The unit comment always claimed the webui drives the same agent state as
the gateway, but the image bakes HERMES_HOME=/opt/data and no unit
overrode it. Podman auto-creates a fresh anonymous volume at every
image-VOLUME point on container recreation, so each restart reset the
webui's config home to the image-default template (provider: auto ->
openrouter.ai with no API key), while the gateway read the corrected
/data/config.yaml. Pin HERMES_HOME=/data so both processes share one
config/state root and config edits propagate without a recreate.
Live config was still routing on pre-rename aliases (frank-default-large,
frank-default-small) after the 2026-09-03 frank-large/frank-small/frank-npu
rename cutover; hermes-webui resolved those ids to nonexistent models and
requests failed. Live config fixed in place (backup kept on-host as
config.yaml.bak-20260905); this backup now mirrors the live shape: named
providers for aux routes, title_generation/triage/kanban routed to their
actual models, moa + mcp sections, signal disabled.
Wget-style (no-JS) clients must never receive application bytes from guarded
services: copyparty serves authenticated traffic with anonymous read perms, so
the guard chain is the only boundary between an unauthenticated client and the
file bytes. Assertions target leakage markers in app code (Copyparty UI title,
homepage panel grid, services.json JSON shape), not gate internals, so any
guard-route regression fails the suite while any gate implementation passes.
Also route 15-*.spec.ts into the guest project (empty storage state).
Flip the homepage Sonarr card from the user category to admin and repoint
its link at the LAN-direct port (192.168.0.112:8989). Retire the unguarded
public vhost sonarr.franksdank.cloud (direct reverse_proxy, no auth) and its
post-auth @sonarr handler from the Caddyfile; drop the Pi-hole addn-hosts A
record with it. No public Porkbun record ever existed (NXDOMAIN at the zone),
so after this there is no WAN path to Sonarr: users request TV via Seerr
(guarded), admins reach Sonarr's own UI from the LAN only.
Fixes the seerr/sonarr mix-up from 19b2589/e0bade6.
FrankBook-Pro becomes the only *arr/qBittorrent deployment. Every fleet
container (qB + five arrs) now shares gluetun's netns, so all egress —
torrent, indexer APIs, metadata lookups — exits the WireGuard tunnel by
construction (AllowedIPs=0.0.0.0/0); the arrs' own ports publish on the
gluetun unit, none on the arr units themselves.
- dankserver/compose.yaml: remove the six arr services (the Aug 20 compose
copy — never healthy, superseded; config dirs trashed on the host)
- dankclaw/Caddyfile + shared/homepage/services.json: arr vhosts and
probes repoint 192.168.0.235 -> 192.168.0.112 (FrankBook-Pro)
- frankbook-pro units: five arrs join gluetun netns (Wants/After/Network);
gluetun publishes 9696/8989/7878/8686/8787 alongside 8080/6881
- tests/frankbook_quadlet.bats: new VPN egress seam — every arr+qB unit
must share gluetun's netns and publish no port; gluetun must publish the
whole fleet's ports
- deploy-plan.py: gluetun changes carry the whole netns family (a gluetun
recreation kills all six joiners); dankserver compose set loses the arrs
- AGENTS.md: deployment is complete only when unit tests AND the Playwright
E2E suite both pass
Rootless podman on dankserver already maps container root (PUID=0) to
the dank user (uid 1000) by default — /proc/<pid>/uid_map reads
0->1000, 1..->100000+. Verified across plex, tautulli, jellyfin,
calibre-web, copyparty, romm. userns_mode: host is unnecessary, and
podman-compose 1.5.0 cannot apply it anyway (compose services run in
pods; --userns and --pod cannot be set together). The real fix for the
never-booted arr stack was chowning the root-owned /opt/<svc>/config
dirs to 1000:1000.
The arr services were committed (b9de886) with PUID=0 but no userns_mode.
Under rootless podman's default subuid mapping, container-root cannot write
host-root-owned bind mounts, so every app died in logger init
(UnauthorizedAccessException on /config/Sentry) before binding its port —
the stack 502'd since it was first brought up (2026-09-04 00:33).
Per the fleet convention (AGENTS.md, plex/tautulli migration): PUID=0 +
UserNS=host maps container-root to dank (1000), which owns /opt data roots
and /mnt/entropy. Config dirs chowned 1000:1000 at bring-up.
Also drops a duplicate 'networks: [appnet]' key on prowlarr.
The arr stack (prowlarr, radarr, sonarr, lidarr, readarr, qbittorrent)
had A records in addn-hosts but no Caddyfile blocks. This adds:
- Six public vhost blocks in the dankserver section, each proxying to
192.168.0.235:<port> (exempt by construction: own auth, no Anubis)
- Six @arr named handlers inside :8017 for authenticated traffic routing
All 233 bats tests pass.
Boot tag flips from qwen3.8-distilled-heretic:9b to nuextract3:4b (verified
live: per-request routing already serves every registered tag; the boot tag
only decides which model is resident at start, so the first request after a
swap pays the load cost). FLM_CTX_LEN=-1 drops the global --ctx-len override
so each pack loads with its own trained context (nuextract3 32768, gemma4
131072).
Live run against the fleet showed the outpost redirects direct navigation to
auth.franksdank.cloud with the guarded host preserved as redirect_uri, rather
than rendering the flow UI in place. The security property under test is that
an unauthenticated visitor never sees app content; assert that shape (uidField
visible + no leak markers + gate is either in-place or a redirect carrying the
return path) instead of hostname preservation.
Mechanical identity rename across the knowledge base, AGENTS.md, README, the
hermes config example, and homepage services.json. No behavior change; served
aliases on the LLM endpoints change with the deploy of commit 69f87c8.
14-guard.spec.ts: every authentik-guarded vhost (www, search, romm, files,
seerr, grafana, prometheus, loki) must challenge an unauthenticated direct
navigation; plex is asserted exempt (PMS answers directly, no IdP form).
11-admin.spec.ts: admin direct-nav to grafana/prometheus/loki passes through
with host preserved and no uidField challenge.
frank-default-large -> frank-large (Dankclaw :7770), frank-default-small ->
frank-small (Dankserver :7770), frank-default-sightsound -> frank-npu
(Dankclaw :7771). Units, env files, serve scripts, deploy-plan mappings,
deploy-remote dispatch (stop/disable old units + relink + enable new), and the
test seams move together. Retired frank-default-npu.* artifacts moved to
scripts/.AGENTTRASH/ (tracked-in-history; ignored on disk).
Served aliases become frank-large / frank-small via --alias; the NPU endpoint
serves the whole FLM registry, so its rename changes no served tags.
Post-change doc reconciliation for the hermes vhosts + DNS deletion batch:
- Hermes-Dashboard.md: access is now the hermesadmin.franksdank.cloud vhost
(direct Caddy proxy to 192.168.0.143:9119, no guard chain — exempt because the
dashboard enforces its own basic-auth login), plus the raw LAN port. The old
text claimed an Authentik-guarded public vhost, which was decommissioned.
- Hermes-WebUI.md: description updated — the webui is now also reachable via the
unguarded hermes.franksdank.cloud vhost (its own password auth is the gate).
- LAN-DNS.md: "add a name in two places" corrected to a two-or-three-step
decision; internal-only names (prometheus/loki/grafana/seerr) deliberately get
no public A record and resolve on the LAN only, and DNS-01 issuance is
unaffected because the challenge is a TXT record in the same zone.
- Seerr.md: DNS row corrected — addn-hosts only since 2026-09-02; NXDOMAIN on WAN.
- hermes-dashboard.container: unit comment no longer claims Authentik termination.
No behavior change in this commit; tests 233/233 green (docs-completeness seam included).
Both Hermes services get direct (unguarded) vhosts: each authenticates itself
(webui password; dashboard basic_auth in /data/config.yaml), so no Anubis
challenge and no Authentik proxy provider is required. Upstreams are the host
LAN IP because Caddy itself sits on dankclaw_default, where the gateway
address 10.89.1.1 has nothing serving 8787. Internal-only by DNS absence:
hermes.franksdank.cloud already resolves via Pi-hole addn-hosts; hermesadmin
is added in this same commit so the caddyfile/addn-hosts cross-check (test 178)
stays green.
New page Architecture/Container Network Namespaces.md: which local services are
addressable from which Podman network namespace on Dankclaw (rootless podman +
netavark). Verified live 2026-09-02: gateway/webui/CDP run in the host netns and
dial loopback; hermes-dashboard is the only Hermes container on a bridge network
(dankclaw_default, 10.89.1.0/24 gw 10.89.1.1) and can dial published ports only —
unpublished host-netns listeners (signal-cli :8080, webui :8787) are refused from
that namespace even though both bind 0.0.0.0.
Corrected while verifying the above:
- Hermes.md: data root is /home/dank/Containers/hermes/data (not the retired
/home/dank/hermes-data); gateway dials the Signal daemon on loopback; the
daemon itself is a host user unit (signal-cli-daemon.service) bound to
0.0.0.0:8080, so the Signal HTTP API is LAN-reachable.
- Hermes-Dashboard.md: it is a Quadlet unit (Network=dankclaw_default), not a
compose service; data root + /opt/data anonymous volume corrected.
- Hermes-WebUI.md: binds 0.0.0.0:8787 in the host netns (verified: unauthenticated
GET /health from another LAN machine returned 200) — the SSH tunnel is an access
path, not a containment boundary; HealthCmd and data-path corrections.
- Network Architecture.md: no hermes vhost exists in either the tracked or the live
Caddyfile (hermes.franksdank.cloud resolves but routes nowhere); SearXNG exits the
tunnel via the shared named network searxng.network, not service:gluetun.
Docs only — deploy is a no-op for this change.
PMS 1.43 serves TLS-only on 32400: a plain-HTTP GET gets a TLS alert and
curl reports "empty reply from server" (exit 52, code 000), so the card read
down while Plex answered 200 at /web/index.html over HTTPS. TCP connect is the
honest liveness signal for this port; the public URL stays HTTP because Caddy
terminates TLS and re-keys the path.
The Hermes card probed 127.0.0.1:8090, a port retired when the hermes
stack moved from compose (8090 web dashboard) to quadlets: the dashboard
now publishes 9119 and the webui listens on 0.0.0.0:8787 in the host netns.
Nothing has listened on 8090 since, so the card reported "down" while the
gateway, dashboard, and webui were all running.
Probe 127.0.0.1:8787 instead — the webui runs HERMES_HOME=/data, the same
agent state as the gateway, and /health answers only when that server is
alive (uptime, sessions, active runs). The prober runs on Dankclaw, so the
loopback probe hits the host netns where the webui binds.
The C5 probe failed for the wrong reason: plex.container lost its Network=
key in the same edit churn that ate tautulli's ContainerName. Plex ran on
the default podman network — published 32400 still worked (clients fine)
but tautulli could not resolve the plex alias, breaking the seeded
PMS_Web_Host=plex. Restore appnet membership; structure now parallel to
tautulli.container. Lesson recorded: after multi-hunk line edits on these
unit files, diff the whole file — key-order churn has eaten three keys
already.
Without ContainerName= the v1 generator names the container
systemd-tautulli; the fleet references containers by their plain names
(podman inspect/exec, deployer health checks). Container was healthy but
renamed — caught by post-cutover verification, not by the seam; the seam
only asserts file keys, so pin the name here and keep plex/tautulli
structures parallel.
- tautulli.container: HealthCmd switches to the repo's proven curl pattern
(jellyfin unit) — quadlet's systemd-style value parsing mangles embedded
double quotes; PublishPort=8181:8181 restored (a mis-aimed line edit
replaced it; the PublishPort seam test caught the regression)
- deploy_plex readiness gate: 36x5s -> 120x5s; the 2026-09 cutover showed
the first container boot of a years-old library runs ~10 min while PMS
pre-binds 32400 and empty-replies; 180s failed the gate twice with a
healthy, still-booting service
Evidence from the failed first cutover: podman top shows container root
maps to dank (1000) under UserNS=host rootless (subuid range 100000:65536
cannot express 997), so PUID=997 fell back to root and PMS crash-looped on
write access to its 997:984-owned data root. Fleet model instead: PUID=0/
PGID=0 (container root = dank, same as jellyfin/copyparty data roots) and
deploy_plex chowns /var/lib/plexmediaserver to 1000:1000 inside the
first-cutover block. Zero bytes moved; rollback regains one chown -R
997:984 step, documented in Plex.md. Seam test pins PUID=0/PGID=0 and the
absence of any userns key.
podman 5.7 podman-user-generator on dankserver hard-fails the whole unit on
the unknown key ('unsupported key UsernsMode in group Container'), so the
first cutover attempt masked the native unit and then found no plex.service
at all. Swap both units to UserNS=host (same --userns=host flag), update the
ownership-contract seam test to pin the exact key, and correct both docs.
Pin the seam: the v1 generator rejects unknown Container keys silently at
deploy distance — the test now pins UserNS=, not the misspelled alias.
- runtime rows: podman quadlet under the systemd user generator, pinned
image digests, in-place bind mounts, identity model, appnet aliases
- cutover/rollback section on Plex.md (mask-native-unit lever, decommission
gate); drop the false 'updates are apt-only' and 'snap refresh' gotchas
- update path is now deploy.sh dankserver --service plex|tautulli
- plex: lscr.io/linuxserver/plex:1.43.3.10896-cb3ebc72d-ls322 (verified ==
ghcr latest digest; plan's ls9 pin superseded by the re-verify clause),
/var/lib/plexmediaserver bind-mounted in place as /config, /mnt/entropy
mounted ro at the same path, PUID=997/PGID=984 + UsernsMode=host so the
container's file identity is byte-compatible with the native unit
- tautulli: lscr.io/linuxserver/tautulli:v2.18.1-ls242 (verified == ghcr
latest digest), fresh /home/dank/Containers/tautulli config root,
PUID=1000/PGID=1000, python3 /home healthcheck
- both on dankserver_appnet with aliases; 32400/8181 published as before
- deploy_plex(): install unit, stop+mask native plexmediaserver.service on
first cutover (mask, never disable), gate on /identity for 180s
- deploy_tautulli(): install unit, stop+disable snap on first cutover,
seed config.ini with PMS_Web_Host=plex only if absent
- allow-lists (deploy.sh valid_service, deploy-remote.sh service_is_allowed),
planner routing (SERVICE_ORDER, DANKSERVER_SERVICES, quadlet_services),
test-changed cutover case, quadlet seam enumeration + new
userns/PUID=997/PGID=984 ownership-contract test
The loki/grafana/seerr proxy providers were script-provisioned with no
flows and no Application: null flows made the embedded outpost's Rust
deserializer reject the whole config (all guarded vhosts down after any
outpost reload), and the missing apps bounced post-login to authentik's
user UI instead of the app. Backfilled both live; documented the two
provisioning rules and updated the provider inventory. SSO e2e now
asserts the app landing (pathname leaves /if/, no IdP markers in body)
instead of only the hostname.
- qB 5.x's 204 login breaks Readarr's retired client at runtime; 4.6.7 answers
legacy 200+Ok. Pin recorded in the unit and documented.
- Prowlarr download client created via schema template; all five clients test
200 through the podman gateway.
- PBKDF2 gotcha: qB 5.x conf rewrite left a hash 4.6.7 rejects; fresh rewrite
of the same line restored login.
- E2E: torrent through the Panama tunnel at ~17 MB/s, completed into Finished
Torrents, deleted with data.
Frank