---
type: configuration
title: Hermes-WebUI (Hermex server)
description: The hermes-webui container on Dankclaw — the API server that the Hermex iPhone app talks to, reachable over an SSH tunnel, from the whole LAN (it binds all interfaces), and from https://hermes.franksdank.cloud (internal-only vhost).
tags:
  - hermes
  - hermes-webui
  - hermex
  - dankclaw
  - ssh-tunnel
timestamp: 2026-09-14
---

# Hermes-WebUI (Hermex server)

`hermes-webui` is the [hermes-webui](https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui)
server (MIT, third-party) that the **Hermex** iPhone app connects to. It runs
the Hermes agent in-process from the shared `HERMES_HOME`, so it is the *same*
agent — same memory, skills, and sessions — as the [[Hermes]] gateway and the
[[Hermes-Dashboard]].

**Host:** Dankclaw — **Port:** `0.0.0.0:8787` (all interfaces; `ss -ltnp`
2026-10-18 shows the webui listening there in the host netns) — **Ingress:** SSH
tunnel for the phone app; direct LAN access also works (re-measured 2026-10-18
from another LAN host: `/health` → 200, `/` → 302) — **Vhost:**
`hermes.franksdank.cloud`, **exempt by construction** — no Anubis, no Authentik;
`HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD` is the only gate

## Facts

| Item | Value |
|------|-------|
| Image | `localhost/hermes-agent:latest` with `Pull=never` (`dankclaw/hermes/quadlet/hermes-webui.container:35-36`) — the same image as the gateway and dashboard. The deployer keeps that alias fresh by tagging the upstream name into local storage (`podman tag docker.io/nousresearch/hermes-agent:latest localhost/hermes-agent:latest`, `scripts/deploy-remote.sh:1056`); the installed image is the 2026-09-24 build, revision `749220e` (`podman image inspect` 2026-10-18). |
| Command | `python3 /webui/bootstrap.py --foreground` (`hermes-webui.container:48`) |
| Source checkout | `/home/dank/Containers/hermes/webui` on Dankclaw, bind-mounted at `/webui` (`hermes-webui.container:47`; live dir `drwxrwxr-x dank dank`) |
| Port | `8787`, bound to `0.0.0.0` in the **host** network namespace (`Network=host` + `HERMES_WEBUI_HOST=0.0.0.0`, `hermes-webui.container:37-40`) — LAN-reachable, not loopback-only |
| Auth | `HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD` (from `/home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/.env`, the unit's only `EnvironmentFile`; Hermex signs in with it) |
| Data | bind mount `/home/dank/Containers/hermes/data` → `/data`, shared with the gateway and dashboard; anonymous volume at `/opt/data` |
| Health | `HealthCmd=` in the Quadlet unit probes `http://127.0.0.1:8787/health` from inside the unit (`hermes-webui.container:53`; works because the webui runs in the host netns). Container state 2026-10-18: **healthy**. There is no host-side probe in the deployer — the contract is the seam `tests/hermes_webui.bats`, which reads the live unit and pins the Caddyfile upstream |

## Why a container, not a host process

The gateway's state files are owned by the container-mapped uid (`109999`,
from rootless Podman's `1 → 100000/65536` subuid range — `/etc/subuid` →
`dank:100000:65536`, and the agent's runtime uid is 10000, so 100000 + 9999 =
109999; `ls -ld /home/dank/Containers/hermes/data` → uid 109999, 2026-10-18). A fresh rootless
namespace on Dankclaw maps identically (verified with `podman unshare
cat /proc/self/uid_map`), so a second container using the same image reads
and writes the shared volume with exactly the ownership the gateway already
uses. A host-side process running as `dank` (uid 1000) could not read the
gateway's `0600` state files (a non-privileged read of the data dir is
`EACCES`, checked 2026-10-18).

## How it works

- `bootstrap.py` creates `/webui/.venv` on first boot, pip-installs the WebUI
  and agent requirements, then **execs** `server.py` as one foreground process
  (`--foreground`). systemd-free inside the container: supervision is the unit's
  `Restart=always` / `RestartSec=5` (`hermes-webui.container:60-61`) — the
  compose-era `restart: unless-stopped` is retired with `dankclaw/compose.yaml`.
- `HERMES_WEBUI_SKIP_ONBOARDING=1` keeps the first-run wizard off (`:45`; live
  env confirms it, `podman inspect hermes-webui` 2026-10-18); a profile
  already exists in `/data` from the gateway.
- The healthcheck `start_period` is 600 s
  (`HealthStartPeriod=600s`, `:57`) because the very first boot spends
  minutes pip-installing into a fresh venv.

## Remote access (Hermex on iOS — persistent SSH tunnel)

Only port `22` is forwarded to Dankclaw at the router *(unverified 2026-10-18:
router configuration is not readable from this host; `sshd -T` confirms sshd
itself listens on port 22)*, so the phone reaches the
webui through an SSH **local forward** — no extra router ports, no third-party
relay (no Tailscale, no Cloudflare). Implemented 2026-08-31. The tunnel is an
*access path* for the phone, **not** a containment boundary: the server binds
`0.0.0.0:8787`, so any host that can route to `192.168.0.143` can reach the API
directly and needs only `HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD` to get in (verified 2026-09-02:
an unauthenticated `GET /health` from another LAN machine returned HTTP 200;
re-measured from a different LAN host on 2026-10-18: `/health` → 200, `/` → 302).
See [[Container Network Namespaces]] for why the webui is reachable this way and
the sibling dashboard on `9119` is not.

- Dedicated `tunnel` account on Dankclaw (`getent passwd tunnel` → uid 994,
  shell `/usr/sbin/nologin`, 2026-10-18; password locked). Authentication is key-only
  *(unverified 2026-10-18: `/home/tunnel/.ssh/authorized_keys` is not readable
  without `sudo`)*; the account can do nothing except
  authenticate — `ForceCommand /usr/sbin/nologin` kills any session channel
  while the transport stays up for port forwarding.
- sshd drop-in `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/99-tunnel.conf` (exists, 118 B, 2026-08-31)
  scopes `AllowTcpForwarding yes` to that user only, plus `PermitTTY no`,
  `X11Forwarding no` and `ForceCommand /usr/sbin/nologin` — all four lines are
  present under `Match User tunnel` (`cat` 2026-10-18).
- Key options on the authorized key pin the blast radius:
  `command="/usr/sbin/nologin",no-pty,restrict,port-forwarding,permitopen="localhost:8787"`
  — a leaked tunnel key can only forward to `localhost:8787`, never act as a
  general SOCKS/SSH proxy *(unverified 2026-10-18: the authorized_keys file
  needs `sudo` to read)*.
- On the phone (client side): create a key on-device (private key never
  leaves the device), hand the **public** key to the admin who appends it to
  `/home/tunnel/.ssh/authorized_keys`, then connect from the SSH client:
  - In-network target `192.168.0.143:22`, off-network target the public
    hostname (router forwards only port 22 → Dankclaw) — same forward config
    otherwise.
  - Local forward `127.0.0.1:8787 → localhost:8787`; Hermex server URL is then
    `http://localhost:8787` in both locations.
  - For a *persistent* tunnel on iOS, Secure ShellFish's personal-VPN mode
    (Network Extension keeps the tunnel up and routes `127.0.0.0/8` through
    it); Termius works but only while its session is connected — iOS allows no
    background SSH daemon.

```mermaid
graph LR
    A[Hermex app] -->|http://localhost:8787| B[SSH local forward on iPhone<br/>persistent via personal VPN]
    B ==>|encrypted SSH to port 22| C[Dankclaw sshd<br/>tunnel user, forced nologin]
    C --> D["hermes-webui 0.0.0.0:8787 (host netns)"]
    D --> E["/home/dank/Containers/hermes/data (shared agent state)"]
```

## Deployment

```
./scripts/deploy.sh dankclaw --service hermes-webui
```

`deploy_hermes` (`scripts/deploy-remote.sh:1034-1071`; any of
`--service hermes|hermes-dashboard|hermes-webui` routes to it,
`scripts/deploy-remote.sh:1594`) copies `chrome-devtools-protocol.container`
plus the three trio units into the quadlet unit directory, starts the CDP daemon
only if inactive (it is never restarted on deploy, so in-flight browser
sessions survive), re-tags the image alias, then restarts
`hermes.service`, `hermes-dashboard.service` and
`hermes-webui.service` in the **user** manager of `dank` (linger must be on for
them to come up at boot — `loginctl show-user dank -p Linger` → `yes`,
2026-10-18), so gateway/dashboard/webui restarts stay isolated from
inference deploys.
Before first deploy, set a strong `HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD` in the live
`dankclaw/.env`.

## Gotchas

- The `/webui` mount is **rw on purpose**: `bootstrap.py` creates `.venv` in
  the repo root. Do not flip it to `:ro`.
- The webui binds `0.0.0.0:8787`, and **two consumers depend on that**: the SSH
  tunnel (which dials the host's `localhost`) *and* Caddy, which fronts
  `hermes.franksdank.cloud` with **`reverse_proxy host.containers.internal:8787`**
  (`dankclaw/Caddyfile:186-188`) — netavark's host address (169.254.1.2), not
  the host's LAN IP. That distinction is load-bearing: this unit is
  host-networked and publishes nothing, so netavark DNATs nothing, and
  `192.168.0.143:8787` is REFUSED from Caddy's bridge netns while
  `host.containers.internal:8787` answers (measured inside the Caddy container
  2026-09-16, recorded at `dankclaw/Caddyfile:178-185` and pinned by the seam
  `tests/hermes_webui.bats:52-64`, which fails any Caddyfile that reverts to the
  LAN IP). The dashboard's `9119` answers on the LAN IP precisely because it IS
  published. So the SSH tunnel is an access path for the phone, not a
  security boundary: any LAN host that can route to `192.168.0.143` reaches the
  API and needs only `HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD`. The webui can run agent commands,
  so treat that password as a credential with command-execution blast radius.
  The vhost itself carries **no** guard chain — no Anubis challenge, no
  Authentik gate (measured 2026-10-18 from another LAN host:
  `https://hermes.franksdank.cloud/` → 302 → `/login?next=/` and `/health` → 200,
  with no authentik or bot-challenge bytes in the body); it is private only
  because no public DNS record exists for the name
  (`dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts:39`, LAN-only).
  To make loopback-only binding true again you must set
  `HERMES_WEBUI_HOST=127.0.0.1` **and** give Caddy another way in (a
  host-gateway route or a bridge-network unit) — that is an exposure change to
  decide deliberately, not a silent fix. It was tried on 2026-09-16 as a silent
  fix and broke the vhost with a 502 while the whole e2e suite stayed green;
  `tests/e2e/specs/17-hermes-vhost.spec.ts` now asserts the vhost reaches its
  app (no 5xx, no Caddy error page, no gate page), so a dead upstream fails a
  gate instead of hiding. Its file comment still names the
  `192.168.0.143:8787` upstream and calls this "the only guarded vhost" — both
  are stale against `dankclaw/Caddyfile:186-188`.
- The webui and the gateway share one data root (`/data` is a bind mount of
  `/home/dank/Containers/hermes/data`). A config change made on one side takes
  effect when the other restarts (same caveat as the dashboard).
- `bootstrap.py` auto-installs a Hermes Agent if it cannot find one; in this
  image the agent is already present, so that path should never fire. If the
  log shows an install attempt, the image changed — re-verify the entrypoint.

# Citations

- hermes-webui README (env vars, `--foreground`, `/health`): https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui
- Hermex setup model (server URL + password; Cloudflare/Tailscale are optional, not required): https://hermexapp.com/

## See Also

- [[Hermes]] — the agent and its Signal gateway
- [[Hermes-Dashboard]] — the LAN browser management UI
- [[Dankclaw Stack]]
- [[Container Network Namespaces]] — why this host-netns service is LAN-reachable