dankclaw/Caddyfile

@@ -268,10 +268,11 @@ files.franksdank.cloud {
 # Anubis → Authentik → app, like romm/files. The container carries
 # ROUTER_BASE_PATH=/audiobookshelf, so this vhost serves the app under that
 # path; the bare root is redirected onto it in the post-auth listener, never
-# pre-auth. Guard state in the IdP: proxy provider `abs-proxy`
-# (external_host https://abs.franksdank.cloud/, internal_host http://caddy:8017,
-# application "Audiobookshelf Guard"), claimed by the embedded outpost.
-abs.franksdank.cloud {
+# pre-auth. Guard state in the IdP: proxy provider `audiobooks-proxy`
+# (external_host https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/, internal_host
+# http://caddy:8017, application "Audiobookshelf Guard"), claimed by the
+# embedded outpost.
+audiobooks.franksdank.cloud {
 	reverse_proxy anubis:8923 {
 		header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}
 	}
@@ -423,13 +424,22 @@ http://:8017 {
 		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:3923
 	}
 
-	@abs host abs.franksdank.cloud
-	handle @abs {
+	@audiobooks host audiobooks.franksdank.cloud
+	handle @audiobooks {
 		# The app answers only under its ROUTER_BASE_PATH; the bare root is a
 		# convenience hop, taken post-auth so nothing reaches the app
 		# pre-authentication.
 		redir / /audiobookshelf/ permanent
-		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8000
+		# Audiobookshelf validates every OIDC callback against the origin it
+		# believes it is served from — getRequestOrigin() is
+		# x-forwarded-proto://Host — and a mismatch is a bodiless 400
+		# "Invalid callback URL - must be same-origin" before the IdP is ever
+		# contacted (measured 2026-11-03). This listener is fed over plain http
+		# by the outpost, so Caddy's own X-Forwarded-Proto here says http; the
+		# edge for this name is TLS-only, so https is the truthful value.
+		reverse_proxy 192.168.0.235:8000 {
+			header_up X-Forwarded-Proto https
+		}
 	}
 
 	@prowlarr host prowlarr.franksdank.cloud

dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 192.168.0.143 romm.franksdank.cloud
 192.168.0.143 files.franksdank.cloud
 192.168.0.143 jelly.franksdank.cloud
-192.168.0.143 abs.franksdank.cloud
+192.168.0.143 audiobooks.franksdank.cloud
 192.168.0.143 radarr.franksdank.cloud
 192.168.0.143 lidarr.franksdank.cloud
 192.168.0.143 readarr.franksdank.cloud

scripts/authentik-audiobookshelf-sso.sh

@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@
 #                            origin, reached directly, which is also what the phone
 #                            app is configured with)
 #   ABS_EXTRA_BASES         space-separated additional origins, base path included
-#                           (default: https://abs.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf —
-#                            the guarded vhost, dankclaw/Caddyfile).
+#                           (default: https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf
+#                            — the guarded vhost, dankclaw/Caddyfile).
 #                            ABS builds its redirect_uri from the ORIGIN of the
 #                            request, so each origin the app is served at needs its
 #                            own registered URI — an unregistered origin is a
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ SSO_USER="${ABS_OIDC_USERNAME:-akadmin}"
 MEMBERS="${ABS_OIDC_USERS:-}"
 E2E_ADMIN="${ABS_E2E_ADMIN:-qa-e2e-admin}"
 BASE="${ABS_BASE:-http://192.168.0.235:8000/audiobookshelf}"
-EXTRA_BASES="${ABS_EXTRA_BASES:-https://abs.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf}"
+EXTRA_BASES="${ABS_EXTRA_BASES:-https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf}"
 HOST="${AUTHENTIK_HOST:-dankclaw}"
 
 # The claim expression: translate group membership into ABS role names. It is stored

scripts/authentik-proxy-provider-defaults.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Census and repair the OAuth2 defaults on every authentik PROXY provider.
+#
+# A proxy provider built by hand in `ak shell` never runs
+# ProxyProvider.set_oauth_defaults() — the REST serializer calls it, the ORM does
+# not — so the row looks perfectly configured (external_host, internal_host,
+# application bound, embedded-outpost claim present) while three OAuth facts are
+# blank. Each one kills the guarded login in a different, unrelated-looking way,
+# all BEFORE any credential is asked for:
+#
+#   * redirect_uris empty -> authentik answers its own page:
+#     "Redirect URI Error — The request fails due to a missing, invalid, or
+#     mismatching redirection URI (redirect_uri)". Measured on the Audiobookshelf
+#     guard provider, 2026-11-03.
+#   * grant_types empty -> the authorize endpoint refuses the outpost's
+#     authorization-code request with a bodiless HTTP 400 (Chromium renders
+#     "This page isn't working / HTTP ERROR 400"). Same provider, one step
+#     later, after the URIs were filled in by hand.
+#   * authorization_flow NULL -> the authorize view crashes building its flow
+#     planner: AttributeError 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'slug', HTTP
+#     500. That is what authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh exists for.
+#
+# So: a guard that shows ANY of those three pages is not an Anubis problem and
+# not a Caddy problem — run this script before touching the route.
+#
+# Repair calls the VENDOR's own set_oauth_defaults() (grant_types = authz code +
+# client credentials + password, confidential client, the stock scope mappings,
+# redirect_uris derived from external_host by _get_callback_url) and points the
+# authorization flow at default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent, the flow
+# every working provider here uses. Providers that already match are untouched,
+# so a deliberate per-provider deviation is never silently flattened.
+#
+# This is authentik DB state. It is NOT in any deployable file: a blueprint
+# re-import, or an ak-shell re-creation of a provider, reverts these facts and
+# the symptom returns verbatim. Re-run after any such rebuild. Idempotent.
+#
+# Usage: authentik-proxy-provider-defaults.sh [--check]
+#          no argument  repair what drifts, print one line per provider
+#          --check       census only, exit 1 if anything drifts (gate use)
+#        override host: AUTHENTIK_HOST=…
+set -euo pipefail
+HOST="${AUTHENTIK_HOST:-dankclaw}"
+MODE="${1:-}"
+case "$MODE" in
+    "" | --check) : ;;
+    *) echo "usage: $(basename "$0") [--check]" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+
+ssh "$HOST" 'podman exec -i authentik-server ak shell' <<PYEOF
+from authentik.flows.models import Flow
+from authentik.providers.proxy.models import ProxyProvider, _get_callback_url
+
+CHECK = $( [ "$MODE" = "--check" ] && echo True || echo False )
+FLOW = "default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent"
+WANT_GRANTS = ["authorization_code", "client_credentials", "password"]
+
+flow = Flow.objects.filter(slug=FLOW).first()
+if not flow and not CHECK:
+    raise SystemExit("flow %s is missing; nothing was changed" % FLOW)
+
+drift = 0
+for p in ProxyProvider.objects.all().order_by("pk"):
+    want_uris = [u.url for u in _get_callback_url(p.external_host)]
+    have_uris = [u.url for u in p.redirect_uris]
+    bad = []
+    if [str(g) for g in p.grant_types] != WANT_GRANTS:
+        bad.append("grant_types=%s" % [str(g) for g in p.grant_types])
+    if have_uris != want_uris:
+        bad.append("redirect_uris=%s" % have_uris)
+    if p.authorization_flow_id is None:
+        bad.append("authorization_flow=None")
+    if not bad:
+        print("ok   %s (ext %s)" % (p.name, p.external_host))
+        continue
+    drift += 1
+    if CHECK:
+        print("DRIFT %s: %s" % (p.name, "; ".join(bad)))
+        continue
+    print("fix  %s: %s" % (p.name, "; ".join(bad)))
+    p.set_oauth_defaults()
+    if p.authorization_flow_id is None:
+        p.authorization_flow = flow
+    p.save()
+    after = ProxyProvider.objects.get(pk=p.pk)
+    print("     -> grants %s, %d redirect URIs, flow %s"
+          % ([str(g) for g in after.grant_types], len(after.redirect_uris),
+             after.authorization_flow and after.authorization_flow.slug))
+
+print("providers checked, drift: %d" % drift)
+raise SystemExit(1 if (CHECK and drift) else 0)
+PYEOF
+
+echo "Verify: walk the guarded vhost in a browser — Anubis solves, authentik"
+echo "renders its login form (no Redirect URI Error, no HTTP 400), and the"
+echo "callback lands back on the app."

serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankserver/Audiobookshelf.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ server — it shares nothing with [[Plex]] or [[Jellyfin]] and owns no files on
 array.
 
 **Host:** Dankserver — **Unit:** `audiobookshelf.service` (rootless Quadlet, user manager) —
-**Doors:** LAN `http://192.168.0.235:8000/audiobookshelf` (direct, what the phone app uses) and guarded `https://abs.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/`.
+**Doors:** LAN `http://192.168.0.235:8000/audiobookshelf` (direct, what the phone app uses) and guarded `https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/`.
 
 ## Shape
 
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ the local form, and the phone app offers SSO on its server-address screen. The l
 | The ABS half: issuer, the four IdP URLs, claim, auto-register | `scripts/audiobookshelf-init.sh`, armed automatically when that secret exists in the credential file |
 | Role at first SSO sign-in | the `abs_groups` claim: `audiobookshelf_admins` → `admin`, `audiobookshelf_users` → `user`, in neither → denied (fail closed) |
 | Admin group members | `akadmin` (the operator's own authentik admin account — sign in as it and the claim grants site admin) and `qa-e2e-admin` (the identity the deploy gate signs in as, so the script re-adds it every run; drop it and the gate fails, not a phone) |
-| The guard in front of the vhost | proxy provider `abs-proxy` (external_host `https://abs.franksdank.cloud/`, internal_host `http://caddy:8017`) + application "Audiobookshelf Guard", claimed by the embedded outpost — the ak-shell recipe in [[Caddy]] *Guard a new vhost* creates it; without that row the chain answers authentik's error page, not the login |
+| The guard in front of the vhost | proxy provider `audiobooks-proxy` (external_host `https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/`, internal_host `http://caddy:8017`) + application "Audiobookshelf Guard" (its own name tracks the app, not the vhost), claimed by the embedded outpost — the ak-shell recipe in [[Caddy]] *Guard a new vhost* creates it; without that row the chain answers authentik's error page, not the login |
 
 The IdP saying yes is not the same as being allowed in: with `authOpenIDAutoRegister` on,
 a first sign-in creates the account, and the claim alone decides the type. A user in
@@ -140,6 +140,14 @@ Both halves — authentik's provider row and ABS's settings — are asserted end
   second wall appears after the fix ships (measured 2026-11-02: the browser reached authentik,
   got `code`+`state`, and ABS still bounced to `/login?error=undefined`). The script sets
   `authorization_code` + `refresh_token`; a blueprint re-import reverts the row silently.
+- **The guarded door has to tell the truth about its scheme.** ABS validates every OIDC
+  `callback` against the origin it believes it is served from — `getRequestOrigin()` is
+  `x-forwarded-proto://Host` (`server/utils/requestUtils.js`, read in the pinned digest
+  2026-11-03) — so behind a TLS edge that reaches the container over plain http it computes
+  `http://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud` and answers its own https callback with a 400 "Invalid callback
+  URL - must be same-origin" before the IdP is ever contacted. The Caddy `:8017` route pins
+  `header_up X-Forwarded-Proto https` for exactly that reason ([[Caddy]] *Guard a new vhost*);
+  the LAN door needs nothing, because there browser and server agree on `http`.
 - **The claim mapping is not the whole `property_mappings` list.** A provider holding only the
   custom mapping grants a token scoped shorter than the scopes ABS requests
   (`openid profile email abs_groups`): the code is issued and exchanged normally, and ABS's
@@ -189,7 +197,7 @@ Both halves — authentik's provider row and ABS's settings — are asserted end
   service across a reboot ([[Quadlet Lifecycle]]).
 - **Two doors, one app.** `http://192.168.0.235:8000/audiobookshelf` is the raw
   LAN address — plain HTTP, nothing in front, what the phone app is configured
-  with; `https://abs.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/` is the guarded vhost
+  with; `https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/` is the guarded vhost
   (Caddy → Anubis → the Authentik outpost → Caddy `:8017` → this container),
   the house chain for browser traffic — [[Caddy]] *Guard a new vhost*. That
   chain serves browsers only: the phone app is a non-browser client and solves

serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Authentik Outpost Reference.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: "Outpost, proxy-provider, OAuth2, LDAP and flow configuration for t
 tags:
   - infrastructure
   - authentik
-timestamp: 2026-10-19
+timestamp: 2026-11-03
 ---
 
 # Authentik Outpost Reference
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ correctly — the outpost matches on hostname.
 
 ## Provisioning rules for proxy providers
 
-Two provisioning rules, each verified live by an outage:
+Three provisioning rules, each verified live by an outage or a dead login:
 
 1. **All three flows are required.** A ProxyProvider created via raw API/ORM
    with any of `authentication_flow`/`authorization_flow`/`invalidation_flow`
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ Two provisioning rules, each verified live by an outage:
    the app. No error is logged anywhere — the SSO "works" and the app never
    appears. Create the Application with `provider_id` set (the UI does this
    automatically; raw API/ORM drives must do it explicitly).
+3. **A raw ORM create skips the OAuth defaults.** The REST serializer calls
+   `ProxyProvider.set_oauth_defaults()`; `ProxyProvider.objects.create()` does not. The row
+   then looks fully configured — external_host, internal_host, application bound, outpost
+   claimed — while `redirect_uris` is empty (those URIs are *derived* from `external_host` by
+   `_get_callback_url`) and `grant_types` is `[]`. Both kill the guard before any credential,
+   in this order: authentik renders its own **"Redirect URI Error"** page, and once the URIs
+   are filled by hand the next wall is a bodiless **HTTP 400** out of `/application/o/authorize/`
+   (both measured on the Audiobookshelf guard provider, 2026-11-03). Census and repair in one idempotent pass, all
+   providers at once: `scripts/authentik-proxy-provider-defaults.sh`; `--check` prints the
+   census and exits 1 on drift, and a provider that already matches is left alone.
 
 ## OAuth2 relying-party quirks (this fork; corrected live 2026-10-20)
 

serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/Caddy.md

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ authentik's error page instead of the app.
    from authentik.providers.proxy.models import ProxyProvider
    from authentik.core.models import Application
    from authentik.outposts.models import Outpost
-   NAME, EXT = "abs", "https://abs.franksdank.cloud/"
+   NAME, EXT = "audiobooks", "https://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/"
    pp = ProxyProvider.objects.filter(name=f"{NAME}-proxy").first()
    if pp is None:
        pp = ProxyProvider.objects.create(name=f"{NAME}-proxy", external_host=EXT,
@@ -125,10 +125,24 @@ authentik's error page instead of the app.
    outpost routes on the ORIGINAL `Host` header alone, so anything else matches zero
    providers. Never print a provider's fields wholesale — a proxy provider carries a
    client secret, and it lands in whatever transcript the command runs in.
+
+   `ProxyProvider.objects.create()` is not the API: the serializer's
+   `set_oauth_defaults()` never runs, so the row lands with `redirect_uris` and
+   `grant_types` empty, and the guard fails *before* any credential — authentik's
+   "Redirect URI Error" page, then a bodiless HTTP 400 once the URIs are filled
+   by hand. Run `scripts/authentik-proxy-provider-defaults.sh` after the snippet
+   (idempotent, covers every provider; `--check` is the census); law and failure
+   signatures in [[Authentik Outpost Reference]].
 2. **Then the route.** The public site block proxies the whole request to `anubis:8923`
    with `header_up X-Real-Ip {remote_host}`, and the post-auth `http://:8017` listener
    gains a `@<name> host <vhost>` handler pointing at the app — copy `romm`/`files`,
    which are the same shape including a Dankserver LAN-port upstream.
+   An app that derives its own origin from the request needs the scheme pinned:
+   Audiobookshelf checks every OIDC callback against `x-forwarded-proto://Host`; this
+   listener is fed over plain http so Caddy's own `X-Forwarded-Proto` is `http`, and the
+   app answers a 400 "Invalid callback URL - must be same-origin" for its own https
+   callback. The edge for a guarded name is TLS-only, so `header_up X-Forwarded-Proto
+   https` is the truthful value ([[Audiobookshelf]]).
 3. **Then the name and the audit.** A `dankclaw/pihole/addn-hosts` line (the `pihole`
    seam fails the build if a Caddyfile vhost has no record), a Porkbun A record if the
    name must resolve off-LAN ([[LAN-DNS]]), and the subdomain added to `GUARDED` in

shared/homepage/services.json

@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@
     "category": "admin",
     "section": "Media Library Apps",
     "description": "Audiobook server for the entropy library: its own SQLite library, its own login, per-listener positions.",
-    "url": "http://abs.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/",
+    "url": "http://audiobooks.franksdank.cloud/audiobookshelf/",
     "docs": "",
     "probe": "192.168.0.235:8000",
     "method": "http",

tests/e2e/specs/14-guard.spec.ts

@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ const BASE = "https://www.franksdank.cloud";
 // Every vhost that Caddy routes through anubis:8923 (see dankclaw/Caddyfile).
 // Keep this list in lockstep with the Caddyfile: a new guarded vhost must be
 // added here or the guard-chain audit is incomplete.
-const GUARDED = ["www", "search", "romm", "files", "seerr", "grafana", "prometheus", "loki", "notebook", "abs"];
+const GUARDED = ["www", "search", "romm", "files", "seerr", "grafana", "prometheus", "loki", "notebook", "audiobooks"];
 
 // Markers that prove app content leaked past the guard to an anonymous user. Each
 // marker must be a string the APP renders that the gate itself could never print —
-// for abs that is the Audiobookshelf login's own SSO button label (the app's OIDC
+// for audiobooks that is the Audiobookshelf login's own SSO button label (the app's
 // door), which authentik's gate never renders because it IS the IdP.
 const LEAK_MARKERS: Record<string, string[]> = {
   "search.franksdank.cloud": ["SearXNG preferences"],
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ const LEAK_MARKERS: Record<string, string[]> = {
   "grafana.franksdank.cloud": ["Dashboards"],
   "prometheus.franksdank.cloud": ["Expression Browser", "Graph"],
   "notebook.franksdank.cloud": ["Open Notebook"],
-  "abs.franksdank.cloud": ["Sign in with Authentik"],
+  "audiobooks.franksdank.cloud": ["Sign in with Authentik"],
 };
 
 test("homepage root (/) is guarded for unauthenticated users", async ({ page }) => {