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@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ for p in (home/".config/secrets").iterdir():
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if m: vals.add(m.group(1))
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known[p.name] = {v for v in vals if len(v) >= 12}
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```
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Also add every secret the repo itself embeds (e.g. credentials living in a *test helper*)
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by concatenating its quoted fragments, then search for the joined value.
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Report ONLY `value[:4] + len + sha256[:10]`. Never print a value, and never quote a
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secret-shaped literal in a doc/commit message — the pre-commit gate will (correctly) block it.
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@@ -41,6 +43,19 @@ git status --porcelain -uall --ignored=matching # !! lines: on-disk ignored fi
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git config --list --show-origin # local/global/system credentials
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git ls-files | grep -E '(auth\.json|trust\.json|\.env|\.pem|\.key|identity)' # quarantine
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```
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**Invocation forms that actually work** (each of these cost a wasted round-trip):
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- `git grep --all -F '<fragment>'` — the options MUST precede the pattern; `git grep -l -F '<frag>' --all`
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treats `--all` as a pathspec and silently returns 0 lines. Grepping a *fragment* (not the full
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value) is what catches split-concatenation disguises like `"Assf.""1234"`.
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- `git ls-tree -r --format=... <rev>` works for ONE rev; pass several revs and it emits nothing,
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no error. For sha→path across all refs use `git rev-list --objects --all`, which yields
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`"<sha> <path>"` lines directly.
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- `git cat-file --batch` fed with `rev-list --objects` lines echoes `sha path` headers, so naive
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header parsing misaligns and content is lost. Feed bare SHAs in chunks, or use
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`git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch` and parse `"<sha> blob <size>\n<content>\n"` records.
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- Check every worktree/checkout: `git -C <other-checkout> rev-parse HEAD` often differs from the
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audited worktree, so the leak may exist on `main` while the audited tree looks clean.
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LFS: scan `.git/lfs/objects/**` as BYTES (`decode("latin-1")`) — a screenshot is a classic
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secret carrier and the tracked tree holds only pointers.
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@@ -53,6 +68,9 @@ Flag every one whose value is in `known` as a LIVE leak; list the rest for triag
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- prose: `Set password: user.set_password(...)`, `authenticate(user, password)`
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- 40-hex hits that are git object ids / packfile names (`pack-<40hex>.pack`)
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- memory/KB records that *describe* a secret operation
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- length-threshold gates that miss short passwords: a check like
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`len(val) >= 24 and re.fullmatch(...)` clears a real 12-char password, so a passing
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secret-scan test proves nothing about short credentials
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A hit is a leak only when the value matches a live secret, decodes to a real credential, or
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sits in a field a program reads.
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@@ -61,8 +79,12 @@ Check file modes of the secret dir (`0600`, dir `0700`) — world-readable secre
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most common real finding. Then grep the live values across shell rc files, `~/.gitconfig`,
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`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, `~/.curlrc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.cache/huggingface/token`,
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`~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/config` and report filenames only.
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Also check files the deployer *generates* on hosts: a script that writes a credential file
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without `chmod 600` (while sibling writes in the same script do chmod) is the same class.
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## 6. Report
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Per layer: scope numbers + verdict. Every hit: path:line, redacted value, verdict
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(leak / benign + why). Name the gate's coverage gap if the project's own hook misses shapes
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you matched. Fix modes/chmod on the spot; changes to a security hook are the operator's call.
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A secret in git history is only removable by rotation or history rewrite — say so, don't
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imply an edit fixes it.
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Frank