FrankBook-Pro becomes the only *arr/qBittorrent deployment. Every fleet
container (qB + five arrs) now shares gluetun's netns, so all egress —
torrent, indexer APIs, metadata lookups — exits the WireGuard tunnel by
construction (AllowedIPs=0.0.0.0/0); the arrs' own ports publish on the
gluetun unit, none on the arr units themselves.
- dankserver/compose.yaml: remove the six arr services (the Aug 20 compose
copy — never healthy, superseded; config dirs trashed on the host)
- dankclaw/Caddyfile + shared/homepage/services.json: arr vhosts and
probes repoint 192.168.0.235 -> 192.168.0.112 (FrankBook-Pro)
- frankbook-pro units: five arrs join gluetun netns (Wants/After/Network);
gluetun publishes 9696/8989/7878/8686/8787 alongside 8080/6881
- tests/frankbook_quadlet.bats: new VPN egress seam — every arr+qB unit
must share gluetun's netns and publish no port; gluetun must publish the
whole fleet's ports
- deploy-plan.py: gluetun changes carry the whole netns family (a gluetun
recreation kills all six joiners); dankserver compose set loses the arrs
- AGENTS.md: deployment is complete only when unit tests AND the Playwright
E2E suite both pass
The arr stack (prowlarr, radarr, sonarr, lidarr, readarr, qbittorrent)
had A records in addn-hosts but no Caddyfile blocks. This adds:
- Six public vhost blocks in the dankserver section, each proxying to
192.168.0.235:<port> (exempt by construction: own auth, no Anubis)
- Six @arr named handlers inside :8017 for authenticated traffic routing
All 233 bats tests pass.
Both Hermes services get direct (unguarded) vhosts: each authenticates itself
(webui password; dashboard basic_auth in /data/config.yaml), so no Anubis
challenge and no Authentik proxy provider is required. Upstreams are the host
LAN IP because Caddy itself sits on dankclaw_default, where the gateway
address 10.89.1.1 has nothing serving 8787. Internal-only by DNS absence:
hermes.franksdank.cloud already resolves via Pi-hole addn-hosts; hermesadmin
is added in this same commit so the caddyfile/addn-hosts cross-check (test 178)
stays green.
DNS at Porkbun was renamed (chat->ai, jellyfin->jelly) and the qbittorrent,
*arr-stack, comfyui, hermes, dankclaw, and dankserver public records were
deleted. This brings the Caddy config in lockstep: ai/jelly vhosts now match
the new names; comfyui (guarded), hermes (guarded), and the *arr/qb vhosts
are removed as their DNS is gone. The legacy dankclaw/dankserver redirect
vhosts stay: Pi-hole still answers those names on the LAN.
The embedded outpost carries no provider token (token=None), so the
auth_proxy identity header was never set and no user could log in. RP
mode is topology-independent: challenge gate stays in front, login runs
inside Grafana via the OAuth2 code flow against auth.franksdank.cloud.
Provider 'grafana' (pk 9, confidential) created via ak shell; secret
written straight into the live .env (never in git). Auth URL uses the
global /application/o/authorize/ path — this fork resolves the provider
by client_id query param; per-slug authorize does not exist.
Caddyfile comment corrected: no identity header is forwarded to Grafana.
Grafana leaves the exempt-by-construction set: grafana.franksdank.cloud
now terminates at the Anubis guard (anubis:8923) and authenticated
traffic returns at the internal :8017 listener, where an @grafana Host
handler proxies through to grafana:3000 with the outpost-proxy trust
token (GRAFANA_PROXY_TOKEN = client_id_client_secret of the new
'grafana-proxy' ProxyProvider on the embedded outpost; created via
ak shell before this route flip — provider-first ordering per the
External Exposure Policy).
The Grafana admin account is intentionally kept: auth.proxy in
auto-upsert mode only creates non-admin users, so the local admin
remains the only way to administer Grafana. The old edge-basicauth
wrapper is retired (shared family password, no per-user audit trail).
- Caddyfile: grafana vhost flipped to the guarded chain; @grafana
handler added at the :8017 return listener.
- compose.yaml: GF_AUTH_PROXY_ENABLED/HEADERS/TOKEN on the grafana
service (auth_proxy trusted-proxy CIDRs left at the image default —
the proxying Caddy container is not statically addressable on
10.89.0.0/24, so Grafana trusts any in-network source and relies on
the token as the capability).
- .env.example: GRAFANA_PROXY_TOKEN placeholder so test env_consistency
keeps guarding the compose<->env contract.
Loki's public vhost had zero auth — any host that can resolve DNS could
query all logs via LogQL. The vhost now terminates at anubis:8923 and
authenticated traffic returns at the internal :8017 listener, where a new
@loki host handler routes to loki:3100. The outpost proxy provider
'loki-proxy' (external_host https://loki.franksdank.cloud/, internal_host
http://caddy:8017) was created before this deploy — provider-first
ordering so authenticated traffic never hits the outpost error page.
Ingestion is unaffected: Alloy pushes to loki:3100 on the compose network.
The flip hunk's first comment line was written with a literal ':' prefix
(edit-tool auto-prefix artifact). Caddyfile parses ':# ...' as a matcher token,
which made the following site block an unrecognized directive and failed
config validation — that is why the earlier deploy validated, failed, and
skipped the reload, leaving the live config pre-flip (comfyui still direct).
comfyui.franksdank.cloud was exempt (direct reverse_proxy to comfyui:8188).
The comfyui-proxy proxy provider was created on the embedded outpost first
(internal_host http://caddy:8017, flows copied from hermes-proxy), then the
vhost flips onto the guard chain and authenticated traffic routes back via a
@comfy host match. ComfyUI has no auth of its own; this closes the last
unguarded admin surface on the internal hosts.
The gateway's SIGNAL_HTTP_URL pointed at the host LAN IP. From container
space on netavark networks only DNAT'd published ports accept connections
to that address; :8080 has no forward, so every connection was refused
and the Signal adapter stayed disconnected since the Aug 26 reboot.
host.containers.internal is the verified working path (probed live from a
probe container on dankclaw_default).
The public hostname also routed to hermes:8090, which serves nothing —
the gateway has no HTTP listener. It now routes to the dashboard's login-
gated admin UI on :9119, behind the existing Anubis+Authentik guard.
The redirect-to-flow design with an absolute cross-host next= was rejected by
the flow's open-redirect guard at completion ("Request has been denied:
Invalid next URL"), and meta-header routing does not exist in this build
(providers route on the ORIGINAL Host). :8016 now proxies every request whole
to authentik-server:9000 preserving Host; the embedded outpost serves login
in place and forwards authenticated traffic back to :8017. Requires one proxy
provider per guarded host (provisioned live: search/hermes/prometheus/romm/
files + www, flows backfilled). Tests flipped from the meta-header claim to
the upheld contract: Host preserved, no absolute next= redirects.
This 2026.x build does not mount /outpost.goauthentik.io/* for proxy-provider
meta-header routing (probed live: ping answers 204, app paths with full meta
headers 404). Guarded vhosts now redirect to /if/flow/default-authentication-flow/
with next= back to the app — unauthenticated sees the login page in place,
authenticated sessions complete instantly and bounce straight to the app.
The proxy provider matches external_host exactly, so Host=www matched zero
providers and Authentik answered its error page while the naked domain
served the homepage. Flip the topology: www.franksdank.cloud is the one
guarded vhost carrying the homepage through Anubis -> Authentik -> :8017;
franksdank.cloud (plus legacy names and the bare-IP catch-all) 308-redirects
onto www before any challenge. Tests flipped to assert the new contract.
Jellyfin's Kestrel backend rejects the h2c upgrade preface, so Caddy turned
every request into a 502 while the same port answers 200 over plain HTTP/1.1
from Caddy's network. Default transport (HTTP/1.1) restores the vhost.
The forward_auth target /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy does not exist
in authentik 2026.8 (verified live: 404 for every header combination; the
URL tree has no outpost auth prefix at all — the outpost worker dials back
to core over ws/outpost/<uuid>/ instead). Unauthenticated subrequests got
404, Caddy treated >=400 as 'not authenticated' and redirected browsers to
the dead path — users saw authentik's own Not-Found page.
Fix: guarded vhosts now proxy the whole request through authentik-server:9000
with X-authentik-meta-outpost/-provider/-app headers (the exact header set
this build's Traefik controller emits, adapted for Caddy). Unauthenticated
clients get the login flow served in place; once a session exists,
authentik proxies on to the provider's internal_host — now
http://caddy:8017, a new post-auth internal listener that routes straight to
the app. The chain terminates; nothing dials back into authentik.
Live DB changes applied alongside (postgres is the source of truth):
provider pk=1 authentication_flow=default-authentication-flow (was NULL —
the actual cause of the 404s) and internal_host=http://caddy:8017 (was
self-referential http://authentik-server:9000).
Bots and AI scrapers hit the SSO-fronted vhosts and eat Authentik auth
work for 403s. Anubis verifies clients first: DENY for known AI scraper
UAs, JS challenge for everyone else; verified traffic resumes the normal
Authentik forward_auth chain on Caddy's internal listener (:8016).
Chain: client -> Caddy (TLS) -> Anubis :8923 (verify) -> Caddy :8016
(auth + routing resumes; Host survives both hops) -> app. Reverse-proxy
through Anubis, not forward_auth: at the pinned tag a CHALLENGE answers
HTTP 200 + HTML, and forward_auth treats 200 as "authenticated" — the
page would pass through unchallenged. Exempt by construction (never
routed through Anubis): plex (plain HTTP legacy), auth.* (IdP login
must be reachable ungated), gitea (git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve
JS challenges), and every app with its own login.
Pinned ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 — the tag was source-verified
before pinning: at this tag the policy parser is JSON-only with a
minimal bots[] schema (no imports, no CEL expressions), flags are the
config surface via flagenv (TARGET/POLICY_FNAME map to --target/
--policy-fname), and the image's exec-form HEALTHCHECK is inherited by
the quadlet unit (dodges the v1 generator's HealthCmd space-split quirk).
Rollback nuance: stopping anubis 502s everything behind the chain (the
public listeners proxy through it); a true rollback is reverting the
Caddyfile and redeploying, not just systemctl --user stop anubis.
All in-repo path references (AGENTS.md, README, old scripts, report artifacts,
test code paths) rewritten in the same commit; focused-test map extended for
.gitignore, old/scripts/*, dankclaw/comfyui/*, and report/* per this repo's
own convention ('add one before committing'). Obsidian wikilinks are
title-based and unaffected.
Caddy v2.11.4's caddyfile adapter rejects 'tls { insecure_skip_verify }'
inside transport http (unrecognized subdirective '{') and also rejects
the handler-level form. The working form, verified live against PMS with
a throwaway caddy (200 OK), is the bare token:
reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:32400 {
transport http {
tls_insecure_skip_verify
}
}
PMS 1.43.x on :32400 accepts, reads, and silently closes every non-TLS
connection from a non-loopback source (loopback exempt). The plain-HTTP
reverse_proxy therefore got EOF and Caddy answered an empty-body 502.
Both Plex vhosts now dial the upstream over TLS with
insecure_skip_verify (PMS self-signed cert, pinned LAN hop only;
client-facing Let's Encrypt TLS unchanged).
The other vhosts (gitea, grafana, search, ...) now use username 'dankuser'
with CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH, which is set to the same hash as the homepage
(dankpassword.123). So the whole protected surface logs in as
dankuser / dankpassword.123; the operator /admin/ page still uses frank.
Updated the two tests that asserted the old 'dank' username.
The homepage user page + shared data now use a dedicated CADDY_HOMEPAGE_HASH
(username dankuser), separate from the shared family password (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH,
username dank, still used by the other vhosts) and the operator password
(CADDY_ADMIN_HASH, username frank, the /admin/ page). This lets the homepage be
re-logged independently without touching the other sites. deploy.sh renders the
new placeholder; the .env.example documents all three hashes.
Caddy SORTS top-level directives, so a 'rewrite' runs before 'basicauth'.
The rewrite changed /admin/ to /admin.html, and the path-based auth matchers
then saw /admin.html (which matched the family 'not path /admin/*' block, not
the operator '/admin/*' block) — so the operator password was checked against
the family hash and 401'd.
Serve each page from its own 'handle' block (which preserves order, so the
auth is checked on the original path before any file rewrite):
- handle /admin* : operator (frank) only, try_files /admin.html
- handle @data : shared data + assets, family (dank) OR operator (frank), so
the admin page's fetches of services.json/status.json reuse the operator
credential
- handle : everything else (the user page), family (dank)
'@admin rewrite ...' is parsed as a one-liner matcher DEFINITION, so it
re-defined @admin and Caddy rejected the config ('matcher is defined more
than once'), crash-looping the container. Per the Caddyfile matcher docs the
matcher token is the first ARGUMENT after the directive: 'rewrite @admin
/admin.html'. The '*' disambiguator is only needed pre-2.8.0. Validated the
rendered config against the porkbun image: 'Valid configuration'.
Two real bugs found on the first production deploy:
- /admin/ 404'd: file_server looked for /srv/homepage/admin/ (a dir), but the
page is admin.html. Add '@admin rewrite * /admin.html' so the /admin/ path
serves admin.html.
- The pages used relative refs (style.css, app.js, services.json, status.json),
which from /admin/ resolved to /admin/... (404). Add <base href="/"> so all
refs resolve to the site root on both pages.
- status.json was written 0600 (root); the checker now chmods it 0644 so Caddy
can serve it regardless of its user.
Red tests first.
- tests/homepage_caddy.bats: the homepage site block carries a root hash and
a distinct /admin/-scoped admin hash (Q18/Q38), and serves /srv/homepage.
- dankclaw/Caddyfile: the homepage block now uses named matchers -
@user (not /admin/*) with the shared hash, @admin (/admin/*) with the
operator-only hash (REPLACE_WITH_ADMIN_HASH, rendered from CADDY_ADMIN_HASH
at deploy). Both placeholders are distinct.
The Caddyfile had 'admin off', which disables Caddy's config file
watcher. Rendered Caddyfile changes never loaded until the container
was recreated, so the double-hash basicauth fix sat on disk unapplied
across deploys (2026-08-22). Admin binds to 127.0.0.1:2019 inside the
container and the port is unpublished, so nothing outside reaches it.
deploy.sh now issues an explicit 'caddy reload' (retry loop) after
'up -d', with the file watcher as backstop.
basicauth (2026-08-22 incident):
- the Caddyfile template carried its own $2a$14$ prefix and deploy.sh
substituted the full hash (prefix included), rendering an invalid
double-prefixed hash. Every basicauth vhost rejected every password
with 401 and Caddy logged nothing.
- template is now a bare REPLACE_WITH_HASH token; tests pin the render
contract (no prefix in template; rendered line is exactly 'dank <hash>').
open-webui (2026-08-22 incident):
- its slirp4netns helper process died, leaving the container running
with only 'lo' in its netns: port 3005 accepted TCP and reset every
request, so chat served empty responses for ~2 days, unlogged.
- move to a pinned bridge network (systemd-open-webui, 10.89.3.0/24,
gw 10.89.3.1) — no per-container helper to die.
- LLM endpoint reached via the gateway (host.containers.internal is
slirp-only): OPENAI_API_BASE_URL=http://10.89.3.1:52625.
- add a quadlet healthcheck: /health (app) + non-loopback interface
(network liveness; the dead-tap state leaves only 'lo').
- deploy script now copies the .network file too.
- docs updated (OpenWebUI History section, Caddy basic-auth contract).
- Caddyfile: drop http:// site prefixes, global acme_dns porkbun block,
HTTPS redirects on the bare-IP and legacy vhosts
- new dankclaw/caddy/Containerfile: xcaddy build with caddy-dns/porkbun
- compose: caddy uses franksdank/caddy-porkbun:latest + Porkbun env vars
- deploy.sh: build the image on first deploy if missing
- .env.example: rename PORKBUN_API_SECRET -> PORKBUN_API_SECRET_KEY
(the name the caddy-dns/porkbun module expects)
- tests: 7 new caddyfile/compose seams for the TLS config
Per user direction, Caddy runs only on dankclaw. It fronts every
service on both hosts: local services by container name, quadlet
services by published LAN port, dankserver services by published LAN
port (192.168.0.235:PORT).
- dankclaw/Caddyfile: merged vhost list (was: two Caddyfiles, one per
host). gitea's single vhost moves in from the retired gitea-caddy
quadlet (option B). Upstreams fixed to live reality: gitea :3000,
search :8081 (gluetun), chat :3005 (open-webui quadlet), media
services via 192.168.0.235. Retired: llms (open-webui on dankserver
is removed; chat is its successor), the dankserver homepage (302 to
the shared one).
- dankserver/Caddyfile, dankclaw/gitea/Caddyfile: deleted (git rm).
- dnsmasq addn-hosts: every name -> 192.168.0.143 (the one Caddy
host); no .235 records, no llms.
- compose.yaml: removed the openwebui/postgres/gitea services (they
are quadlets now); caddy service mounts the rendered Caddyfile from
/home/dank/Containers/caddy, healthcheck probes the bare-IP
catch-all (302).
- deploy.sh: per-target logic (dankserver = pull-only, health via the
shared Caddy at 192.168.0.143); renders CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH from
the host .env into the mounted Caddyfile.
- .env.example: CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH on dankclaw; Porkbun block
dropped from dankserver (its Caddy is gone); SEARXNG_BASE_URL to
the flat name; stale OPENAI_* block dropped (quadlet is
self-contained).
- tests: caddyfile.bats now asserts the single-Caddyfile invariant;
dnsmasq.bats cross-checks vhosts -> .143 and the retired names.
/opt is root-owned; the established data-location pattern (see
docs/Architecture/Storage Policy.md, open-webui quadlet) is
/home/dank/Containers/<service>.
Phase 1 of the local-DNS-name work. Users type a name, not a port.
- dnsmasq quadlet on dankclaw (rootless, slirp4netns, port 53 published):
serves the flat name scheme from addn-hosts, upstream 1.1.1.1/1.0.0.1.
Image built from the in-repo Containerfile (localhost/dnsmasq:latest).
- Caddyfiles (both hosts): all *.dankclaw.local / *.dankserver.local vhosts
renamed to flat <service>.franksdank.cloud. Explicit http:// site
addresses for now; TLS (wildcard LE via DNS-01/Porkbun) lands in phase 2.
- Drift reconciliation (live /etc/caddy/Caddyfile on dankserver differs
from the repo): added the live-only llms.franksdank.cloud vhost
(OpenWebUI on :3000). Dropped the legacy search vhost from dankserver
(the name belongs to dankclaw's gluetun-routed SearXNG; the legacy
instance stays reachable at 192.168.0.235:8081).
- Homepage service links updated to the new names.
- New test seams (TDD): tests/dnsmasq.bats (quadlet boot-persistence,
port 53, conf/record validity, Caddyfile<->addn-hosts cross-check on
the right host IPs); caddyfile.bats naming-convention tests updated.
LAN clients get this DNS from the SURFboard G36 (DNS Relay -> statically
configured -> 192.168.0.143); the router change is a pending user step.
Replace the dead dankserver open-webui (bare container, :3000, pointed at a
dead :9090 backend) with a boot-persistent quadlet on dankclaw:
- CPU image (:main); dankclaw is CPU-only, so the :cuda image is wasted.
- Isolated on slirp4netns; publishes 3005 (3000 is Gitea's HTTP port).
- Default LLM backend is the local vLLM on 52625 (frank-default-large).
- Data persists under /home/dank/Containers/open-webui/data.
- Caddy route now proxies to the published LAN port (the container is not on
Caddy's network).
Also corrects the model/port mapping in the docs: the live state (verified
2026-08-19) is frank-default-large on vLLM :52625 (dankclaw) and
frank-default-small on llama.cpp :7770 (dankserver) — the reverse of the
2026-08-17 note.
unattended-upgrades rebooted dankclaw at 15:01; the legacy
podman-compose gitea stack had no systemd units, so rootless podman
did not auto-start the containers. Gitea was down ~1 hour.
- add quadlet units (dankclaw/gitea/quadlet/): gitea-postgres,
gitea-server, gitea-caddy + gitea.network (DNS enabled; the default
rootless podman network has dns_enabled=false)
- add gitea stack Caddyfile (upstream gitea-server:3000) and
.env.example; live password stays in /opt/gitea/.env (0600)
- fix latent name bugs in main stack config: DATABASE_HOST
gitea-postgres, Caddyfile upstream gitea-server
- docs: rewrite Gitea page for the quadlet stack (management, boot
persistence, secrets, gotchas, incident log); fix port 3000 in
stack table; Postgres connection notes
- legacy compose retired on target to /opt/gitea/.deprecated/
Frank