Files
serverAppConfigs/tests/e2e/specs/14-guard.spec.ts
dank 2a48751283 feat(caddy): serve Audiobookshelf outside the guard chain
The Audiobookshelf phone app could never sign in over the public name. The guard
chain answered its /ping and /socket.io/ handshake with Anubis challenge HTML, so
the app evaluated 'isInit' in e.data on a non-object and reported "Failed to
contact server" while the container's request log recorded nothing at all. Anubis
demands a JavaScript proof-of-work and the authentik outpost works from a session
cookie: the chain is browser-only by construction, and a native client, a podcast
RSS reader or an OPDS client cannot pass it.

Audiobookshelf authenticates itself (local accounts plus authentik OIDC), so it
joins jelly/plex/*arr in the exempt set: the public site block dials the container
directly, keeping the X-Forwarded-Proto pin its OIDC origin check depends on, and
the @audiobooks route leaves the post-auth listener so one host has one owner. The
IdP rows that guarded the name go after this deploys, never before.

tests/e2e/specs/14-guard.spec.ts loses audiobooks as a guarded target and gains the
exemption assertion (app bytes to an anonymous client, the app's own 401, never
challenge HTML); tests/anubis.bats pins the route shape.
2026-11-03 01:54:08 -08:00

155 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { expect, test } from "@playwright/test";
// Guard chain: Caddy -> Anubis (edge challenge) -> authentik outpost -> app.
// The guard is only effective if the outpost is actually consulted on every
// route of a guarded vhost — including deep links and API paths that a direct
// navigation would skip. These tests drive the browser as an UNAUTHENTICATED
// user (the guest project has no storage state) and navigate directly to each
// guarded vhost's root path: the guard must present authentik's flow UI in
// place and must never leak app content. plex and audiobooks are the documented
// exemptions — PMS and Audiobookshelf enforce their own auth — so they must be
// reachable unauthenticated with zero challenge pages, proving the exemption is
// deliberate, not accidental.
const BASE = "https://www.franksdank.cloud";
// Every vhost that Caddy routes through anubis:8923 (see dankclaw/Caddyfile).
// Keep this list in lockstep with the Caddyfile: a new guarded vhost must be
// added here or the guard-chain audit is incomplete.
const GUARDED = ["www", "search", "romm", "files", "seerr", "grafana", "prometheus", "loki", "notebook"];
// Markers that prove app content leaked past the guard to an anonymous user. Each
// marker must be a string the APP renders that the gate itself could never print:
// authentik's gate never renders an app's UI text, because it IS the IdP.
const LEAK_MARKERS: Record<string, string[]> = {
"search.franksdank.cloud": ["SearXNG preferences"],
"romm.franksdank.cloud": ["RomM"],
"files.franksdank.cloud": ["Copyparty"],
"seerr.franksdank.cloud": ["Request Movie"],
"grafana.franksdank.cloud": ["Dashboards"],
"prometheus.franksdank.cloud": ["Expression Browser", "Graph"],
"notebook.franksdank.cloud": ["Open Notebook"],
};
test("homepage root (/) is guarded for unauthenticated users", async ({ page }) => {
await page.goto(`${BASE}/`);
// The login flow renders in place (no redirect away from the vhost).
const uid = page.locator('input[name="uidField"]');
await expect(uid).toBeVisible({ timeout: 90_000 });
await uid.fill("nobody");
await page.locator('button[type="submit"]').first().click();
// Wrong credentials must not leak panels: the flow re-renders with an error.
const pwd = page.locator('input[name="password"]');
await expect(pwd).toBeVisible({ timeout: 30_000 });
await pwd.fill("not-a-real-user");
await pwd.press("Enter");
await expect(page.locator("#grid .panel").first()).toHaveCount(0);
});
test("/admin/ is guarded for unauthenticated users", async ({ page }) => {
await page.goto(`${BASE}/admin/`);
const uid = page.locator('input[name="uidField"]');
await expect(uid).toBeVisible({ timeout: 90_000 });
await expect(page.locator("#grid .panel").first()).toHaveCount(0);
});
for (const sub of GUARDED) {
test(`unauthenticated direct navigation to ${sub}.franksdank.cloud is gated by authentik`, async ({ page }) => {
test.setTimeout(180_000);
const host = `${sub}.franksdank.cloud`;
await page.goto(`https://${host}/`);
// The guard resolves (Anubis PoW solves automatically in a real browser)
// and presents authentik's flow UI — either in place or after a redirect
// to the IdP host. Either way, the user never reaches the app content.
const uid = page.locator('input[name="uidField"]');
await expect(uid).toBeVisible({ timeout: 90_000 });
// The challenge/login flow itself must not be leaking content.
const body = await page.locator("body").innerText();
for (const marker of LEAK_MARKERS[host] ?? []) {
expect(body, `${host} leaked app content to an unauthenticated user`).not.toContain(marker);
}
// The guard is present: either the flow UI renders in place on the guarded
// vhost, or the browser was redirected to the IdP host (auth.) with the
// guarded host preserved as redirect_uri. Both prove a gate; neither leaks.
const landed = new URL(page.url()).hostname;
expect([host, "auth.franksdank.cloud"], `${host} must gate, not pass through`).toContain(landed);
if (landed === "auth.franksdank.cloud") {
const params = new URL(page.url()).searchParams;
const redirect = params.get("redirect_path") ?? params.get("redirect_uri") ?? "";
expect(redirect, `${host} must return to the guarded host after auth`).toContain(sub);
}
});
}
test("plex is exempt from the guard chain and serves PMS content unauthenticated", async ({ page }) => {
test.setTimeout(120_000);
// Exempt-by-construction: Caddy reverse-proxies straight to PMS on the LAN
// hop (PMS enforces its own auth). An unauthenticated visitor must reach the
// app itself — never an authentik challenge or flow UI.
await page.goto("https://plex.franksdank.cloud/");
expect(new URL(page.url()).hostname).toBe("plex.franksdank.cloud");
const body = await page.locator("body").innerText();
expect(body).not.toContain("Making sure you're not a bot"); // no challenge
expect(await page.locator('input[name="uidField"]').count()).toBe(0); // no IdP form
// PMS answers with its XML MediaContainer index when unauthenticated; the
// exact payload (empty body vs XML) depends on PMS version, so assert only
// that the answer comes from PMS itself: sub-500 and no IdP markers.
const resp = await page.request.get("https://plex.franksdank.cloud/");
expect(resp.status(), "PMS must answer directly, not error").toBeLessThan(500);
});
// Audiobookshelf is exempt by construction (2026-11-03). The phone app is a
// non-browser client and solves no JS proof-of-work, so behind the guard chain it
// was answered with challenge HTML wherever the socket `init` payload belongs —
// every remote sign-in died as a TypeError on a non-object, and the container's
// request log never saw a byte of it. ABS enforces its own auth (local accounts
// plus authentik OIDC), exactly like PMS above. Asserted from the CLIENT side: the
// endpoints an app must call before it holds any credential are answered by the
// app, and the app's own 401 — not a 200 of HTML — is what an anonymous API call gets.
test("audiobookshelf answers an unauthenticated app client with app bytes, not gate bytes", async ({
request,
}) => {
const ABS = "https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud";
// The probe every Audiobookshelf client sends first. The app answers it at the
// ROOT whatever ROUTER_BASE_PATH says, so this is the vhost's own behaviour.
const ping = await request.get(`${ABS}/ping`, { timeout: 30_000 });
expect(ping.status(), "/ping must be answered by the app").toBe(200);
expect(await ping.json(), "/ping must carry the app's own payload").toEqual({ success: true });
// The socket.io handshake. Engine.IO answers this in a machine format; the gate
// answered it in HTML, which is the defect this exemption exists to kill.
const sock = await request.get(`${ABS}/audiobookshelf/socket.io/?EIO=4&transport=polling`, {
timeout: 30_000,
});
expect(
await sock.text(),
"the socket handshake was answered by the gate, not Engine.IO",
).not.toContain("Making sure you're not a bot");
expect(
sock.headers()["content-type"] ?? "",
"the socket handshake must not arrive as HTML",
).not.toMatch(/text\/html/);
// An API call with no credential: the app refuses it. A gate would answer 200
// with HTML, so the status code alone distinguishes the two owners.
const api = await request.get(`${ABS}/audiobookshelf/api/libraries`, { timeout: 30_000 });
expect(api.status(), "the app's own auth gate must own unauthenticated API calls").toBe(401);
});
test("audiobookshelf login renders the app's own sign-in to an anonymous browser", async ({ page }) => {
test.setTimeout(120_000);
await page.goto("https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/login");
expect(new URL(page.url()).hostname).toBe("audiobooks.franksdank.cloud");
const body = await page.locator("body").innerText();
expect(body, "the bot challenge still fronts this vhost").not.toContain("Making sure you're not a bot");
expect(await page.locator('input[name="uidField"]').count(), "the IdP gate form must not front the app").toBe(0);
// The app answers, and its login screen carries SSO beside the local form.
await expect(page.getByText("Sign in with Authentik")).toBeVisible({ timeout: 90_000 });
});