Audit of all 12 e2e specs for the 'green-but-vacuous' class that broke
Grafana's SSO. The suite is otherwise sound (incident-driven, leakage-based);
two real coverage gaps surfaced:
- notebook.franksdank.cloud (open-notebook, deployed 2026-10-19) was a guarded
vhost in NEITHER the 13-/14- GUARDED lists NOR any dedicated spec. A broken
upstream would stay invisible - the exact 17-hermes class. Added to the 14-
guard audit (unauth -> authentik gate, 'Open Notebook' leak marker) plus a
new 21- that proves authenticated reachability to open-notebook's own login
through the guard chain, with a positive app marker.
- prometheus.franksdank.cloud was only ever asserted '<500 and not a login
wall' (13-/11-), which a 404 also passes. New 22- adds the app-is-really-
there proof 20- gives Grafana: SSO handoff + its own /api/v1/status/buildinfo
answers {status:success}.
Both specs wired into the standard project (playwright testMatch), which the
e2e_scaffold bats gate enforces. Verified live against the fleet; full bats
suite green.
Live run against the fleet showed the outpost redirects direct navigation to
auth.franksdank.cloud with the guarded host preserved as redirect_uri, rather
than rendering the flow UI in place. The security property under test is that
an unauthenticated visitor never sees app content; assert that shape (uidField
visible + no leak markers + gate is either in-place or a redirect carrying the
return path) instead of hostname preservation.
14-guard.spec.ts: every authentik-guarded vhost (www, search, romm, files,
seerr, grafana, prometheus, loki) must challenge an unauthenticated direct
navigation; plex is asserted exempt (PMS answers directly, no IdP form).
11-admin.spec.ts: admin direct-nav to grafana/prometheus/loki passes through
with host preserved and no uidField challenge.
Frank