Frank
0ae3650414
Bots and AI scrapers hit the SSO-fronted vhosts and eat Authentik auth work for 403s. Anubis verifies clients first: DENY for known AI scraper UAs, JS challenge for everyone else; verified traffic resumes the normal Authentik forward_auth chain on Caddy's internal listener (:8016). Chain: client -> Caddy (TLS) -> Anubis :8923 (verify) -> Caddy :8016 (auth + routing resumes; Host survives both hops) -> app. Reverse-proxy through Anubis, not forward_auth: at the pinned tag a CHALLENGE answers HTTP 200 + HTML, and forward_auth treats 200 as "authenticated" — the page would pass through unchallenged. Exempt by construction (never routed through Anubis): plex (plain HTTP legacy), auth.* (IdP login must be reachable ungated), gitea (git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve JS challenges), and every app with its own login. Pinned ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 — the tag was source-verified before pinning: at this tag the policy parser is JSON-only with a minimal bots[] schema (no imports, no CEL expressions), flags are the config surface via flagenv (TARGET/POLICY_FNAME map to --target/ --policy-fname), and the image's exec-form HEALTHCHECK is inherited by the quadlet unit (dodges the v1 generator's HealthCmd space-split quirk). Rollback nuance: stopping anubis 502s everything behind the chain (the public listeners proxy through it); a true rollback is reverting the Caddyfile and redeploying, not just systemctl --user stop anubis.
82 lines
3.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
82 lines
3.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bats
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# Seam: the Anubis bot-challenge proxy (dankclaw/anubis). Anubis sits between
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# Caddy's public listeners and the guarded vhosts: clients hit Caddy (TLS),
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# Caddy proxies everything through Anubis, Anubis verifies (DENY known AI
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# scrapers, CHALLENGE everyone else per policy.json) and forwards accepted
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# traffic back to Caddy's internal listener at :8016, where per-vhost routing
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# resumes. Static assertions only — the container runs on dankclaw.
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load helpers
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setup() {
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UNIT="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container"
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POLICY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json"
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CADDY="$REPO_ROOT/dankclaw/Caddyfile"
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}
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@test "the anubis quadlet unit exists and is boot-persistent by [Install]" {
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test -f "$UNIT"
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grep -q 'WantedBy=default.target' "$UNIT"
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# Generated units cannot be enabled on this host (v1 quadlet generator);
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# boot persistence comes from [Install], not from systemctl enable.
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! grep -q '^Enable=true' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "the image is pinned to an exact upstream tag and never pulled at boot" {
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grep -qE '^Image=ghcr\.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' "$UNIT"
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grep -q '^Pull=never$' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "anubis publishes no host port — it is internal-network-only" {
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# Metrics (:9090) are unauthenticated; the protection strategy is that
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# only dankclaw_default members can reach the container at all. Caddy
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# reaches it by container DNS name, so no published port may exist.
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! grep -q '^PublishPort=' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "the unit points TARGET back at caddy's internal listener" {
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grep -q '^Environment=TARGET=http://caddy:8016$' "$UNIT"
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grep -q '^Environment=POLICY_FNAME=/policy/policy.json$' "$UNIT"
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# The policy file is mounted read-only from the repo checkout on the host.
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grep -q 'policy.json:/policy/policy.json:ro' "$UNIT"
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}
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@test "the policy parses as JSON and matches v1.13.0 schema (bots array, action rules)" {
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# At the pinned tag the parser is JSON-only with a minimal schema:
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# {"bots":[{"name","user_agent_regex"|"path_regex","action"}],"dnsbl":bool}
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# — imports/CEL/expression keys do not exist at this tag and would crash
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# the container at parse time. Assert the shape statically via python.
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python3 - "$POLICY" <<'PY'
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import json, sys
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with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
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p = json.load(f)
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assert set(p.keys()) <= {"bots", "dnsbl"}, p.keys()
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actions = [b["action"] for b in p["bots"]]
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assert any(a == "DENY" for a in actions), actions
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assert actions[-1] == "CHALLENGE", actions
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for b in p["bots"]:
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keys = set(b) ^ {"name", "action"}
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assert len(keys) == 1, f"{b.get('name')}: exactly one matcher required, got {keys}"
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assert (keys ^ {"user_agent_regex"}) != (keys ^ {"path_regex"}), b
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PY
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}
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@test "guarded vhosts proxy through anubis with the real client IP forwarded" {
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# Anubis reads X-Real-Ip for its decisions; without the header every
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# request looks like it comes from the Caddy container. Every guarded
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# public listener must set it.
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grep -q 'header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}' "$CADDY"
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}
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@test "exempt vhosts never route through anubis (auth, plex, own-auth apps)" {
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# The IdP login flow and git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve challenges;
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# these vhosts bypass the chain by construction.
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local block
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block=$(awk '/^auth\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
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echo "$block" | grep -q 'reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000'
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! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
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block=$(awk '/^plex\.franksdank\.cloud/,/^}/' "$CADDY")
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echo "$block" | grep -q '192\.168\.0\.235:32400'
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! echo "$block" | grep -q anubis
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}
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