Landing blocker for #61 and #63: the deployment checkout is 12 commits behind and
`merge --ff-only` refuses while tracked paths are dirty. Discard is not available here
(workspace policy: no `checkout`/`stash` on shared state), so the dirt is committed.
- `agent/APPEND_SYSTEM.md`: the point-of-use / one-work-log / PR-link doctrine, already
byte-identical to `origin/main` (`cmp` against the trunk blob: no difference). No new
prose — the commit exists so the trunk merge can proceed.
- `agent/config.yml` and `agent/managed-skills/**`: the machine-live tier the heartbeat
owns (AGENTS.md § Live-sync tiers).
`ALLOW_SECRETS=1` was used, deliberately and after auditing the staged diff by hand: the
only credential-shaped strings in it are two copies of `AKIA0000000000000EXAMPLE` — the
inert all-zero AWS example id — and they appear inside the two skill pages that teach
that exact placeholder shape. This checkout is still running the pre-#61 hook; the merged
gate (value-scoped placeholder filter, `71601f7`) exempts this value, so the refusal
dies with this landing. No `--no-verify` was used: the gate ran and its verdict is
recorded here.
Refs #61
The auto-learned memory tier for serverAppConfigs carried, in plaintext, the
Caddy basicauth bcrypt hash for dankuser, the password behind it, and the
Pi-hole internal password. The file is tracked, so all three are in git
history on every machine that has pulled this repo, and in every agent
context window that has read the bucket.
Operational knowledge preserved in full (which auth layer fails, how to
reset, that the CLI hash is what CivetWeb validates, hot-reload through the
file watcher); only the credential values removed.
Both credentials still need rotation: redaction does not un-leak history.
That is an operator action on Dankclaw, not something this commit can do.
Refs #40
Frank