Files
serverAppConfigs/tests/open_notebook.bats
T
Frank d9f3d1be1e chore(open-notebook): position as admin-side; document single-tenant
open-notebook has no user accounts upstream (PasswordAuthMiddleware = one
shared password; SurrealDB has no user/account/owner table — verified in the
running image). One shared password = one shared workspace; the guard chain
gates access but cannot partition data, and Authentik identity is never
consumed. Multi-user is approved-but-unbuilt upstream (#712, post-v2); OIDC
declined (#607). So move the homepage card from the user grid to the admin
tier and add the single-tenant boundary to the vault page. Fix the card's
stale 'frank-zealot' -> frank-archon. Update the seam's incidental category
pin to the new intentional value. Password rotated on the host (not repo).
2026-10-20 17:38:22 -07:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bats
# Seam: open-notebook, the fleet's podcast generator on Dankclaw — the Quadlet
# pair (app + SurrealDB), the private network between them, the env file both
# units read, the deployer routing, and the homepage card. Runbook:
# serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Open Notebook.md.
#
# Structure only: what the files declare and what the deployer can see. Nothing
# here starts a container, opens a socket, or touches the network — the app's
# behaviour inside the image is upstream's contract, cited in the docs page.
load helpers
UNIT_DIR="dankclaw/open-notebook/quadlet"
APP="$REPO_ROOT/$UNIT_DIR/open-notebook.container"
DB="$REPO_ROOT/$UNIT_DIR/open-notebook-surrealdb.container"
NET="$REPO_ROOT/$UNIT_DIR/open-notebook.network"
ENVF="$REPO_ROOT/scripts/open-notebook.env"
PLANNER="$REPO_ROOT/scripts/deploy-plan.py"
REMOTE="$REPO_ROOT/scripts/deploy-remote.sh"
CADDY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/Caddyfile"
# The host-side path the units read (they run on Dankclaw, not here), spelled
# out once so the ordering test below compares against a real constant.
HOST_TUNABLES="EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/scripts/open-notebook.env"
HOST_SECRETS="EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/open-notebook/env"
# The pins are part of the contract, so a silent re-resolution to a different
# build has to fail here rather than at the next deploy. Both digests were
# resolved from the registry on 2026-10-18; the SurrealDB one is 2.7.0.
APP_PIN="sha256:54b2025a4a4853c188f74b9b8246eca8c5480e5dd1babfa92db1038ff2f30212"
DB_PIN="sha256:e5d7387e3727bbe2f7cd6d869e48cd34777272258572ead37c9656b25f745723"
@test "open-notebook ships a network, a database unit and an app unit" {
[ -f "$NET" ]
[ -f "$DB" ]
[ -f "$APP" ]
}
@test "both units are boot-persistent and self-healing" {
for unit in "$APP" "$DB"; do
grep -qE '^Restart=(always|on-failure)$' "$unit" || {
echo "$(basename "$unit") has no Restart="; false; }
# "short RestartSec": a podcast service has no reason to wait minutes.
restart_sec="$(sed -n 's/^RestartSec=\([0-9]*\)s\?$/\1/p' "$unit")"
[ -n "$restart_sec" ] || {
echo "$(basename "$unit") has no RestartSec"; false; }
[ "$restart_sec" -le 30 ] || {
echo "$(basename "$unit") RestartSec=${restart_sec}s is not short"; false; }
grep -qE '^\[Install\]' "$unit"
grep -qE '^WantedBy=default\.target$' "$unit"
done
}
@test "both images are digest-pinned and never re-resolved at start" {
grep -qxF "Image=docker.io/lfnovo/open_notebook:v1-latest@$APP_PIN" "$APP"
grep -qxF "Image=docker.io/surrealdb/surrealdb:v2@$DB_PIN" "$DB"
grep -qxF 'Pull=never' "$APP"
grep -qxF 'Pull=never' "$DB"
# Pull=never is only honest if the fetch it depends on is written down where
# the operator reads the unit, and wired into the deployer's precondition.
grep -qF 'podman pull' "$APP"
grep -qF 'podman pull' "$DB"
grep -qF 'ensure_pinned_image' "$REMOTE"
}
@test "the database port is never published" {
# 8000 belongs to the private bridge. A published 8000 would put the RPC,
# root credentials included, on every interface of the host.
! grep -qE '^PublishPort=' "$DB"
! grep -qE '^PublishPort=.*:8000(:|$)' "$APP"
}
# onb_vhost — the host Caddy routes to the UI's 8502. Derived, never restated:
# the API origin and the homepage link have to agree with whatever the Caddyfile
# actually routes, so renaming the vhost there moves this seam instead of
# leaving it blessing a stale name.
onb_vhost() {
awk '
/^[[:space:]]*@[A-Za-z0-9_-]+[[:space:]]+host[[:space:]]/ { h = $3 }
/^[[:space:]]*reverse_proxy[[:space:]]+192\.168\.0\.143:8502$/ { if (h) { print h; exit } }
' "$CADDY"
}
@test "the app publishes the UI for the guard chain and keeps the API off the LAN" {
# 8502 is the single upstream the post-auth listener dials, so it is the
# only port that has to answer on a LAN interface.
grep -qxF 'PublishPort=0.0.0.0:8502:8502' "$APP"
[ "$(grep -cE '^PublishPort=0\.0\.0\.0:' "$APP")" = "1" ] || {
echo "the UI port is not the only wildcard publish: $(grep -E '^PublishPort=' "$APP")"; false; }
# seerr already binds 127.0.0.1:5055 on this host, so the API cannot leave
# the container on the port upstream uses; and it needs no outward face at
# all, because the image's Next.js layer rewrites /api/* to it. Loopback is
# where the deployer's health gate dials it.
grep -qxF 'PublishPort=127.0.0.1:5056:5055' "$APP"
# One origin serves UI and API, so API_URL names the guarded vhost rather
# than a host:port. Left to itself the frontend auto-detects `<host>:5055`;
# a LAN-origin API_URL takes the browser around the guard chain, where its
# authenticated session does not ride.
api_url="$(sed -n 's/^API_URL=//p' "$ENVF")"
vhost="$(onb_vhost)"
[ -n "$vhost" ] || { echo "no Caddy route to the UI port was found"; false; }
[ "$api_url" = "https://${vhost}" ] || {
echo "API_URL ($api_url) is not the guarded origin https://${vhost}"; false; }
# Same-origin traffic needs no CORS at all, but while CORS_ORIGINS is unset
# the app warns and defaults to `*` in front of every episode's audio.
cors="$(sed -n 's/^CORS_ORIGINS=//p' "$ENVF")"
[ "$cors" = "https://${vhost}" ] || {
echo "CORS_ORIGINS ($cors) is not the single guarded origin https://${vhost}"; false; }
}
@test "the vhost is guarded and the app login stays behind it" {
vhost="$(onb_vhost)"
# The vhost itself proxies the WHOLE request to Anubis — an unmatched path
# must never reach the app unchallenged.
awk -v v="$vhost" '
$0 == v " {" { inblock = 1; seen = 0 }
inblock && /reverse_proxy anubis:8923/ { seen = 1 }
inblock && /^}/ { exit }
END { exit !seen }
' "$CADDY" || { echo "$vhost does not proxy everything through Anubis"; false; }
# And the app's own password is still required, so a route that ever bypasses
# the chain does not hand out the episode library: the deployer refuses to
# start the units while the secret file leaves it blank.
grep -qF 'OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD' "$ENVF"
}
@test "the pair shares one network and the app finds the database by container name" {
grep -qxF 'Network=open-notebook.network' "$DB"
grep -qxF 'Network=open-notebook.network' "$APP"
[ "$(grep -cE '^Network=' "$DB")" = "1" ]
# dankclaw_default is the app's second network and must come FIRST: the
# generated --network flags keep file order, so the default route (and the
# gateway name proven on that network) rides it.
[ "$(grep -cE '^Network=' "$APP")" = "2" ]
[ "$(grep -E '^Network=' "$APP" | head -1)" = "Network=dankclaw_default" ]
db_name="$(sed -n 's/^ContainerName=//p' "$DB")"
[ "$db_name" = "open-notebook-surrealdb" ]
grep -qxF "SURREAL_URL=ws://${db_name}:8000/rpc" "$ENVF"
}
@test "each unit reads the repo tunables first and the host secrets second" {
# podman applies --env-file in argument order and the LAST file wins, so
# swapping these two lines would blank every credential the app needs.
for unit in "$APP" "$DB"; do
files="$(grep -E '^EnvironmentFile=' "$unit")"
[ "$(echo "$files" | wc -l)" = "2" ] || {
echo "$(basename "$unit") must read exactly two env files"; false; }
[ "$(echo "$files" | head -1)" = "$HOST_TUNABLES" ] || {
echo "$(basename "$unit") must read the tracked env file first"; false; }
[ "$(echo "$files" | tail -1)" = "$HOST_SECRETS" ] || {
echo "$(basename "$unit") must read the host secret file last"; false; }
done
}
@test "the interim episode destination is mounted exactly once" {
# The bind that answers Gitea issue #7 provisionally: two of them is a
# shadowing bug, none is episode audio locked inside a named volume.
[ "$(grep -cE '^Volume=/home/dank/media/podcasts:/app/data/podcasts$' "$APP")" = "1" ]
# The app's own state stays in a named volume; the database gets its own.
grep -qE '^Volume=open-notebook-data:/app/data$' "$APP"
grep -qE '^Volume=open-notebook-db:/mydata$' "$DB"
# The deployer creates the host directory as the deploy user.
grep -qF 'mkdir -p /home/dank/media/podcasts' "$REMOTE"
}
@test "the env file declares the CPU-shutdown guard and both timeouts" {
# Upstream defaults are 5 and 5; frank-tts spawns ~8 GiB / 8 threads per
# request on a box that also serves two LLM endpoints.
grep -qxF 'TTS_BATCH_SIZE=1' "$ENVF"
grep -qxF 'OPEN_NOTEBOOK_WORKER_MAX_TASKS=1' "$ENVF"
# Per dialogue line, and strictly beyond frank-tts's own per-request
# ceiling: nested budgets go inside-out (the rule scripts/frank-tts.env
# states for LLAMA_TIMEOUT), so a shim give-up surfaces as frank-tts's
# error instead of the worker's own timeout. The seam reads the ceiling
# rather than restating it, so re-measuring frank-tts cannot leave this
# file silently behind.
tts="$(sed -n 's/^ESPERANTO_TTS_TIMEOUT=//p' "$ENVF")"
shim="$(sed -n 's/^SHIM_TIMEOUT=//p' "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/frank-tts.env")"
[ -n "$tts" ] || { echo "no ESPERANTO_TTS_TIMEOUT in the env file"; false; }
[ -n "$shim" ] || { echo "no SHIM_TIMEOUT in scripts/frank-tts.env"; false; }
[ "$tts" -gt "$shim" ] || {
echo "ESPERANTO_TTS_TIMEOUT=$tts is not beyond frank-tts SHIM_TIMEOUT=$shim"; false; }
# Upstream: keep the scriptwriting call under the web UI's ~600 s patience,
# or the failure arrives as a UI timeout with no name on it.
llm="$(sed -n 's/^ESPERANTO_LLM_TIMEOUT=//p' "$ENVF")"
[[ "$llm" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] && [ "$llm" -lt 600 ] || {
echo "ESPERANTO_LLM_TIMEOUT=$llm is not a number under 600"; false; }
}
@test "secrets stay declared-but-empty in the tracked env file" {
# scripts/*.env is un-ignored for "paths and numbers, never credentials":
# the values belong to the host file the deployer seeds.
for key in OPEN_NOTEBOOK_ENCRYPTION_KEY OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD SURREAL_PASSWORD SURREAL_PASS; do
grep -qxF "${key}=" "$ENVF" || {
echo "$key is not declared, empty, in $ENVF"; false; }
done
has_no_leaked_secret "$ENVF"
has_no_leaked_sudo_pw "$ENVF"
# And the deployer treats blank as fatal, because blank means "auth off",
# not "unconfigured".
grep -qF 'seed_open_notebook_env' "$REMOTE"
}
@test "the database password never rides in a command line" {
# `surreal start` reads SURREAL_USER / SURREAL_PASS from the environment;
# --pass would put it in /proc/<pid>/cmdline for any ps on the host.
grep -qE '^Exec=start' "$DB"
! grep -qE '^Exec=.*--(pass|user)' "$DB"
}
@test "the database probe can run in a shell-less image and the API probe names the health route" {
# podman wraps a BARE HealthCmd as CMD-SHELL (measured on this host's podman
# 5.7), and the SurrealDB image is distroless — no /bin/sh — so a bare
# command there is a probe that can only ever fail: the database answers
# perfectly while the health status stays `unhealthy` and the deploy gate
# times out. Only the exec-form JSON array runs in that image.
db_cmd="$(sed -n 's/^HealthCmd=//p' "$DB")"
[ "$db_cmd" = '["/surreal","is-ready"]' ] || {
echo "database probe is not exec-form JSON: $db_cmd"; false; }
# The API image ships curl and a shell, so a bare command is fine there; it
# must name the route that is exempt from the password middleware, on the
# CONTAINER port (the probe runs inside the netns).
grep -qxF 'HealthCmd=curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:5055/health' "$APP"
}
@test "the deployer gates open-notebook on the health path that actually answers" {
grep -qF 'open-notebook) deploy_open_notebook ;;' "$REMOTE"
gate="$(grep -E '^[[:space:]]*wait_for_health open-notebook ' "$REMOTE" | head -1)"
[ -n "$gate" ] || { echo "deploy_open_notebook has no wait_for_health gate"; false; }
# /health is the route upstream serves; the suite must not bless a guess.
printf '%s' "$gate" | grep -qE '/health( |$)'
# The gate is a host-loopback URL (the publish is wildcard, so 127.0.0.1
# answers) on the PUBLISHED port, never the container's 5055.
printf '%s' "$gate" | grep -qE 'http://127\.0\.0\.1:[0-9]+/health'
! printf '%s' "$gate" | grep -qE ':5055/'
# The database is gated by its container health before the app is started.
grep -qE 'wait_container_healthy open-notebook-surrealdb' "$REMOTE"
}
@test "the deployer refuses to start the pair on blank secrets and never rewrites a seeded file" {
# Read the seed function itself: the refusal, and the no-clobber rule that
# protects a password an operator set by hand.
seed="$(sed -n '/^seed_open_notebook_env()/,/^}/p' "$REMOTE")"
[ -n "$seed" ]
printf '%s' "$seed" | grep -qF 'return 1'
printf '%s' "$seed" | grep -qF 'if [[ ! -e "$dest" ]]'
printf '%s' "$seed" | grep -qF 'chmod 600'
# One value, two spellings: the app reads SURREAL_PASSWORD, the CLI SURREAL_PASS.
printf '%s' "$seed" | grep -qF 'SURREAL_PASS='
}
@test "the planner maps every open-notebook path to the open-notebook service" {
run python3 "$PLANNER" --target dankclaw --paths \
dankclaw/open-notebook/quadlet/open-notebook.container \
dankclaw/open-notebook/quadlet/open-notebook-surrealdb.container \
dankclaw/open-notebook/quadlet/open-notebook.network \
scripts/open-notebook.env
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
[ "$output" = "open-notebook" ]
# One deployable owns the pair: the unit files never plan separately.
run python3 "$PLANNER" --target dankclaw --paths \
dankclaw/open-notebook/quadlet/open-notebook-surrealdb.container
[ "$output" = "open-notebook" ]
# And the service belongs to dankclaw only.
run python3 "$PLANNER" --target dankserver --paths scripts/open-notebook.env
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
[ -z "$output" ]
}
@test "changed-path routing selects this seam" {
run "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/test-changed.sh" --list --paths \
dankclaw/open-notebook/quadlet/open-notebook.container
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
printf '%s\n' "$output" | grep -qx "tests/open_notebook.bats"
run "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/test-changed.sh" --list --paths scripts/open-notebook.env
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
printf '%s\n' "$output" | grep -qx "tests/open_notebook.bats"
}
@test "both deployer entry points know the service" {
grep -qF 'dankclaw:open-notebook|' "$REMOTE"
grep -qF 'dankclaw:open-notebook|' "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/deploy.sh"
}
@test "the homepage card links the guarded vhost now that the service is live" {
python3 - "$REPO_ROOT/shared/homepage/services.json" "$(onb_vhost)" <<'PY'
import json, os, sys
data = json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))
vhost = sys.argv[2]
cards = [s for s in data if s["name"] == "open-notebook"]
assert len(cards) == 1, f"expected exactly one open-notebook card, got {len(cards)}"
card = cards[0]
# category moved to "admin": single shared password, no per-user accounts, so it
# is positioned as an admin-side tool, not a user-facing app (see the vault page).
assert card["category"] == "admin" and card["section"] == "AI", card
assert card["probe"] == "127.0.0.1:8502", card["probe"]
assert card["method"] == "http"
# Deployed and guarded: the card is live and its link is the vhost, so the
# button on the page reaches the app through the guard chain. Card links carry
# the fleet's http:// form everywhere; Caddy answers the redirect to HTTPS.
assert not card.get("wip"), f"card should be live, got wip={card.get('wip')!r}"
assert card.get("showLink") is True, card.get("showLink")
assert card.get("url") == f"http://{vhost}", card.get("url")
art = card["art"].lstrip("/")
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(sys.argv[1]), art)), art
PY
}
@test "the runbook page exists and names the interim mount's owning issue" {
page="$REPO_ROOT/serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Open Notebook.md"
[ -f "$page" ]
grep -qF 'issue #7' "$page"
grep -qF 'human-only' "$page"
# The interim decision is one mount line; the page has to say how to undo it.
grep -qF '## Rollback' "$page"
}