serverAppConfigs/tests/dankserver_quadlet.bats

#!/usr/bin/env bats
# Seam: the eight cutover-era dankserver quadlet units (romm trio, jellyfin,
# calibre-web, copyparty, plex, tautulli) must keep their boot-persistence and v1-generator
# contracts. The podman 5.x v1 Quadlet generator silently drops or hard-fails
# on several keys; these tests pin the contract that keeps the units loadable
# and secret-free in the repo.

load helpers

@test "all eight cutover units exist under dankserver/<svc>/quadlet/" {
    for unit in romm/quadlet/romm romm/quadlet/romm-mariadb romm/quadlet/romm-redis jellyfin/quadlet/jellyfin calibre-web/quadlet/calibre-web copyparty/quadlet/copyparty plex/quadlet/plex tautulli/quadlet/tautulli; do
        [ -f "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/$unit.container" ] || return 1
    done
}

@test "every cutover unit is boot-persistent (WantedBy=default.target)" {
    for unit in romm/quadlet/romm romm/quadlet/romm-mariadb romm/quadlet/romm-redis jellyfin/quadlet/jellyfin calibre-web/quadlet/calibre-web copyparty/quadlet/copyparty plex/quadlet/plex tautulli/quadlet/tautulli; do
        grep -q '^WantedBy=default.target$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/$unit.container" || return 1
    done
}

@test "copyparty uses Exec= not Command= (v1 generator hard-fails on Command=)" {
    unit="$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/copyparty/quadlet/copyparty.container"
    grep -q '^Command=' "$unit" && return 1
    grep -q '^Exec=-a ${COPAY_ACCOUNT}:${COPAY_PASSWORD}' "$unit" || return 1
}

@test "copyparty and romm consume host-local env files, never in-repo secrets" {
    grep -q '^EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/copyparty/env$' \
        "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/copyparty/quadlet/copyparty.container" || return 1
    for unit in romm/quadlet/romm romm/quadlet/romm-mariadb; do
        grep -q '^EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/romm/env$' \
            "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/$unit.container" || return 1
    done
    # No literal credential may ever appear in a tracked unit file: the only
    # Exec= arguments must be variable expansions, never a literal account:secret.
    ! grep -qE '\-a [A-Za-z0-9]+:[A-Za-z0-9]' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/copyparty/quadlet/copyparty.container" || return 1
}

@test "romm db services keep their service-discovery aliases on the appnet" {
    grep -q '^Network=dankserver_appnet:alias=mariadb$' \
        "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/romm/quadlet/romm-mariadb.container" || return 1
    grep -q '^Network=dankserver_appnet:alias=redis$' \
        "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/romm/quadlet/romm-redis.container" || return 1
}

@test "no unit uses the unsupported Device= key (v1 generator needs AddDevice=)" {
    # A rejected file kills its own unit silently: the deploy would then die
    # with "Unit jellyfin.service not found" only on the target. Device= was
    # the first offender (jellyfin GPU passthrough); Command= is guarded
    # above. Keep this list current with every generator finding.
    for unit in dankserver/romm/quadlet/romm dankserver/romm/quadlet/romm-mariadb \
                dankserver/romm/quadlet/romm-redis dankserver/jellyfin/quadlet/jellyfin \
                dankserver/calibre-web/quadlet/calibre-web dankserver/copyparty/quadlet/copyparty \
                dankserver/plex/quadlet/plex dankserver/tautulli/quadlet/tautulli; do
        ! grep -q '^Device=' "$REPO_ROOT/$unit.container" || return 1
    done
    grep -q '^AddDevice=/dev/dri$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/jellyfin/quadlet/jellyfin.container" || return 1
}

@test "every host-served port is explicitly published (no silent bridge-only)" {
    grep -q '^PublishPort=8085:8080$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/romm/quadlet/romm.container" || return 1
    grep -q '^PublishPort=8096:8096$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/jellyfin/quadlet/jellyfin.container" || return 1
    grep -q '^PublishPort=8083:8083$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/calibre-web/quadlet/calibre-web.container" || return 1
    grep -q '^PublishPort=3923:3923$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/copyparty/quadlet/copyparty.container" || return 1
    grep -q '^PublishPort=32400:32400$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/plex/quadlet/plex.container" || return 1
    grep -q '^PublishPort=8181:8181$' "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/tautulli/quadlet/tautulli.container" || return 1
}

@test "plex runs the fleet identity model (PUID=0/PGID=0, no userns remap)" {
    # Rootless podman cannot map the real host uid 997 (subuid range is
    # 100000:65536), so the fleet model applies: container root maps to the
    # dank user and the deployer chowns /var/lib/plexmediaserver to
    # 1000:1000 on first cutover; rollback chowns back to 997:984. Pin both
    # keys and the ABSENCE of any userns key — UsernsMode= is compose syntax
    # (the v1 generator hard-fails the whole unit on it) and UserNS= would
    # remap the container away from the fleet identity.
    unit="$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/plex/quadlet/plex.container"
    grep -q '^Environment=PUID=0$' "$unit" || return 1
    grep -q '^Environment=PGID=0$' "$unit" || return 1
    ! grep -qE '^(UserNS|UsernsMode)=' "$unit" || return 1
}

@test "calibre-server unit exists and is boot-persistent" {
    unit="$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/calibre-server/quadlet/calibre-server.container"
    [ -f "$unit" ] || return 1
    grep -q '^WantedBy=default.target$' "$unit" || return 1
    grep -q '^Restart=always$' "$unit" || return 1
}

@test "calibre-server serves the content server auth-gated on the published port" {
    # The security contract: the content server runs with --enable-auth and
    # --auth-mode=basic (Digest is the non-SSL default and rejects Basic
    # clients with 400), on the internal port the unit publishes as 8084.
    unit="$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/calibre-server/quadlet/calibre-server.container"
    grep -q '^Exec=calibre-server --port 8090 --enable-auth --auth-mode=basic --userdb /userdb.sqlite /books$' "$unit" || return 1
    grep -q '^PublishPort=8084:8090$' "$unit" || return 1
}

@test "calibre-server consumes host-local credential stores, never in-repo secrets" {
    unit="$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/calibre-server/quadlet/calibre-server.container"
    grep -q '^EnvironmentFile=/home/dank/Containers/calibre-server/env$' "$unit" || return 1
    grep -q '^Volume=/home/dank/Containers/calibre-server/userdb.sqlite:/userdb.sqlite$' "$unit" || return 1
    # The userdb's pw column is plaintext: no literal password may appear in
    # the tracked unit, and the desktop basic-auth credential comes from the
    # env file, not an Environment= line.
    ! grep -qE '^Environment=CUSTOM_(USER|PASSWORD)=' "$unit" || return 1
}

@test "a quadlet that asks for an I/O share ships the host permission that makes it real" {
    # IOWeight= is silently inert unless the system manager both enables io for
    # user.slice and delegates it to the user manager: systemd drops a resource
    # line it cannot honour without a word and the container still starts healthy.
    # So an in-repo weight is only honest together with both drop-ins AND with a
    # deployer that places them. Measured 2026-10-31; verification chain in
    # Architecture/Quadlet Lifecycle 4b.
    if grep -lq '^IOWeight=' "$REPO_ROOT"/dankserver/*/quadlet/*.container; then
        asked=1
    else
        skip "no dankserver quadlet asks for an I/O share"
    fi
    grep -q '^IOAccounting=yes$' \
        "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/host/systemd/user.slice.d/io-accounting.conf" || return 1
    grep -q '^DelegateControllers=.* io' \
        "$REPO_ROOT/dankserver/host/systemd/user@1000.service.d/io-delegate.conf" || return 1
    for f in user.slice.d/io-accounting.conf 'user@1000.service.d/io-delegate.conf'; do
        grep -q "dankserver/host/systemd/$f" "$REPO_ROOT/scripts/deploy-remote.sh" || return 1
    done
}