dank/serverAppConfigs
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 6 Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

SearXNG docs: document the 429 root cause + pass_ip fix

Browse Source 
The JSON rate cap (API_MAX=4/hour) is hardcoded in Python, not settable in
limiter.toml; pass_ip is the only bypass. Rootless podman strips the client IP
on published-port hits (the container sees a slirp source), so local subagents
must present a pass_ip source. Document the slirp IP-strip, the pass_ip
expansion, and the root-owned config file (one-off sudo cp to update).
This commit is contained in:
Frank
2026-08-19 12:48:53 -07:00
parent 4fa9fdf36e
commit aa38c556b2
1 changed files with 9 additions and 4 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
docs/Dankclaw/SearXNG.md
+9 -4
View File
@@ -86,14 +86,19 @@ Two lists control access:
- `pass_ip` — an IP in this list gets unrestricted access and bypasses all bot detection.
- `trusted_proxies` — if the request IP is in this list, SearXNG reads the real client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` (set by Caddy).
The whole homelab LAN `192.168.0.0/24` is in both lists. This lets local agents and browsers poll the JSON API without tripping the 4-per-hour limit. `deploy.sh` copies the file into place on each deploy.
The `pass_ip` list holds loopback (`127.0.0.1/32`, `::1`), the whole homelab LAN (`192.168.0.0/24`), and the host's private podman/slirp ranges (`10.88.0.0/16`, `10.89.0.0/16`). An IP in `pass_ip` skips every bot-detection check, including the rate limiter. `deploy.sh` copies the file into place on each deploy.
Access SearXNG through Caddy (`search.dankclaw.local`). A direct request on the published port has no `X-Forwarded-For` header. The bot-detection cannot resolve the client and returns 429. The searxng network subnet 10.89.2.0/24 is in `trusted_proxies` so Caddy's request is trusted. The subnet is pinned in `searxng.network`, so the value stays stable across reboots.
Why so many ranges: rootless podman strips the client IP on published-port hits. A request to the published port reaches the container with a slirp/bridge source (`10.88.x`/`10.89.x`), never the real client IP. Only Caddy's `X-Forwarded-For` restores it. So a local subagent that hits the port directly must present a `pass_ip` source, or it is treated as an untrusted client. All these ranges are reachable only from the host or the LAN, never the internet.
The rate limiter's JSON cap is `API_MAX = 4` requests per IP per hour. The constant is hardcoded in Python (`searx/botdetection/ip_limit.py`). It cannot be raised from `limiter.toml`. `pass_ip` is the only bypass. This is what lets 4 parallel subagents poll the JSON API at full rate without a 429.
Reach SearXNG through Caddy (`search.dankclaw.local`) for browser use. A local subagent can hit the published port directly because its slirp source is now trusted. The searxng subnet 10.89.2.0/24 is in `trusted_proxies`, so Caddy's `X-Forwarded-For` is honored. The subnet is pinned in `searxng.network`, so it stays stable across reboots.
## Gotchas
- The JSON API is rate-limited hard by the limiter (4 per 3600s per IP for untrusted). Add the agent's IP to `pass_ip` in `limiter.toml` if it polls.
- Reach SearXNG through Caddy, not the raw published port. A direct port hit has no `X-Forwarded-For` header and the bot-detection returns 429.
- The JSON API rate cap (4 per 3600s per IP) is hardcoded in Python, not settable in `limiter.toml`. The only bypass is `pass_ip`. Local subagents are covered because their slirp/loopback/LAN sources are in `pass_ip`.
- The limiter stays armed for untrusted sources (a spoofed public IP still 429s). Do not disable it. Widen only `pass_ip` for sources you trust on this host.
- The config file is root-owned (uid of the rootless podman namespace). Update it with a one-off `sudo cp`, then run `systemctl --user restart searxng.service` to reload.
- `base_url` must match the public address or proxy rewrites break.
- Keep the valkey cache container on the same podman network as searxng.