Structural repair: - 13 pages were the same document twice (each exactly 2x its HEAD size), a second frontmatter block whose closing fence had been glued onto a body line by a frontmatter rewrite that re-read its own output. Un-doubled by cutting at the second frontmatter and keeping the copy whose body is a superset; the orphan census reports 0 lost tokens against HEAD. - log.md: one entry per date, bare `## YYYY-MM-DD` headings, newest first — 66 dated headings merged into 34, titles demoted to bold leads, every content line verified present. The file had been descending at the head and ascending at the tail. Ownership moves: - New `LLM/frank-medium.md` is the locator for the retired Dankserver endpoint: era windows quoted from each era page's own banner, no numbers restated, and the two unresolved date conflicts recorded instead of silently resolved. `frank-archon.md` links to it instead of restating the pre-rename window. - The four Pipeline-Parallelism stubs (frontmatter only, no body) are gone; `Multi-Node Runtimes.md` owns runtime construction, launch, mixed-vendor verdicts and cross-split spec decode, and the four links that pointed at the stubs were repointed at it or at the drafter page. - Authentik's three stub pages fold into `Authentik.md`, with the process detail and the outpost reference split out so the parent stays under the length hint. Verified corrections (host census + live probe, 2026-10-19): - The MXFP4 checkpoint two pages called the "on-disk rollback" is gone: /home/dank/models/ holds StillDeadcode, rad and tpl.jinja. Stated once, on the era page that owns that payload; the swap page now links to it. - frank-medium-radiance-mxfp4: the 4.24/7 accept rate belongs to the DFlash2 arm measured on the FP8 target, not to the MXFP4 era; the 3-family soak run census is kept once (155 requests) instead of twice (~120 and 155). - Fleet shapes re-confirmed against the live endpoints before touching any page: 3x200000 fp8 KV, 2x200704, 2x262144. Index rows are regenerated, not hand-carved. Net -1,849 vault lines.
9.2 KiB
type, title, description, tags, timestamp
| type | title | description | tags | timestamp | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| reference | qBittorrent | The download client for the *arr stack: pinned image, shared WireGuard netns, WebUI credential recipe. |
|
2026-09-03T00:00:00Z |
qBittorrent
qBittorrent is the torrent download client for the *arr stack. The stack runs on FrankBook-Pro (the Mac mini) as quadlet units inside its podman machine — not on Dankserver. It receives download requests from Sonarr, Radarr, Lidarr, and Readarr via category tagging.
Host: FrankBook-Pro (podman machine) — Access: WebUI on port 8080,
published by the Gluetun unit because qBittorrent shares that container's
network namespace (a netns-sharer publishes no ports of its own).
Facts
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Image | lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:4.6.7 — pinned, see the pin rationale below |
| Network | Network=gluetun.container (torrent egress exits via the WireGuard/ProtonVPN tunnel) |
| Ports | 8080 (WebUI) and 6881 TCP+UDP published on the gluetun unit |
| Env | PUID=0, PGID=0, TZ=America/Los_Angeles, UMASK_SET=022 |
| Volumes | /Volumes/COMPLETE/qbittorrent-data:/config, plus /Volumes/COMPLETE and /Volumes/INCOMPLETE mounted at identical paths |
| Auth | Web UI username/password (admin + generated password); LAN bypass not used |
Why the 4.6.7 pin exists (2026-09-01)
Readarr's abandoned qBittorrent client rejects qB ≥ 5's 204 empty-body login
success as Authentication failure — a runtime break, not just an API-create
issue. The fleet pins lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:4.6.7 while Readarr is
in the stack. Never unpin to latest while Readarr is in the fleet.
Second trap on any version flip: qB 5.x's shutdown conf rewrite leaves a
WebUI\Password_PBKDF2=@ByteArray(...) line that 4.6.7 rejects — every login
then returns "invalid credentials" (the arrs included). Fix = rewrite the same
conf line with the same password while qB is stopped.
Persistent WebUI credentials (verified 2026-08-30)
qBittorrent 5 mints a new temporary password at every start unless a
password is stored in qBittorrent.conf. That rotation silently breaks every
arr download client after each reboot. The Web-API has no password endpoint
any more (/api/v2/app/setPassword was removed), and the linuxserver image
has no WEBUI_AUTH handling — so persistence must be written to the conf
directly, in qb's own salt:hash format (src/base/utils/password.cpp:
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 100 000 iterations, 16-byte salt = 4×uint32, then
base64(salt) + ":" + base64(hash) as the raw value):
import base64, hashlib, os
salt = os.urandom(16)
h = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha512", password.encode(), salt, 100000, 64)
val = (base64.b64encode(salt) + b":" + base64.b64encode(h)).decode()
# with the container STOPPED, in [Preferences]:
# WebUI\Username=admin
# WebUI\Password_PBKDF2=<val>
Then podman start qbittorrent and confirm login survives a
podman restart — the temp-password rotation stops the moment stored
credentials verify. The chosen value lives host-local in /home/dank/.qbpass
(mode 600, owner dank) — never in git; every arr download client and
Prowlarr reference it. (The classic @ByteArray(salt+hash) form is WRONG
for qb5: login 401s on it; verify() base64-decodes the two halves separately.)
Deployment (current)
Quadlet unit qbittorrent.container from this repo
(frankbook-pro/qbittorrent/quadlet/), installed inside the podman machine at
/home/core/.config/containers/systemd/qbittorrent.service by the
frankbook-pro handler in scripts/deploy-remote.sh:
[Container]
ContainerName=qbittorrent
Image=lscr.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent:4.6.7
Network=gluetun.container
Environment=PUID=0
Environment=PGID=0
Environment=TZ=America/Los_Angeles
Environment=UMASK_SET=022
Volume=/Volumes/COMPLETE/qbittorrent-data:/config
Volume=/Volumes/COMPLETE:/Volumes/COMPLETE
Volume=/Volumes/INCOMPLETE:/Volumes/INCOMPLETE
[Service]
TimeoutStartSec=900
Restart=always
Gotchas (verified live)
- Temporary-password rotation on every boot is the default state of an untouched qb5 — see the persistence recipe above; without it, all arr download clients silently fail queue adds ("Couldn't add release … to download queue" in the arr logs) after any restart.
- API login from
curlneeds aReferer: http://<host>:<port>/header (CSRF protection) or POSTs get rejected even with a valid SID. - Cookie-name quirk by version: qB 5.x names its WebUI session cookie
QBT_SID_<port>; 4.6.7 uses plainSID. Any automation must parse the cookie generically (e.g.grep -oE '[A-Za-z_]*SID[A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^;[:space:]]*') instead of hard-coding a port-suffixed name, or it fails with 403 cascades that never reach qB as failed logins. - Egress verification for this stack must run inside the gluetun container
(
podman exec gluetun wget -qO- https://ipinfo.io/json); running the same probe one ssh-context out returns the residential IP — a false leak alarm. - Ensure umask is set to
022so downloaded files are readable by arr apps.
E2E verification after any pipeline change
Run after ANY change to the torrent pipeline — WireGuard credential rotation,
qB version change, gluetun reconfig, category re-seeding. Proves the full
grab path (tunnel egress → qB download → category save path → clean
removal). All commands from a dev box via ssh frankbook-pro; inside the
Mac shell export PATH="/usr/local/bin:/opt/homebrew/bin:$PATH" for
podman machine ssh.
Access note (2026-09-21): the Mac's login user is dank@192.168.0.112
(NOT core — core is the podman-machine VM user, reached only via
podman machine ssh). blankpad has key auth for dank@ (bootstrapped
2026-09-21) and a frankbook-pro alias in ~/.ssh/config. macOS sshd has a
low MaxAuthTries: when password-bootstrapping use -o PreferredAuthentications=password -o PubkeyAuthentication=no -o IdentitiesOnly=yes or the key offers exhaust the attempts before the
password is tried.
1. Egress gate — MUST run inside gluetun:
podman machine ssh 'podman exec gluetun wget -qO- https://ipinfo.io/json'
Require org = AS9009 (M247 — ProtonVPN Panama PA-12 config); judge by org,
never country alone. NEVER run this one ssh-context out (bare wget on the
Mac host): it silently returns the residential Comcast IP and reads as a
hard-gate leak that does not exist. A residential reading ⇒ re-run inside
the container before diagnosing.
2. Login — generic cookie parse. The QPW fetch is flaky (~1 in N returns empty); assert length before use — an empty-password run once produced a Forbidden loop that cost hours:
QPW=$(podman machine ssh 'cat /home/core/Containers/qbittorrent/env' | grep QBIT_WEBUI_PASSWORD | cut -d= -f2)
[ ${#QPW} -eq 20 ] || exit 1
SID=$(curl -si --data-urlencode "username=admin" --data-urlencode "password=$QPW" \
http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/v2/auth/login \
| grep -oE '[A-Za-z_]*SID[A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^;[:space:]]*' | head -1)
curl -b "$SID" … # pass the WHOLE match
WebUI from the LAN: http://192.168.0.112:8080 (published on the gluetun
unit). Username admin; password = the machine-local QBIT_WEBUI_PASSWORD
(20 chars, generated once at provisioning by the deploy handler — never in
the repo). Parse-bug 403s never reach qB as failed logins — no ban accrues;
server-side truth is /Volumes/COMPLETE/qbittorrent-data/qBittorrent/config/qBittorrent/logs/qbittorrent.log
(WebAPI login success/failure + source IP). Repeated REAL failures accrue
toward qB's 5-failures/3600 s IP ban.
3. Add a legal test torrent. Blender open-movie torrents (~300 MB, e.g.
Big Buck Bunny) via POST /torrents/add with the raw .torrent file
(-F "file=@…") and category=Finished Torrents. Never leave a real-looking
grab behind.
4. Poll and verify. Poll GET /torrents/info (~20 s): state
downloading → moving (INCOMPLETE→COMPLETE move) → stalledUP/uploading
at progress=1. save_path must be /Volumes/COMPLETE/Finished Torrents
(qB 4.x auto-creates unknown categories at DefaultSavePath; 5.x did NOT
inherit category paths — one more reason for the 4.6.7 pin). Confirm on
disk: ls "/Volumes/COMPLETE/Finished Torrents/". Throughput ~17 MB/s is
normal for the tunnel.
5. Cleanup — delete only your artifact:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -b "$SID" \
--data-urlencode "hashes=<literal-hash>" \
--data-urlencode "deleteFiles=true" \
http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/v2/torrents/delete # expect 200
Target the known hash literally — the user's real grabs share the directory
and MUST be untouched. Verify: hash absent from /torrents/info, your dir
gone, all other entries intact.
Version-coupling constraints: qB is pinned to 4.6.7 (Readarr's EOL
client rejects qB ≥ 5's 204 login at runtime — see the pin rationale
above). Do not unpin while Readarr exists. After ANY qB version flip,
regenerate the WebUI\Password_PBKDF2 line fresh (same password, 100k
iterations) — a 5.x-written hash line makes 4.6.7 reject every login.
Rewrite while qB is stopped.