---
type: reference
title: Bundle Change Log
description: Chronological record of meaningful changes to the serverAppConfigs knowledge base.
tags:
  - changelog
  - documentation
  - maintenance
timestamp: 2026-09-14
---

# Bundle Change Log


## 2026-08-30 (night) — frank fleet double swap: STRIX on its pinned fork, Huihui on FreeToken
- **Dankclaw / frank-default-large**: swapped to
  `kingjones777/Qwen3.8-Flash-Next-ROCmFP4-STRIX-GGUF` on the card's
  pinned `kingjones30/ROCmFPX` runtime (built at
  `/home/dank/GitPackages/kingjones-ROCmFPX/build`, `LLAMA_BUILD_WEBUI=OFF`
  — npm/HF-bucket asset provisioning aborts the link at 98% otherwise).
  On-host 113.47 GiB file verified byte-identical to the HF LFS oid
  (no re-download). Kept our args (401408×2, ub 512, fa on, fit off);
  fa-on works UNPATCHED on this model — the QSA F32 assert was
  agentionai-specific. No spec decode (card ships none; MTP heads
  unloadable). Validated live: ~225 s load, health 200, reasoning
  completions, real 111k-token prefill at 213–232 t/s. Deployed via
  git flow; manual-process race during validation caught and fixed
  (unit was crash-looping on a bound port while its health check
  passed — check MainPID, not just /health).
- **Dankserver / frank-default-small**: swapped the model within
  FreeToken v0.1.2 to `batsclamp/Huihui-Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-FP8`
 (native block-fp8, same loader path and pool plan; 35 GB downloaded
  via `hf`, official checkpoint retained for rollback). Learned:
  FreeToken's chat API 422s without an explicit `model` field. ~40
  tok/s verified post-deploy. Both `.service` Descriptions refreshed.
- Docs: [[kingjones-strix-rocmfp4]] reactivated as the large runbook
  (runtime build + swap procedure + validation), [[agentionai-fast-imatrix]]
  marked RETIRED (rollback record), [[freetoken-frank-default-small]]
  model sections updated, LLM index + AGENTS fleet tables refreshed.

## 2026-08-30 (late) — download chain proven end to end; qB credentials persisted
- **Cracked the arr↔Prowlarr feed contract**: route is `/{indexerId}/api`
  (Prowlarr `NewznabController`; absolute `/api/v1/indexer/{id}/newznab`),
  auth = the Prowlarr **global** key. The previously hand-rolled
  `/torznab/{id}/feed` paths were Forms-auth catch-alls returning
  `302 → /login` — which the arrs XML-parsed as "unexpected token '/'".
  A source-verified librarian answer settled it in one shot.
- **Re-pointed all four arr indexer rows** (Radarr→YTS id7,
  Sonarr/Lidarr→Nyaa id4, Readarr→Byrutor id3) via each app's own API;
  every PUT passed the app's live connection validator (202); RSS enabled.
- **TV + music chains proven** by live search: Sonarr returned 76 current
  releases via Prowlarr-Nyaa; Lidarr initially logged `0 active indexers`
  (new rows default all-off) — enabling the search flags yielded 18
  releases for YOASOBI – THE BOOK.
- **First real grab**: `MoviesSearch` → 3 YTS releases → *The Dark Knight
  (2008) 2160p* (7.5 GiB) → qBittorrent 100 % → **imported**
  (`hasFile: true`, 8,078,103,833 B at `/movies/The Dark Knight (2008)`,
  hardlinked from the shared `/mnt/entropy` filesystem), queue empty.
- **Prowlarr Application auto-sync found broken by version skew**
  (`Unable to cast object of type 'NzbDrone.Core.Thing…'` against Radarr
  6.3) — the manual rows are the integration; documented.
- **qBittorrent permanent credentials installed**: the WebUI temp password
  rotated on every boot (it had silently broken the arr clients once this
  session). qb5 removed the API password endpoint and the lscr image has
  no env support — wrote `WebUI\Password_PBKDF2` (source-verified
  `base64(salt):base64(PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512/100k)` form) into the conf with
  the container stopped; login survives `podman restart` (204). All arr
  download clients updated to it; value kept host-local in
  `/home/dank/.qbpass` (0600), never in git.
- **Readarr parked with reason**: abandoned upstream; its qB client cannot
  authenticate against qB 5 while three sibling apps pass with identical
  credentials. Indexer row healthy; books pipeline awaits a successor.
- **Docs**: rewrote `Dankserver/prowlarr.md` (live wiring + six verified
  gotchas incl. the joiner bug and the 302-masquerading-as-auth failure)
  and `Dankserver/qbittorrent.md` (persistent-credential recipe, Referer
  CSRF note).

## 2026-08-29 (late) — guarded-host sign-in fixed end to end
- **Diagnosed** both user symptoms: `Invalid next URL` = the flow being entered with an absolute cross-host `next=` (open-redirect guard rejects at completion); phone "hostname could not be found" = the public DNS zone had **no `auth` A record** (added via Porkbun API, `auth A 71.227.227.172 TTL 300`).
- **Disproved meta-header routing** live (full meta-header set still 404s; matching `Host` alone answers). The 2026.8 embedded outpost routes solely on the original `Host` vs each proxy provider's `external_host`.
- **Provisioned** proxy providers + applications for `search`, `hermes`, `prometheus`, `romm`, `files` (pks 2–6) via ORM, attached to the embedded outpost; `internal_host = http://caddy:8017` everywhere.
- **Wedge found + fixed live:** providers created with null `authorization_flow`/`invalidation_flow` starve the outpost's config fetch (`Failed to fetch outpost from API, retrying in 3 seconds` forever → entire outpost URL space 404s). Backfilled all three flows; the 3-second retry loop recovered without restart.
- `/dankclaw/Caddyfile` (`29f9a86`) — `:8016` is now a uniform whole-request `reverse_proxy authentik-server:9000` preserving `Host`; deleted the per-vhost redirect/flow design and stale comments.
- `/dankclaw/anubis/policy.json` (`2a72efa`) — ALLOW `^/outpost\.goauthentik\.io/` so login/transport paths are reachable before the challenge dance; app paths remain challenged.
- **Gotcha:** the policy bind-mount pins the file inode; a git checkout of a new policy file does NOT reach the running distroless container (observed 22 h of stale policy with zero reload logs). `--service anubis` deploy restart is mandatory after policy edits.
- `/tests/authentik.bats` — meta-header test replaced by the upheld contract (Host preserved; no absolute cross-host `next=` anywhere in the Caddyfile). Suite green (`0` not-ok).
- `/docs/Infrastructure/Authentik.md`, `/docs/Infrastructure/Anubis.md`, `/docs/Architecture/Network Architecture.md` (`ee1e038`) — rewritten to the live-verified mechanism: Host→provider routing, lockstep rule (guard set = TLS edge = :8017 table = provider list = public DNS), provisioning pitfalls, failure-mode rows for both symptoms.
- **Verified** by headless JS client: `https://search.franksdank.cloud/` → Anubis PoW solved → outpost intercept → authentik login form renders with the return path inside the signed OAuth2 `state` JWT. Credential submission is the user's step.

## 2026-09-14
- **Creation**: [[Hermes-WebUI]] — new `hermes-webui` compose service on Dankclaw (the Hermex server): runs `hermes-webui`'s `bootstrap.py --foreground` in the agent image, shares `/home/dank/hermes-data` with the gateway (identical rootless Podman uid mapping), publishes `127.0.0.1:8787` only, password-gated via `HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD` in the host `.env`.
- `/dankclaw/compose.yaml`, `/dankclaw/.env.example` — service definition and password placeholder; container-internal bind is `0.0.0.0` (Podman's port forwarder dials the bridge IP) while the host-side publish stays loopback so the SSH tunnel is the sole ingress.
- `/scripts/deploy-plan.py`, `/scripts/deploy.sh`, `/scripts/deploy-remote.sh` — `hermes-webui` registered as an isolated Dankclaw service in all three inventories; planner narrows edits to its compose block only.
- `/tests/hermes_webui.bats` — new seam: foreground entrypoint, loopback publish + auth, shared volume, `/health` healthcheck, env placeholder, planner narrowing (hermetic fixture repo), deployer dispatch.
- Remote access pattern documented: iPhone Termius local forward `127.0.0.1:8787 -> 127.0.0.1:8787` over the existing router port forward to Dankclaw `:22`; Hermex points at `http://localhost:8787`. No Tailscale, no Cloudflare.

## 2026-08-26
- `/dankclaw/Caddyfile` — Both Plex vhosts now proxy to PMS over a TLS upstream (`insecure_skip_verify`); PMS drops plain-HTTP connections from non-loopback sources, which produced empty-body 502s.
- `/docs/Infrastructure/Caddy.md` — Documented the Plex TLS-upstream requirement and the `/web/` vs `/` distinction.
- `/tests/caddyfile.bats` — Added a test pinning the TLS upstream transport on both Plex vhosts.
- `/docs/Dankclaw/Gitea.md` — Documented migration of Gitea web proxy ownership to canonical Caddy and retirement of the standalone proxy.
- `/docs/Dankclaw/Dankclaw Stack.md` — Updated boot-persistence and Caddy deployment descriptions for the two-unit Gitea stack.
- `/docs/Architecture/Deployment Flow.md` — Replaced the split-proxy safety description with the canonical Caddy ownership model.
- `/dankclaw/gitea/quadlet/gitea-caddy.container` — Retired the standalone Gitea Caddy Quadlet; deployment stages any live copy into home trash.
- `/scripts/deploy-plan.py` — Routes retirement of the legacy proxy to the canonical Caddy and removes it from the service inventory.
- `/scripts/deploy.sh` and `/scripts/deploy-remote.sh` — Removed standalone proxy dispatch and added idempotent retirement before canonical Caddy deployment.
- `/tests/caddyfile.bats`, `/tests/deployment_scoping.bats`, `/tests/deployment_flow.bats`, `/tests/frank_large_config.bats` — Added migration coverage and corrected the existing ubatch harness assertion.
- `/docs/index.md` — Bundle index remains the root navigation entry for the updated pages.
- **Boot-persistence audit (post-reboot, 2026-08-26 evening):** after Frank's reboot, Caddy and Pi-hole were both down. Caddy ran as a bare compose container (`restart: unless-stopped` does not survive shutdown's explicit stop; rootless Podman has no boot-time auto-start for bare containers). Pi-hole's quadlet existed but crash-looped (restart counter 1645): `net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start` was reset to 80 by two sources — a later-sorted sysctl drop-in (`99-rootless-ports.conf`) and a stale line in `/etc/sysctl.conf`, which systemd-sysctl applies **after** all of `sysctl.d/` (the first deploy pass only fixed the drop-in; the runtime value stayed 80 until the `/etc/sysctl.conf` line was neutralized too).
- `/AGENTS.md` — new MANDATORY section "Boot Persistence & Self-Healing": every deployed, proven-working container must have a self-healing, boot-persistent quadlet unit (`WantedBy=default.target` + enabled + linger, `Restart=always`, repo-provenance `.container`), verified before a service is declared deployed.
- `/dankclaw/caddy/quadlet/caddy.container`, `/dankclaw/caddy/env.example` — Caddy is now a boot-persistent quadlet (`caddy.service`): joins `dankclaw_default` so container-name upstreams keep resolving, `Pull=never` (local-only image), Porkbun credentials via `/home/dank/Containers/caddy/env` (deploy writes it from `.env`), bare-IP-catch-all health check. The caddy service was removed from `/dankclaw/compose.yaml`.
- `/dankclaw/pihole/sysctl/99-dnsmasq.conf` — repo source of truth for `ip_unprivileged_port_start=53`; `deploy_pihole` installs it to `/etc/sysctl.d/`, stages conflicting drop-ins (value > 53) in the home trash, comments out a stale `/etc/sysctl.conf` line (applied after all of sysctl.d), and applies `sysctl --system` (the boot code path).
- `/scripts/deploy-remote.sh` — `deploy_caddy` installs/starts the quadlet (retiring the bare container; all state is in host volumes). Boot persistence comes from podman's quadlet generator, which creates the `default.target.wants` symlink from the unit's `[Install]` section at every user-manager start — `is-enabled` reports `generated` for all healthy quadlets, and an explicit `systemctl enable` fails on generated units (learned live during the deploy). `deploy_pihole` enforces the sysctl prerequisites.
- `/tests/caddy_quadlet.bats` (new seam), `/tests/caddyfile.bats`, `/tests/deployment_flow.bats`, `/tests/pihole.bats` — quadlet boot-persistence, self-healing, network, env, and sysctl coverage; compose assertions repointed from the removed caddy service to the quadlet.
- `/docs/Infrastructure/Caddy.md`, `/docs/Infrastructure/Pi-hole.md`, `/docs/Dankclaw/Dankclaw Stack.md` — quadlet runtime facts, the 2026-08-26 incident, and the sysctl-conflict failure mode.