dank
2a48751283
The Audiobookshelf phone app could never sign in over the public name. The guard chain answered its /ping and /socket.io/ handshake with Anubis challenge HTML, so the app evaluated 'isInit' in e.data on a non-object and reported "Failed to contact server" while the container's request log recorded nothing at all. Anubis demands a JavaScript proof-of-work and the authentik outpost works from a session cookie: the chain is browser-only by construction, and a native client, a podcast RSS reader or an OPDS client cannot pass it. Audiobookshelf authenticates itself (local accounts plus authentik OIDC), so it joins jelly/plex/*arr in the exempt set: the public site block dials the container directly, keeping the X-Forwarded-Proto pin its OIDC origin check depends on, and the @audiobooks route leaves the post-auth listener so one host has one owner. The IdP rows that guarded the name go after this deploys, never before. tests/e2e/specs/14-guard.spec.ts loses audiobooks as a guarded target and gains the exemption assertion (app bytes to an anonymous client, the app's own 401, never challenge HTML); tests/anubis.bats pins the route shape.
97 lines
4.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
97 lines
4.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bats
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# Seam: the Anubis bot-challenge proxy (dankclaw/anubis). Anubis sits between
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# Caddy's public listeners and the guarded vhosts: clients hit Caddy (TLS),
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# Caddy proxies everything through Anubis, Anubis verifies (DENY known AI
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# scrapers, CHALLENGE everyone else per policy.json) and forwards accepted
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# traffic back to Caddy's internal listener at :8016, where per-vhost routing
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# resumes. Static assertions only — the container runs on dankclaw.
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load helpers
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setup() {
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UNIT="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container"
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POLICY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json"
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CADDY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/Caddyfile"
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}
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@test "the anubis quadlet unit exists and is boot-persistent by [Install]" {
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test -f "$UNIT"
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grep -q 'WantedBy=default.target' "$UNIT"
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# Generated units cannot be enabled on this host (v1 quadlet generator);
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# boot persistence comes from [Install], not from systemctl enable.
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! grep -q '^Enable=true' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "the image is pinned to an exact upstream tag and never pulled at boot" {
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# The unit runs a localhost/ alias tag of the canonical upstream ref
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# (podman 5.7 quadlet quirk: registry-prefixed refs fail container
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# create on this host). The pin is still an exact upstream tag — the
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# deploy handler pulls the canonical ghcr.io ref and re-tags the alias;
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# nothing is pulled at boot (Pull=never).
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grep -qE '^Image=localhost/techarohq/anubis:v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' "$UNIT"
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grep -q '^Pull=never$' "$UNIT"
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grep -q 'podman pull ghcr\.io/techarohq/anubis:v[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*' "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/deploy-remote.sh"
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}
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@test "anubis publishes no host port — it is internal-network-only" {
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# Metrics (:9090) are unauthenticated; the protection strategy is that
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# only dankclaw_default members can reach the container at all. Caddy
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# reaches it by container DNS name, so no published port may exist.
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! grep -q '^PublishPort=' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "the unit points TARGET back at caddy's internal listener" {
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grep -q '^Environment=TARGET=http://caddy:8016$' "$UNIT"
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grep -q '^Environment=POLICY_FNAME=/policy/policy.json$' "$UNIT"
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# The policy file is mounted read-only from the repo checkout on the host.
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grep -q 'policy.json:/policy/policy.json:ro' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "the policy parses as JSON and matches v1.13.0 schema (bots array, action rules)" {
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# At the pinned tag the parser is JSON-only with a minimal schema:
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# {"bots":[{"name","user_agent_regex"|"path_regex","action"}],"dnsbl":bool}
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# — imports/CEL/expression keys do not exist at this tag and would crash
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# the container at parse time. Assert the shape statically via python.
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python3 - "$POLICY" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
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p = json.load(f)
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assert set(p.keys()) <= {"bots", "dnsbl"}, p.keys()
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actions = [b["action"] for b in p["bots"]]
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assert any(a == "DENY" for a in actions), actions
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assert actions[-1] == "CHALLENGE", actions
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for b in p["bots"]:
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keys = set(b) ^ {"name", "action"}
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assert len(keys) == 1, f"{b.get('name')}: exactly one matcher required, got {keys}"
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assert (keys ^ {"user_agent_regex"}) != (keys ^ {"path_regex"}), b
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PY
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}
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@test "guarded vhosts proxy through anubis with the real client IP forwarded" {
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# Anubis reads X-Real-Ip for its decisions; without the header every
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# request looks like it comes from the Caddy container. Every guarded
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# public listener must set it.
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grep -q 'header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}' "$CADDY"
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}
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@test "exempt vhosts never route through anubis (auth, plex, own-auth apps)" {
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# The IdP login flow, git smart-HTTP clients, and any non-browser client (the
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# Audiobookshelf phone app, podcast RSS readers) cannot solve a challenge, so
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# services that enforce their own complete auth bypass the chain by
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# construction — the gate would answer their API calls with HTML.
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local block
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block=$(awk '/^auth\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
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echo "$block" | grep -q 'reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000'
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! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
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block=$(awk '/^plex\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
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echo "$block" | grep -q '192\.168\.0\.235:32400'
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! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
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block=$(awk '/^audiobooks\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
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echo "$block" | grep -q '192\.168\.0\.235:8000'
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! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
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# The exemption is total: the post-auth listener must not still carry an
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# audiobooks route. A leftover handle there is a second owner for one host,
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# and its X-Forwarded-Proto pin would silently disagree with the edge.
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! grep -q '@audiobooks host audiobooks.franksdank.cloud' "$CADDY"
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}
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