serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/Caddyfile

# Homelab Caddyfile — the single Caddy for both hosts.
#
# Caddy runs as a container on dankclaw (192.168.0.143, this repo's
# compose.yaml service 'caddy') and fronts every service on both hosts:
#   - dankclaw services: by container name (compose network) or by the
#     published LAN port (quadlet services on isolated networks)
#   - dankserver services (192.168.0.235): by published LAN port
#
# Naming: flat franksdank.cloud scheme (see serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/LAN-DNS.md).
# DNS for these names is served by the Pi-hole quadlet on this host
# (dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts — every name resolves to 192.168.0.143)
# and handed to LAN clients by the SURFboard G36 router.
#
# Authentication chain (2026-08-29): the guarded vhosts (homepage, SearXNG,
# Prometheus, RomM, Copyparty) proxy EVERYTHING through the Anubis
# bot-challenge proxy first, then the whole request is proxied THROUGH
# Authentik (2026.8 proxy-provider mode: this build serves no forward_auth
# endpoint; the authentication flow runs inline — unauthenticated clients get
# the login UI served in place, and once a session exists Authentik proxies
# the request on to the app via the provider's internal_host). Chain: client →
# Caddy (TLS, public listener) → Anubis :8923 (verify: DENY known AI scrapers,
# CHALLENGE everyone else) → Caddy's internal listener http://:8016 (auth
# decision; Host headers survive every hop) → authenticated traffic is
# forwarded back to http://:8017 and routed straight to the app.
# Apps with their own auth (Gitea, OpenWebUI, Jellyfin, *arr, Pi-hole) and the
# Authentik IdP itself (auth.franksdank.cloud — its login flow must never sit
# behind a challenge) are exempt by construction: their vhosts never route
# through Anubis. ComfyUI left this exempt set on 2026-08-31 and Grafana left
# it on 2026-09-01 (OAuth2 relying-party mode against authentik): both now sit
# behind the guard chain; Grafana authenticates users itself via the OAuth2
# code flow, so no identity header is forwarded to it.
# The pihole vhost keeps its basicauth edge; the hash placeholder below is
# rendered by deploy.sh from CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH (host .env, git-ignored) into
# /home/dank/Containers/caddy/Caddyfile, which the container mounts.
#
# TLS: real Let's Encrypt certs. Site addresses carry no http:// prefix,
# so Caddy serves HTTPS (and auto-redirects HTTP). Certs are issued via
# dns-01 through the Porkbun module built into the franksdank/caddy-porkbun
# image (caddy/Containerfile). That needs no inbound ports and works from the
# LAN, where Pi-hole resolves these names to 192.168.0.143.
{
	# Admin stays ON: it binds to 127.0.0.1:2019 inside the container and the
	# port is not published, so nothing outside the container can reach it.
	# It powers the config file watcher, so a rendered-config change
	# hot-reloads without a container restart. 'admin off' once left a broken
	# basicauth hash sitting on disk unapplied for hours (2026-08-22).
	email admin@franksdank.cloud

	# Solve ACME challenges for every site via Porkbun DNS (no port 80/443
	# reachability needed). Credentials come from the container environment
	# (compose.yaml, from the host .env — never committed).
	acme_dns porkbun {
		api_key {env.PORKBUN_API_KEY}
		api_secret_key {env.PORKBUN_API_SECRET_KEY}
	}
}

# --- Bare-IP access (health checks, convenience) ---
:80 {
	redir https://www.franksdank.cloud/ 308
}

# --- Homepage (Anubis → Authentik SSO) ---
# www holds the homepage; the naked domain redirects onto it at the TLS edge.
# A redirect needs no challenge, so unauthenticated naked traffic never enters
# the auth chain. The proxy provider's external_host must match the host that
# actually carries traffic (https://www.franksdank.cloud) or Authentik matches
# zero providers and answers its error page instead.
franksdank.cloud {
	redir https://www.franksdank.cloud/ 308
}

www.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Legacy name: the old homepage name redirects straight onto www ---
dankclaw.franksdank.cloud {
	redir https://www.franksdank.cloud/ 308
}

# --- Legacy name: the media host has no Caddy of its own anymore ---
dankserver.franksdank.cloud {
	redir https://www.franksdank.cloud/ 308
}

# --- Authentik (SSO / OIDC provider) ---
# Exempt by construction: the IdP login flow must be reachable without a
# challenge, so this vhost never routes through Anubis.
auth.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000
}

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Services on this host (dankclaw, 192.168.0.143)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# --- SearXNG (quadlet; behind the Gluetun tunnel, published 8081) ---
search.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- OpenWebUI (quadlet on slirp4netns; published 3005) ---
ai.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:3005
}

# --- Gitea (quadlet; published 3000) ---
# Exempt by construction: Gitea has its own login, and git smart-HTTP
# clients (git push/fetch over HTTPS) cannot solve JS challenges. The
# policy would need a bypass for /info/refs + /git-*-pack paths if this
# ever moves behind Anubis.
gitea.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:3000
}

# --- Grafana (guarded: Anubis → Authentik outpost gate; login inside Grafana) ---
# Auth model = OAuth2 relying party against authentik (OAuth2Provider "grafana",
# confidential client). The guard chain gates unauthenticated traffic; the
# outpost carries no provider token in this deployment, so identity headers
# never reach Grafana — RP mode needs none and works regardless of topology.
# The basicauth edge this replaces (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH) is retired.
grafana.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Prometheus ---
prometheus.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Loki (guarded: Anubis → Authentik; loki-proxy provider, internal_host caddy:8017) ---
loki.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Seerr (guarded: Anubis → Authentik; seerr provider, internal_host caddy:8017) ---
seerr.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Marreta (guarded: Anubis → Authentik; marreta provider, internal_host caddy:8017) ---
# Content-cleaning proxy. Any authentik-authenticated user may use it (no
# group gate). Egress rides the searxng gluetun tunnel; reached via the
# host-published port 8082 (gluetun netns), not by container name.
marreta.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Open Notebook (guarded: Anubis → Authentik; notebook-proxy provider, internal_host caddy:8017) ---
# The podcast generator. ONE upstream carries the whole app: the image's own
# Next.js layer rewrites /api/* to the FastAPI beside it (INTERNAL_API_URL,
# default http://localhost:5055 inside the container), so a browser on this
# vhost never needs the API port. That is why scripts/open-notebook.env sets
# API_URL to exactly this origin — left unset, the app auto-detects
# `<host-you-opened>:5055`, and 5055 on this host belongs to seerr — and why
# the published API port sits on loopback. App-level login
# (OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD) stays on behind the chain: two owners, edge identity
# and the app's own session.
# Dialled by published LAN port, not container name: open-notebook is a
# rootless quadlet and this Caddy lives in root's storage, so root's DNS does
# not see the container (the same reason marreta and SearXNG are dialled by IP).
notebook.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Pi-hole (quadlet on slirp4netns; published 8083) ---
pihole.franksdank.cloud {
	basicauth {
		dankuser REPLACE_WITH_HASH
	}
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8083
}

# --- Hermes WebUI (Hermex webui; host-netns container, published 8787) ------
# Exempt by construction: the webui authenticates itself (HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD),
# so no Anubis challenge and no Authentik proxy provider is required — nothing
# here enters the http://:8016 auth chain. Internal-only by DNS absence: there is
# no public Porkbun A record for this name, so only LAN clients (Pi-hole
# addn-hosts → 192.168.0.143) can resolve it at all; DNS-01 issuance via the
# Porkbun module needs no public record. Upstream is `host.containers.internal`
# — netavark's host address, 169.254.1.2 — NOT the host LAN IP: hermes-webui is
# `Network=host`, so 8787 is a host-netns bind and not a published port, and
# netavark DNATs only published ports (192.168.0.143:9119, the dashboard below,
# answers from this bridge; 192.168.0.143:8787 does not). Measured live
# 2026-09-16 inside the Caddy container: 192.168.0.143:8787 and 10.89.1.1:8787
# both REFUSED, host.containers.internal:8787 → 200.
hermes.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy host.containers.internal:8787
}

# --- Hermes dashboard (admin UI; published 9119 on dankclaw_default) --------
# Exempt by construction: the app enforces its own complete auth — verified live
# from Caddy's own network, an unauthenticated GET / returns 302 → /login?next=%2F
# (uvicorn), and basic_auth.username + a scrypt password_hash are set in the
# dashboard's /data/config.yaml. No outpost provider needed.
hermesadmin.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:9119
}

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Services on dankserver (192.168.0.235) — published LAN ports
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# --- Plex (existing, kept) ---
# http:// on purpose: franksdank.casa is not hosted in the same Porkbun
# account as franksdank.cloud, so the DNS-01 provider cannot issue a
# Let's Encrypt cert for it. It stays plain-HTTP legacy; the canonical
# name is plex.franksdank.cloud (HTTPS, below).
http://plex.franksdank.casa {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:32400 {
		transport http {
			tls_insecure_skip_verify
		}
	}
}

# PMS requires TLS from every non-loopback client: plain-HTTP off-loopback
# is read and silently closed (diagnosed 2026-08-26), which surfaced as an
# empty-body 502 here. Dial the upstream over TLS; PMS's self-signed cert is
# skipped on this pinned-LAN hop only (client-facing LE TLS is untouched).
# The web UI lives at /web/; / returns the XML MediaContainer index.
plex.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:32400 {
		transport http {
			tls_insecure_skip_verify
		}
	}
}

# --- Calibre-Web ---
books.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8083
}

# --- RomM ---
romm.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Copyparty ---
files.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
	}
}

# --- Jellyfin ---
jelly.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8096
}


# --- *arr Stack (exempt by construction: own auth) ---

prowlarr.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:9696
}

radarr.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:7878
}

# --- Sonarr: internal-only by construction (retired 2026-09-04) -----------
# No vhost and no public DNS record for sonarr.franksdank.cloud: the TV-library
# admin UI is reachable only on the LAN at 192.168.0.112:8989 (users request TV
# through Seerr, which sits behind the guard chain; admins reach Sonarr's own
# UI directly). A brief unguarded public vhost lived here and served the
# zero-auth UI to the internet via manual DNS — retired.

lidarr.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:8686
}

readarr.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:8787
}

qbittorrent.franksdank.cloud {
	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:8080
}

# --- Internal listener: auth decision layer ---------------------------------
# Anubis dials http://caddy:8016 after verifying a client (TARGET in
# dankclaw/anubis/quadlet/anubis.container). Host headers survive the hop.
# Every request here is proxied whole-request to Authentik with Host
# preserved. This build's embedded outpost routes ONLY on the ORIGINAL Host
# against each proxy provider's external_host — meta headers are ignored and
# cross-host absolute next= redirects are rejected by the flow's open-redirect
# guard ("Request has been denied: Invalid next URL"), verified live.
# Unauthenticated clients get the login flow served in place; authenticated
# sessions are forwarded by the provider's internal_host back to
# http://:8017 and routed straight to the app. Every host that may enter this
# listener MUST have a proxy provider registered with the embedded outpost —
# the Anubis guard set, the Caddy TLS edge, and the provider list stay in
# lockstep. Exempt vhosts never enter this block.
http://:8016 {
	reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000 {
		header_up X-Forwarded-Proto https
	}
}

# --- Post-auth listener: where Authentik forwards authenticated traffic ----
# The proxy provider's internal_host is http://caddy:8017, so every request
# that passes authentication lands here (Host header preserved) and routes
# straight to its app. This is the end of the chain — nothing dials back
# into Authentik from here, so the chain cannot loop.
http://:8017 {
	@home host www.franksdank.cloud
	handle @home {
		root * /srv/homepage
		# Deploys overwrite /srv/homepage in place; without revalidation a
		# browser keeps serving the pre-deploy CSS/JS/HTML. no-cache forces an
		# ETag round-trip on every load (a cheap 304 when unchanged).
		header Cache-Control "no-cache"
		# RBAC (2026-09-01): /admin requires membership in the homepage-admins
		# authentik group. In proxy-provider mode the outpost injects
		# X-Authentik-Groups on its upstream request to this listener and strips
		# any client-supplied X-Authentik-* headers first, so browsers cannot
		# spoof it. Regex is a substring match, insensitive to the group-list
		# separator.
		handle /admin* {
			@adminok header_regexp X-Authentik-Groups homepage-admins
			handle @adminok {
				try_files /admin.html
				file_server
			}
			respond "Forbidden: homepage admins only" 403
		}
		# User docs page (static). Anchors (#models etc.) are client-side,
		# so both /docs and /docs/ map onto the single docs.html.
		handle /docs {
			try_files /docs.html
			file_server
		}
		handle /docs/ {
			try_files /docs.html
			file_server
		}
		# /whoami echoes the outpost-injected identity headers so the page
		# can gate the admin button client-side (the /admin* 403 above stays
		# the real gate; this only decides what is shown). The outpost strips
		# client-supplied X-Authentik-* before injecting, so this is spoof-proof.
		handle /whoami {
			templates
			header Content-Type application/json
			respond "{\"user\":\"{header.X-Authentik-Username}\",\"groups\":\"{header.X-Authentik-Groups}\"}"
		}
		@data path /services.json /status.json /app.js /style.css /deployed.js /img/* /sfx/*
		handle @data {
			file_server
		}
		handle {
			try_files /index.html
			file_server
		}
	}

	@search host search.franksdank.cloud
	handle @search {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8081
	}

	@loki host loki.franksdank.cloud
	handle @loki {
		reverse_proxy loki:3100
	}

	@seerr host seerr.franksdank.cloud
	handle @seerr {
		reverse_proxy seerr:5055
	}

	@grafana host grafana.franksdank.cloud
	handle @grafana {
		reverse_proxy grafana:3000
	}

	@prometheus host prometheus.franksdank.cloud
	handle @prometheus {
		reverse_proxy prometheus:9090
	}

	@romm host romm.franksdank.cloud
	handle @romm {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8085
	}

	@files host files.franksdank.cloud
	handle @files {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:3923
	}

	@prowlarr host prowlarr.franksdank.cloud
	handle @prowlarr {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:9696
	}

	@radarr host radarr.franksdank.cloud
	handle @radarr {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:7878
	}

	@lidarr host lidarr.franksdank.cloud
	handle @lidarr {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:8686
	}

	@readarr host readarr.franksdank.cloud
	handle @readarr {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:8787
	}

	@qbittorrent host qbittorrent.franksdank.cloud
	handle @qbittorrent {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.112:8080
	}

	@marreta host marreta.franksdank.cloud
	handle @marreta {
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8082
	}

	@notebook host notebook.franksdank.cloud
	handle @notebook {
		# Bare proxy, like ai.franksdank.cloud: the app's SSE answers
		# (/api/search/ask, chat sessions) stream for minutes through this
		# same listener with no flush or timeout tuning, so nothing here
		# needs it — a read/write timeout on the route would be the thing
		# that cuts them.
		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8502
	}
}

# --- Optional: Jackett ---
# jackett.franksdank.cloud {
# 	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:9117
# }

# --- Optional: Whisparr ---
# whisparr.franksdank.cloud {
# 	reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:6969
# }