Frank
0ae3650414
Bots and AI scrapers hit the SSO-fronted vhosts and eat Authentik auth work for 403s. Anubis verifies clients first: DENY for known AI scraper UAs, JS challenge for everyone else; verified traffic resumes the normal Authentik forward_auth chain on Caddy's internal listener (:8016). Chain: client -> Caddy (TLS) -> Anubis :8923 (verify) -> Caddy :8016 (auth + routing resumes; Host survives both hops) -> app. Reverse-proxy through Anubis, not forward_auth: at the pinned tag a CHALLENGE answers HTTP 200 + HTML, and forward_auth treats 200 as "authenticated" — the page would pass through unchallenged. Exempt by construction (never routed through Anubis): plex (plain HTTP legacy), auth.* (IdP login must be reachable ungated), gitea (git smart-HTTP clients cannot solve JS challenges), and every app with its own login. Pinned ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 — the tag was source-verified before pinning: at this tag the policy parser is JSON-only with a minimal bots[] schema (no imports, no CEL expressions), flags are the config surface via flagenv (TARGET/POLICY_FNAME map to --target/ --policy-fname), and the image's exec-form HEALTHCHECK is inherited by the quadlet unit (dodges the v1 generator's HealthCmd space-split quirk). Rollback nuance: stopping anubis 502s everything behind the chain (the public listeners proxy through it); a true rollback is reverting the Caddyfile and redeploying, not just systemctl --user stop anubis.
51 lines
2.2 KiB
INI
51 lines
2.2 KiB
INI
# Quadlet unit: Anubis bot-challenge proxy (rootless, boot-persistent).
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#
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# Install path on dankclaw: ~/.config/containers/systemd/anubis.container
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# Unit name: anubis.service (container name: anubis)
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#
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# Two-tier chain: the public Caddy listeners for the guarded vhosts proxy
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# everything to this container (port 8923, internal only — no published port,
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# so metrics on :9090 stay reachable only inside dankclaw_default); Anubis
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# verifies the client (challenge/DENY per policy) and forwards accepted
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# traffic back to Caddy's internal listener (TARGET below), where the normal
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# per-vhost routing — including Authentik forward_auth — resumes. Host headers
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# survive both hops, so vhost matching on the internal listener still works.
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#
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# Version pin: ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0 was source-verified before
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# pinning (policy parser is JSON-only at this tag, flags are the config
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# surface via flagenv: an env var named TARGET sets --target, POLICY_FNAME
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# sets --policy-fname). Upgrading = stop unit, change Image=, deploy; policy
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# schema must be re-verified against the new tag first.
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#
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# No secrets here: Anubis holds no credentials (memory store; challenge
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# cookies are client-side JWTs). A restart invalidates issued challenges —
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# users just re-challenge once. See serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Anubis.md.
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[Unit]
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Description=Anubis bot-challenge proxy container
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After=network-online.target
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Wants=network-online.target
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[Container]
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ContainerName=anubis
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Image=ghcr.io/TecharoHQ/anubis:v1.13.0
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Pull=never
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Network=dankclaw_default
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# flagenv maps env names to flag names (TARGET -> --target, POLICY_FNAME ->
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# --policy-fname). TARGET points back at Caddy's internal listener; the
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# container DNS name resolves on dankclaw_default.
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Environment=TARGET=http://caddy:8016
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Environment=POLICY_FNAME=/policy/policy.json
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Volume=/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json:/policy/policy.json:ro
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# No HealthCmd: the image ships an exec-form HEALTHCHECK
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# (["/app/bin/anubis","--healthcheck"]) and quadlet inherits it when no
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# HealthCmd is set — this dodges the v1 generator's space-splitting quirk
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# that mangled quoted probes for the authentik units.
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[Service]
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Restart=always
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RestartSec=5
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[Install]
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WantedBy=default.target
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