The stock SearXNG image ships a native kagi engine; enabling it needs an
API key that must never enter git, and SearXNG does not expand env vars
in settings.yml (the live secret_key literally was '${SEARXNG_SECRET}'
until now — the app tolerated the placeholder string silently).
- settings.yml: kagi engine enabled (weight 2, kg shortcut, paging off so
exactly one API credit per aggregated query, timeout 8.0 vs 5.0 scrapers
so a slow paid query is not a wasted credit); api_key stays ${KAGI_API_KEY}.
- new scripts/searxng-render-settings.py: deploy-time renderer, allowlisted
to KAGI_API_KEY/SEARXNG_SECRET/SEARXNG_BASE_URL, fails the deploy loudly
on an unresolvable placeholder, idempotent on redeploys.
- deploy-remote.sh copy_searxng_config runs the renderer against
/opt/searxng/.env after copying settings.yml into /opt/searxng/config.
- KAGI_API_KEY placeholder added to dankclaw/.env.example (real key staged
into the host-side /opt/searxng/.env, mode 600, out of band).
- bats: engine wiring, renderer substitution, loud-failure, deployer seam.
- docs: SearXNG.md Kagi section + renderer law; Providers.md carve-out on
the no-credentials policy (paid engine acceptable when bounded + ordered).
Verified live on dankclaw: direct API probe via the gluetun netns (200,
data.search[] shape), then an aggregated query returned 29/29 results
tagged kagi, zero unresponsive engines.
Root cause of the 429s: the ip_limit rate limiter caps JSON (format!=html)
requests at API_MAX=4 per IP per hour, and that constant is hardcoded in
Python (searx/botdetection/ip_limit.py), not settable in limiter.toml. The
only bypass is pass_ip (filter_request returns before ip_limit runs).
Rootless podman strips the client IP on published-port hits, so the container
sees a slirp/bridge source (10.88.x/10.89.x), never the real client - hence
even a LAN-IP curl 429'd on /search. Expand pass_ip to loopback + the host's
private podman/slirp ranges (plus the existing LAN) so local subagents present
a trusted source and skip the rate limit entirely. All these ranges are
reachable only from the host or LAN, never the internet.
Converts the podman-compose SearXNG stack to boot-persistent quadlet units so
it survives a reboot (the compose deployment did not). searxng sets
Network=gluetun.container, which makes it reuse gluetun's network namespace so
outbound search traffic exits the WireGuard tunnel; it publishes no port of its
own (the port lives on gluetun). gluetun and valkey join a pinned searxng
network (10.89.2.0/24, DNS-enabled) so searxng reaches valkey by name.
Secrets stay in /opt/searxng/.env (mode 0600), referenced via [Service]
EnvironmentFile= so ${VAR} expands. Adds a bats seam asserting the netns
wiring, port placement, boot install, and that no secret material is tracked.
A direct hit on the published port has no X-Forwarded-For header, so the
bot-detection cannot resolve a client and returns 429. SearXNG must be
reached through Caddy (search.dankclaw.local), which sets X-Forwarded-For.
Add the podman bridge subnets to trusted_proxies so Caddy's source is
trusted for XFF extraction; note the CIDR is dynamic and should be pinned.
Verified agentic JSON search returns 26-31 relevant results via this path.
The trusted group lives in limiter.toml, not settings.yml. Add
shared/searxng/limiter.toml trusting 192.168.0.0/24 in pass_ip and
trusted_proxies, copy it into /opt/searxng/config on deploy, and correct
the SearXNG doc. New test seam: tests/searxng_limiter.bats.
Frank