endpoint's host, and `/diagnostics` answers "is the *box* the limit" in one call (configuration drift, VRAM split, per-card link chain and clocks, findings with fixes).
+- Rootless container logs: read as the deploy user (`podman logs <svc>`), never `sudo podman logs`; check where the serve script redirects before trusting a log file.
+- In a temporary/remote shell, zsh aborts on a non-matching glob — quote or guard `/sys/...` wildcards.
+
+## Knob semantics (radiance 1.8.x, GUIDE §4.5; pinned source is referee)
+
+- `--prefill-interleave N` — the **decoder dial**: N decode-only steps follow any chunk step taken beside decoders; held steps admit nothing. Costs the prefilling prompt's TTFT and a queued request its first step. Counts as `engine_steps_held_total`.
+- `--busy-prefill-chunk` — a **prefill-speed dial**, not decoder protection: `auto` reserves 1+spec rows per decoding sequence and 1/8 of the budget per waiting request, and the source refuses to halve for decode rows alone. Never below the prefill stager's smallest pass (named on the boot line) — below it every routed layer reads its pooled experts synchronously.
+- `--prefill-span N` — needs `--max-num-batched-tokens` = N intervals; re-funds a *lone* prefill only, so it cannot buy back held steps while decoders run, and its extra intervals land on the arena that the expert slab loses.
+- `--checkpoint-policy` — retention only, three names (`geometric-backoff` | `tip-only` | `keep-all`); snapshot writes happen at every interval whatever the policy says (only `--prefill-span` skips them), so `keep-all` buys a bounded replay for pinned host RAM and no extra PCIe. Shortening `--checkpoint-interval` does NOT fix deep divergence: the geometric ladder's coarsest scale is the largest `interval × 2^k` under the depth, so the deepest gap stays ≈ half the prompt while every cut multiplies the writes.
+- `--checkpoint-slots` is a **total**, `auto` = policy `held()` + 1, per `--max-num-seqs`, within an eighth of host RAM; `--max-num-batched-tokens` is the blunt rung — it raises the arena the slab loses and its resonance on an expert-tiered payload can be violent.
+
+## Verify an arm, don't assume it
+
+Flags may be passed conditionally by the serve script, so prove the flag reached argv (`tr '\0' ' ' < /proc/$(pidof <engine>)/cmdline`), then the counter the knob moves (`engine_steps_held_total` must leave zero), then the bucket pair. A deploy is not evidence a knob engaged. Rollback for each of these is its env line, not a rebuild.
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+name: radiance-flag-truth-from-pinned-source
+description: "Before writing a radiance flag, value, or metric name into a runbook, prove it against the pinned image's source and the engine's own boot ledger — catches invented option names and stale defaults."
+---
+
+# Radiance flag truth from the pinned source
+
+Use when a radiance (`codeberg.org/StillDeadcode/radiance`) flag, its admitted values, a resolved
+default, or a `/metrics` name is about to go into a vault page, env comment, or arm proposal — or when
+a claim about one is being repeated from memory. Docs and old vault pages go stale; the pinned tree and
+the boot ledger do not.
+
+## Procedure
+
+1. **Get the tree at the running version, not at master.** Read the pin:
+   `grep -E 'FRANK_ARCHON_IMAGE' scripts/frank-archon.env` (digest), then
+   `ssh dank@192.168.0.235 'podman images --no-trunc | grep radiance'`.
+   `git clone --branch <ver>` (or checkout the tag) into `/tmp/rad-<ver>`. A `--depth 1` clone makes
+   every `git log -S` report its own tip — never date a flag's introduction from a shallow clone.
+2. **Flag table is the admitted set.** `core/config.cpp` holds the help strings (each option's legal
+   names/units live in the value column) and the validator branch refuses anything else at boot, e.g.
+   `--checkpoint-policy` → `geometric-backoff | tip-only | keep-all`. `core/rad_core.h` carries the
+   struct with the compiled-in defaults. `tests/config_test.cpp` asserts the admitted set — it is the
+   fastest oracle for "is `lru` a policy?".
+3. **Live argv beats the repo env.** `sudo tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$(pidof radiance)/cmdline` — proves the
+   knob actually reached the engine (an env var typo is invisible from the repo).
+4. **Boot ledger is the referee for every resolved number.** The engine prints its own arithmetic:
+   `ssh dank@192.168.0.235 'podman logs frank-archon 2>&1 | grep -iE "checkpoint|chunk geometry|pools|arena|stager"'`
+   (root unit, but podman storage is dank's — **no sudo**, sudo reads empty root storage). Lines like
+   *"checkpoint slots: auto: 20 … geometric-backoff keeps 9 for a 200000-token session at a 2048-token
+   interval"* are exact; quote them.
+5. **Reproduce the engine's arithmetic to check you understood it.** Reimplement the policy/geometry
+   function in a throwaway Python eval (`select()` / `held()` in `core/mem/prefix.cpp`, `plan_chunk` in
+   `core/sched/scheduler.cpp`) and confirm the numbers match the ledger line from step 4. Agreement
+   means the rule is understood; disagreement means the read is wrong. Delete the scratch after.
+6. **Metric names: query the live target, not the guide.** Latency histograms and preemption live under
+   the **`vllm:`** compatibility prefix, cadence under **`radiance:`**; preemption is the counter
+   `vllm:num_preemptions_total` while `radiance:num_requests_preempted` is an instant gauge. Enumerate
+   with `curl -s localhost:7770/metrics | grep '^# HELP'` on Dankserver, or
+   Prometheus `/api/v1/label/__name__/values?match[]={job="frank-archon"}`.
+
+## Traps that produced real errors here
+
+- A policy name invented from prose (`--checkpoint-policy floor`) would be a boot refusal; a stale
+  resolved default (`auto` = 512) had been copied between pages. Both survived only in the vault.
+- `--checkpoint-policy` governs **retention only**; snapshots are written at every interval regardless
+  (only `--prefill-span` skips writes). Read the call site (`retain()` in `core/mem/prefix.cpp`), not
+  the flag help.
+- Guide/`GUIDE.md` inside an image can be newer or older than the binary; `/diagnostics`
+  `configuration` and the ledger print the running truth.
+- Facts belong to the vault page that owns the endpoint (`serverAppConfigs-docs/LLM/frank-archon.md`) —
+  this skill owns the *procedure*, not the numbers.
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+name: radiance-knob-arm-live-verify
+description: "Arm a radiance scheduler/cadence knob on a live endpoint and prove it engaged: per-knob /metrics meter, argv-vs-default truth, the three behaviour probes, no bench."
+---
+
+# Arming a radiance knob on a live endpoint (no bench)
+
+Use for a one-flag change on a radiance endpoint (e.g. `PREFILL_INTERLEAVE=0→1`,
+`BUSY_PREFILL_CHUNK`, `CHECKPOINT_POLICY`) under the "swap, don't instrument" law:
+edit the trio → deploy the one service → prove the flag reached the engine, the
+engine's own counter moved, and behaviour survived. Never a bench unless Frank orders one.
+
+## Before you set a value
+- **Unset means default, and the engine prints what it resolved.** Grep
+  `/proc/$(pidof radiance)/cmdline` (`sudo tr '\0' ' ' < …`) *and* the container ledger
+  (`podman logs <svc>` as the deploy user — rootless storage, `sudo podman` finds nothing).
+  The ledger line names the resolved value and whether a budget clamped it
+  (`--checkpoint-slots 20 [auto] … of a budget of 31.5 GiB, bound by None`).
+- **Prove the flag exists in the pinned build** before promising it: `--help` from the
+  running container image, not from a vendored tree. Inventing a name (`floor`) cost a
+  doc rewrite; `config_parse` refuses unknown enums at boot.
+- Some flags are conditional in the serve script (e.g. `--prefill-interleave` is passed
+  only when the env value is `> 0`), so a zero→nonzero arm adds argv; re-check argv after deploy.
+
+## Meter map (`/metrics`, names carry the `radiance:` prefix)
+| change | meter that must move |
+|---|---|
+| `--prefill-interleave` | `engine_steps_held_total` (read 0 for a 34.7 h boot while the knob sat at 0; 126 within 4 min of arming) |
+| `--busy-prefill-chunk` | `engine_prefill_chunks_capped_total` |
+| step-time contention generally | decode-only `engine_step_seconds_decode_total/engine_steps_decode_total` vs `(step_seconds_total − step_seconds_decode_total)/(steps_total − steps_decode_total)` |
+| prefix retention | `prefix_hit_cut_tokens_total` (labels: `no_snapshot`), `vllm:num_preemptions_total` |
+
+Trap: **latency lives under `vllm:`, cadence under `radiance:`.** A `radiance:`-only query
+finds no TTFT/ITP and no preemption and reads as "nothing stalls". The arena / expert slab /
+heat engine / prefill stager have **no metric at all** — that half is boot ledger + `/stats`.
+
+## Post-deploy proof, in order
+1. argv contains the flag (or the ledger shows the resolved value).
+2. `/health` 200 (`in_flight`, `queue_cap` come back in the body).
+3. Three probes on the endpoint itself: exact-reply chat (`temperature 0`, expect the
+   literal word — reasoning tokens are normal in `reasoning_content`); a `tools` call
+   expecting a real `tool_calls` object; a **solid-colour PNG via `image_url`** (never the
+   legacy top-level `images` field) with `max_tokens ≥ 512` or thinking eats the budget and
+   a thinking model reads as blind.
+4. The knob's meter left zero-state. If it didn't move, the arm did nothing — say so.
+5. Effect is judged later from real traffic buckets, not from a synthetic load.
+
+## Deploy cycle gotchas that cost the most time
+- `deploy.sh` must run from the dev checkout literally on `main`, tree clean including
+  untracked files; it pushes its own `main`. Never from an agent worktree or the target.
+- Name the service (`--service <svc>`); a bare `deploy.sh <host>` is a fleet-wide drain.
+- Health binds only after the full load (~100 s here, gate budget much larger) — 503 during
+  load is not a fault.
+- Post-deploy for a recently-benched LLM service: `systemctl show <svc> -p DropInPaths`
+  must be empty before believing anything.
+
+## Rollback
+One env line back to the previous value + redeploy the same service. Write the meter and
+the rollback into the endpoint's vault page (that page is the owner), never into a new page.
@@ -1,111 +1,39 @@
 ---
 name: radiance-kv-cache-resize
-description: "Resize the KV cache / VRAM pair on a radiance (StillDeadcode) endpoint: engine-budget-table ceiling, pool contract arithmetic, slab-slope law, ledger-first verification, free token-count probes"
+description: "Resize a radiance endpoint's KV cache/VRAM: the resolver's funding formula, which knob actually moves the carve, the pinned-RAM ledger to recompute, and the boot-ledger lines that referee the result."
 ---

-# Radiance KV / VRAM pair resize
-
-Use when changing `--vram-kv-mib`, `--vram-weights-mib`, `--max-num-seqs`,
-`--max-model-len` or `--kv-cache-dtype` on a radiance endpoint
-(frank-archon pattern), or when asked "what can we do with the free VRAM".
-
-## 1. The ceiling is the engine's, never a hand-picked reserve
-
-`rocm-smi` free space is NOT spare capacity. The boot prints a `VRAM budget,
-per card` table; read it:
+## Method
+- The endpoint is sized by ONE env file (`scripts/<svc>.env`) plus the serve script; the boot ledger prints the split before allocating anything: `VRAM budget, per card` → `claimable` → `elastic` → `experts / kv cache`, then `kv: the cache can grow to X a card -- N tokens of context, M sessions at W`.
+- **`--vram-weights-mib` / `--vram-kv-mib` no longer exist (1.8.1).** The engine REFUSES to start on them (`core/config.cpp`), so this skill has no direct KV knob; the budget resolver derives everything from the cache bound (`--max-num-seqs` x `--max-model-len`), `--gpu-headroom-mib` and `--host-pool-mib`.

+## The funding formula (radiance 1.8.1, source-cited — re-read the pinned tree before trusting it against another build)
 ```
-card total          31.86 GiB
-vram_weights        25.00 GiB   stated by --vram-weights-mib
-vram_kv              5.00 GiB   stated by --vram-kv-mib
-unclaimed            477.30 MiB  the headroom, the unusable above, rounding
-W VRAM budgets total 30.00 GiB of the card's 31.86 GiB, so 1.86 GiB is neither
-  budgeted nor accounted. The driver's context, the activation arena and
-  --gpu-headroom-mib come out of it; anything past those is throughput on the floor
-W card 0 settled at 2.01 GiB free against 209.19 MiB (the 96.00 MiB
-  --gpu-headroom-mib and 113.19 MiB kept for the static region)
+capacity = card_total - already_held - drift - headroom - arena - step_staging - hw_queues - prefetch
+elastic  = capacity - static_weights
+expert_floor = min(plane+spare, max(plane + 2*unit_max - host_room, 0))   # planner.cpp expert_vram_floor
+host_room  = host_pool_mib * MiB  (less the file tier's staging when disk tiering is on)
+kv_cap     = max_num_seqs * max_model_len          # DEMAND, in tokens
+kv         = min(kv_cap, elastic - expert_floor)   # what it actually gets
+tokens     = min over paged groups of n_blocks*block_size   # the printed number
 ```
+Read consequence: **`--max-num-seqs` raises demand, `--host-pool-mib` raises supply, and both are the same lever** — every MiB added to the host pool lowers the expert floor one-for-one and the cache takes it (up to `kv_cap`); the leftover returns to the experts. `--max-num-seqs` alone does nothing to capacity: it raises demand while the floor is unchanged, so the printed tokens stay put. The page's "funds ~91 % of demand" table rows are that cap, not a policy percentage.
+- Derive the plane from a live ledger instead of guessing: `plane + 2*unit ≈ printed_experts + host_pool_bytes`.
+- `--gpu-headroom-mib` lowers go to the cache but the engine's settle floor is built from it — 48 MiB measured decode-neutral, 24 untested. 48 is the first rung.

-`ceiling = (settled_free_MiB - engine_floor_MiB) + current_pair_sum`.
-Worked (dankserver, 2026-10-13): 29,120 + (2,058 − 209) = **30,969 MiB/card**.
-A pair at the ceiling settles ~330 MiB free at worst case. If a bound cannot be
-traced to a ledger line, it is a personal reserve — label it and put it in the
-bats gate as such.
+## Procedure
+1. Read `scripts/<svc>.env` for the current pool: `GPU_HEADROOM_MIB` (96), `HOST_POOL_MIB` (44,928 per rank), `MAX_SEQS` x `MAX_MODEL_LEN` (demand), `HOST_POOL_MIB`, `PLACEMENT`.
+2. Compute the target as tokens: tokens x bytes/token-per-card, where bytes/token = (cache_given_bytes / tokens) from the latest ledger. If the target exceeds `elastic - expert_floor`, ALSO lower `expert_floor` via `--host-pool-mib` (up = more room = fewer resident experts) — a bigger host pool buys cache only while experts remain on the card; once the host absorbs the whole plane, more host RAM buys nothing (measured: +640 MiB moved `vram_kv` byte-identical).
+3. Edit ONE knob (`GPU_HEADROOM_MIB`), deploy service-scoped: `./scripts/deploy.sh <host> --service <svc>`. The engine reloads everything (~2-4 min); the deployer's `LLM_WAIT` covers it.
+4. Re-read the ledger: `vram_kv` must be the new number, byte-exact or the knob lost to another claim; `mover: N slots can be lent` tells what the expert slab re-borrowed from the enlarged pool — that steal is the decode cost of the resize.
+5. Re-run the probe (`scripts/probe-frank-archon-kv.py`): depth 1.75x tokens, then the 2x refusal. Update `<svc>.md` Laws with the measured pair (tokens, given, backing %).
+6. Under-funded? Raise `HOST_POOL_MIB` in 1,024-MiB steps and redeploy; never touch demand to fake the number.

-## 2. Pool contract (the engine enforces it at REQUEST time, not boot)
+## Pinned-RAM ledger to recompute BEFORE booting (this is where a resize kills the host)
+`total_pin = tp * HOST_POOL_MIB + PLE/n-gram table + PREFIX_CACHE_MIB + (statics + arena ~2,048) + checkpoint_store`, with `checkpoint_store = slots * 111.98 MiB` and `--checkpoint-slots auto` = `max_num_seqs * (1 + what the retention policy keeps)` — **it grows with the slot count**, so a slot bump raises the pin ledger twice (state + store). The repo's bats guard recomputes this and asserts `TTM_MIN_MIB >= ledger`; when you change pool or slots, update `TTM_MIN_MIB` (and that guard) in the same commit, or the seam fails. The serve script's own gate refuses to start below `TTM_MIN_MIB`; `ttm-preflight.sh` raises the knob to `TTM_TARGET_MIB`, so the target must clear the new floor with slack.

-`pool_mib >= seqs*max_model_len*rate + 110*seqs + 448`
-
- rate/token/rank: **7,488 B fp8**, **14,144 B bf16** (1.89×, not 2× — the QSA
-  block key is 3.25 KiB at BOTH dtypes; it is an index, not attention state).
- +110 MiB a sequence of recurrent state (`kv_gdn_state` 54 MiB × 2 copies +
-  conv/tail/ple) and 448 MiB of prefix checkpoints, dtype-independent.
-
-A pool that fails this **boots, serves short chats, then 400s every long
-request** as `does not fit the 200000 token context, which leaves nothing to
-generate into` — radiance refuses, never truncates. Encode it as a bats gate.
-
-`--kv-cache-dtype` takes ONLY `bf16|fp8`, one dtype for the whole cache (no
-llama.cpp-style exact-K/quantized-V pair).
-
-## 3. Slab and KV are one budget; the slab is a SLOPE
-
- Idle KV VRAM is the expert cache's spillover: ledger
-  `mover: N slots can be lent out of the KV cache (X GiB)`. A bigger pool steals
-  residency twice over.
- Slab MiB ↔ resident experts is linear (~1,300 slots per 1,792 MiB measured);
-  the pinned host pool hands back the same slot count as the slab grows
-  (16,235→17,548 slab with 8,893→7,580 pool). The pinned RAM path is the slow
-  path, so slab MiB = throughput.
- Measured law (fp8, 43.5k single-stream, Qwen3.8-Flash-Next w4):
-  22,208 → 3,397, 24,000 → 3,290, 25,600 → **3,584**, 26,071 → **4,379 t/s**.
-  Two points inside the ±3 % noise band are NOT a plateau — never infer a
-  threshold from two arms.
- **Decode is a separate axis.** It follows KV dtype/bandwidth and draft
-  acceptance, not the slab: fp8/slab 26,071 decoded 124.1 t/s cold where
-  bf16/slab 22,208 decoded 94.1 (512 tokens, 51.5k). Slot count moves the
-  batch-shared per-stream floor (3 concurrent ≈ 6 t/s; solo ≈ 90–120).
-
-## 4. Verify: ledger first, then live probes (no scratch server)
-
-1. Deploy the service; read `podman logs <svc>`: `backs N sequences all at
-   M tokens at once` is the capacity referee; check slab slots, `unclaimed`,
-   `sampler: ... R rows` (= seqs × (1+spec), must stay inside the 25-row wht6
-   exactness bound), `settled at … free against … floor`.
-2. Boundary probe: N concurrent prompts sized to `max_model_len - gen`, each
-   with a unique marker at the head; expect N/N marker retrieval.
-3. Prefill/decode probe: repo `scripts/probe-frank-archon-kv.py` (reads the
-   shape from the deployed env, so it self-resizes).
-
-### Free token-count calibration (no prefill burned)
-
-`/v1/completions` refuses when **prompt tokens alone** exceed the window —
-`prompt: 202,777 prompt tokens does not fit the 200000 token context` — and the
-refusal names the count BEFORE any prefill. It does NOT fire on
-prompt + max_tokens. Corpus ratio measured: **2.7617 chars/token** (2.5714 for
-the fox filler), so a 200,000-token window ≈ 514,286–552,286 chars. Calibrate
-with a probe ABOVE the window; below it the request is accepted and pays real
-prefill (~22 s).
-
-### Probe traps that produced false results
-
- Generate **≥128 tokens** (512 preferred) for any decode number; at 8–9 tokens
-  `inter_token` is first-token noise — rates like 92.7 vs 85.8 are noise.
- Radiance `timings` can carry `null` rates — `(t.get(k) or 0)`, and
-  `j.get("timings") or {}`.
- The disk prefix cache (64 GiB) survives restarts; put a random nonce at the
-  HEAD of a "cold" prompt. A warm 197k prefill returns in ~10 s and looks like
-  a 60,000 t/s miracle.
- With thinking enabled, a small `max_tokens` yields empty `content` +
-  `finish_reason: stop` on a healthy server; set
-  `chat_template_kwargs.enable_thinking=false` in probes.
- `echo ===` in an ssh'd zsh dies on `=`-expansion; it silently truncates the
-  command chain.
-
-## 5. Ship
-
-`scripts/<svc>.env` pair + header, serve-script header, bats gates (pair ≤
-ceiling; pool ≥ contract), docs (runbook, `AGENTS.md` fleet row, LLM index,
-log.md), `./tests/run.sh`, `deploy.sh <host> --service <svc>`, then the probes.
-Record every prediction as falsifiable in the env comment and write the verdict
-there when the probe lands — including when it kills the prediction.
+## Traps
+- The cache is ELASTIC: the ledger's `kv cache` line is the ceiling, and `mover: ... slots can be lent out of the activation arena` (987 MiB) means the slab borrows arena first, then cache blocks. A bigger ceiling only helps if the heat engine stops re-borrowing it — check `flex_bytes`/`flex_capacity` movement after load, not just the budget line.
+- A resize that shrinks the pool mid-session preempts live sequences (`vllm:num_preemptions_total` jumps); a resize that grows it cannot retroactively un-preempt. Deploy at low traffic.
+- Do not resize the KV pool AND the expert placement in one deploy: the `experts` and `kv cache` lines move together and the attribution dies.
+- The `claimable` arithmetic (`capacity`) is computed ONCE before allocation; `card total` differs per card (26.0 vs 26.68 GiB on dankserver), so the SLOWER card's number is the budget — read the `[0]` and `[1]` `pools:` lines separately, not just the shared budget table.
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+name: react-prod-state-mismatch-bisection
+description: Diagnose React SPA prod-build state mismatches (state-derived props update but sibling output stays stale) by driving a real browser and bisecting per-render state via throwaway source instrumentation.
+---
+
+# Prod React state-mismatch bisection
+
+Use when a built SPA shows an internally inconsistent DOM — e.g. `aria-current` flips
+while a sibling conditional slot stays stale, a click handler runs with zero network
+activity, jsdom tests pass but the prod journey fails. Reasoning from source fails
+here; only per-render state truth resolves it.
+
+## Steps
+
+1. **Drive the real browser, not tests.** Throwaway `@playwright/test` chromium script
+   beside the package that installs it (e.g. `tests/`), seeded via direct API calls +
+   cookie injection:
+   ```js
+   import { chromium } from "@playwright/test";   // resolve from tests/ node_modules
+   const ctx = await browser.newContext();
+   await ctx.addCookies([{ name, value, domain: "127.0.0.1", path: "/" }]);
+   page.on("console", ...); page.on("pageerror", ...); page.on("request", ...);
+   ```
+   Run it from that directory; a script at repo root or /tmp hits
+   `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND` for workspace deps.
+
+2. **Fiber prop probe** — call the handler outside React events to split
+   "delegation dead" from "handler wrong", and read the props the fiber holds:
+   ```js
+   await page.evaluate(() => {
+     const el = document.querySelector('[data-testid^="thing-"]');
+     const key = Object.keys(el).find((k) => k.startsWith("__reactProps$"));
+     el[key].onClick();          // or .onChange({target:{value:"x"}})
+   });
+   ```
+
+3. **If props updated but output is inconsistent, suspect falsy-equality, not React.**
+   `undefined === undefined` yields `"true"` for `el.id === selectedId` highlights —
+   a fake "state updated" signal. Dump the slot's raw `innerHTML`, don't trust the
+   derived attribute.
+
+4. **Instruments beats deduction:** insert temporary `console.log`s in the component
+   source (one in each state-mutating callback, one at render logging the state),
+   rebuild, restart the server, re-run the script. Compare *per-render* values — the
+   render where the value is `undefined` instead of the id names the root cause
+   (usually a server payload keyed differently than the client type, e.g. DB row key
+   `orgId` crossing HTTP where the contract says `id`).
+
+5. **Also grep every suite teardown for broad `DELETE ... LIKE`/`TRUNCATE` on the
+   shared DB when a test flakes only under uncached concurrent runs
+   (`turbo run test --force`) and passes isolated:** parallel vitest files on one DB —
+   the suite that finishes first FK-cascades away the other's live sessions; the
+   symptom is a spurious 401 (or missing row) in the still-running file. Fix by
+   namespacing emails/ids per suite and scoping teardowns to rows the suite created.
+
+## Cleanup
+
+Remove instrumentation, move the throwaway script to `.AGENTTRASH/`, never commit the
+debug script. Verified on franksign: `GET /api/orgs` leaked `orgId` where the client
+contract was `id` (fake aria-current true, silent auto-select failure).
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+name: real-pdf-acroform-census
+description: "Census a real-world PDF before running it through a flat→AcroForm pipeline: check for hidden widget layers, prove fill/flatten, avoid the pdfinfo ghost."
+---
+
+Census recipe for a real-world PDF arriving at a flat-form pipeline (e.g. franksign's sidecar that injects AcroForm widgets). Run BEFORE assuming the document is flat.
+
+## Sequence
+
+1. **Metadata**: `pdfinfo file.pdf` — note `Form:` line, producer (`macOS ... Quartz PDFContext` = Preview/Preview-era export), page size.
+2. **Text layer**: `pdftotext -layout file.pdf -` — underscore rules (`____`) look "flat".
+3. **Widget census (the decisive probe)** — never trust the looks:
+   ```bash
+   podman run --rm --entrypoint python -v ~/Downloads:/in:z <sidecar-image>:local -c "
+   import pymupdf
+   d = pymupdf.open('/in/file.pdf')
+   for p in d.pages():
+       for w in p.widgets():
+           print(w.field_name, w.field_type_string, [round(v) for v in w.rect])
+   print('annots:', sum(1 for p in d.pages() for _ in p.annots()))
+   ```
+   Traps: a custom ENTRYPOINT script swallows `python` as argv — override with `--entrypoint python`. Mount a directory, not a single file (MuPDF atomic-save EBUSY).
+4. **Fill live-fire**: pass the file through the fill step as-is with placeholder values; verify with `pdftotext -layout` that values land on the rules.
+5. **Flatten audit**: re-run the widget census on the output (expect 0) — do NOT read `pdfinfo`.
+
+## Laws learned
+
+- macOS Preview/Quartz exports (and most print-to-PDF paths) **already embed AcroForm widgets** under transparent rects over their drawn underscore rules. Field names are human-meaningful (`date_today`, ...). Injecting widgets over them duplicates/shadows fields — the design-time injection stage must be skipped when a widget layer exists (widget-first detection).
+- pdf-lib `flatten()` removes every **widget** but leaves the AcroForm **field dictionary**: `pdfinfo` keeps printing `Form: AcroForm` on a fully flattened file. Widget enumeration (MuPDF) is the only truth; pdfinfo is the ghost.
+- Underscore rules in the text layer are drawings, not fields; the text layer alone cannot tell flat from widget-bearing.
+
+## Verdicts
+
+- Widgets present → fill as-is; detection spec = widget layer (names, types, rects; flip top-left→bottom-left origin if the pipeline spec uses bottom-left).
+- Zero widgets → true flat form; needs position detection (underscore runs + nearest preceding label) before injection.
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+name: recover-externally-reverted-file
+description: "Rebuild a worktree file that an external process (stale editor buffer, watcher) keeps reverting mid-session: idempotent script rebuild, verify, immediate commit, cat-file restore instead of checkout."
+---
+
+# Recovering a File an External Process Keeps Reverting
+
+Symptom: edits to one file flip-flop under you — grep/wc/read return two different
+versions minutes apart; tool edit warnings say "file modified externally" repeatedly;
+committed content disagrees with reads of the same path. Typical cause on Frank's
+boxes: an IDE window with a stale buffer auto-saving the old version, or another
+agent's git operation in a sibling worktree.
+
+## Procedure
+
+1. **Stop editing surgically.** Line-anchored `edit` calls are unsafe when the disk
+   identity of the file is unstable. Take one snapshot:
+   `cp <file> /tmp/obs1.bats` (twice, a few seconds apart; differing hashes confirm the flapping).
+2. **Write an idempotent rebuild script** (`/tmp/rebuild-*.py`) that transforms
+   whichever known version is on disk into the target:
+   - every patch is `sub_if_present(pattern, exact_replacement)` /
+     `insert_before(anchor, block)` / `insert_after(anchor, block)`;
+   - each helper first checks whether the block is already present and skips;
+   - anchors must be taken from the committed/original file text, re-grepped,
+     never from memory of an edit that may have been reverted;
+   - print `ok/skip/FAIL` per patch so a mismatch is visible.
+3. **Apply + verify + commit in ONE bash invocation**:
+   `python3 /tmp/rebuild.py && <syntax check e.g. bats -c / tsc> && git add <file> && git commit ...`
+   The commit is the stable artifact; the disk is not.
+4. **Restore from git without checkout** (workspace policy blocks `git checkout/reset`
+   in shared checkouts): `git cat-file blob HEAD:<path> > <path>`.
+   Never `git checkout -- <path>` blindly — it silently nukes uncommitted work.
+5. **Run consumers immediately after the restore/commit** (tests etc. in the same
+   invocation where practical); re-check content with one hash compare
+   (`md5sum <path>; git cat-file blob HEAD:<path> | md5sum`) when results look impossible.
+6. If duplicates crept in from double-application (flapping + reruns), dedupe by
+   occurrence span (`src.find(marker)` twice, cut the second span) — full-block dedupe
+   fails when the two copies differ in a byte of comment text.
+
+## Distinguishing real failure from flapping evidence
+
+If a test fails, re-run the exact command once before believing it: the failing read
+may have run against the reverted file, not the committed one. Verify what the runner
+saw (`git hash-object <path>` vs `git rev-parse HEAD:<path>`).
+
+## Afterward
+
+Flag the reverter to the user (open editor buffer / watcher / sibling agent); do not
+fight it — commits and cat-file restores make it harmless.
@@ -1,28 +1,27 @@
 ---
 name: recover-subagent-yield-payload
-description: "Recover a subagent's full structured report when it exited without yielding (SYSTEM WARNING) — extract aborted yield payloads from the session JSONL, including harness double-encode and split-JSON quirks."
+description: "Recover or salvage subagent deliverables: missing yields, payloads misrouted to xd://report_issue, and degraded TAKEN-list echoes."
 ---

-Use when a subagent ends with "exited without yielding" yet the transcript shows it repeatedly calling `yield` (each reply "…[+N]" — payload too big for display). The research is usually COMPLETE; only the yield serialization failed. Known harness quirk: the yield `arguments` get wrapped as `{"data": "<json string>"}`, so an object payload is validated as a string → "expected object, received string" retry loop until the agent dies.
+# Recovering subagent deliverables

-## 1. Locate the session JSONL
-Transcript header prints the path: `~/.omp/agent/sessions/<cwd-slug>/<session-id>/<AgentName>.jsonl` (worktrees: cwd slug like `-.omp-wt-wt-...`).
+Three failure modes seen with scout bulk-content tasks, in order of frequency.

-## 2. Extract every aborted yield payload (Python via eval — shell quoting will mangle these)
- Parse each line with `json.loads` guarded by try/except (lines may be non-JSON).
- Keep `message.role == "assistant"` messages; in `content`, keep entries with `type == "toolCall"` and `name == "yield"`; collect their `arguments`.
- Unwrap: `arguments` may be a dict containing `data` (a JSON string) or a plain string; `json.loads` it.
+## 1. Misrouted payload: scout wrote the deliverable to `xd://report_issue`
+Symptom: yield summary says "delivered to `xd://report_issue`" instead of containing the content. That device is write-only (a bug-report channel); the response "Noted, thanks!" fooled the scout into thinking delivery worked.

-## 3. Tolerate broken JSON
-Naive `json.loads` on `data` can fail "Extra data: line 1 column ~4600" — the payload is a complete object followed by `, "architecture": ..., "report": ...}` (agent emitted a structure whose early brace-closure ended the first object). Recover with `json.JSONDecoder().raw_decode`:
-1. `part1, end = dec.raw_decode(data.strip())`
-2. `rest = data[end:].strip()` — if it starts with `,`, parse `part2 = dec.raw_decode('{' + rest.lstrip(', '))[0]`
-3. `merged = {**part1, **part2}`
-Do this for ALL yields and keep the largest merged dict (attempts evolve; keys seen: `summary`, `files`, `report`, `architecture`).
+**Salvage path (often impossible — decide fast, ≤2 probes):**
+- Transcript jsonl: `~/.omp/agent/sessions/*/*/Tan-*/Tan-*.jsonl` (glob by agent id).
+- Streamed `toolCall` blocks store only **partial arg fragments** of big writes (`arguments.content` is chunked/empty; `partialArgs` holds deltas). Reassembly of a 140-line write across ~100 fragment rows has never worked — if `content` on the toolCall rows is empty or truncated, **abandon salvage**.
+- Only reliable in-file content: final assistant text blocks — walk rows for `message.role=="assistant"`, `content[].type=="text"`, filter lines against the delivery contract regex.

-## 4. Persist and deliver
-Write the recovered `report`/`summary` to a durable file (memory dir or `local://`), then continue synthesis — never re-run the research the dead scout already did.
+**Prevention (put in scout prompts for bulk content):** "Return the deliverable as plain lines in your FINAL OUTPUT TEXT. NEVER write it to `xd://report_issue`, files, or eval state."

-## Prevention (do this first next time)
- While the agent is still alive and looping: write to `agent://<Name>` steering it to "yield immediately, wrap in minimal object or raw markdown, schema-invalid yield acceptable — I read the transcript anyway." It often still can't (the failure is in the harness wrapper, not the agent) → let it be killed and use the extraction above.
- Scout default schema wants objects; terse yields from `scout` agents hit this most. Keep expected reports slice-sized.
+## 2. Degenerate echo: scout returns the TAKEN/dedupe examples verbatim
+Symptom: candidate lines repeat the "already used" examples given in the prompt, in looping blocks. Write off that batch entirely — do not re-prompt (it repeats). Cover the cluster inline yourself.
+
+## 3. No yield at all (hung/force-stopped)
+`history://<agent-id>` renders the transcript but compresses tool payloads to "1 line" — useless for payloads, fine for status. Try `write agent://<id>` with a one-line re-emit instruction ("end your turn by yielding the lines verbatim; do not re-research") exactly once; if the reply is garbage, abandon.
+
+## Rule of thumb for bulk creative content
+Scouts add value for *terminology research* (search the universe's rank/offices vocabulary, 2-5 searches), not for drafting hundreds of lines — models echo, spin variants ("dune-mentat of the X" ×14), and misroute. Pattern: scout researches → parent drafts.
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+name: red-verify-without-stash
+description: "Prove a regression test is red-capable against pre-fix code in a shared worktree where git stash/checkout are policy-blocked, via git-show blob swap with md5-verified restore."
+---
+
+# Red-verifying tests without `git stash`
+
+## When
+You fixed a file and added tests that should have failed before the fix, but workspace policy blocks `git stash` (and `git checkout -- file`) in shared worktrees (e.g. `~/.omp` shared-workspace policy). Needed to prove red-capture instead of asserting it.
+
+## Recipe
+One `bash` call — swap the fixed file for the HEAD (pre-fix) blob, run only the fix-relevant tests, restore, verify byte-identity:
+
+```bash
+cd "$WT"
+md5sum path/to/fixed.file > /tmp/file-hash
+cp path/to/fixed.file /tmp/fixed.file.bak
+git show HEAD:path/to/fixed.file > path/to/fixed.file   # pre-fix content; new tests now exercise old code
+bats -f "test name A|test name B" tests/suite.bats       # expect: not ok for every fix-relevant test
+cp /tmp/fixed.file.bak path/to/fixed.file
+md5sum -c /tmp/file-hash && echo RESTORED
+```
+
+## Notes
+- `git show HEAD:path > path` truncates-and-refills the file in place; safe because you hold the md5 and a backup copy, and the restore check proves the fixed bytes are back.
+- Run only the fix-relevant tests via the runner's name filter (`bats -f` regex); a full suite wastes time and old tests pass on both versions.
+- Expect exactly the tests that pin the fix's behavior to fail pre-fix; tests unrelated to the change (pure coverage of old behavior) pass on both versions — don't count them as red evidence.
+- `bats` pipelines mask exit codes without `pipefail`; judge by the `ok`/`not ok` lines, not the shell status.
+- For non-test proof of endpoint behavior (live A/B of an HTTP request body), replay the exact body with `curl` against the live endpoint instead of speculating; keep both timings.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+name: repo-agent-handoff-doc
+description: "Use when asked to write or refresh a standing handoff/status doc so agents landing in a repo can continue work isolated from other directories; sections that code cannot reveal, plus moving untracked docs onto a branch without dirtying a shared checkout."
+---
+
+# Standing agent handoff doc for a repo
+
+"Put a complete handoff on project X in its directory so agents there can work
+isolated" is not a changelog request. The value is the knowledge the code cannot
+reveal. Discover the repo's own conventions first, then write one **living** file.
+
+## 0. Fit the repo, do not invent a layout
+
+`ls -a` + `grep -n '^##' README.md` + `find docs -maxdepth 2` before writing:
+- existing `docs/` conventions (dated `docs/decisions/*.md` records vs flat pages),
+- whether an `AGENTS.md`/`CLAUDE.md` auto-loads (if not, the README is the only
+  entry point → the handoff MUST be linked from it, same commit),
+- the exact numbers you will quote: per-file `grep -c '^@test'`, `package.json`
+  `scripts`, module list from `ls src/`. Never write a test count or command from
+  memory.
+
+## 1. Section checklist (point of use — each answers a question the next agent hits)
+
+1. **State line**: the commit it describes (`main` at `<sha>`, "after PRs #N") +
+   the rule that whoever leaves work updates it in the same commit. A stale
+   handoff is worse than none: it gets believed.
+2. **Commands** — build/typecheck/test with real runtime, plus concurrency
+   hazards (e.g. a suite that rebuilds `dist/` in `setup()` → two `bats` runs
+   corrupt each other's byte-identical pin).
+3. **Test seam and how to add a test** — where the harness mock lives, scenario
+   names, how scripted UI answers are consumed, env dials that are *ignored*
+   (a `setup()` that clobbers your override), and the red-first rule with the
+   one exception (a characterization test that says so in a comment).
+4. **The laws, each with the test that holds it** — table form. Distinguish
+   load-bearing invariants from incidental behaviour; this is the section that
+   stops a confident agent "fixing" a chosen design.
+5. **Worktree/dev-dir recipe** — symlinked deps, gitignore rule that keeps the
+   symlink untracked, why the shared checkout stays clean.
+6. **Ship path** — branch → tests → rebuild committed artifact → PR → merge on the
+   owner's OK → land with `--ff-only` → deploy (the gotcha that the upgrade target
+   is the PACKAGE name, not the directory alias) → `cmp` the live artifact against
+   the merged build → prune. Include the auth traps of the forge (token via a
+   600 curl `-K` file, empty token answering 404 not 401, form-encoded merge).
+7. **Live verification** — the instrument that produces evidence (stub player,
+   log line counts, pty submit semantics), and explicitly what is NOT a check
+   (print-mode invocation, screen reads of transient toasts, single-take audio
+   comparisons).
+8. **Environment reality not visible from this code** — the live endpoints,
+   measured limits, refusals; crosslink the README if it owns the table.
+9. **Open items** — numbered, each actionable alone, each saying who decides if a
+   human must; name the repo a fix belongs in when it is NOT this one.
+10. **History** — one line per issue/PR. No tables of metrics.
+
+One owner per fact: link the README/decision records instead of restating knob
+tables or rationale.
+
+## 2. Tree hygiene (the costly step)
+
+Writing straight into a shared checkout leaves an untracked file on `main` — a
+half-deployed state where the checkout is the deployment, and a dirty tree for
+everyone else. Move it onto a branch without switching anyone's HEAD:
+
+```bash
+mv <repo>/docs/handoff.md /tmp/handoff.md
+git -C <repo> fetch -q origin
+git -C <repo> worktree add -q -b docs/<slug> ~/Projects/wt-<topic> origin/main
+ln -s <repo>/node_modules ~/Projects/wt-<topic>/node_modules   # if deps are needed
+mv /tmp/handoff.md ~/Projects/wt-<topic>/docs/handoff.md
+git -C <repo> status --porcelain                              # shared checkout clean again
+```
+
+README pointer edit happens **in the worktree** (an edit there is a separate
+checkout; editing the shared one dirties a tracked file). Then commit, run the
+suite, push, open the PR, and merge only on the owner's explicit OK.
+
+## 3. Voice rules
+
+Prose in the repo's own style (match an existing decision record). State reasons
+and consequences, not bookkeeping. No measured numbers for things that drift;
+keep the law, drop the figure.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+name: rescue-loose-home-scripts
+description: "Promote a durable loose $HOME script into dank/command-center: archive-first, black-box bats red-first with env seams, docs page + index + log entry, one atomic commit per instrument, PR to main."
+---
+
+Rescue a throwaway-looking `$HOME` script into the command-center repo as a maintained instrument. Used for `remote-job.sh` + `scripts/probes/*.hip` (PR #54, Refs #53); the archive still holds ~120 candidates.
+
+## 1. Archive first, never delete
+
+Loose scripts at `$HOME` root move to `~/.AGENTTRASH/home-scripts-<date>/` (`rm` is forbidden; deletion is a pruning session with Frank). Consolidate bulk media separately (`~/audiosamples`). Then check the archive for **instruments**, not convenience: something that answers a question you will ask again, or that carries a trap you paid for.
+
+## 2. Tests first, and black-box
+
+Write `tests/<name>.bats` before the script; confirm red (`bats tests/<name>.bats` → all `not ok` because the script is absent).
+
+- Assert **output, exit codes, and on-disk ordering** only — never internals, never "variable X equals Y".
+- A test that asserts a race outcome (file exists immediately after a detached `start`) is wrong: assert the *contract* instead (`status` reports RUN/PENDING and exits 1). Rewrite the test, not the code, when the failure is your own assumption.
+- Design env seams **so the untestable path becomes testable off the target hardware**: `*_SYSFS`, `*_KFD`, `*_HIPCC`, `*_SRC`, `*_BUILD`. A refusal that can only be exercised on a card box is an untested refusal. Stub the toolchain in `$PATH`/via env to drive build-failure and busy-device paths.
+
+## 3. Safety law in the tool, not the docs
+
+Anything that measures a GPU must **refuse before it builds or runs** when the device is busy (`gpu_busy_percent` over threshold, or any process holding `/dev/kfd`) and must **stop nothing**: unloading a production endpoint is a human decision (`--force`). Pin the refusal-before-build ordering in a test — otherwise a reordered guard silently reintroduces contention beside a live service.
+
+Exit-code taxonomy worth reusing: `0` did the work · `2` usage/missing inputs · `3` refused (would have contended) · `4` toolchain/build failure. A client box without the SDK must exit 4 loudly, never report an empty success.
+
+## 4. An instrument that crashes is not an instrument
+
+`hipGetDeviceProperties` **segfaults** on the fleet's ROCm build while `hipGetDeviceCount` works fine. The shipped probes called it only to print device name + PCI bus id — replaced by the sysfs topology block the driver prints (`current_link_width`/`current_link_speed` vs `max_*`). Record the trap as a comment in the sources so it is not reintroduced.
+
+## 5. Docs, three places, in the same commit as the code
+
+- `omp-docs/tools/<name>.md` — frontmatter per OKF (`type: reference`, title, description, tags, `verified`, `timestamp`); sections: contract (command table + exit status), the law + why, how to read the output, failure-modes table, test seams. Point-of-use only: measured numbers do **not** live here (they belong with the endpoint's runbook vault).
+- `omp-docs/tools/index.md` — one alphabetical bullet per page.
+- `omp-docs/log.md` — dated entry above the newest one: what changed + the durable laws, a few lines.
+
+Gates before commit: `bash scripts/kb-lint.sh` (0 violations) and full `bats tests/` green.
+
+## 6. Land it
+
+One commit per instrument (stage that page's index line only — re-add the next page's line for its own commit), message = imperative what + why + `Refs #N`, hooks armed (never `--no-verify`). Push to the local Gitea, open the PR with `gitea-pr-api-cycle` (token from `~/.config/secrets/gitea` via curl `-K`; body ends with `---` then `cwd: <session cwd> · session: <live transcript UUID>`), then `xdg-open <PR-URL>`. **Never merge without Frank's explicit OK.**
+
+## 7. Report the gap you could not close
+
+Verification on a client box proves the guard/refusal/usage paths only. If compile-or-run needs the hardware box, say so in the PR under "Not done here" and offer the exact low-risk command rather than implying the artifact is proven.
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+name: rng-pool-sweep-blackbox-test
+description: "Prove membership/absence in a randomly sampled pool (epithets-style) from black-box tests: prime-cycled Math.random sweeps every index; pool-first probe for setting precedence."
+---
+
+# Deterministic pool sweeps for random-sampling black-box tests
+
+When a built bundle samples uniformly at random from a curated pool (epithet-style) and tests must prove a setting admits/excludes whole classes of pool entries, do NOT write probabilistic sampling tests. Two proven designs:
+
+## 1. Full-pool sweep (class membership, distinct counts)
+
+In the test driver (the process that imports the built bundle), before firing utterances:
+
+```ts
+let seed = 0;
+Math.random = () => (seed++ % PRIME) / PRIME; // PRIME > pool size, e.g. 1009
+```
+
+The extension calls `Math.random()` at speak time, so the patch applies regardless of import order. Picks are `floor(random * poolSize)`; with N=PRIME samples the step is `< 1`, so **every index of every pool ≤ PRIME is visited exactly once**. Observable per-utterance text (e.g. the fixture server logs the synthesized `input=`) then reveals the entire sampling pool:
+
+- distinct picks == pool size exactly (pin the total only if it is itself law);
+- a sentinel name from class X appears / must never appear per mode — deterministic, zero flake;
+- absence proofs are exhaustive, not lucky.
+
+Drive one narration per iteration and gate the loop on the fixture's call counter advancing (`while (speechCount() < before + expected) await nap(2)`), otherwise typed/coalescing paths collapse iterations and counts drift.
+
+**Wall-clock budget:** one sweep ≈ 20–40 s per pool; bats serializes and jobs cap at 600 s — run at most two sweeps per backgrounded bats `-f` selection, or launch full suites with `timeout: 0`.
+
+## 2. Pool-first probe (setting precedence, milliseconds)
+
+With the same patched RNG, the FIRST pick is `pool[0]`. Run each config mode with exactly one utterance and compare the first spoken name:
+
+- mode-A setting vs env-mode-A → equal (settings key honored);
+- env-X overriding file-Y → equals env-X's pick (precedence law);
+- pick strings are pool literals that live in exactly one class (e.g. `comrade operator`).
+
+Avoid: regex scans over spoken text (possessives/compounds false-fire), probabilistic "absent in 300 samples" tests (flake floor unless the block is contiguous), and reading source internals (white-box).
+
+Red-first check: the sweep test for a not-yet-filtered pool must fail by SPEAKING the forbidden sentinel — if a "new mode" test passes pre-implementation, the probe accidentally tautologized (e.g. old pool[0] == new pool[0]); pick probe literals whose values differ between old and new behavior. Beware bats `setup()` rebuilding the bundle per test file: a long first sweep lets mid-session src edits leak into later tests' "red" proof — prove red from a pristine tree before implementing.
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More