# Copyparty

Copyparty is a lightweight file server and media streamer that runs as a single Python binary. It handles large payloads, media streaming, resumable uploads, directory browsing, and WebDAV from one process.

**Host:** Dankserver — **Hostname:** `files.dankserver.local` — **Docs:** https://github.com/9001/copyparty

## Facts

| Item | Value |
|------|-------|
| Latest version | v1.20.21 (2026-08) |
| Image | `ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest` (ac = full edition; the bare `copyparty:latest` tag does not exist — ghcr answers 403 on the token request for nonexistent repos) |
| Port | 3923 (host) → 3923 (container) |
| Volume | bind mount the shared root directory |
| Auth | Per-directory `.cpy` config files, HTTP basic auth, `dirkeys`, `filekeys` |
| Streaming | HTTP range requests, HLS, WebDAV, WOPI (Office editing) |
| Docker editions | `dj` (document + media), `iv` (image + video), `v` (video only) |

## Configuration

### Command-line interface (ac edition)

The ac edition's entrypoint is `/bin/ash /z/cpp.sh -c /z/initcfg` — it parses
a config file, then `exec`s `python3 -m copyparty "$@"`, so accounts and
volumes are passed as **argv flags**, not env vars. `COPAY_PASS`/`COPAY_MODE`
envs are *not* consumed by this image (zero `COPAY_` references in the
package). The deployed interface:

```
command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
```

`-a` takes `USER:PASS`. `-v` takes `src:dst:perm1:perm2:...` (authoritative:
`python3 -m copyparty --help-accounts` inside the image, v1.20.21): each perm
field is `<letters>[,user[,user...]]` and a field with **no username applies to
every unauthenticated request**. Letters: `r` read (list + download), `w`
upload, `m` move, `d` delete, `a` admin (control panel, config reload), `A` =
`rwmda.` (everything). Empty `dst` mounts at the basename of `src` → URL `/w`.

**Read-only posture (2026-08-31):** `::r` = browse + download for anonymous
(required: the guarded `files.franksdank.cloud` chain delivers authentik'd
traffic to copyparty *unauthenticated*), `:ra,dank` = admin for the `dank`
account. **No `w`/`m`/`d` for anyone** — uploads, moves, and deletes are
rejected server-side over HTTP, PUT, and WebDAV alike. There is no dedicated
"reject uploads" volflag; the perms field is the documented mechanism
(`--help-flags` volflags only throttle/reshape uploads).

History: the pre-2026-08-31 flag `-v /w::A` was *not* "A for dank, nothing for
anonymous" as an earlier revision of this page claimed — the bare `A` granted
full read/write/delete to anyone reaching port 3923. Verified live the same
day: anonymous `GET /Movies/` → 200, `PROPFIND /` → 207, `PUT` → 201.

### Configuration File Options

Copyparty reads its configuration from `initcfg` (or `config` in the `/data` directory). Key options:

- `use-bwrap: n` — Disable bwrap sandboxing for ffmpeg (default in Docker). Set to `y` to enable.
- `shadowing //NULL` — Full unmap of a volume from the filesystem.
- Config env-var expansion: Use `${VAR}` syntax in `[global]` section for environment variable substitution.

### Docker Editions

Different editions bundle different libraries:

| Edition | Bundled Libraries | Use Case |
|---------|-------------------|----------|
| `dj` | Document + image + video libraries | Full-featured server |
| `iv` | Image + video libraries | Image and video focused |
| `v` | Video only | Transcoding only, minimal footprint |

The `iv` edition is no longer available for arm32/armv6. Use `dj` for maximum compatibility.

## Volumes

Live deployment: the whole LUKS array is served at URL `/w` (the ac edition
takes its volume roots from argv plus `chdir: /w` in `/z/initcfg`, not from a
`/data` convention). Access is **read-only since 2026-08-31** (`-v /w::r:ra,dank`
— see [[#Command-line interface (ac edition)]] above). The compose bind mount is
`/mnt/entropy:/w` (host path → container path). Note the bind itself is still
rw on disk — copyparty enforces read-only at the application layer, so local
services (Jellyfin, Calibre) keep writing into the array directly.

## Docker Compose

```yaml
  copyparty:
    image: ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest
    container_name: copyparty
    restart: unless-stopped
    command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
    ports:
      - "3923:3923"
    volumes:
      - /mnt/entropy:/w
      - /opt/copyparty/cfg:/cfg
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "python3", "-c", "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:3923/')"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 10s
      retries: 3
```

`${COPAY_PASS}` is compose-time interpolation from `dankserver/.env` — the
password lands in the container's **argv**, visible to anyone who can run
`podman inspect copyparty` on the host.

**Applying changes:** `scripts/deploy.sh` deliberately does not touch the
dankserver compose stack (host containers are not quadlet-managed there), so
`command:` edits need a manual recreate on Dankserver:

```
cd /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankserver && podman-compose up -d --force-recreate copyparty
```

Same project (`dankserver`), only copyparty is recreated; a fresh container
answers `000` for the first seconds while it mounts.

## Healthcheck

A simple HTTP check on port 3923 works. The root path returns HTTP 200 with the directory listing.

## WOPI Integration

Copyparty v1.20.9+ supports WOPI (Web Application Open Platform Interface) for editing Office documents in the web UI via Collabora Online. Enable with the `--wopi-accs` flag to limit WOPI access to specific paths.

## Security Advisories

| Version | CVE | Issue |
|---------|-----|-------|
| v1.20.19 | GHSA-phv8-wgjp-g4p9 | FTP upload outside volume |
| v1.20.17 | GHSA-x5pq-m9p8-f4vx | dirkey/filekey confusion |
| v1.20.9 | CVE-2026-27948 / GHSA-62cr-6wp5-q43h | XSS via file upload |

Upgrade to v1.20.19+ to cover all known CVEs. The dirkey fix (v1.20.17) matters if using both `dirkeys` and `filekeys`.

## Gotchas

- **Large transfers:** Disable TLS inside the app and let Caddy terminate TLS. This avoids double encryption overhead.
- **Dedicated share directory:** Do not give Copyparty the whole disk. Mount only the intended share path.
- **Whole-disk share (live choice):** this deployment *does* serve the whole
  91 T array from `/w`. Since 2026-08-31 the volume is application-level
  read-only for every account, so no remote write path exists. But note:
  **LAN-direct `:3923` is unauthenticated browse/download** (anonymous holds
  `r`) — Caddy + Anubis + authentik guard only `files.franksdank.cloud`, not
  the published port. Tighten to `-v /w::r,dank` if anonymous LAN reads become
  unacceptable. (Before 2026-08-31, `-v /w::A` made the array world-writable
  on the LAN — see [[#Command-line interface (ac edition)]].)
- **Upload tokens scoped per folder:** Prevents accidental global write access.
- **CSP nonces (v1.20.17+):** Security hardening for JavaScript execution. May break third-party JS plugins (`--js-browser` / `--html-head`).
- **Custom thumbnail extractors (v1.20.19+):** New `thumbex` framework. Requires configuration in `initcfg`.

## See Also

- [[Dankserver Stack]]
- [[Caddy]] — TLS termination and authentication in front
- [[ARR-Stack]] — Copyparty as a viewer alongside automated download management