Frank
b83b706f23
On this host's podman 5.7 quadlet path, a registry-prefixed Image ref
fails to resolve from local storage at container create time even when
the image is present ('image not known'); the identical argv works from
a shell or transient unit. Verified live: an identical unit with
Image=localhost/techarohq/anubis:v1.13.0 starts immediately. The deploy
handler now tags the alias after the guarded pull; upgrades re-tag
after pulling the new tag.
56 lines
2.6 KiB
INI
56 lines
2.6 KiB
INI
# Quadlet unit: Anubis bot-challenge proxy (rootless, boot-persistent).
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#
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# Install path on dankclaw: ~/.config/containers/systemd/anubis.container
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# Unit name: anubis.service (container name: anubis)
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#
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# Two-tier chain: the public Caddy listeners for the guarded vhosts proxy
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# everything to this container (port 8923, internal only — no published port,
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# so metrics on :9090 stay reachable only inside dankclaw_default); Anubis
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# verifies the client (challenge/DENY per policy) and forwards accepted
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# traffic back to Caddy's internal listener (TARGET below), where the normal
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# per-vhost routing — including Authentik forward_auth — resumes. Host headers
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# survive both hops, so vhost matching on the internal listener still works.
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#
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# Image pin: the image is pulled from ghcr.io/techarohq/anubis (source of
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# truth), but the unit runs it under a localhost/-aliased tag: on this host's
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# podman 5.7 quadlet path, registry-prefixed refs fail to resolve from local
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# storage at container create time ("image not known") even when present; the
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# localhost alias resolves (verified live 2026-08-28). v1.13.0 was
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# source-verified before pinning (policy parser is JSON-only at this tag,
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# flags are the config surface via flagenv: TARGET sets --target,
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# POLICY_FNAME sets --policy-fname). Upgrading = pull new tag, re-tag the
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# localhost alias, restart the unit; re-verify the policy schema first.
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# (the active Image= key lives in the [Container] section below)
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#
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# No secrets here: Anubis holds no credentials (memory store; challenge
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# cookies are client-side JWTs). A restart invalidates issued challenges —
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# users just re-challenge once. See serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Anubis.md.
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[Unit]
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Description=Anubis bot-challenge proxy container
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After=network-online.target
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Wants=network-online.target
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[Container]
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ContainerName=anubis
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Image=localhost/techarohq/anubis:v1.13.0
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Pull=never
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Network=dankclaw_default
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# flagenv maps env names to flag names (TARGET -> --target, POLICY_FNAME ->
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# --policy-fname). TARGET points back at Caddy's internal listener; the
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# container DNS name resolves on dankclaw_default.
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Environment=TARGET=http://caddy:8016
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Environment=POLICY_FNAME=/policy/policy.json
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Volume=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json:/policy/policy.json:ro
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# No HealthCmd: the image ships an exec-form HEALTHCHECK
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# (["/app/bin/anubis","--healthcheck"]) and quadlet inherits it when no
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# HealthCmd is set — this dodges the v1 generator's space-splitting quirk
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# that mangled quoted probes for the authentik units.
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[Service]
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Restart=always
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RestartSec=5
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[Install]
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WantedBy=default.target
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