Files
Frank 33eae71d33 docs: distill the managed skill library into the vault (waves 1-7)
All ~173 managed skills read in full and merged, one polished reference
page per skill-cluster:

- LLM cross-cutting (17 pages): GGUF Compatibility, Llama Cpp Serving
  Sizing, Llama Cpp Multi-Device Splits, PCIe Link and Atomics, RDNA4
  Container Serving, RDNA4 MoE Expert Offload VRAM Budget, vLLM Boot
  Forensics, vLLM Porting and Compile Triage, LLM Bench Windows, LLM
  Performance Diagnosis, Model Swap and Rollback, Tcclaviger Fork Ops,
  Heterogeneous Split Triage, FreeToken Builds + deltas folded into the
  retired runbooks (GLM DFlash2 port laws, Lucebox dual-R9700, R9V
  qualification pipeline, FLM pack registration, ik hybrid envelope,
  frank-medium split rebalance, llama.cpp GGUF preflight, batch-ubatch
  split section, bench-window D-state/stale-read notes, second-endpoint
  bring-up).
- Architecture (3): Stale Signal Audit, Quadlet Lifecycle, Deploy State
  Triage.
- Operations (6 + index): Remote Job Runner, Payload and Disk Reclaim,
  Container Host Reachability, Fleet Ops Playbook, Fleet Audit and
  Posture, SSH and Remote Access.
- Infrastructure: Observability Provisioning + Homepage Status Probes;
  updates to Authentik, Anubis, LAN-DNS (per-client DoH bypass, Porkbun
  zone ops), Swap Configuration, OpenWebUI, Hermes (pre-existing page
  preserved and extended).
- FrankBook-Pro: ARR-Stack filled (API split, schema-first probing,
  auth-posture, auth-config trap); qBittorrent E2E verification.
- Desktop/Agent/Research: Noctalia and Niri, OMP Harness, Agent Docs and
  Edits, Command Center Dotfiles, PICO-8 Asset Standards.
- Indexes: LLM Cross-Cutting References section, Operations/ and Agent/
  index pages, root-index Skill Distillation section, AGENTS.md pointer.
- log.md carries the wave plan.

check-vault-links.py 0 unresolved (185 pages); ./tests/run.sh 366/366.
2026-10-05 21:19:15 -07:00

12 KiB

type, title, description, tags, timestamp
type title description tags timestamp
reference Quadlet Lifecycle The full Quadlet discipline on this fleet — ownership auditing, compose-to-Quadlet cutover, drift/crash-loop diagnosis, the podman 5.x v1 generator quirks, log retrieval, and compose bring-up with ground truth.
podman
quadlet
systemd
boot-persistence
compose
drift
2026-10-05T00:00:00-07:00

Quadlet Lifecycle

Fleet rule (AGENTS.md "Boot Persistence & Self-Healing"): every deployed, working container MUST have a self-healing, boot-persistent Quadlet unit — .container file in the repo (<host>/<svc>/quadlet/), installed by the deployer, [Install] WantedBy=default.target, Restart=always, linger on. A container that runs only from compose dies silently at reboot. This page is the operating manual for that lifecycle.

1. Ownership audit — find the containers that will not survive a reboot

for c in $(podman ps --format '{{.Names}}'); do
  printf '%-26s %s\n' "$c" "$(podman inspect $c --format '{{index .Config.Labels "PODMAN_SYSTEMD_UNIT"}}')"
done
  • label present → the unit owns it; persistence = [Install] + loginctl show-user <user> -p Linger = yes.
  • label absent, compose service exists → the classic gap: dies at reboot. Check the publish address while there — compose forms often bind the wildcard (an unauthenticated UI/API on every interface).
  • label present AND a compose service with the same name → two owners; a stray podman compose up can create a duplicate that fights the unit for the name and the port. Remove the compose service, leave an explanatory comment (repo convention).

2. Cutover: compose service → Quadlet unit

Checklist (precedents to copy: dankclaw/{caddy,gitea,searxng,open-webui,seerr}/quadlet/, dankclaw/observability/quadlet/):

  1. Unit file at <host>/<svc>/quadlet/<name>.container, mirroring compose line for line: Image= (localhost/ prefix for locally built images + Pull=never), ContainerName= (Caddy and scrape configs address containers by name), Network=, User=0:0 when the image's own user cannot write a rootless-owned bind mount, Volume= (:ro preserved), Exec= for compose command:, PublishPort=, health keys, [Service] Restart=always + RestartSec=10, [Install] WantedBy=default.target. Never systemctl --user enable the generated unit — [Install] + linger IS the persistence (is-enabled = generated is healthy; explicit enable fails with "transient or generated").
  2. Exposure: publish on 127.0.0.1 unless something off-host genuinely needs it (Caddy reaches containers by name over the shared network; the wildcard publish is a guard-chain bypass).
  3. Handler in scripts/deploy-remote.sh: install_quadlet <dir> <name> → systemctl --user restart <name>.service → wait_for_health; retire any legacy hand-written unit into ~/.AGENTTRASH/ (a leftover ~/.config/systemd/user/<svc>.service that shells out to podman compose up collides BY NAME with the generated unit); podman rm -f <container> so the unit's container can take the name.
  4. Planner: map <host>/<svc>/** → service in scripts/deploy-plan.py AND add a service_is_allowed entry; keep SERVICE_ORDER dependencies ordered. Add a test-changed case above the generic */quadlet/*.container fallback.
  5. Retire the compose entry in the SAME change — two owners is how a stale duplicate comes back.
  6. Seam test tests/<svc>_quadlet.bats: boot persistence, restart policy, no wildcard publish, container name matches Caddy/scrape references, health command, deployer installs+restarts+waits, never rm, never enable. Migrate any older assertion that read the compose file for devices/flags.
  7. Deploy --service <name>; prove: is-active/is-enabled = active/generated, container healthy, endpoint answers, list-dependencies default.target shows the unit, off-host probes on previously published ports now refuse, and the container no longer carries io.podman.compose.project.

Traps that cost real time:

  • HealthCmd = CMD-SHELL (podman runs /bin/sh -c); a distroless image has no shell → the check fails forever. --health-cmd won't take exec form either. Put HEALTHCHECK … CMD ["binary","arg"] in the image and build with --format docker — the default OCI format has no HEALTHCHECK field and drops it with only a warning.
  • Never point a unit's EnvironmentFile at the repo-root .env — it is a gluetun env carrying HOME=/root; systemd sets HOME for the service and the unit dies with stat /root/.config: permission denied. Use a per-service env under /home/dank/Containers/<svc>/env, seeded by the handler with a single-variable filter, validated so a missing secret fails loudly.
  • Network=host exporters scraped by containerized Prometheus must bind the host's LAN address (containers cannot reach host loopback) PLUS 127.0.0.1 for the homepage probe — two --web.listen-address flags, never the wildcard.
  • alloy 1.x refuses the ui config block; the unit must pass --server.http.listen-addr=0.0.0.0:12345 before its port can be published.
  • GPU services: AddDevice= + GroupAdd=keep-groups (user-unit spawns carry no supplementary groups).
  • When the last service leaves a compose file, the compose-validity seam fails (requires ≥1 service): keep the file as comments and relax the seam deliberately, or delete the file and fix the planner's compose-diff path — decide with the owner, the deploy tooling reads it.

3. Drift / crash-loop diagnosis (5 minutes, in order)

Symptom: crash-looping or perpetually unhealthy container whose DEFINITION looks right; or a service quietly down for days because a restart policy kept something running. Cause: the running container was created from an OLDER definition — a compose/unit edit does not touch an existing container, and the restart policy faithfully resurrects it forever.

  1. Who started it: podman inspect <name> --format 'unit={{index .Config.Labels "PODMAN_SYSTEMD_UNIT"}} restart={{.HostConfig.RestartPolicy.Name}} created={{.Created}}'; compare created with when the definition changed (git log -p --follow <config>). Created-before-the-edit is the signature.
  2. What it is ACTUALLY running: {{.Config.CreateCommand}} is the truth. {{.HostConfig.Devices}} / {{.HostConfig.GroupAdd}} print empty/0 even for containers started with --device/--group-add — a false negative that sends you hunting the wrong root cause.
  3. What the process says: podman logs <name> | grep -iE 'error|cannot|Runtime' (a capability error like No HIP GPUs are available beside a missing device flag confirms drift). Count the damage: {{.RestartCount}} — one instance reached 9,146 restart attempts on stale config.

Quickest unblock: podman compose up -d --force-recreate <svc>. Durable fix = the §2 cutover. Verify the capability, not the status: podman exec <name> python3 -c "import torch; print(torch.cuda.is_available())"; ss -ltn | grep <port> for the actual bind addresses. ComfyUI incident: 2026-09-16, stale device-less container, 9,146 restarts. History repeats: 2026-08-26 Caddy (no unit), 2026-09-11 five observability services.

4. Podman 5.x quadlet v1 generator quirks (verified live 2026-08-28)

  • Hard-fail keys — the whole unit silently fails to generate (systemctl --user cat <unit> shows "could not be found"): any dash-prefixed [Container] option (--shm-size=… → unsupported key … in group 'Container'); Command= is unsupported, use Exec=.
  • HealthCmd space-splitting: the v1 generator splits HealthCmd on spaces into the healthcheck argv; a quoted probe /bin/sh -c "pg_isready …" lands as argv token "pg_isready → command-not-found → container reads unhealthy while the DB is up. HealthCmd must contain only space-free tokens (HealthCmd=pg_isready -d authentik -U authentik). If health reads unhealthy but logs look fine, compare the baked {{.Config.Healthcheck.Test}} array against the intended command before believing the status.
  • Probe a new key before shipping: drop a throwaway probe.container, daemon-reload, journalctl --user --since "1 min ago" -o cat | grep -i "unsupported key", systemctl --user cat probe.service (shows the generated ExecStart verbatim), then remove + reload.

5. Rootless Quadlet log retrieval

Step 0 — establish ownership: systemctl --user status <name>.service (works ⇒ rootless user unit); loginctl show-user <user> -p Linger. If --user knows the unit, EVERY command runs as that user with NO sudo.

Need Command
Current instance tail/follow podman logs --tail 200 / -f <name>
Across restarts/recreates journalctl --user -u <name>.service -n 200 --no-pager
Time-bounded / crash-only --since "14:30" / -p warning
Kernel-side evidence (OOM, SVM) sudo journalctl -k --since …

Quadlet units commonly run --replace --rm: podman logs is destroyed on recreation — the journal is the only durable record. Traps: sudo podman logs → "no such container" (root's store does not contain rootless containers; same for sudo podman ps); a system-level journalctl -u <name> returns nothing for a user unit; during first-start weight downloads health reports unhealthy BY DESIGN (check the payload file is growing). Verbose vendor switches are a config change — through git and deploy.sh, never a live env poke.

6. Compose bring-up with ground truth (rootless hosts)

  1. Audit reality before pressing buttons: podman ps -a runs per-user — check every namespace (sudo podman ps -a) and native units (systemctl list-units) before declaring a service absent. Compare compose mount sources against the real filesystem — compose files name phantom paths (e.g. /mnt/media/* vs the real LUKS array at /mnt/entropy). Fix compose through git first, deploy second.
  2. Pre-create bind-mount sources (sudo mkdir -p + chown 1000:1000) or creation fails statfs …: no such file or directory.
  3. Staged bring-up: infra first (up -d mariadb redis), poll {{.State.Health.Status}}, then the rest. Fresh containers answer 000/refused for the first seconds — poll.
  4. Never guess image tags: ghcr.io answers 403 on the bearer-token request for nonexistent/private repos ("manifest unknown"/token len 0 = repo or tag does not exist, not auth). Query the registry API (ghcr.io/token?scope=repository:<ns>/<repo>:pull → /v2/<ns>/<repo>/tags/list).
  5. Read the interface from inside the image before guessing flags/envs: podman exec <ctr> cat /z/cpp.sh etc. HTTP 500 with a styled error page means RUNNING-but-misconfigured, not down. Copyparty ac ground truth: entrypoint /bin/ash /z/cpp.sh -c /z/initcfg; accounts/volumes are ARGV flags (-a USER:PASS, -v SRC:DST:PERMS), not envs — and with none configured it serves cwd read/write for everyone (an unauthenticated world-writable share).
  6. Remote-shell quoting: zsh eats bare ===/? tokens; a zero-match from a mangled pattern is not absence — re-verify the target exists.
  7. user: "1000:1000" SIGSEGV at boot = unmapped uid in the rootless userns (host 1000 == container 0): drop the user line, run as container-root.