Files
Frank 327e78b950 docs(vault): destroy the dead weight — 53 pages and the change diary
The vault was 155 pages / 31,210 lines, most of it measurement ledgers for
payloads that no longer run. A throughput figure for a runtime nobody operates is
not a record: AI moves faster than the vault, so the number is wrong before
anyone reads it, and a wrong number in a runbook gets believed. Per the new
purpose test in `AGENTS.md` → *Documentation Policy*, it is destroyed.

Gone (`.AGENTTRASH/20261019-destruction/`, KILL-LIST.txt is the manifest):
- the `frank-medium` endpoint and its five era pages, `frank-npu`, FastFlowLM,
  the ikllama/kingjones/dealign/frank-redo eras, the ling/swift15/freetoken/ubatch
  campaign pages, qwen3.8 spec-matrix and strix-optimizations, the two
  "Running Qwen3.6 …" pages;
- the whole `Pipeline Parallelism/` folder (no live script passes a pipeline flag)
  and the multi-device/x4-pair/hybrid/offload experiment pages;
- every vLLM page — no vLLM endpoint exists on this fleet;
- `LLM/deployment.md` (`Architecture/Deployment Flow.md` is the test-referenced
  owner) and the external surveys (SGLang, Lemonade, llama.cpp forks/diff,
  self-hosted app census, the TTS survey) that were obsolete by construction;
- `log.md`, 2,380 lines. Git holds the chronology; a causal law belongs to the
  page that owns the thing it governs, never to a diary.

Survivors: 101 pages, 17,542 lines, 0 OKF violations, 0 unresolved links. Eras
tables keep the window, payload, runtime, reason and rollback pointer; the rate
columns are blanked. The live shapes stay verbatim — those numbers are what the
deployer and `models.yml` consume.
2026-10-19 10:56:37 -07:00

184 lines
8.7 KiB
Markdown

---
type: reference
description: "Copyparty is a lightweight file server and media streamer that runs as a single Python binary."
tags:
- dankserver
- copyparty
timestamp: 2026-09-03
---
# Copyparty
Copyparty is a lightweight file server and media streamer that runs as a single Python binary. It handles large payloads, media streaming, resumable uploads, directory browsing, and WebDAV from one process.
**Host:** Dankserver — **Access:** `files.franksdank.cloud` guarded by the
Anubis → Authentik chain ([[Caddy]] routes it post-auth to
`192.168.0.235:3923`); the published port itself stays unauthenticated on the
LAN — **Docs:** https://github.com/9001/copyparty
## Facts
| Item | Value |
|------|-------|
| Running image | `ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest` (ac = full edition; the bare `copyparty:latest` tag does not exist — ghcr answers 403 on the token request for nonexistent repos). Upstream latest v1.20.24 (2026-09-19); v1.20.21 at research time (2026-08) |
| Port | 3923 (host) → 3923 (container) |
| Volume | bind mount the shared root directory |
| Auth | Per-directory `.cpy` config files, HTTP basic auth, `dirkeys`, `filekeys` |
| Streaming | HTTP range requests, HLS, WebDAV, WOPI (Office editing) |
| Docker editions | `dj` (document + media), `iv` (image + video), `v` (video only) |
## Configuration
### Command-line interface (ac edition)
The ac edition's entrypoint is `/bin/ash /z/cpp.sh -c /z/initcfg` — it parses
a config file, then `exec`s `python3 -m copyparty "$@"`, so accounts and
volumes are passed as **argv flags**, not env vars. `COPAY_PASS`/`COPAY_MODE`
envs are *not* consumed by this image (zero `COPAY_` references in the
package). The deployed interface:
```
command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
```
`-a` takes `USER:PASS`. `-v` takes `src:dst:perm1:perm2:...` (authoritative:
`python3 -m copyparty --help-accounts` inside the image, v1.20.21): each perm
field is `<letters>[,user[,user...]]` and a field with **no username applies to
every unauthenticated request**. Letters: `r` read (list + download), `w`
upload, `m` move, `d` delete, `a` admin (control panel, config reload), `A` =
`rwmda.` (everything). Empty `dst` mounts at the basename of `src` → URL `/w`.
**Read-only posture (2026-08-31):** `::r` = browse + download for anonymous
(required: the guarded `files.franksdank.cloud` chain delivers authentik'd
traffic to copyparty *unauthenticated*), `:ra,dank` = admin for the `dank`
account. **No `w`/`m`/`d` for anyone** — uploads, moves, and deletes are
rejected server-side over HTTP, PUT, and WebDAV alike. There is no dedicated
"reject uploads" volflag; the perms field is the documented mechanism
(`--help-flags` volflags only throttle/reshape uploads).
History: the pre-2026-08-31 flag `-v /w::A` was *not* "A for dank, nothing for
anonymous" as an earlier revision of this page claimed — the bare `A` granted
full read/write/delete to anyone reaching port 3923. Verified live the same
day: anonymous `GET /Movies/` → 200, `PROPFIND /` → 207, `PUT` → 201.
### Configuration File Options
Copyparty reads its configuration from `initcfg` (or `config` in the `/data` directory). Key options:
- `use-bwrap: n` — Disable bwrap sandboxing for ffmpeg (default in Docker). Set to `y` to enable.
- `shadowing //NULL` — Full unmap of a volume from the filesystem.
- Config env-var expansion: Use `${VAR}` syntax in `[global]` section for environment variable substitution.
### Docker Editions
Different editions bundle different libraries:
| Edition | Bundled Libraries | Use Case |
|---------|-------------------|----------|
| `dj` | Document + image + video libraries | Full-featured server |
| `iv` | Image + video libraries | Image and video focused |
| `v` | Video only | Transcoding only, minimal footprint |
The `iv` edition is no longer available for arm32/armv6. Use `dj` for maximum compatibility.
## Volumes
Live deployment: the whole LUKS array is served at URL `/w`
`Volume=/mnt/entropy:/w:ro` in the quadlet unit ([[Entropy Volume]]) —
read-only **at the mount level**, so no containerized consumer can write into
the array through this path regardless of account permissions. The ac edition
takes its volume roots from argv (`-v /w::r:ra,dank`), not from a `/data`
convention; see [[#Command-line interface (ac edition)]] above.
## Docker Compose (reference — retired 2026-09-01; live deployment is the quadlet unit below)
```yaml
copyparty:
image: ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest
container_name: copyparty
restart: unless-stopped
command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
ports:
- "3923:3923"
volumes:
- /mnt/entropy:/w
- /opt/copyparty/cfg:/cfg
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python3", "-c", "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:3923/')"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 10s
retries: 3
```
`${COPAY_ACCOUNT}`/`${COPAY_PASSWORD}` are **never** written into the unit:
they live in the host-local `/home/dank/Containers/copyparty/env` (0600)
loaded via `[Service] EnvironmentFile=` so systemd expands them into
`Exec=-a ${COPAY_ACCOUNT}:${COPAY_PASSWORD}` at start. The password still
lands in the container argv — visible to anyone who can run
`podman inspect copyparty` on the host.
## Deployment (Quadlet)
Since 2026-09-01: `dankserver/copyparty/quadlet/copyparty.container` →
`copyparty.service`, deployed with
`./scripts/deploy.sh dankserver --service copyparty`. Cutover details:
- v1 generator rejects `Command=` → the argv lives in `Exec=`.
- No `HealthCmd=` — the v1 generator splits unquoted spaces in that key;
self-healing is `Restart=always`.
- `PublishPort=3923:3923` — the first cutover dropped it (unit joined
`dankserver_appnet`), copyparty answered inside the netns only; the
published-port seam test now pins 3923 alongside 8085/8096/8083.
- Config root moved `/opt/copyparty` → `/home/dank/Containers/copyparty/cfg`.
- The deployer refuses to start the unit before the env file exists, so a
missing seed cannot create an admin account with a garbage password.
## Healthcheck
A simple HTTP check on port 3923 works. The root path returns HTTP 200 with the directory listing.
## WOPI Integration
Copyparty v1.20.9+ supports WOPI (Web Application Open Platform Interface) for editing Office documents in the web UI via Collabora Online. Enable with the `--wopi-accs` flag to limit WOPI access to specific paths.
## Security Advisories
| Version | Advisory | CVE | Issue |
|---------|----------|-----|-------|
| v1.20.19 | GHSA-phv8-wgjp-g4p9 | CVE-2026-104102 | FTP upload outside the defined volumes (limited path traversal) |
| v1.20.17 | GHSA-x5pq-m9p8-f4vx | CVE-2026-70657 | dirkey/filekey confusion |
| v1.20.9 | GHSA-62cr-6wp5-q43h | CVE-2026-27948 | reflected XSS via the `?setck=` URL parameter (not the upload path — the separate upload/DOM-XSS advisory is GHSA-m2jw-cj8v-937r) |
Upgrade to v1.20.19+ to cover all known advisories. The dirkey fix (v1.20.17) matters if using both `dirkeys` and `filekeys`. Each row's patched version is the advisory's own `first_patched_version`.
## Gotchas
- **Large transfers:** Disable TLS inside the app and let Caddy terminate TLS. This avoids double encryption overhead.
- **Dedicated share directory:** Do not give Copyparty the whole disk. Mount only the intended share path.
- **Whole-disk share (live choice):** this deployment *does* serve the whole
~91 T array from `/w`. The volume is mounted `:ro` in the unit AND the
permission flags grant anonymous only `r`, so no remote write path exists at
all now. But note:
**LAN-direct `:3923` is unauthenticated browse/download** (anonymous holds
`r`) — Caddy + Anubis + authentik guard only `files.franksdank.cloud`, not
the published port. Tighten to `-v /w::r,dank` if anonymous LAN reads become
unacceptable. (Before 2026-08-31, `-v /w::A` made the array world-writable
on the LAN — see [[#Command-line interface (ac edition)]] — and the mount
was rw.)
- **Upload tokens scoped per folder:** Prevents accidental global write access.
- **CSP nonces (v1.20.17+):** Security hardening for JavaScript execution. May break third-party JS plugins (`--js-browser` / `--html-head`).
- **Custom thumbnail extractors (v1.20.19+):** New `thumbex` framework. Requires configuration in `initcfg`.
## See Also
- [[Dankserver Stack]]
- [[Caddy]] — TLS termination and authentication in front
- [[ARR-Stack]] — Copyparty as a viewer alongside automated download management
## Citations
- GitHub Security Advisories, `9001/copyparty` —
https://github.com/9001/copyparty/security/advisories (accessed 2026-10-19)
each row's patched version read from `first_patched_version` in the
`https://api.github.com/advisories/<GHSA-id>` response.