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Frank d9f3d1be1e chore(open-notebook): position as admin-side; document single-tenant
open-notebook has no user accounts upstream (PasswordAuthMiddleware = one
shared password; SurrealDB has no user/account/owner table — verified in the
running image). One shared password = one shared workspace; the guard chain
gates access but cannot partition data, and Authentik identity is never
consumed. Multi-user is approved-but-unbuilt upstream (#712, post-v2); OIDC
declined (#607). So move the homepage card from the user grid to the admin
tier and add the single-tenant boundary to the vault page. Fix the card's
stale 'frank-zealot' -> frank-archon. Update the seam's incidental category
pin to the new intentional value. Password rotated on the host (not repo).
2026-10-20 17:38:22 -07:00
dank afa3a4521c Merge pull request 'docs(authentik): record 7-day login-session TTL + setter script' (#48) from chore/authentik-session-ttl into main 2026-10-20 16:57:29 -07:00
Frank 9cc8ca1c88 docs(authentik): record the 7-day login-session TTL and add a setter script
The login-session lifetime (raised to days=7 on 2026-10-20) is owned by the
default-authentication-login stage's session_duration, not a global setting and
not SESSION_COOKIE_AGE. Authentik exposes no SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST, so the
window is absolute. session_duration is a STRING idiom; a timedelta stores a form
timedelta_from_string rejects, crashing login. Add scripts/authentik-set-login-session-duration.sh
that validates the form before writing (DB state, not repo-managed, re-run after
a blueprint re-import). Trim the page back under the OKF 500-line cap. tests/run.sh green.
2026-10-20 16:55:44 -07:00
dank 9c05c40aa0 Merge pull request 'docs(agent): scaffold agent-skills config in the vault' (#47) from chore/agent-skills-vault-setup into main 2026-10-20 16:11:47 -07:00
5 changed files with 60 additions and 3 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Set the authentik login-session TTL on Dankclaw.
#
# The login-session lifetime is governed by the `default-authentication-login`
# stage's `session_duration`, NOT a global setting and NOT SESSION_COOKIE_AGE
# (that is the pre-login session, sessions.unauthenticated_age). Authentik does
# not expose SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST at all, so the session is an absolute
# window from login, not a sliding one.
#
# The field is a STRING in authentik's own idiom ("days=7", "seconds=30",
# "hours=12") — not a Python timedelta. Writing str(timedelta(days=7)) stores
# "7 days, 0:00:00", which authentik's timedelta_from_string parser REJECTS
# (ValueError), and login then crashes computing the session expiry. Always pass
# the "key=value" form; this script validates it before writing.
#
# Existing sessions keep their old expiry; the new TTL applies from the next
# login. This is DB state — it is NOT repo-managed and a blueprint re-import or
# rebuild-from-scratch reverts it. Run this again after such a rebuild.
#
# Usage: authentik-set-login-session-duration.sh ["days=7"] (default days=7)
set -euo pipefail
DUR="${1:-days=7}"
STAGE="default-authentication-login"
HOST="${AUTHENTIK_HOST:-dankclaw}"
# Refuse anything that is not the safe key=value duration idiom.
if ! printf '%s' "$DUR" | grep -Eq '^[A-Za-z]+=[0-9]+([ ]+[A-Za-z]+=[0-9]+)*$'; then
echo "invalid duration '$DUR' — use authentik form, e.g. 'days=7' or 'seconds=30'" >&2
exit 2
fi
ssh "$HOST" 'podman exec -i authentik-server ak shell' <<PYEOF
from django.apps import apps
from authentik.lib.utils.time import timedelta_from_string
dur = "$DUR"
timedelta_from_string(dur) # validate the form before touching the row
ULS = apps.get_model("authentik_stages_user_login", "UserLoginStage")
s = ULS.objects.get(name="$STAGE")
s.session_duration = dur
s.save(update_fields=["session_duration"])
back = ULS.objects.get(name="$STAGE").session_duration
assert back == dur, "persisted value mismatch: %r" % back
print("session_duration set to", repr(back), "->", timedelta_from_string(back))
PYEOF
echo "Login-session TTL for '$STAGE' is now $DUR (applies on next login)."
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ open-notebook ([lfnovo/open-notebook](https://github.com/lfnovo/open-notebook))
The app's own login stays on behind the chain. It is not redundant: publishing the API on loopback does **not** hide it from this host's other containers, which can dial `open-notebook:5055` by name on `dankclaw_default`. The chain decides *who from outside* gets in; `OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD` decides what anything that already reached the port may do. The app's own login stays on behind the chain. It is not redundant: publishing the API on loopback does **not** hide it from this host's other containers, which can dial `open-notebook:5055` by name on `dankclaw_default`. The chain decides *who from outside* gets in; `OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD` decides what anything that already reached the port may do.
**Single tenant — there are no user accounts, so this is an admin-side tool.** Upstream ships one global password and nothing else: `PasswordAuthMiddleware` compares `Bearer <OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD>`, and the SurrealDB schema has no user/account/owner table (verified in the running image, 2026-10-20). One shared password therefore means **one shared workspace** — the guard chain can gate the door but cannot partition the data, and Authentik identity is never consumed. Multi-user is *approved but unbuilt* upstream (issue **#712**, "design phase, targeted post-v2"); OIDC/SSO was declined for now (**#607** closed). Real per-person isolation means **one deployment per person**, not a flag to flip. For that reason the homepage lists open-notebook under **admin**, not as a user-facing app.
## What the image actually runs ## What the image actually runs
One container, three processes under supervisord (`supervisord.conf` upstream): `uvicorn api.main:app --port 5055` (`:12`), the job worker (`:25`), and the Next.js frontend (`:39`). Two consequences the config depends on: One container, three processes under supervisord (`supervisord.conf` upstream): `uvicorn api.main:app --port 5055` (`:12`), the job worker (`:25`), and the Next.js frontend (`:39`). Two consequences the config depends on:
@@ -267,6 +267,12 @@ The silent re-auth path was proven end-to-end: after deleting
`qa-e2e-admin`'s rows, the e2e admin spec ran against the stale storage `qa-e2e-admin`'s rows, the e2e admin spec ran against the stale storage
state and passed with no login prompt (2 tests, 2.9 s). state and passed with no login prompt (2 tests, 2.9 s).
## Login-session lifetime (how often you re-authenticate)
How long a login stays valid is the **`default-authentication-login` stage's `session_duration`** (`UserLoginStage`) — not a global setting, and not `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` (that is the *pre-login* session). Raised to **`days=7`** on 2026-10-20 (was stage value `0` = the 24 h framework default). It is an **absolute** window, never sliding: authentik implements `SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST` nowhere, so activity does not extend it and no supported knob makes it one.
**`session_duration` is a STRING** in authentik's idiom (`"days=7"`, `"seconds=30"`, `"hours=12"`). A Python `timedelta` stores `"7 days, 0:00:00"`, which `authentik.lib.utils.time.timedelta_from_string` rejects with `ValueError` and login then crashes computing the expiry — so set it with **`scripts/authentik-set-login-session-duration.sh`** (validates the form first). Any non-zero value applies to *every* login (the "remember me" box only adds `remember_me_offset` on top) and a positive `set_expiry` also overrides `SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE`, so closing the browser no longer logs you out; **existing sessions keep their old expiry** — delete the user's `authentik_core_session`/`…proxysession` rows and re-login to force it now. This is **DB state, not repo-managed**: a blueprint re-import or rebuild reverts the stage to `0`, so re-run the script after one. The other two login stages (`default-source-*`) drive external-source/enrollment logins and stay at the framework default.
## Guard-chain flip recipe (adding a guarded vhost) ## Guard-chain flip recipe (adding a guarded vhost)
Move a public vhost from `reverse_proxy <app>:<port>` onto the chain: Move a public vhost from `reverse_proxy <app>:<port>` onto the chain:
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@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@
}, },
{ {
"name": "open-notebook", "name": "open-notebook",
"category": "user", "category": "admin",
"section": "AI", "section": "AI",
"description": "Podcast generator — notes in, spoken episode out: script written by frank-zealot, voices rendered by frank-tts. Guarded twice: Authentik at the edge, then its own login.", "description": "Podcast generator — notes in, spoken episode out: script written by frank-archon, voices rendered by frank-tts. Guarded twice: Authentik at the edge, then its own login. Single shared password, no per-user accounts — admin-only.",
"url": "http://notebook.franksdank.cloud", "url": "http://notebook.franksdank.cloud",
"docs": "", "docs": "",
"probe": "127.0.0.1:8502", "probe": "127.0.0.1:8502",
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@@ -290,7 +290,9 @@ vhost = sys.argv[2]
cards = [s for s in data if s["name"] == "open-notebook"] cards = [s for s in data if s["name"] == "open-notebook"]
assert len(cards) == 1, f"expected exactly one open-notebook card, got {len(cards)}" assert len(cards) == 1, f"expected exactly one open-notebook card, got {len(cards)}"
card = cards[0] card = cards[0]
assert card["category"] == "user" and card["section"] == "AI", card # category moved to "admin": single shared password, no per-user accounts, so it
# is positioned as an admin-side tool, not a user-facing app (see the vault page).
assert card["category"] == "admin" and card["section"] == "AI", card
assert card["probe"] == "127.0.0.1:8502", card["probe"] assert card["probe"] == "127.0.0.1:8502", card["probe"]
assert card["method"] == "http" assert card["method"] == "http"
# Deployed and guarded: the card is live and its link is the vhost, so the # Deployed and guarded: the card is live and its link is the vhost, so the