Files
serverAppConfigs/docs/Infrastructure/Caddy.md
T
Frank aa473aeddb fix: proxy Plex through a TLS upstream (PMS drops plain HTTP off-loopback)
PMS 1.43.x on :32400 accepts, reads, and silently closes every non-TLS
connection from a non-loopback source (loopback exempt). The plain-HTTP
reverse_proxy therefore got EOF and Caddy answered an empty-body 502.
Both Plex vhosts now dial the upstream over TLS with
insecure_skip_verify (PMS self-signed cert, pinned LAN hop only;
client-facing Let's Encrypt TLS unchanged).
2026-08-26 01:27:33 -07:00

5.6 KiB

Caddy

Caddy is the single reverse proxy for both hosts. It runs as a container on Dankclaw (192.168.0.143), terminates TLS with real Let's Encrypt certificates, routes hostnames to containers on both hosts, and protects the homepage and sensitive services with HTTP basic auth.

Docs: https://caddyserver.com/docs

Facts (live inventory)

Item Value
Image franksdank/caddy-porkbun:latest (local build, dankclaw/caddy/Containerfile)
Config /home/dank/Containers/caddy/Caddyfile (bind mount, rendered by deploy)
Data /home/dank/Containers/caddy/data (certs) and .../config (ACME state)
Ports 80, 443 on 192.168.0.143
TLS Let's Encrypt, DNS-01 via the Porkbun module (one cert per vhost)
Runs on Dankclaw only — Dankserver has no Caddy

The Caddyfile in git (dankclaw/Caddyfile) carries a REPLACE_WITH_HASH placeholder. scripts/deploy.sh renders the real basicauth hash from the host .env (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH) into the mounted path before up. See Deployment Flow.

The porkbun image

Stock Caddy cannot solve the ACME challenge because the router exposes no inbound port 80/443. The local image adds the github.com/caddy-dns/porkbun module, which answers the DNS-01 challenge by creating and deleting a _acme-challenge TXT record through the Porkbun API. No inbound port is needed. Rebuild only when Caddy or the module needs an update:

podman build -t franksdank/caddy-porkbun:latest -f dankclaw/caddy/Containerfile .

The Caddyfile references the credentials through the environment:

acme_dns porkbun {
    api_key {env.PORKBUN_API_KEY}
    api_secret_key {env.PORKBUN_API_SECRET_KEY}
}

compose passes both variables from the host .env. Keep the real keys in .env only; .env.example holds placeholders. The Porkbun account holds only franksdank.cloud.

Vhost map

Every vhost uses the flat franksdank.cloud convention. The full list lives in dankclaw/Caddyfile. Routing by host:

Upstream Reach
Dankclaw services (compose network) by container name, e.g. comfyui:8188
Dankclaw quadlet services by published LAN port, e.g. 192.168.0.143:3000 (Gitea)
Dankserver services by published LAN port, e.g. 192.168.0.235:8085 (RomM)

The bare-IP catch-all :80 302-redirects to https://dankclaw.franksdank.cloud/. The legacy name dankserver.franksdank.cloud 302-redirects there too. plex.franksdank.casa is the only plain-HTTP vhost; it cannot get a DNS-01 cert because franksdank.casa is not in the Porkbun account. The canonical Plex name is plex.franksdank.cloud. Both Plex vhosts dial PMS over TLS upstream (transport http { tls { insecure_skip_verify } }): PMS 1.43.x silently closes plain-HTTP connections from non-loopback sources (diagnosed 2026-08-26 — it accepts, reads the request, and FINs without responding), which surfaced here as an empty-body 502 (blank page in browsers). insecure_skip_verify applies only to this pinned-LAN hop (PMS serves a self-signed cert); client-facing Let's Encrypt TLS is unchanged. The Plex web UI is at /web/; / returns the XML MediaContainer index.

Basic auth

The Caddyfile in git carries a bare placeholder; deploy.sh substitutes the full hash from the host .env (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH):

chat.franksdank.cloud {
    basicauth {
        dank REPLACE_WITH_HASH
    }
    reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:3005
}

After rendering, the line reads dank $2a$14$xxxx… (one complete hash). Do not put a $2a$14$ prefix in the template: it would render a double-prefixed, invalid hash (2026-08-22 incident — every basicauth vhost returned 401 for every password). tests/deployment_flow.bats pins the render contract.

The homepage (and SearXNG, Hermes, Prometheus, RomM, Copyparty) use forward_auth (Authentik SSO) rather than basicauth; see Homepage and Authentik. The basicauth hash above is still rendered for the vhosts that keep it (Grafana, Pi-hole).

Operations

Validate before a reload:

caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile

The admin endpoint stays on (loopback-only, unpublished port), so a Caddyfile change hot-reloads within seconds via the file watcher. deploy.sh also issues an explicit reload after rendering. Manual reload from the host:

podman exec caddy caddy reload --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile

Certificates and ACME state live in the caddy data volume. Back it up with the stack. Each vhost owns one certificate; renewals are automatic and also use DNS-01.

Gotchas

  • admin off disables the config file watcher: rendered changes then sit on disk while Caddy serves its stale in-memory config until the container is recreated, and nothing logs an error (2026-08-22: a broken basicauth hash survived several deploys this way). tests/caddyfile.bats forbids admin off.
  • The basicauth template must stay a bare REPLACE_WITH_HASH token (no $2a$14$ prefix) — the rendered value is the complete hash. A double prefix silently rejects every password with 401; no Caddy error is logged.
  • A new vhost needs three things: a Pi-hole addn-hosts line, a Porkbun A record, and the Caddyfile block. See LAN-DNS.
  • The G36 has no NAT loopback, so LAN clients must resolve the name to the LAN IP. That is the Pi-hole role in LAN-DNS.
  • Caddy serves HTTPS on 443 and HTTP on 80 (redirects). The router needs no 80/443 port forward for LAN use.

See Also