docs(vault): OpenWebUI picker opened to all three models for every account (2026-10-21)

Per Frank, frank-archon is public alongside dragoon/zealot: three-leg DB trio (conn enable, model row ctx 200000, access_grant principal='*'), verified as role=user. Token-mint traps recorded (cwd, PID-1 secret).
Merge pull request 'feat(security): digest-pin every registry image; drop batch-killing HostAddr' (#74 ) from security/quadlet-digest-pins into main
2026-10-21 16:48:32 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 16:32:44 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 16:32:36 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 16:32:36 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 16:25:32 -07:00 · 2026-10-21 16:04:53 -07:00
46 changed files with 184 additions and 76 deletions
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Wants=authentik-server.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=authentik-outpost
-Image=ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.8.3
+Image=ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.8.3@sha256:ab9b4e8cc4ab3f8d1198d2db6aeea66bafea1963b3f2843589e0d163f97d9849
 Exec=worker
 Network=dankclaw_default
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/.env
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=authentik-postgres
-Image=docker.io/library/postgres:16-alpine
+Image=docker.io/library/postgres:16-alpine@sha256:721873c34ceb9f8d8fc265984940dc982404c105f19ad51be9fdc5970a6080ea
 Network=dankclaw_default
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/.env
 Environment=POSTGRES_DB=authentik
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Wants=authentik-postgres.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=authentik-server
-Image=ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.8.3
+Image=ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.8.3@sha256:ab9b4e8cc4ab3f8d1198d2db6aeea66bafea1963b3f2843589e0d163f97d9849
 Exec=server
 Network=dankclaw_default
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/.env
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Wants=authentik-server.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=authentik-worker
-Image=ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.8.3
+Image=ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.8.3@sha256:ab9b4e8cc4ab3f8d1198d2db6aeea66bafea1963b3f2843589e0d163f97d9849
 Exec=worker
 Network=dankclaw_default
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/.env
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ After=network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=gitea-postgres
 Network=gitea.network
-Image=docker.io/library/postgres:16-alpine
+Image=docker.io/library/postgres:16-alpine@sha256:721873c34ceb9f8d8fc265984940dc982404c105f19ad51be9fdc5970a6080ea
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/gitea/env
 Environment=POSTGRES_USER=gitea
 Environment=POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${GITEA_DB_PASSWORD}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ After=gitea-postgres.service network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=gitea-server
 Network=gitea.network
-Image=docker.io/gitea/gitea:latest
+Image=docker.io/gitea/gitea:latest@sha256:30777c91280d973fa02be48b1ade735bd6859e8f6f7af3b4444d519437852504
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/gitea/env
 Environment=DATABASE_TYPE=postgres
 Environment=DATABASE_HOST=gitea-postgres
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ After=gluetun.service network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=marreta_browser
 Network=gluetun.container
-Image=docker.io/lightpanda/browser:nightly
+Image=docker.io/lightpanda/browser:nightly@sha256:979c36ed869f1016b8dcf22939a0633c262f2c30e892a03a9f720eba2ff1931e

 [Service]
 TimeoutStartSec=300
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ After=gluetun.service marreta-browser.service network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=marreta
 Network=gluetun.container
-Image=ghcr.io/manualdousuario/marreta:latest
+Image=ghcr.io/manualdousuario/marreta:latest@sha256:30f2a34567b79b66da794b4b9423751bbbcd07ceff600d9f6a2d219e7e439362
 # Relocate off SearXNG's 8080 inside the shared netns.
 Environment=NGINX_HTTP_PORT=8085
 Environment=APP_NAME=Marreta
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=alertmanager
-Image=docker.io/prom/alertmanager:latest
+Image=docker.io/prom/alertmanager:latest@sha256:e9733bafb1bdef9b00e25a21f8f99dc26a22224bf16641ad754d1649f4c3357a
 Network=dankclaw_default
 User=0:0
 Exec=--config.file=/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml --storage.path=/alertmanager
@@ -11,16 +11,19 @@
 # 0.0.0.0:8188 publish answers on loopback). A bridge-networked prober could
 # reach neither class reliably.
 #
-# WHY the listener binds TWO addresses. The netavark hairpin gap (measured
-# 2026-10-21, cadvisor job comment): a BRIDGE CONTAINER CANNOT DIAL ITS OWN
-# HOST'S LAN IP at all — so a LAN-only bind is unscrapable by Prometheus,
-# whatever the signal-relay law suggests for services containers dial as
-# clients. The podman gateway (169.254.1.2 = host.containers.internal) is the
-# address bridge containers reach same-host targets at, so the exporter binds
-# it explicitly for the scrape rather than relying on loopback-forwarding
-# semantics, and keeps the LAN bind for its own healthcheck and diagnostics.
+# WHY the listener binds 127.0.0.1 + LAN. A bridge container CANNOT dial
+# its own host's LAN IP (netavark hairpin gap, measured 2026-10-21), but a
+# bridge container dialing the podman gateway 169.254.1.2 lands on the host
+# LOOPBACK — that is the scrape path, and it needs this exporter to be
+# LISTENING ON LOOPBACK (proved: 200 from the prometheus container to
+# http://169.254.1.2:9115/-/healthy with a loopback bind). The gateway
+# address itself is NOT bindable from the host netns — it exists only
+# inside each rootless netns; binding it dies "bind: cannot assign
+# requested address" (live 2026-10-21). The LAN bind stays for diagnostics.
 # No public DNS name, no guard chain: internal net only, per the exposure
-# policy.
+# policy. The listen flag is --web.listen-address and it is REPEATABLE, one
+# flag per bind; plain --listen-address does not exist and the exporter
+# exits in 100 ms with "unknown long flag" (live 2026-10-21).

 [Unit]
 Description=Blackbox exporter (HTTP probe prober)
@@ -30,9 +33,18 @@ After=network-online.target
 Image=docker.io/prom/blackbox-exporter@sha256:ea1c7aa3ef3f307cd03e85f34abb604478ccb90b567fc690da0cd9776da76b13
 ContainerName=blackbox-exporter
 Network=host
-Exec=/bin/blackbox_exporter --config.file=/etc/blackbox_exporter/config.yml --listen-address=192.168.0.143:9115,169.254.1.2:9115
+# The image's ENTRYPOINT is /bin/blackbox_exporter itself (proved live
+# 2026-10-21: `podman run IMAGE sh` dies "unexpected sh"), so Exec= carries
+# FLAGS ONLY — repeating the binary makes it a positional arg and kingpin
+# exits "unexpected /bin/blackbox_exporter".
+Exec=--config.file=/etc/blackbox_exporter/config.yml --web.listen-address=127.0.0.1:9115 --web.listen-address=192.168.0.143:9115
 Volume=/opt/blackbox/blackbox.yml:/etc/blackbox_exporter/config.yml:ro
-HealthCmd=/bin/sh -c "wget -q -O /dev/null http://169.254.1.2:9115/-/healthy || exit 1"
+# Plain exec form like every sibling unit. Shell form (`/bin/sh -c "…"`)
+# is passed as one quoted token and quadlet then folds the following
+# --health-interval/--health-retries (and the image name) into the command
+# string — unit died twice that way, live 2026-10-21. wget only; this
+# busybox variant has no curl, and host-network wget answers on loopback.
+HealthCmd=wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:9115/-/healthy
 HealthInterval=30s
 HealthRetries=3

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=cadvisor
-Image=gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.49.1
+Image=gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.49.1@sha256:3cde6faf0791ebf7b41d6f8ae7145466fed712ea6f252c935294d2608b1af388
 PodmanArgs=--pid=host --cgroupns=host
 PublishPort=127.0.0.1:8080:8080
 PublishPort=192.168.0.143:8080:8080
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target prometheus.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=grafana
-Image=docker.io/grafana/grafana:latest
+Image=docker.io/grafana/grafana:latest@sha256:dbbc38ea21103cefb50396340cd88afec779c7e070b0a7bf5a75b4ce46651d3f
 Network=dankclaw_default
 User=0:0
 PublishPort=127.0.0.1:3002:3000
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=node-exporter
-Image=docker.io/prom/node-exporter:latest
+Image=docker.io/prom/node-exporter:latest@sha256:1b4e4438faca4dd7e001dd445d161a4a2091b0fededa84093b3a8dfeae1f1be0
 Network=host
 PodmanArgs=--pid=host
 Exec=--path.procfs=/host/proc --path.sysfs=/host/sys --path.rootfs=/rootfs --web.listen-address=127.0.0.1:9100 --web.listen-address=192.168.0.143:9100
@@ -43,14 +43,16 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=prometheus
-Image=docker.io/prom/prometheus:latest
+Image=docker.io/prom/prometheus:latest@sha256:fa3302279710be2f21a8301ec17a8b4f2301fd829bd113839b3b6b02b6f191a2
 Network=dankclaw_default
-# Name the podman gateway so scrape jobs can reach same-host targets (the
-# netavark hairpin gap bars this container from dialing its own host's LAN
-# IP; the cadvisor/gpu jobs and the blackbox scrape all ride this name).
-# Same mechanism the hermes Caddy upstream learned the hard way (Container
-# Host Reachability in the vault).
-HostAddr=host.containers.internal=169.254.1.2
+# Same-host scrape targets are dialed at host.containers.internal (the podman
+# gateway): a bridge container cannot dial its own host's LAN IP (netavark
+# hairpin gap, measured 2026-10-21), and traffic to the gateway lands on host
+# loopback / published ports (cadvisor/gpu jobs and the blackbox scrape all
+# ride it). The name resolves natively — NO HostAddr key: quadlet 5.7.0 calls
+# it unsupported and the WHOLE user quadlet batch then fails to generate,
+# silently orphaning every other unit (live 2026-10-21: prometheus.service
+# vanished while its container kept running as an orphan).
 User=0:0
 Exec=--config.file=/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml --storage.tsdb.path=/prometheus --storage.tsdb.retention.time=30d --web.enable-lifecycle
 PublishPort=127.0.0.1:9090:9090
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ After=network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=open-webui
 Network=open-webui.network
-Image=ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main
+Image=ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main@sha256:4860ba005ae8f19f08d1e12b0868855b7b339ea0dad9927f196820fc0de04575
 PublishPort=3005:8080
 Environment=OPENAI_API_BASE_URL=http://192.168.0.143:7770
 Environment=ANONYMIZED_TELEMETRY=False
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=pihole
-Image=docker.io/pihole/pihole:latest
+Image=docker.io/pihole/pihole:latest@sha256:d34134716fc32038b052a8674c7c6879e0ff21f0e6d8af345166fffa2c27c113
 Network=slirp4netns
 PublishPort=0.0.0.0:53:53/udp
 PublishPort=0.0.0.0:53:53/tcp
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ After=searxng-network.service network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=gluetun
 Network=searxng.network
-Image=docker.io/qmcgaw/gluetun:latest
+Image=docker.io/qmcgaw/gluetun:latest@sha256:c2ee4191762fca6b6a3c3359a731198a95d9c9af4db32d466e223bf3a84e779b
 AddCapability=NET_ADMIN
 AddDevice=/dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
 Environment=VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=${VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER}
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ After=searxng-network.service network.target
 ContainerName=searxng-valkey
 Network=searxng.network
 NetworkAlias=valkey
-Image=docker.io/valkey/valkey:9-alpine
+Image=docker.io/valkey/valkey:9-alpine@sha256:48332870af354a799964c0012ae1194a0bf2bf894eb508f945810596dc2d8d11
 Volume=/opt/searxng/valkey:/data

 [Service]
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ After=gluetun.service searxng-valkey.service network.target
 [Container]
 ContainerName=searxng
 Network=gluetun.container
-Image=ghcr.io/searxng/searxng:latest
+Image=ghcr.io/searxng/searxng:latest@sha256:5ed0323b5f5f8701264ef65e239a2bd83cb57098f2b971fa30bf79c06eeae271
 Environment=SEARXNG_SECRET=${SEARXNG_SECRET}
 Environment=SEARXNG_BASE_URL=${SEARXNG_BASE_URL}
 Volume=/opt/searxng/config:/etc/searxng
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=seerr
-Image=ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr:v3.4.1
+Image=ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr:v3.4.1@sha256:f4768de5f616248d723e05891f3345a1402123775d03bf0890dbfedc0831bda1
 Network=dankclaw_default
 PublishPort=127.0.0.1:5055:5055
 Volume=/home/dank/Containers/seerr/data:/app/config
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=calibre-server
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/calibre:9.15.0
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/calibre:9.15.0@sha256:59e4b0e036e62f228f8bcfae1ade42f47047719885fe454ddbad38e4597b987b
 Network=pasta
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/calibre-server/env
 Environment=PUID=1000
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=calibre-web
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/calibre-web:0.6.27-ls402
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/calibre-web:0.6.27-ls402@sha256:802729966faed5e32d671cd4f92ba6196e9e754a6c0f740ce1ee9acd86b10e55
 Network=pasta
 Environment=DOCKER_MODS=linuxserver/mods:universal-calibre
 Environment=LANG=en_US.UTF-8
@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=copyparty
-Image=ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest
+# Digest-pinned: upstream stopped publishing version tags after 1.19.15, so
+# the pin rides :latest@digest (the tag in the reference is cosmetic; the
+# digest is the pull). Pinned 2026-10-21 at the build whose label is
+# 1.20.26 - closes GHSA-3c88-p299-7hvr (1.20.25) and GHSA-hg99-jqfp-rf76
+# (1.20.26); the previously running build was the rolling :latest at
+# 1.20.24 (issue #73 on command-center).
+Image=ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest@sha256:7f77459160a4bf34fdca79f2965dff4f0c1d7069a3d9cdfb3632acb041dd2f6a
 Network=dankserver_appnet
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/copyparty/env
 Exec=-a ${COPAY_ACCOUNT}:${COPAY_PASSWORD} -v /w::r:ra,dank
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=jellyfin
-Image=ghcr.io/jellyfin/jellyfin:latest
+Image=ghcr.io/jellyfin/jellyfin:latest@sha256:c3efa69a22f2691fc88d6bb035e87a8560e395a6047f062fb381c61c3185e8f5
 Network=dankserver_appnet
 Environment=DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
 Environment=DOTNET_SYSTEM_IO_DISABLEFILELOCKING=true
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=cadvisor
-Image=gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.49.1
+Image=gcr.io/cadvisor/cadvisor:v0.49.1@sha256:3cde6faf0791ebf7b41d6f8ae7145466fed712ea6f252c935294d2608b1af388
 PodmanArgs=--pid=host --cgroupns=host
 PublishPort=127.0.0.1:8080:8080
 PublishPort=192.168.0.235:8080:8080
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=node-exporter
-Image=docker.io/prom/node-exporter:latest
+Image=docker.io/prom/node-exporter:latest@sha256:1b4e4438faca4dd7e001dd445d161a4a2091b0fededa84093b3a8dfeae1f1be0
 Network=host
 PodmanArgs=--pid=host
 Exec=--path.procfs=/host/proc --path.sysfs=/host/sys --path.rootfs=/rootfs --web.listen-address=127.0.0.1:9100 --web.listen-address=192.168.0.235:9100
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ After=network-online.target
 Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/plex:1.43.5.11029-6bf8af3f0-ls329
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/plex:1.43.5.11029-6bf8af3f0-ls329@sha256:8f655bad7dcbc5398a78f70a5af12600b4ed3424f901566ed1eaa6710e9e2334
 ContainerName=plex
 Network=dankserver_appnet:alias=plex
 Environment=PUID=0
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=romm-mariadb
-Image=docker.io/library/mariadb:11
+Image=docker.io/library/mariadb:11@sha256:f16d7a344413e519dff518f27bdb221388f84b0d274c97c4fb5f2cb0dc1b34fa
 Network=dankserver_appnet:alias=mariadb
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/romm/env
 Environment=MARIADB_DATABASE=romm
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ After=network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=romm-redis
-Image=docker.io/library/redis:7-alpine
+Image=docker.io/library/redis:7-alpine@sha256:858f009f9709ce576febc734aa78b8f6d624b82571f9ddb6bda4377c833b3499
 Network=dankserver_appnet:alias=redis
 Volume=/home/dank/Containers/romm/redis:/data
 HealthCmd=redis-cli ping
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ After=romm-mariadb.service romm-redis.service network.target

 [Container]
 ContainerName=romm
-Image=ghcr.io/rommapp/romm:latest
+Image=ghcr.io/rommapp/romm:latest@sha256:03295f95a6290e752641f9553ac4198b0e5b71b879d57f7b2371b98f608feb54
 Network=dankserver_appnet
 EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/romm/env
 Environment=DB_HOST=mariadb
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ After=network-online.target
 Wants=network-online.target

 [Container]
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/tautulli:v2.18.1-ls245
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/tautulli:v2.18.1-ls245@sha256:c66d3afa8f7a701a48dd1b1f57b22eca0483d895d670fe11ecff783f6a9bbd73
 ContainerName=tautulli
 Network=dankserver_appnet:alias=tautulli
 Environment=PUID=0
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Description=Gluetun VPN tunnel (FrankBook-Pro podman machine)

 [Container]
 ContainerName=gluetun
-Image=docker.io/qmcgaw/gluetun:latest
+Image=docker.io/qmcgaw/gluetun:latest@sha256:c2ee4191762fca6b6a3c3359a731198a95d9c9af4db32d466e223bf3a84e779b
 AddCapability=NET_ADMIN
 AddDevice=/dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
 Environment=VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=${VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER}
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ After=gluetun.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=lidarr
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/lidarr:latest
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/lidarr:latest@sha256:d8549ff9ea29b4015c32257360652c1000c31ea471a2b3f0835ae77292faf35b
 Environment=PUID=0
 Environment=PGID=0
 Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ After=gluetun.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=prowlarr
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/prowlarr:latest
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/prowlarr:latest@sha256:b3b00047ed20f6ce2b16780145cb6a0acb51c9e28ea6aa6f5dcd33c7034f1797
 Environment=PUID=0
 Environment=PGID=0
 Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Network=gluetun.container
 # Pinned to the last 4.x line: Readarr's retired qB client requires the
 # qB 4.x login response (HTTP 200, body "Ok."); qB 5.x answers 204 with an
 # empty body, which fails Readarr's auth check. All other clients accept 4.x.
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:4.6.7
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:4.6.7@sha256:55f15d44396315551f87294a176efae733b16e283f38980308e46073950257c6
 Environment=PUID=0
 Environment=PGID=0
 Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ After=gluetun.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=radarr
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/radarr:latest
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/radarr:latest@sha256:fc0ae3c50f8128b97e84381903ec8d6845c3a569641cb7117c124376cccb57c1
 Environment=PUID=0
 Environment=PGID=0
 Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ After=gluetun.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=readarr
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/readarr:amd64-1.0.980
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/readarr:amd64-1.0.980@sha256:a95e82dbb0eb2bb43de4c150f1dab9dd821306c67ea0b418983a957e731f2b61
 Environment=PUID=0
 Environment=PGID=0
 Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ After=gluetun.service

 [Container]
 ContainerName=sonarr
-Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/sonarr:latest
+Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/sonarr:latest@sha256:889dcc58c6aea859033985894b519b2e6b1e55d92527ed123f9f52e42ae7c97b
 Environment=PUID=0
 Environment=PGID=0
 Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
@@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ deploy_observability() {
        loki) wait_for_health loki http://127.0.0.1:3100/ready 60 ;;
        node-exporter) wait_for_health node-exporter http://127.0.0.1:9100/metrics 60 ;;
        cadvisor) wait_for_health cadvisor http://127.0.0.1:8080/healthz 90 ;;
+        # Loopback: the exporter binds 127.0.0.1 + LAN (the gateway address
+        # is not bindable from the host netns — see the unit header).
        blackbox-exporter) wait_for_health blackbox-exporter http://127.0.0.1:9115/-/healthy 60 ;;
    esac
 }
@@ -130,10 +130,19 @@ Quickest unblock: `podman compose up -d --force-recreate <svc>`. Durable fix

 ## 4. Podman 5.x quadlet v1 generator quirks (verified live 2026-08-28)

- **Hard-fail keys** — the whole unit silently fails to generate
-  (`systemctl --user cat <unit>` shows "could not be found"): any
-  dash-prefixed `[Container]` option (`--shm-size=…` → `unsupported key …
-  in group 'Container'`); `Command=` is unsupported, use `Exec=`.
+- **Hard-fail keys abort the WHOLE BATCH, not one unit** (podman 5.7.0,
+  live 2026-10-21): one unsupported key — e.g. `HostAddr=` — makes the
+  generator log `unsupported key … in group 'Container'` plus
+  `processing encountered some errors` and generate NOTHING for that
+  manager. The running containers keep going as orphans, so the failure
+  first appears on the next deploy as `Unit <x>.service not found` for a
+  service that is visibly up. Other offenders: any dash-prefixed
+  `[Container]` option (`--shm-size=…`), `Command=` (use `Exec=`).
+  The seam `tests/quadlet_image_pins.bats` fails the build on any
+  generator-rejected key in any host's units.
+  Also: an image whose ENTRYPOINT is the binary takes FLAGS ONLY in
+  `Exec=` — repeating the binary makes it a positional arg
+  (`unexpected /bin/blackbox_exporter`, live 2026-10-21).
 - **HealthCmd space-splitting:** the v1 generator splits `HealthCmd` on
  spaces into the healthcheck argv; a quoted probe
  `/bin/sh -c "pg_isready …"` lands as argv token `"pg_isready` →
@@ -148,6 +157,16 @@ Quickest unblock: `podman compose up -d --force-recreate <svc>`. Durable fix
  "unsupported key"`, `systemctl --user cat probe.service` (shows the
  generated ExecStart verbatim), then remove + reload.

+## 4a. Image pins (fleet law, 2026-10-21)
+
+Every registry image in a quadlet is digest-pinned (`tag@sha256:…`);
+locally built images (`localhost/*`, `franksdank/*`) are exempt — their
+build is the pin. A rolling tag lets a rebuild move under a running
+service with nobody approving it, and it makes a CVE audit ungradeable.
+Gate: `tests/quadlet_image_pins.bats`. Where upstream publishes no version
+tags (copyparty-ac stops at 1.19.15), pin `:latest@sha256:` and name the
+version the config label carries in the comment beside it.
+
 ## 5. Rootless Quadlet log retrieval

 Step 0 — establish ownership: `systemctl --user status <name>.service`
@@ -34,15 +34,16 @@ https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
 The picker is built from the `model` table in `webui.db` (one row per model)
 plus the `model_ids` of each **enabled** OpenAI connection, NOT from live
 connection discovery — so the picker shows exactly what is seeded there.
-As of 2026-10-07 the picker exposes **exactly one model: `frank-zealot`** *(unverified
-2026-10-18: `webui.db` is the authority; the fleet itself serves all three ids
-`frank-dragoon`/`frank-zealot`/`frank-archon`, per the cards in
-`shared/homepage/services.json`)*.
+Since 2026-10-21 the picker exposes **all three fleet models to every
+account**: `frank-dragoon`, `frank-archon`, `frank-zealot` (per Frank: open
+`frank-archon` to everyone; the other two were already public). Proven with
+a `role=user` token: `/api/models` lists all three ids and a chat turn to
+`frank-archon` answers end-to-end.

-| Connection (`openai.api_configs` idx) | URL as recorded 2026-10-09 | Enabled | `model_ids` | Endpoint page |
+| Connection (`openai.api_configs` idx) | `openai.api_base_urls` (live 2026-10-21) | Enabled | `model_ids` | Endpoint page |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
-| 0 | `http://host.containers.internal:7770/v1` | no (2026-10-07) | `frank-dragoon` | [[frank-dragoon]] |
-| 1 | `http://192.168.0.235:7770/v1` | no (2026-10-07) | `frank-archon` | [[frank-archon]] |
+| 0 | `http://host.containers.internal:7770/v1` | yes | `frank-dragoon` | [[frank-dragoon]] |
+| 1 | `http://192.168.0.235:7770/v1` | yes | `frank-archon` | [[frank-archon]] |
 | 2 | `http://host.containers.internal:7771/v1` | yes | `frank-zealot` | [[frank-zealot]] |

 The URLs in the first column are the DB's recorded values and predate the 2026-08-22
@@ -50,9 +51,10 @@ bridge move; on this network they are wrong — see the reachability gotcha belo
 is the corrected law. The picker row for `frank-zealot` was re-keyed on 2026-10-18 after
 that day's payload swap (see [[frank-zealot]] for what was deployed and when).

-The `model` table carries exactly two decoration rows, `frank-zealot` and
-`frank-dragoon`. Both the context length and the description live **inside
-JSON columns** — `params` holds `{"context": {"length": …}}` and `meta` holds
+The `model` table carries three decoration rows — `frank-zealot`,
+`frank-dragoon`, `frank-archon` (200,000 context, added 2026-10-21).
+Both the context length and the description live **inside JSON columns** —
+`params` holds `{"context": {"length": …}}` and `meta` holds
 `{"description": …}`; there is no `context_length` or `description` column, so
 `sqlite3` one-liners against those names fail. `params.context.length` is a copy
 of the endpoint's per-slot window, so the authoritative number lives on the
@@ -380,6 +382,20 @@ neither.
  name: /selected model/i })`) and the welcome text "How can I help you
  today?"; that snapshot is also the cheapest proof the picker is populated.

+- **2026-10-21 — picker opened to all three models, for everyone.** Per
+  Frank: `frank-archon` accessible to everyone. Three-leg repair on
+  `webui.db` (snapshot `webui.db.bak-20261021` first): connection idx 1
+  `enable: true`, a `model` row `frank-archon` (params
+  `{"context":{"length":200000}}`, meta description from the endpoint card),
+  and an `access_grant` row `(resource_type='model', resource_id='frank-archon',
+  principal_id='*', 'read')` — `principal_id='*'` is the public grant, not a
+  role row. Verified as a plain `role=user` token: `/api/models` lists all
+  three ids, chat to `frank-archon` answers. Token-mint gotchas: the backend
+  package imports only with cwd `/app/backend`, and `WEBUI_SECRET_KEY` must
+  come from **PID 1's environ** (`podman exec` sessions do not inherit the
+  app process env; the `.webui_secret_key` file happens to equal it — use it
+  explicitly, `podman exec -e`).
+
 ## See Also

 - [[Dankclaw Stack]]
@@ -54,9 +54,10 @@ Scraping a web root is not a health check: an HTML page fails the scrape
 protocol (`unsupported Content-Type`), which is what kept those targets red
 beside healthy services. The classification rule and the honesty law live in
 [[Stale Signal Audit]]. The prober is `blackbox-exporter.container` (host
-netns, config `shared/blackbox/blackbox.yml`); it binds 9115 on both the LAN
-and the podman gateway, and Prometheus scrapes the gateway address — the
-netavark hairpin gap bars this container from its own host's LAN IP.
+netns, config `shared/blackbox/blackbox.yml`); it binds 9115 on loopback and
+the LAN, and Prometheus scrapes it at `host.containers.internal` — traffic to
+that gateway lands on the host's loopback listener. The gateway address is
+not itself bindable from the host netns.
 Plain targets stay `host:port`, never URLs — the probe job's URL targets are
 the documented exception, relabeled onto the prober.

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ FRANKBOOK_UNITS=(
 }

@test "readarr keeps its pinned image" {
-    grep -q '^Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/readarr:amd64-1.0.980$' \
+    # 2026-10-21 fleet law: version tag AND digest (tests/quadlet_image_pins.bats)
+    grep -qE '^Image=lscr\.io/linuxserver/readarr:amd64-1\.0\.980@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$' \
        "$REPO_ROOT/frankbook-pro/readarr/quadlet/readarr.container" || return 1
 }
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ QDIR="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/open-webui/quadlet"
 }

@test "open-webui uses the CPU image, not :cuda (dankclaw is CPU-only)" {
-    grep -qE '^Image=ghcr\.io/open-webui/open-webui:main$' "$QDIR/open-webui.container" \
-        || { echo "open-webui.container must use the :main (CPU) image"; return 1; }
+    # 2026-10-21 fleet law: tag AND digest (tests/quadlet_image_pins.bats)
+    grep -qE '^Image=ghcr\.io/open-webui/open-webui:main@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$' "$QDIR/open-webui.container" \
+        || { echo "open-webui.container must use the :main (CPU) image, digest-pinned"; return 1; }
    if grep -qE '^Image=.*:cuda' "$QDIR/open-webui.container"; then
        echo "open-webui.container must not use the :cuda image on a CPU-only host"
        return 1
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# Seam: fleet-wide quadlet laws learned the hard way.
+#   1. Every registry image is digest-pinned. A rolling tag (":latest",
+#      ":9-alpine", ":nightly") lets a rebuild move under a running
+#      service at the next restart/reboot with nobody approving it, and it
+#      makes a CVE audit ungradeable (you cannot score a tag). Locally
+#      built images (localhost/*, franksdank/*) are exempt: their build
+#      IS the pin, and they never pull.
+#   2. No unit carries a key the podman 5.7.0 quadlet generator rejects.
+#      The generator aborts the WHOLE batch on an unsupported key, so one
+#      bad file silently un-generates every other unit in that manager -
+#      live 2026-10-21: HostAddr= in prometheus.container orphaned
+#      prometheus.service while its container kept running, and the next
+#      deploy died on "Unit prometheus.service not found".
+
+load helpers
+
+@test "every registry Image= is digest-pinned across all three hosts" {
+    bad=""
+    while IFS= read -r unit; do
+        while IFS= read -r img; do
+            case "$img" in
+                localhost/*|franksdank/*) continue ;;
+            esac
+            case "$img" in
+                *@sha256:*) ;;
+                *) bad="$bad$unit: $img"$'\n' ;;
+            esac
+        done < <(sed -n 's/^Image=//p' "$unit")
+    done < <(find "$REPO_ROOT"/dankserver "$REPO_ROOT"/dankclaw "$REPO_ROOT"/frankbook-pro \
+                 -path '*/quadlet/*.container' -not -path '*.AGENTTRASH*')
+    [ -z "$bad" ] || { printf 'unpinned images:\n%s' "$bad" >&2; return 1; }
+}
+
+@test "no unit uses a key the 5.7.0 quadlet generator rejects (batch killer)" {
+    # HostAddr rejected by podman 5.7.0 (live 2026-10-21); Device= and
+    # Command= are the older v1 findings, guarded host-locally too.
+    # Keep this list current with every generator finding.
+    bad=""
+    while IFS= read -r unit; do
+        for key in HostAddr Device Command; do
+            grep -q "^${key}=" "$unit" && bad="$bad$unit: ${key}="$'\n'
+        done
+    done < <(find "$REPO_ROOT"/dankserver "$REPO_ROOT"/dankclaw "$REPO_ROOT"/frankbook-pro \
+                 -path '*/quadlet/*.container' -not -path '*.AGENTTRASH*')
+    [ -z "$bad" ] || { printf 'generator-rejected keys:\n%s' "$bad" >&2; return 1; }
+}
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@ SEERR_UNIT="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/seerr/quadlet/seerr.container"
    grep -q '^Restart=always$' "$SEERR_UNIT"
 }

-@test "seerr image is pinned to an exact version tag" {
-    grep -Eq '^Image=ghcr\.io/seerr-team/seerr:v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' "$SEERR_UNIT"
+@test "seerr image is pinned to an exact version tag and digest" {
+    # 2026-10-21 fleet law: tag AND digest (tests/quadlet_image_pins.bats)
+    grep -Eq '^Image=ghcr\.io/seerr-team/seerr:v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$' "$SEERR_UNIT"
 }

@test "seerr publishes 5055 on loopback only (guard chain is the user path)" {
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Frank	bfe4d185bd	docs(vault): OpenWebUI picker opened to all three models for every account (2026-10-21) Per Frank, frank-archon is public alongside dragoon/zealot: three-leg DB trio (conn enable, model row ctx 200000, access_grant principal='*'), verified as role=user. Token-mint traps recorded (cwd, PID-1 secret).	2026-10-21 16:48:32 -07:00
dank	94a9f3aa31	Merge pull request 'feat(security): digest-pin every registry image; drop batch-killing HostAddr' (#74 ) from security/quadlet-digest-pins into main	2026-10-21 16:32:44 -07:00
Frank	d2810ab610	feat(security): digest-pin every registry image on all three hosts (fleet law) Closing the command-center security queue #70/#71/#72/#73/#74: rolling tags let a rebuild move under a running service with nobody approving it, and make a CVE audit ungradeable. 36 quadlet units across dankclaw, dankserver and frankbook-pro now carry tag@sha256; localhost/* builds stay exempt (their build is the pin). The pihole and copyparty pins pull the fixed builds; valkey 9.1.2 (already running) and redis 7.4.11 are pinned in place, vendor fixes TBD. New gate tests/quadlet_image_pins.bats: no unpinned registry image, no generator-rejected key anywhere. Three seams that pinned the old exact-tag law (frankbook readarr, open_webui, seerr) now require tag AND digest - strictly stronger. Quadlet Lifecycle docs: batch-abort law, entrypoint flags-only law, pin law.	2026-10-21 16:32:36 -07:00
Frank	7a8cc83385	fix(quadlet): drop HostAddr from prometheus.unit - podman 5.7.0 rejects the key and the quadlet generator then aborts the ENTIRE user batch, silently orphaning every other unit (prometheus.service vanished while the container ran; deploy died 'Unit prometheus.service not found', live 2026-10-21). host.containers.internal resolves natively; the key was never needed.	2026-10-21 16:32:36 -07:00
dank	c4623f1629	Merge pull request 'fix(blackbox): flags-only Exec; bind loopback+LAN; exec-form HealthCmd' (#73 ) from fix/blackbox-entrypoint-bind into main	2026-10-21 16:25:32 -07:00
Frank	065a6911f9	fix(blackbox): Exec carries flags only (image has ENTRYPOINT) and the exporter binds loopback+LAN Three stacked lessons, each proved live 2026-10-21: - the image's ENTRYPOINT is /bin/blackbox_exporter, so Exec= repeating the binary made it a positional arg: 'unexpected /bin/blackbox_exporter'. - the podman gateway 169.254.1.2 is NOT bindable from the host netns - it exists only inside each rootless netns: 'bind: cannot assign requested address'. The scrape path does not need it bound: a bridge container dialing the gateway lands on the host LOOPBACK (proved 200 from the prometheus container), so the exporter binds 127.0.0.1 + LAN. - HealthCmd shell form ('/bin/sh -c "..."') is passed as one quoted token and quadlet folds the following --health-interval/--health-retries (and the image) into the command string; the plain exec form the sibling units use is correct. Prometheus.md bind law corrected (gateway is a forward-to-loopback, not a bind address); deploy-remote gate stays loopback, which is now honest.	2026-10-21 16:04:53 -07:00
dank	745d66d60d	Merge pull request 'fix(blackbox): --web.listen-address (repeatable), not --listen-address' (#72 ) from fix/blackbox-web-listen-flag into main	2026-10-21 15:58:36 -07:00
Frank	4009f118c1	fix(blackbox): the flag is --web.listen-address, repeatable, not --listen-address Third boot failure: the exporter exited 100 ms in with 'unknown long flag --listen-address' (proved against the pinned image, plus --help). The bind semantics were right; the flag name was invented. --web.listen-address is repeatable - one per address - so the dual gateway+LAN bind stands. Proven again pre-deploy with the real argv: the run starts and dies only on the deliberate /dev/null placeholder config.	2026-10-21 15:55:21 -07:00
dank	7de343c171	Merge pull request 'fix(blackbox): complete the unit - Image, Network=host, honest bind topology' (#71 ) from fix/blackbox-unit-generation into main	2026-10-21 15:52:30 -07:00