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980491668c | ||
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2fe68e69af |
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@@ -47,24 +47,9 @@ Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=${GRAFANA_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET}
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# client_id query parameter — /application/o/<slug>/authorize/ does not exist.
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# client_id query parameter — /application/o/<slug>/authorize/ does not exist.
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_AUTH_URL=https://auth.franksdank.cloud/application/o/authorize/
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_AUTH_URL=https://auth.franksdank.cloud/application/o/authorize/
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL=https://auth.franksdank.cloud/application/o/token/
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL=https://auth.franksdank.cloud/application/o/token/
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# Standard OIDC userinfo. Grafana v13 fetches <api_url>/emails for the address
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# ?api=1 = introspection-style userinfo: returns custom claims (groups) too.
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# ONLY when the token carries no `email` claim (authentik has no /emails path and
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_API_URL=https://auth.franksdank.cloud/application/o/userinfo/?api=1
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# 404s it, failing the login) — so the claim must actually be there: the fix is
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ALLOW_SIGN_UP=false
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# the grafana-email-scope mapping (see scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh),
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# not a Grafana flag. Do NOT append ?api=1 to this URL: Grafana then GETs
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# <...>/userinfo/?api=1/emails, a 403.
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_API_URL=https://auth.franksdank.cloud/application/o/userinfo/
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# authentik's scopes are openid/email/profile. `user:email` (a GitLab-ism) is
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# not a known scope here; requesting it makes the authorize view crash.
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# Quoted: quadlet word-splits Environment=, so an unquoted spaced list
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# truncates SCOPES to its first token.
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Environment="GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_SCOPES=openid email profile"
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_EMAIL_ATTRIBUTE_PATH=email
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_LOGIN_ATTRIBUTE_PATH=sub
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_NAME_ATTRIBUTE_PATH=preferred_username
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# First SSO login auto-provisions the user. Safe: unauthenticated traffic never
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# reaches this callback — the Anubis -> Authentik guard fronts every request.
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ALLOW_SIGN_UP=true
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_AUTO_UPSERT=true
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_AUTO_UPSERT=true
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ALLOW_ASSIGN_ORG=true
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ALLOW_ASSIGN_ORG=true
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ORG_ID=1
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Environment=GF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ORG_ID=1
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@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Repair the Grafana OAuth2 relying-party SSO on Dankclaw's authentik.
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#
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# grafana.franksdank.cloud logs in through authentik as an OAuth2 relying party.
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# Two DB-side facts (the provider was created by hand via `ak shell`, never
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# repo-managed) silently broke that login, and BOTH had previously been
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# mis-recorded here as a single "the property-mapping evaluator is broken, so
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# userinfo returns only `sub`" myth. They are neither, and the evaluator is fine:
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#
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# 1. provider.authorization_flow was NULL. The authorize view builds a flow
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# planner from it and crashes with
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# `AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'slug'` — an HTTP 500
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# "Server Error — Powered by authentik", before any claim is touched.
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# Fix: point it at default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent, the
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# flow every other provider in this instance already uses.
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# 2. The `grafana-email-scope` ScopeMapping's expression was the bare string
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# `user.email`. authentik merges a scope mapping's result into the token as
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# a MAPPING: a returned dict adds its keys as claims; a returned string is
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# keyed under the mapping's NAME ("grafana-email-scope"), so no `email`
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# claim is ever emitted. Grafana, finding no email, falls back to
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# GET <api_url>/emails, authentik 404s that path, and the login dies with
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# "Login failed: InternalError". Fix: return
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# {"email": user.email, "email_verified": True} — the shape the stock
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# OpenID 'email' mapping uses. The dict-valued `grafana-profile-scope`
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# mapping has always worked, which is the proof the evaluator is fine.
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#
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# This is authentik DB state. It is NOT in any deployable file: a blueprint
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# re-import, or an ak-shell re-creation of the grafana provider, reverts BOTH
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# facts and the symptom returns verbatim. Re-run this after any such rebuild.
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# Every step is idempotent.
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#
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# Grafana's own half — SCOPES="openid email profile", a standard userinfo API_URL
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# with no `?api=1`, and ALLOW_SIGN_UP=true — lives in
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# dankclaw/observability/quadlet/grafana.container and deploys normally.
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#
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# Usage: authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh (override host: AUTHENTIK_HOST=…)
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set -euo pipefail
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HOST="${AUTHENTIK_HOST:-dankclaw}"
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ssh "$HOST" 'podman exec -i authentik-server ak shell' <<'PYEOF'
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from authentik.flows.models import Flow
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from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import OAuth2Provider
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p = OAuth2Provider.objects.filter(name="grafana").first()
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if not p:
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raise SystemExit("no OAuth2Provider named 'grafana'")
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# 1. The authorization flow every other provider uses.
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want = Flow.objects.filter(slug="default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent").first()
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if not want:
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raise SystemExit("default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent flow is missing")
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if p.authorization_flow_id != want.pk:
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p.authorization_flow = want
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p.save()
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print(f"set grafana.authorization_flow -> {want.slug}")
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else:
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print(f"grafana.authorization_flow already {want.slug}")
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# 2. The email scope mapping must RETURN A DICT, not a bare string.
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m = p.property_mappings.filter(name="grafana-email-scope").first()
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if not m:
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raise SystemExit("grafana-email-scope mapping is missing")
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fixed = 'return {"email": user.email, "email_verified": True}'
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if m.expression.strip() != fixed:
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m.expression = fixed
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m.save()
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print("repaired grafana-email-scope -> returns {email, email_verified}")
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else:
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print("grafana-email-scope expression already correct")
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# 3. The id_token must carry the scope claims; Grafana reads identity from it.
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if not p.include_claims_in_id_token:
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p.include_claims_in_id_token = True
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p.save()
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print("enabled include_claims_in_id_token")
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else:
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print("include_claims_in_id_token already on")
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PYEOF
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echo "Done. Verify: sign in at https://grafana.franksdank.cloud via Authentik;"
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echo "the round trip must land on / and /api/user must answer 200 with an email."
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@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Two provisioning rules, each verified live by an outage:
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appears. Create the Application with `provider_id` set (the UI does this
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appears. Create the Application with `provider_id` set (the UI does this
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automatically; raw API/ORM drives must do it explicitly).
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automatically; raw API/ORM drives must do it explicitly).
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## OAuth2 relying-party quirks (this fork; corrected live 2026-10-20)
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## OAuth2 relying-party quirks (this fork, verified live 2026-08-31)
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The Grafana RP provider (`grafana`, pk 9, confidential client) was created and
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The Grafana RP provider (`grafana`, pk 9, confidential client) was created and
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verified end-to-end via `ak shell` ORM drives. This fork's OAuth2 provider
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verified end-to-end via `ak shell` ORM drives. This fork's OAuth2 provider
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@@ -100,32 +100,23 @@ implementation diverges from upstream in ways that bit us; all verified live:
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- **Provider resolution is by `client_id` query param** on the global
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- **Provider resolution is by `client_id` query param** on the global
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`/application/o/authorize/` route; per-slug authorize paths do not exist in
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`/application/o/authorize/` route; per-slug authorize paths do not exist in
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this build. Token/userinfo live at `/application/o/token/` and
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this build. Token/userinfo live at `/application/o/token/` and
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`/application/o/userinfo/` — do **not** append `?api=1` to a Grafana API URL.
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`/application/o/userinfo/?api=1`.
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- **NULL `authorization_flow` → authorize 500, `AttributeError: 'NoneType'
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- **Property-mapping evaluator is broken → userinfo returns `sub` only.**
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object has no attribute 'slug'`.** A provider created via raw `ak shell`
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`PropertyMappingEvaluator.evaluate(*args, **kwargs)` forwards kwargs to
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`create()` leaves `authorization_flow` unset; the authorize view then crashes
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`BaseEvaluator.evaluate(expression_source)`, so the first context kwarg
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building the flow planner (`flows/planner.py`) and returns "Server Error —
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becomes the *expression source* instead of the context; every call raises a
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Powered by authentik" before any claim is built. This was previously
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swallowed `PropertyMappingExpressionException` and the claim is skipped.
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mis-attributed to a broken evaluator; the crash is the missing flow. Fix: set
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Scope-grant filtering has the same class of bug: `ScopeMapping` has no
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`authorization_flow = default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent` (the
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provider FK (linkage lives in the `ProviderPropertyMapping` through model)
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flow every other provider in this instance already uses).
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so `filter(provider=...)` always yields an empty queryset and tokens asked
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- **A scope mapping that returns a non-dict emits no claim.** authentik merges a
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to carry scopes get zero. Net effect: userinfo/introspection answers with
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granted scope mapping's evaluated result into the token **as a mapping**: a
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`{sub}` only — email/groups/entitlements claims cannot be delivered by this
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dict contributes its keys as claims; a bare string is keyed under the
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build until the evaluator is patched or upgraded. Clients consuming this
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mapping's NAME, so nothing usable appears. `grafana-email-scope` returned the
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provider must key identity off `sub`.
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bare string `user.email`, so no `email` claim landed — the evaluator was
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- Scope mappings for this provider exist — `grafana-email-scope` and
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never broken (the dict-valued `grafana-profile-scope` mapping has always
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`grafana-profile-scope` are both rows in `authentik_core_propertymapping`
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delivered, and the stock OpenID mappings return dicts). Fix:
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(read-only `SELECT`, 2026-10-18) — and will start emitting claims the moment
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`return {"email": user.email, "email_verified": True}`. With no email, Grafana
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the evaluator bug is fixed; no config change is needed then.
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v13 falls back to GET `<api_url>/emails`; authentik 404s it → "Login failed:
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InternalError".
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- **Grafana reads identity from the standard userinfo endpoint** (`API_URL` with
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no `?api=1`); no `USE_ID_TOKEN` is needed once the `email` claim exists.
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- **Net (2026-10-20):** the evaluator is fine; email/profile claims reach RP
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clients. Both IdP fixes are idempotent in
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`scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh` (re-run after an ak-shell re-creation of
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the provider or a blueprint import, which revert them). Grafana's half plus the
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verified outcome (Viewer, `login = <sub hex>`, email present) are in [[Grafana]].
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## LDAP provider objects (provisioned via `ak shell` ORM)
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## LDAP provider objects (provisioned via `ak shell` ORM)
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: "Grafana visualizes the metrics that Prometheus collects from every
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tags:
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tags:
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- infrastructure
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- infrastructure
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- grafana
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- grafana
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timestamp: 2026-10-20
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timestamp: 2026-09-11
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---
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---
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# Grafana
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# Grafana
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@@ -64,28 +64,19 @@ Grafana responds on `/api/health` with 200 and `"database":"ok"`; measured 2026-
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- Change the default admin credentials at first boot (env or UI).
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- Change the default admin credentials at first boot (env or UI).
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- Dashboards provisioned as code (dashboard JSON plus a YAML provider, `shared/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/`) survive container recreation; UI-created ones live in the data volume — back it up.
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- Dashboards provisioned as code (dashboard JSON plus a YAML provider, `shared/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/`) survive container recreation; UI-created ones live in the data volume — back it up.
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- **Auth = OAuth2 relying-party, not auth_proxy.** The embedded outpost carries
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- **Auth = OAuth2 relying-party, not auth_proxy.** The embedded outpost carries
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no provider token (`token=None`), so no identity header reaches Grafana; the
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no provider token (`token=None`), so no identity header ever reaches Grafana;
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login is Grafana's own "Sign in with Authentik" button against the `grafana`
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RP mode is topology-independent. The full verified contract (provider pk 9,
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confidential-client provider. **Verified end-to-end 2026-10-20** after four
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client_id `grafana-21ca190cde75d60f`, global authorize/token/userinfo paths,
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independent breakages had made it fail. The two Authentik-side causes (a NULL
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Basic client auth, form-encoded token body, and the fork's userinfo-claims
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`authorization_flow` → authorize 500; an email scope mapping that returned a
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bug that leaves identity at the `sub` hash only) is in
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bare string so no `email` claim was emitted) and the full wire contract live in
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[[Authentik Outpost Reference]] → "OAuth2 relying-party quirks". Consequences for Grafana:
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[[Authentik Outpost Reference]] → "OAuth2 relying-party quirks"; the IdP half is
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The unit sets `ALLOW_SIGN_UP=false`, `AUTO_UPSERT=true`, `ALLOW_ASSIGN_ORG=true`
|
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re-applied by `scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh` (idempotent — re-run after
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`ORG_ID=1` and **no** role-attribute mapping (`grafana.container:52-55`), so
|
||||||
an ak-shell re-creation of the provider or a blueprint import, both of which
|
users land as Viewer with `login = <sub hex>`; no email/groups/role claims
|
||||||
revert it silently). The Grafana half is the unit's own env (`grafana.container`):
|
reach Grafana until the evaluator bug is fixed — do not write role mappings
|
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`SCOPES="openid email profile"` (a GitLab-style `user:email` scope crashes the
|
that depend on those claims. The local admin account stays the only Admin.
|
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authorize view), the standard userinfo `API_URL` with **no `?api=1`**, the
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(The Viewer-default outcome and the `<sub hex>` login are not readable from
|
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attribute paths `email`/`sub`/`preferred_username`, and `ALLOW_SIGN_UP=true`
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the host without the database or an admin password. *(unverified 2026-10-18)*)
|
||||||
(safe: the guard fronts the callback). Grafana v13 only GETs `<api_url>/emails`
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when the token carries no `email` claim — so it is the email claim itself (an
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IdP fix, above) that makes the login land, not any Grafana toggle.
|
|
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- **What a new login becomes:** a Viewer in org 1 (`ALLOW_ASSIGN_ORG=true`,
|
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||||||
`ORG_ID=1`, no role-attribute mapping), with `login = <sub hex>` but the real
|
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||||||
`email`. The local admin account stays the only Admin. The landing that the
|
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edge-only 13-sso spec never checked is now asserted by
|
|
||||||
`tests/e2e/specs/20-grafana-sso.spec.ts` (RP round-trip → `/api/user` 200 with
|
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an email).
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|
||||||
- **Never point this unit's `EnvironmentFile` at the repo-root `.env`.** That
|
- **Never point this unit's `EnvironmentFile` at the repo-root `.env`.** That
|
||||||
file is a gluetun env file and it carries `HOME=/root`; systemd imports it
|
file is a gluetun env file and it carries `HOME=/root`; systemd imports it
|
||||||
for the service, podman then looks for its configuration under `/root`
|
for the service, podman then looks for its configuration under `/root`
|
||||||
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|||||||
@@ -29,10 +29,8 @@ export default defineConfig({
|
|||||||
// green suite with a test that does not exist. 17- joined on 2026-09-16
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// green suite with a test that does not exist. 17- joined on 2026-09-16
|
||||||
// (the hermes vhost, whose upstream is a host address rather than a
|
// (the hermes vhost, whose upstream is a host address rather than a
|
||||||
// container name, so it needs its own pass condition). 18- joined on
|
// container name, so it needs its own pass condition). 18- joined on
|
||||||
// 2026-09-24 (OpenWebUI SSO through authentik). 20- joined on 2026-10-21
|
// 2026-09-24 (OpenWebUI SSO through authentik).
|
||||||
// (Grafana's OAuth2 relying-party login, which the edge-only 13- never
|
testMatch: /(10|12|13|16|17|18)-.*\.spec\.ts/,
|
||||||
// follows).
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||||||
testMatch: /(10|12|13|16|17|18|20)-.*\.spec\.ts/,
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||||||
use: { storageState: ".auth/qa-e2e.json" },
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use: { storageState: ".auth/qa-e2e.json" },
|
||||||
dependencies: ["setup"],
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dependencies: ["setup"],
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||||||
},
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},
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
import { expect, test } from "@playwright/test";
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||||||
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||||||
// Grafana (grafana.franksdank.cloud) is an OAuth2 RELYING PARTY, not an
|
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||||||
// outpost-fronted proxy: the guard chain (13-sso) only proves an authenticated
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||||||
// session reaches Grafana's login page. The login itself happens through
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||||||
// Grafana's own "Sign in with Authentik" button, which the edge test never
|
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||||||
// follows — that is exactly how the RP login could be dead (500 on authorize,
|
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||||||
// or an email-claim gap bouncing back to /login) while 13- still passed green.
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||||||
// This spec drives the real RP round-trip and asserts a live Grafana session.
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||||||
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||||||
const HOST = "grafana.franksdank.cloud";
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||||||
const CHALLENGE = "Making sure you're not a bot";
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|
||||||
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||||||
test("SSO: Grafana relying-party login lands a real session", async ({ page, request }) => {
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||||||
test.setTimeout(180_000);
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
// Warm the guard: the vhost runs its own Anubis proof-of-work on first visit.
|
|
||||||
await page.goto(`https://${HOST}/`);
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|
||||||
await expect
|
|
||||||
.poll(
|
|
||||||
async () => !(await page.locator("body").innerText()).includes(CHALLENGE),
|
|
||||||
{ timeout: 90_000 },
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
.toBe(true);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// The "Sign in with Authentik" button targets this RP start URL exactly.
|
|
||||||
// Going straight there is the same code path without depending on the SPA's
|
|
||||||
// button markup.
|
|
||||||
await page.goto(`https://${HOST}/login/generic_oauth`);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// The chain: grafana -> auth (implicit consent, the session is already
|
|
||||||
// there) -> back to grafana with the code -> grafana provisions the user and
|
|
||||||
// redirects to "/". A dead provider/claims config bounces back to /login.
|
|
||||||
await expect
|
|
||||||
.poll(
|
|
||||||
async () => {
|
|
||||||
const u = new URL(page.url());
|
|
||||||
return u.hostname === HOST && u.pathname !== "/login";
|
|
||||||
},
|
|
||||||
{ timeout: 90_000 },
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
.toBe(true);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const body = await page.locator("body").innerText();
|
|
||||||
expect(body).not.toContain("Login failed");
|
|
||||||
expect(body.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("powered by authentik"); // IdP flow shell
|
|
||||||
expect(body).not.toContain(CHALLENGE);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A genuine logged-in session exists: /api/user answers 200 with an email,
|
|
||||||
// not 401. This is the assertion the edge-only spec could never make.
|
|
||||||
const resp = await page.request.get(`https://${HOST}/api/user`);
|
|
||||||
expect(resp.status()).toBe(200);
|
|
||||||
const user = await resp.json();
|
|
||||||
expect(typeof user.email).toBe("string");
|
|
||||||
expect(user.email.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
|
|
||||||
});
|
|
||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user