Frank
2e179b024d
New page Architecture/Container Network Namespaces.md: which local services are addressable from which Podman network namespace on Dankclaw (rootless podman + netavark). Verified live 2026-09-02: gateway/webui/CDP run in the host netns and dial loopback; hermes-dashboard is the only Hermes container on a bridge network (dankclaw_default, 10.89.1.0/24 gw 10.89.1.1) and can dial published ports only — unpublished host-netns listeners (signal-cli :8080, webui :8787) are refused from that namespace even though both bind 0.0.0.0. Corrected while verifying the above: - Hermes.md: data root is /home/dank/Containers/hermes/data (not the retired /home/dank/hermes-data); gateway dials the Signal daemon on loopback; the daemon itself is a host user unit (signal-cli-daemon.service) bound to 0.0.0.0:8080, so the Signal HTTP API is LAN-reachable. - Hermes-Dashboard.md: it is a Quadlet unit (Network=dankclaw_default), not a compose service; data root + /opt/data anonymous volume corrected. - Hermes-WebUI.md: binds 0.0.0.0:8787 in the host netns (verified: unauthenticated GET /health from another LAN machine returned 200) — the SSH tunnel is an access path, not a containment boundary; HealthCmd and data-path corrections. - Network Architecture.md: no hermes vhost exists in either the tracked or the live Caddyfile (hermes.franksdank.cloud resolves but routes nowhere); SearXNG exits the tunnel via the shared named network searxng.network, not service:gluetun. Docs only — deploy is a no-op for this change.
102 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
102 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# Network Architecture
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One Caddy fronts both hosts. It runs as a container on Dankclaw (192.168.0.143) and terminates TLS for every service on the LAN. Pi-hole on Dankclaw answers the service names for LAN clients; Porkbun answers them for the WAN. The G36 router firewall governs external access. SearXNG outbound traffic exits through the Gluetun VPN container.
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## Topology
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As of 2026-08-28 the front door is a two-tier chain: Caddy terminates TLS,
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Anubis verifies the client (DENY known AI scrapers, CHALLENGE everyone
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else), and accepted traffic returns to Caddy's internal listener on `:8016`,
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which proxies every request whole to the Authentik server with the Host
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header preserved; Authentik's embedded outpost routes on that Host against
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each proxy provider's `external_host`, serves the login flow in place for
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sessionless clients, and forwards authenticated traffic back to Caddy's
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post-auth listener `:8017`, where per-vhost routing reaches the app. See
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[[Anubis]] and [[Authentik]].
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```mermaid
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graph TB
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EXT[Internet] -->|port forwards 80/443| CADDY[Caddy TLS :80 :443 — Dankclaw]
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LAN[LAN clients] -->|Pi-hole DNS :53| CADDY
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subgraph Dankclaw[Dankclaw 192.168.0.143]
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CADDY -->|unwrapped vhosts route direct| DIRECT{direct routes}
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CADDY -->|guarded vhosts| ANUBIS[Anubis verify :8923]
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ANUBIS -->|deny AI bots| EXT
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ANUBIS -->|challenge solved or transport-exempt| INT[Caddy internal listener :8016]
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INT -->|whole request, Host preserved| AUTH[Authentik embedded outpost :9000]
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AUTH -->|session valid, provider internal_host| POST[Caddy post-auth listener :8017]
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POST --> HOME[Homepage file_server]
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POST --> SEARCH[SearXNG via Gluetun netns :8081]
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POST --> PROM[Prometheus :9090]
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DIRECT -->|3000 + ssh 2222| GITEA[Gitea]
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DIRECT -->|3005| OWEBUI[OpenWebUI]
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DIRECT -->|3002| GRAFANA[Grafana :3000]
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DIRECT -->|8083 web UI| PIHOLE[Pi-hole]
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AUTH -->|login UI + sessions| AUTHDB[(Authentik Postgres :5432)]
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SEARCH -.->|tunnel exit| GLU[Gluetun VPN]
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GLU -.-> EXT
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end
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subgraph Dankserver[Dankserver 192.168.0.235]
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ROMM[RomM :8085]
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COPY[Copyparty :3923]
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CAL[Calibre-Web :8083]
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PLEX[Plex :32400]
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JEL[Jellyfin :8096]
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ARR[*arr stack + qBittorrent]
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end
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POST -->|romm| ROMM
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POST -->|files| COPY
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DIRECT -->|plex plain-HTTP passthrough| PLEX
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DIRECT --> CAL
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DIRECT --> JEL
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DIRECT --> ARR
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```
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Guarded (through Anubis): homepage, search, prometheus, romm, files.
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Exempt by construction: `auth.` (the IdP login itself), plex (plain HTTP),
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gitea (git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve JS challenges — `/info/refs` and
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`git-*-pack` pass unchallenged), grafana (own auth).
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Dankserver runs no proxy of its own. Its services expose published LAN ports, and the Dankclaw Caddy routes the names to those ports.
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## Hostnames
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| Scope | Convention | Resolved by |
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|-------|------------|-------------|
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| LAN | `romm.franksdank.cloud` → 192.168.0.143 | Pi-hole (`addn-hosts`) |
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| WAN | `romm.franksdank.cloud` → 71.227.227.172 | Porkbun A record |
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Users type a name and nothing else. Caddy maps the name to the upstream. The split between the two resolvers removes the need for router NAT loopback. See [[LAN-DNS]] for the flow and the router hand-off.
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## TLS
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Caddy holds one Let's Encrypt certificate per vhost, issued and renewed through the DNS-01 challenge via the Porkbun module. No inbound port 80/443 is required. Details in [[Caddy]].
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## Gluetun Path (SearXNG only)
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`gluetun.container`, `searxng.container` and `searxng-valkey.container` all set
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`Network=searxng.network` in their Quadlet sources (runtime network
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`systemd-searxng`); only those three share the tunnel. The old compose idiom
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(`network_mode: service:gluetun`) is gone — a shared named network is what
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carries SearXNG's outbound traffic through the VPN exit. Everything else on
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Dankclaw uses the normal LAN route. This matches KB Pattern 2 in [[Gluetun]].
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See [[Container Network Namespaces]] for which addresses are reachable from that
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namespace (none of the unpublished host-netns listeners).
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## Access Policy
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- The **G36 router firewall** governs what the WAN can reach. Port forwards are manual router steps; the repo tracks no router state.
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- Access is layered: Anubis challenges/denies bots at the front door, then Authentik's embedded outpost (whole-request proxy, routed by `Host` → provider `external_host`) gates the wrapped apps — one proxy provider per guarded host is mandatory, and Anubis exempts the `/outpost.goauthentik.io/*` transport paths so login can happen before a challenge cookie exists. Apps with their own login (Grafana, Gitea, Plex) run unwrapped. See [[Anubis]] and [[Authentik]].
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- LAN subnet: `192.168.0.0/24`.
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## See Also
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- [[LAN-DNS]] — name resolution, Pi-hole, router hand-off
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- [[Caddy]] — vhost map, TLS, basic auth
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- [[Dankserver Stack]], [[Dankclaw Stack]]
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- [[Gluetun]]
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- Knowledge base: [[Gluetun]], [[SearXNG]]
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- [[Container Network Namespaces]] — who can dial what on Dankclaw (host netns vs bridge nets) |