serverAppConfigs/serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankclaw/Marreta.md

---
type: reference
title: Marreta on Dankclaw
description: The content-cleaning proxy (manualdousuario/marreta, Laravel/serversideup fpm-nginx) deployed as a rootless Quadlet pair that shares SearXNG's Gluetun netns for egress and sits behind the Anubis + Authentik guard chain at marreta.franksdank.cloud.
tags:
  - dankclaw
  - marreta
  - proxy
  - gluetun
  - authentik
  - quadlet
timestamp: 2026-09-12
---

# Marreta

Marreta is a self-hosted **content-cleaning proxy**: you hand it a URL and it
returns a stripped, readable version of the page — no paywall chrome, no
tracking, no cookie walls. It is a Laravel 13 app on the
`serversideup/php:8.4-fpm-nginx` image (`composer.json` requires
`php: ^8.4`, `laravel/framework: ^13.0`, `filament/filament: ^5.7` —
<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/manualdousuario/marreta/main/composer.json>),
with an optional headless-browser companion for JavaScript-heavy pages.

**Host:** Dankclaw — **vhost:** `marreta.franksdank.cloud` (Caddy, guard-chained)
— **Upstream:** host-published port `8082` (inside the Gluetun netns)
— **Source:** <https://github.com/manualdousuario/marreta>

## What it does (from the upstream README)

- Fetches a target URL with a cascade of strategies: plain HTTP (curl), a
  headless browser (Lightpanda) for JS pages, and the Internet Archive
  (Wayback) as a last resort — the three `app/Services/Fetch/*FetchStrategy.php`
  files upstream (`BrowserFetchStrategy`, `CurlFetchStrategy`,
  `WaybackFetchStrategy`, dispatched by `app/Services/FetchManager.php`).
- Strips paywall/consent/tracking markup and re-renders clean HTML.
- Ships a Filament admin panel at `/admin` (login = `ADMIN_EMAIL` /
  `ADMIN_PASSWORD`) for settings and usage — live 2026-10-18
  `curl http://127.0.0.1:8082/admin/login` → **200**.
- Health endpoint at `/up` (Laravel's built-in health route —
  `bootstrap/app.php` passes `health: '/up'`). Live: `curl
  http://127.0.0.1:8082/up` → **200** (2026-10-18).

## Topology

Marreta runs as **two rootless Quadlet containers** that both join
**Gluetun's network namespace** — the same tunnel [[SearXNG]] uses — so every
outbound fetch exits over WireGuard, never the home IP.

```mermaid
graph LR
    C[Client] -->|HTTPS| TLS[Caddy TLS edge]
    TLS -->|challenge| AN[Anubis :8923]
    AN -->|auth decision| A16[Caddy :8016]
    A16 -->|Authentik| AUTH[authentik-server]
    AUTH -->|authenticated| A17[Caddy :8017]
    A17 -->|host marreta| PUB[host :8082]
    subgraph G[gluetun netns - WireGuard egress]
        PUB -->|8085| M[marreta :8085]
        M -->|ws loopback| B[marreta_browser :9222]
    end
    M -->|fetch| WG[WireGuard tunnel]
    B -->|fetch| WG
```

| Unit | File | Image | Netns | Listens |
|------|------|-------|-------|---------|
| `marreta.service` | `dankclaw/marreta/quadlet/marreta.container` | `ghcr.io/manualdousuario/marreta:latest` (`:35`) | `gluetun.container` (`:34`) | `8085` (nginx, `NGINX_HTTP_PORT=8085`, `:37`) |
| `marreta-browser.service` | `dankclaw/marreta/quadlet/marreta-browser.container` | `docker.io/lightpanda/browser:nightly` (`:26`) | `gluetun.container` (`:25`) | `9222` (CDP) |

Both units are boot-persistent (`WantedBy=default.target`) and self-healing
(`Restart=always`, `RestartSec=10` — `marreta.container:62-69`,
`marreta-browser.container:30-34`), per the repo's Boot Persistence rule. Live
2026-10-18 both report `systemctl --user is-enabled` → `generated` and
`is-active` → `active`, and `podman inspect` reports marreta **healthy**
(`HealthCmd` GETs `http://127.0.0.1:8085/up`, `marreta.container:53`) and
marreta_browser `running`. Both images are `:latest`, so a redeploy can move
them.

## The port-collision resolution (why 8085)

The shared netns **already has SearXNG on 8080**. Marreta's image
(`serversideup/php:8.4-fpm-nginx`) defaults to `NGINX_HTTP_PORT=8080`, so a
naive deploy would fail the moment nginx tried to bind a port SearXNG holds.

The fix is a single env var, verified against the serversideup source:

- The image sets `ENV NGINX_HTTP_PORT="8080"` and the site template is
  `listen ${NGINX_HTTP_PORT} default_server;`.
- The image does **not** bake `conf.d/*.conf` (it `rm -rf`s them at build);
  the entrypoint `10-init-webserver-config.sh` runs `envsubst` over every
  `NGINX_*` variable **at container start**.
- So `Environment=NGINX_HTTP_PORT=8085` in the quadlet relocates the listen
  port off the collision with no custom build.

Marreta then publishes **nothing** of its own — the netns owner (Gluetun)
publishes `8082:8085` on its behalf (`dankclaw/searxng/quadlet/gluetun.container:32`),
exactly as it publishes `8081:8080` for SearXNG. Caddy dials
`192.168.0.143:8082` (`dankclaw/Caddyfile:419-422`). Live env confirms the
relocation: `podman inspect marreta` carries `NGINX_HTTP_PORT=8085`
(2026-10-18).

## Why netns sharing, not `PROXY_URL`

Marreta supports a `PROXY_URL` env var, but it only covers the **curl**
fetch strategy. The `BrowserFetchStrategy` connects to Lightpanda over CDP
and passes **no proxy** — the browser makes its own connections. If the
browser ran outside the tunnel it would leak the host's real egress IP on
every JS-rendered page. Netns sharing is the only way to put **both** the
app and the browser on the same exit, which is what "share the same Gluetun
egress as SearXNG" requires. The browser is therefore reached on loopback
(`ws://127.0.0.1:9222`) inside the shared netns — upstream's own compose uses
`ws://marreta_browser:9222`, which needs no service name here because both
containers share one namespace. Live env: `BROWSER_WS_ENDPOINT=ws://127.0.0.1:9222`
(`podman inspect marreta` 2026-10-18; `marreta.container:44`). Upstream agrees
on the mechanism: `BrowserFetchStrategy.php` only calls
`BrowserFactory::connectToBrowser($wsEndpoint)` and never passes a proxy, while
`CurlFetchStrategy.php:24-25` is the only place `marreta.proxy_url` is read.

## Guard chain (behind Authentik)

`marreta.franksdank.cloud` follows the standard chain documented in
[[Anubis]] and [[Authentik]]:

1. **Public edge** — the vhost proxies everything to `anubis:8923`
   (bot challenge), with `header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}`
   (`dankclaw/Caddyfile:159-163`).
2. **Auth decision** — Anubis dials Caddy's `http://:8016`, which proxies
   whole-request to `authentik-server:9000` (`dankclaw/Caddyfile:22-24,94`).
3. **Post-auth routing** — authenticated traffic returns to `http://:8017`,
   where `@marreta host marreta.franksdank.cloud` routes to
   `reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8082` (`dankclaw/Caddyfile:419-422`).

**Access model: any authenticated user.** The post-auth handler carries no
group gate (unlike the homepage `/admin`, which requires the
`homepage-admins` group) — the Caddyfile says so in the block header
("Any authentik-authenticated user may use it (no group gate)",
`dankclaw/Caddyfile:156-157`). Anyone who can log in via Authentik can use
Marreta.

**Required provider (manual, one-time).** Before the vhost goes live, a
proxy provider must exist on the embedded outpost or authenticated traffic
hits the outpost error page instead of the app:

```python
# podman exec -i authentik-server ak shell   < provider.py
from authentik.core.models import Group
from authentik.providers.proxy.models import ProxyProvider

p = ProxyProvider.objects.filter(name="marreta").first() or ProxyProvider()
p.name = "marreta"
p.external_host = "https://marreta.franksdank.cloud/"   # exact, trailing slash
p.internal_host = "http://caddy:8017"
p.save()
```

This is the "provider first, then route" ordering from the guard-chain
runbook — the Anubis guard set, the Caddy TLS edge, and the provider list
must change together.

## Scheme / proxy trust

Marreta ships `trustProxies(at: '172.16.0.0/12,10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.1')`
— that is the `TRUSTED_PROXIES` fallback in upstream `bootstrap/app.php`, and
this container sets no `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, so the default is what runs
(`podman inspect marreta` 2026-10-18) — and forces `https` when `APP_URL`
starts with `https://` (`app/Providers/AppServiceProvider.php:23-24`,
`URL::forceScheme('https')`). With
`APP_URL=https://marreta.franksdank.cloud` (`dankclaw/marreta/quadlet/marreta.container:41`) the app honors the forwarded
scheme and client IP through the whole chain, so there is no redirect loop
or mixed-content breakage.

## Secrets

Three values, seeded into `/home/dank/Containers/marreta/env` (mode 0600,
dank-owned so the rootless unit can read it — the grafana convention, not
`/opt`; live 2026-10-18 `-rw------- dank dank` 155 B). The seeder writes it
only when the file does not exist and `chmod 600`s it
(`seed_marreta_env`, `scripts/deploy-remote.sh:615-622`).

| Repo `.env` key | Mapped to (app) | Notes |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| `MARRETA_APP_KEY` | `APP_KEY` | Laravel encryption key. **Must be the `base64:`-prefixed form**: `base64:$(openssl rand -base64 32)`. A bare base64 string (no prefix) is read as a raw key of the wrong length and every app route 500s with `Unsupported cipher or incorrect key length` at `Encrypter.php:61` (laravel/framework 13.x, `src/Illuminate/Encryption/Encrypter.php:61`) while `/up`, which skips the encrypter, still passes. Today's key is well-formed: `/`, `/admin/login` and `/up` all answer 200 (`curl http://127.0.0.1:8082/…` 2026-10-18). Changing it after first boot invalidates encrypted session/cookie data. |
| `MARRETA_ADMIN_EMAIL` | `ADMIN_EMAIL` | Admin panel login (created on first boot). |
| `MARRETA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | `ADMIN_PASSWORD` | Admin panel password. |

The quadlet maps them with `Environment=APP_KEY=${MARRETA_APP_KEY}` etc.
(`dankclaw/marreta/quadlet/marreta.container:47-49`), loaded from the env file
via `[Service] EnvironmentFile=` (`:60`). The `.container` files hold **no**
secrets — only `${VAR}` placeholders.
The SQLite DB + cache live in the `marreta_storage` named volume at
`/var/www/html/storage/app` (`marreta.container:52`; podman auto-creates it and
copyups the image's `www-data` ownership so the app can write). Live 2026-10-18
the volume exists at `/home/dank/.local/share/containers/storage/volumes/marreta_storage/_data`.

## Deploy

```
./scripts/deploy.sh dankclaw --service marreta
```

`deploy_marreta` (`scripts/deploy-remote.sh:630-640`) seeds the env file (only if absent), installs both
`.container` units, ensures Gluetun is up, then restarts the browser before
the app. Because Marreta shares Gluetun's netns, the planner treats it as
part of the Gluetun netns family: a change to `gluetun.container` or
`searxng.network` also selects `marreta` (`scripts/deploy-plan.py:295-309` — a Gluetun recreation tears the
netns down and would otherwise orphan it).

> **First deploy note:** adding `PublishPort=8082:8085` to `gluetun.container`
> means the first deploy recreates Gluetun, which briefly cycles SearXNG and
> Marreta together. Plan for the short tunnel restart.

## Verification

- **Unauthenticated:** `curl -s https://marreta.franksdank.cloud/` → the
  Anubis challenge page (grep body for `challenge`/`not a bot`). A 502 here
  means the chain is mis-wired. Re-checked 2026-10-18: **200** with `challenge`
  ×5 and `not a bot` ×2 in the body — the guard chain is live.
- **Post-auth routing:** `podman exec caddy sh -c "grep -n -A3 '@marreta host' /etc/caddy/Caddyfile"`
  after the deploy's reload line (repo copy: `dankclaw/Caddyfile:419-422`).
- **Egress:** from inside the netns, `podman exec marreta curl -s https://ifconfig.co`
  must return the VPN exit IP, not the home IP. The tunnel's own egress is
  readable without exec: `journalctl --user -u gluetun` logged exit
  `149.22.88.19` (United States, Washington, Seattle) on 2026-10-18.
- **Port:** `podman exec marreta sh -c 'curl -fsS localhost:8085/up'` → 200;
  `curl http://192.168.0.143:8082/up` → 200 (also **200** from the host
  loopback, `curl http://127.0.0.1:8082/up` 2026-10-18; the container health
  probe GETs `http://127.0.0.1:8085/up` and reports **healthy**).
- **Test seam:** `bats tests/marreta_quadlet.bats` (17 contracts — 17 `@test`
  blocks, counted 2026-10-18).

### Live verification (deployed 2026-09-12, rev `91e9410`)

Deployed via `deploy.sh dankclaw --service gluetun --service marreta --service
caddy` (gluetun first to recreate the tunnel with the new `8082:8085` publish,
which also cycles SearXNG's netns ref). Authentik `ProxyProvider` `marreta`
registered (pk 13, `external_host=https://marreta.franksdank.cloud/`,
`internal_host=http://caddy:8017`). Results:

- Unauth edge → Anubis challenge page (not 502). TLS cert issued via DNS-01.
- Post-auth sim (`caddy :8017` with `Host: marreta.franksdank.cloud`) → **200**.
- `marreta` container health: **healthy**; `/` and `/admin/login` → 200.
- Netns sharing proven: `gluetun`, `marreta`, `marreta_browser` all on the same
  `net:[…]` inode; marreta reads the CDP endpoint
  (`GET 127.0.0.1:9222/json/version` → `Lightpanda/1.0`).
- SearXNG unaffected: `:8081` → 200 after the tunnel recreate.

> **Gotcha hit during deploy:** the first seed used a bare-base64 `APP_KEY`,
> which 500s every app route (see Secrets above). Fixed by re-keying with the
> `base64:` prefix before any encrypted data was persisted.

## Citations

- Marreta upstream: <https://github.com/manualdousuario/marreta> (README,
  `compose.yml`, `bootstrap/app.php`, `app/Services/Fetch/BrowserFetchStrategy.php`,
  `lang/` directory listing).
- serversideup/php fpm-nginx port mechanism: `serversideup/docker-php`
  `src/variations/fpm-nginx/Dockerfile` (`NGINX_HTTP_PORT="8080"`) and
  `src/s6/etc/entrypoint.d/10-init-webserver-config.sh` (`envsubst` over
  `NGINX_*` at start; `conf.d/*.conf` removed at build).
- Lightpanda browser image: <https://hub.docker.com/r/lightpanda/browser>
  (`nightly` tag).
- Guard-chain ordering and provider-first rule: [[Anubis]], [[Authentik]],
  and the `anubis-guard-chain-flip` runbook.
- Netns egress pattern: [[SearXNG]], [[Gluetun]], [[Container Network Namespaces]].