anubis: bot-challenge proxy in front of the guarded vhosts (two-tier chain)

Bots and AI scrapers hit the SSO-fronted vhosts and eat Authentik auth
work for 403s. Anubis verifies clients first: DENY for known AI scraper
UAs, JS challenge for everyone else; verified traffic resumes the normal
Authentik forward_auth chain on Caddy's internal listener (:8016).

Chain: client -> Caddy (TLS) -> Anubis :8923 (verify) -> Caddy :8016
(auth + routing resumes; Host survives both hops) -> app. Reverse-proxy
through Anubis, not forward_auth: at the pinned tag a CHALLENGE answers
HTTP 200 + HTML, and forward_auth treats 200 as "authenticated" — the
page would pass through unchallenged. Exempt by construction (never
routed through Anubis): plex (plain HTTP legacy), auth.* (IdP login
must be reachable ungated), gitea (git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve
JS challenges), and every app with its own login.

Pinned ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 — the tag was source-verified
before pinning: at this tag the policy parser is JSON-only with a
minimal bots[] schema (no imports, no CEL expressions), flags are the
config surface via flagenv (TARGET/POLICY_FNAME map to --target/
--policy-fname), and the image's exec-form HEALTHCHECK is inherited by
the quadlet unit (dodges the v1 generator's HealthCmd space-split quirk).

Rollback nuance: stopping anubis 502s everything behind the chain (the
public listeners proxy through it); a true rollback is reverting the
Caddyfile and redeploying, not just systemctl --user stop anubis.

dankclaw/Caddyfile

@@ -11,13 +11,19 @@
 # (dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts — every name resolves to 192.168.0.143)
 # and handed to LAN clients by the SURFboard G36 router.
 #
-# Authentication: Caddy forward_auth (Authentik SSO) protects the vhosts that
+# Authentication chain (Anubis rollout, 2026-08-28): the guarded vhosts
-# do not have their own application-level auth (homepage, SearXNG, Hermes,
+# (homepage, SearXNG, Hermes, Prometheus, RomM, Copyparty) proxy EVERYTHING
-# Prometheus, RomM, Copyparty). The basicauth hash is a placeholder; deploy.sh
+# through the Anubis bot-challenge proxy first. Chain: client → Caddy (TLS,
-# renders the real hash (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH from the host .env, git-ignored)
+# public listener) → Anubis :8923 (verify: DENY known AI scrapers, CHALLENGE
-# into /home/dank/Containers/caddy/Caddyfile, which the container mounts.
+# everyone else) → Caddy's internal listener http://:8016 (Authentik
-# Apps with their own auth (Grafana, Gitea, OpenWebUI, Jellyfin, *arr, Pi-hole)
+# forward_auth + app routing resumes; Host headers survive both hops) → app.
-# are not wrapped in forward_auth — they handle their own login.
+# Apps with their own auth (Grafana, Gitea, OpenWebUI, ComfyUI, Jellyfin,
+# *arr, Pi-hole) and the Authentik IdP itself (auth.franksdank.cloud — its
+# login flow must never sit behind a challenge) are exempt by construction:
+# their vhosts never route through Anubis. The basicauth hash is a
+# placeholder; deploy.sh renders the real hash (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH from the
+# host .env, git-ignored) into /home/dank/Containers/caddy/Caddyfile, which
+# the container mounts.
 #
 # TLS: real Let's Encrypt certs. Site addresses carry no http:// prefix,
 # so Caddy serves HTTPS (and auto-redirects HTTP). Certs are issued via
@@ -28,7 +34,7 @@
 {
 	# Admin stays ON: it binds to 127.0.0.1:2019 inside the container and the
 	# port is not published, so nothing outside the container can reach it.
-	# It powers the config file watcher, so a rendered Caddyfile change
+	# It powers the config file watcher, so a rendered-config change
 	# hot-reloads without a container restart. 'admin off' once left a broken
 	# basicauth hash sitting on disk unapplied for hours (2026-08-22).
 	email admin@franksdank.cloud
@@ -47,42 +53,10 @@
 	redir https://franksdank.cloud/ 302
 }
 
-# --- Homepage (Authentik SSO) ---
+# --- Homepage (Anubis → Authentik SSO) ---
 franksdank.cloud www.franksdank.cloud {
-	root * /srv/homepage
+	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
-
+		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
-	route {
-		# Authentik outpost (login UI + session management).
-		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
-
-		# Forward auth: check the Authentik session before serving the page.
-		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
-			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
-			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
-			trusted_proxies private_ranges
-		}
-
-		# Operator-only admin page. Auth is checked on the original path,
-		# before any rewrite, so the path matcher is reliable. 'handle'
-		# preserves order.
-		handle /admin* {
-			try_files /admin.html
-			file_server
-		}
-
-		# Shared data + assets: fetched by both the user page and the admin
-		# page. With forward_auth, any authenticated user can access them
-		# (the browser's Authentik session covers these fetches).
-		@data path /services.json /status.json /app.js /style.css /deployed.js
-		handle @data {
-			file_server
-		}
-
-		# Everything else (the user page).
-		handle {
-			try_files /index.html
-			file_server
-		}
 	}
 }
 
@@ -97,6 +71,8 @@ dankserver.franksdank.cloud {
 }
 
 # --- Authentik (SSO / OIDC provider) ---
+# Exempt by construction: the IdP login flow must be reachable without a
+# challenge, so this vhost never routes through Anubis.
 auth.franksdank.cloud {
 	reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000
 }
@@ -107,14 +83,8 @@ auth.franksdank.cloud {
 
 # --- SearXNG (quadlet; behind the Gluetun tunnel, published 8081) ---
 search.franksdank.cloud {
-	route {
+	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
-		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
-		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
-			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
-			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
-			trusted_proxies private_ranges
-		}
-		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8081
 	}
 }
 
@@ -130,18 +100,16 @@ chat.franksdank.cloud {
 
 # --- Hermes ---
 hermes.franksdank.cloud {
-	route {
+	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
-		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
-		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
-			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
-			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
-			trusted_proxies private_ranges
-		}
-		reverse_proxy hermes:8090
 	}
 }
 
 # --- Gitea (quadlet; published 3000) ---
+# Exempt by construction: Gitea has its own login, and git smart-HTTP
+# clients (git push/fetch over HTTPS) cannot solve JS challenges. The
+# policy would need a bypass for /info/refs + /git-*-pack paths if this
+# ever moves behind Anubis.
 gitea.franksdank.cloud {
 	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:3000
 }
@@ -156,14 +124,8 @@ grafana.franksdank.cloud {
 
 # --- Prometheus ---
 prometheus.franksdank.cloud {
-	route {
+	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
-		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
-		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
-			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
-			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
-			trusted_proxies private_ranges
-		}
-		reverse_proxy prometheus:9090
 	}
 }
 
@@ -217,27 +179,15 @@ books.franksdank.cloud {
 
 # --- RomM ---
 romm.franksdank.cloud {
-	route {
+	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
-		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
-		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
-			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
-			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
-			trusted_proxies private_ranges
-		}
-		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8085
 	}
 }
 
 # --- Copyparty ---
 files.franksdank.cloud {
-	route {
+	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
-		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
-		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
-			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
-			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
-			trusted_proxies private_ranges
-		}
-		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:3923
 	}
 }
 
@@ -275,6 +225,107 @@ qbittorrent.franksdank.cloud {
 	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8080
 }
 
+# --- Internal listener: where Anubis forwards accepted traffic ---
+# Anubis dials http://caddy:8016 after verifying a client (TARGET in
+# dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container). Host headers survive the hop,
+# so per-vhost routing resumes here: outpost paths go straight to the
+# Authentik outpost, everything else runs the forward_auth check and then
+# dials the app. This block is the second half of every guarded vhost.
+http://:8016 {
+	@home host franksdank.cloud www.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @home {
+		root * /srv/homepage
+		route {
+			# Authentik outpost (login UI + session management).
+			reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+
+			# Forward auth: check the Authentik session before serving the page.
+			forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
+				uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
+				copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
+				trusted_proxies private_ranges
+			}
+
+			# Operator-only admin page. Auth is checked on the original path,
+			# before any rewrite, so the path matcher is reliable. 'handle'
+			# preserves order.
+			handle /admin* {
+				try_files /admin.html
+				file_server
+			}
+
+			# Shared data + assets: fetched by both the user page and the admin
+			# page. With forward_auth, any authenticated user can access them
+			# (the browser's Authentik session covers these fetches).
+			@data path /services.json /status.json /app.js /style.css /deployed.js
+			handle @data {
+				file_server
+			}
+
+			# Everything else (the user page).
+			handle {
+				try_files /index.html
+				file_server
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	@search host search.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @search {
+		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
+			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
+			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
+			trusted_proxies private_ranges
+		}
+		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8081
+	}
+
+	@hermes host hermes.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @hermes {
+		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
+			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
+			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
+			trusted_proxies private_ranges
+		}
+		reverse_proxy hermes:8090
+	}
+
+	@prometheus host prometheus.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @prometheus {
+		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
+			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
+			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
+			trusted_proxies private_ranges
+		}
+		reverse_proxy prometheus:9090
+	}
+
+	@romm host romm.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @romm {
+		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
+			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
+			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
+			trusted_proxies private_ranges
+		}
+		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8085
+	}
+
+	@files host files.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @files {
+		reverse_proxy /outpost.goauthentik.io/* authentik-server:9000
+		forward_auth authentik-server:9000 {
+			uri /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy
+			copy_headers X-Authentik-Username X-Authentik-Groups X-Authentik-Email X-Authentik-Name
+			trusted_proxies private_ranges
+		}
+		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:3923
+	}
+}
+
 # --- Optional: Jackett ---
 # jackett.franksdank.cloud {
 # 	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:9117

dankclaw/anubis/policy.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "bots": [
+    {
+      "name": "deny AI scrapers",
+      "user_agent_regex": "(?i)^(GPTBot|ChatGPT-User|OAI-SearchBot|CCBot|anthropic-ai|ClaudeBot|Claude-Web|PerplexityBot|PerplexityUser|Google-Extended|Applebot-Extended|Bytespider|Amazonbot|meta-externalagent|DuckAssistBot|cohere-ai|YouBot|KimiBot)",
+      "action": "DENY"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "challenge everything else",
+      "path_regex": ".",
+      "action": "CHALLENGE"
+    }
+  ],
+  "dnsbl": false
+}

dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Quadlet unit: Anubis bot-challenge proxy (rootless, boot-persistent).
+#
+# Install path on dankclaw: ~/.config/containers/systemd/anubis.container
+# Unit name: anubis.service (container name: anubis)
+#
+# Two-tier chain: the public Caddy listeners for the guarded vhosts proxy
+# everything to this container (port 8923, internal only — no published port,
+# so metrics on :9090 stay reachable only inside dankclaw_default); Anubis
+# verifies the client (challenge/DENY per policy) and forwards accepted
+# traffic back to Caddy's internal listener (TARGET below), where the normal
+# per-vhost routing — including Authentik forward_auth — resumes. Host headers
+# survive both hops, so vhost matching on the internal listener still works.
+#
+# Version pin: ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 was source-verified before
+# pinning (policy parser is JSON-only at this tag, flags are the config
+# surface via flagenv: an env var named TARGET sets --target, POLICY_FNAME
+# sets --policy-fname). Upgrading = stop unit, change Image=, deploy; policy
+# schema must be re-verified against the new tag first.
+#
+# No secrets here: Anubis holds no credentials (memory store; challenge
+# cookies are client-side JWTs). A restart invalidates issued challenges —
+# users just re-challenge once. See serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Anubis.md.
+
+[Unit]
+Description=Anubis bot-challenge proxy container
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Container]
+ContainerName=anubis
+Image=ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0
+Pull=never
+Network=dankclaw_default
+# flagenv maps env names to flag names (TARGET -> --target, POLICY_FNAME ->
+# --policy-fname). TARGET points back at Caddy's internal listener; the
+# container DNS name resolves on dankclaw_default.
+Environment=TARGET=http://caddy:8016
+Environment=POLICY_FNAME=/policy/policy.json
+Volume=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json:/policy/policy.json:ro
+# No HealthCmd: the image ships an exec-form HEALTHCHECK
+# (["/app/bin/anubis","--healthcheck"]) and quadlet inherits it when no
+# HealthCmd is set — this dodges the v1 generator's space-splitting quirk
+# that mangled quoted probes for the authentik units.
+
+[Service]
+Restart=always
+RestartSec=5
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=default.target

scripts/deploy-plan.py

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ def services_for_path(path: str, target: str) -> set[str]:
         if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1] == "Containerfile.comfyui":
             _add(services, "comfyui")
             return services
-        if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1] in {"caddy", "comfyui", "loki", "alloy", "hermes"}:
+        if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1] in {"caddy", "comfyui", "loki", "alloy", "hermes", "anubis"}:
             _add(services, parts[1])
             return services
         if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1] == "searxng":

scripts/deploy-remote.sh

@@ -550,6 +550,22 @@ deploy_authentik() {
     systemctl --user start authentik-worker.service
 }
 
+deploy_anubis() {
+    # Anubis is the bot-challenge proxy in front of the guarded vhosts.
+    # The image lives on ghcr.io; pull once, then the unit runs it from
+    # local storage (Pull=never keeps boots off the registry).
+    if ! podman image inspect ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        podman pull ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0
+    fi
+    cp "dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container" "$quadlet_unit_dir/"
+    systemctl --user daemon-reload
+    # No enable: generated units cannot be enabled on this host (v1 quadlet
+    # generator); boot persistence comes from [Install] in the unit file.
+    # restart, not start: policy.json is parsed at process start only (no
+    # reload signal exists), so every redeploy must cycle the process.
+    systemctl --user restart anubis.service
+    wait_container_healthy anubis 60 || return 1
+}
 
 deploy_llm_large() {
     relink_unit frank-default-large
@@ -604,6 +620,7 @@ deploy_service() {
         authentik-postgres|authentik-server|authentik-worker)
             deploy_authentik
             ;;
+        anubis) deploy_anubis ;;
         frank-default-large) deploy_llm_large ;;
         frank-default-small) deploy_llm_small ;;
         frank-default-npu) deploy_llm_npu ;;

scripts/deploy.sh

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ valid_service() {
         dankclaw:comfyui|dankclaw:hermes|dankclaw:hermes-dashboard|\
         dankclaw:hermes-webui|dankclaw:prometheus|dankclaw:grafana|dankclaw:loki|dankclaw:alloy|\
         dankclaw:node-exporter|dankclaw:authentik-postgres|dankclaw:authentik-server|\
-        dankclaw:authentik-worker|dankclaw:caddy|dankclaw:homepage|\
+        dankclaw:authentik-worker|dankclaw:anubis|dankclaw:caddy|dankclaw:homepage|\
         dankclaw:frank-default-large|dankclaw:frank-default-npu|\
         dankserver:mariadb|dankserver:redis|dankserver:romm|dankserver:copyparty|\
         dankserver:jellyfin|dankserver:calibre-web|dankserver:prowlarr|\

scripts/test-changed.sh

@@ -120,6 +120,17 @@ for path in "${CHANGED[@]}"; do
             add_test tests/searxng_quadlet.bats
             add_test tests/deployment_scoping.bats
             ;;
+        # Anubis is a quadlet + Caddyfile pair: the chain (public listener ->
+        # anubis:8923 -> internal :8016 listener) spans both, so any change
+        # under the service dir must re-run the caddyfile seam too. This case
+        # precedes the dankclaw/*/quadlet/*.container fallback below, which
+        # would otherwise swallow it into unrelated seams.
+        dankclaw/anubis/*)
+            add_test tests/anubis.bats
+            add_test tests/caddyfile.bats
+            add_test tests/homepage_caddy.bats
+            add_test tests/deployment_scoping.bats
+            ;;
         # Quadlets live under dankclaw/<svc>/quadlet/ (reorganized out of the
         # top-level dankclaw/*.container globs above). Map the whole subtree so
         # changes to the pihole, open-webui, searxng, and gitea quadlets hit

tests/anubis.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+# Seam: the Anubis bot-challenge proxy (dankclaw/anubis). Anubis sits between
+# Caddy's public listeners and the guarded vhosts: clients hit Caddy (TLS),
+# Caddy proxies everything through Anubis, Anubis verifies (DENY known AI
+# scrapers, CHALLENGE everyone else per policy.json) and forwards accepted
+# traffic back to Caddy's internal listener at :8016, where per-vhost routing
+# resumes. Static assertions only — the container runs on dankclaw.
+
+load helpers
+
+setup() {
+    UNIT="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container"
+    POLICY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json"
+    CADDY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/Caddyfile"
+}
+
+@test "the anubis quadlet unit exists and is boot-persistent by [Install]" {
+    test -f "$UNIT"
+    grep -q 'WantedBy=default.target' "$UNIT"
+    # Generated units cannot be enabled on this host (v1 quadlet generator);
+    # boot persistence comes from [Install], not from systemctl enable.
+    ! grep -q '^Enable=true' "$UNIT"
+}
+
+@test "the image is pinned to an exact upstream tag and never pulled at boot" {
+    grep -qE '^Image=ghcr\.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' "$UNIT"
+    grep -q '^Pull=never$' "$UNIT"
+}
+
+@test "anubis publishes no host port — it is internal-network-only" {
+    # Metrics (:9090) are unauthenticated; the protection strategy is that
+    # only dankclaw_default members can reach the container at all. Caddy
+    # reaches it by container DNS name, so no published port may exist.
+    ! grep -q '^PublishPort=' "$UNIT"
+}
+
+@test "the unit points TARGET back at caddy's internal listener" {
+    grep -q '^Environment=TARGET=http://caddy:8016$' "$UNIT"
+    grep -q '^Environment=POLICY_FNAME=/policy/policy.json$' "$UNIT"
+    # The policy file is mounted read-only from the repo checkout on the host.
+    grep -q 'policy.json:/policy/policy.json:ro' "$UNIT"
+}
+
+@test "the policy parses as JSON and matches v1.13.0 schema (bots array, action rules)" {
+    # At the pinned tag the parser is JSON-only with a minimal schema:
+    # {"bots":[{"name","user_agent_regex"|"path_regex","action"}],"dnsbl":bool}
+    # — imports/CEL/expression keys do not exist at this tag and would crash
+    # the container at parse time. Assert the shape statically via python.
+    python3 - "$POLICY" <<'PY'
+import json, sys
+with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
+    p = json.load(f)
+assert set(p.keys()) <= {"bots", "dnsbl"}, p.keys()
+actions = [b["action"] for b in p["bots"]]
+assert any(a == "DENY" for a in actions), actions
+assert actions[-1] == "CHALLENGE", actions
+for b in p["bots"]:
+    keys = set(b) ^ {"name", "action"}
+    assert len(keys) == 1, f"{b.get('name')}: exactly one matcher required, got {keys}"
+    assert (keys ^ {"user_agent_regex"}) != (keys ^ {"path_regex"}), b
+PY
+}
+
+@test "guarded vhosts proxy through anubis with the real client IP forwarded" {
+    # Anubis reads X-Real-Ip for its decisions; without the header every
+    # request looks like it comes from the Caddy container. Every guarded
+    # public listener must set it.
+    grep -q 'header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}' "$CADDY"
+}
+
+@test "exempt vhosts never route through anubis (auth, plex, own-auth apps)" {
+    # The IdP login flow and git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve challenges;
+    # these vhosts bypass the chain by construction.
+    local block
+    block=$(awk '/^auth\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
+    echo "$block" | grep -q 'reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000'
+    ! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
+    block=$(awk '/^plex\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
+    echo "$block" | grep -q '192\.168\.0\.235:32400'
+    ! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
+}

tests/caddyfile.bats

@@ -124,9 +124,11 @@ CADDYFILE="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/Caddyfile"
 @test "all vhosts use TLS except the legacy .casa name" {
     # franksdank.casa is not in the same Porkbun account, so it cannot get
     # a DNS-01 Let's Encrypt cert; it stays explicitly http. Every other
-    # site address must carry no http:// prefix.
+    # client-facing site address must carry no http:// prefix. The internal
+    # listener (http://:8016) is not client-facing — Anubis dials it over
+    # container DNS after verifying a client, so plain HTTP is intended.
     local offenders
-    offenders=$(grep -E '^http://' "$CADDYFILE" | grep -v 'plex\.franksdank\.casa' || true)
+    offenders=$(grep -E '^http://' "$CADDYFILE" | grep -v 'plex\.franksdank\.casa' | grep -v '^http://:8016' || true)
     [ -z "$offenders" ] || { echo "non-.casa http:// vhosts: $offenders"; return 1; }
 }
 

tests/homepage_caddy.bats

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bats
-# Seam: the homepage site block in dankclaw/Caddyfile. It serves /srv/homepage
+# Seam: the homepage site block in dankclaw/Caddyfile. Since the Anubis
-# from the naked domain (franksdank.cloud) and www. Authentication is via
+# rollout the naked domain + www are guarded vhosts: the public listener
-# Caddy forward_auth (Authentik SSO) — the basicauth hashes were retired in
+# proxies everything through Anubis (bot challenge), and the Authentik
-# favor of the unified Authentik login. caddy is not on the dev box, so the
+# forward_auth for SSO runs on Caddy's internal listener (http://:8016)
+# after Anubis has verified the client. caddy is not on the dev box, so the
 # tests assert the structure statically.
 
 load helpers
@@ -26,13 +27,19 @@ setup() {
 @test "the shared data + assets are served to any authenticated user" {
     # The data (services.json, status.json) and assets are fetched by both the
     # user page and the admin page. With forward_auth, any authenticated user
-    # can access them (the browser's Authentik session covers the fetch).
+    # can access them (the browser's Authentik session covers these fetches).
     grep -qE "@data[[:space:]]+path[[:space:]]+/services\.json[[:space:]]+/status\.json" "$CADDY"
     grep -qE "handle[[:space:]]+@data" "$CADDY"
 }
 
-@test "the homepage vhost uses forward_auth (Authentik SSO)" {
+@test "the homepage vhost chains Anubis (public) before Authentik SSO (internal listener)" {
+    # Public listener: the naked domain proxies everything through Anubis.
     local block
     block=$(awk '/^franksdank\.cloud[[:space:]]/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
-    echo "$block" | grep -q 'forward_auth'
+    echo "$block" | grep -q 'reverse_proxy anubis:8923'
+    # The SSO check itself now runs on the internal listener that Anubis
+    # forwards accepted traffic to; Host survives the hop, so per-vhost
+    # routing (and with it forward_auth) resumes there.
+    grep -q 'http://:8016' "$CADDY"
+    awk '/^http:\/\/:8016/,/^\}/' "$CADDY" | grep -q 'forward_auth authentik-server:9000'
 }