The two knobs that keep the box alive: TTS_BATCH_SIZE=1 and
OPEN_NOTEBOOK_WORKER_MAX_TASKS=1. Upstream ships 5 x 5; frank-tts spawns one
~8 GiB, 8-thread engine process per synthesis request on a machine that also
serves two LLMs, so a five-way fan-out is a self-inflicted shutdown. The worker
knob is real, not decorative: the image's supervisord expands
${OPEN_NOTEBOOK_WORKER_MAX_TASKS:-5} into the worker command
(supervisord.conf:25).
Both ESPERANTO_* timeouts go above upstream's 300 s defaults, sized for CPU
synthesis (SHIM_TIMEOUT=600, LLAMA_TTS_THREADS=8) — one episode is dozens of
per-line /audio/speech calls and a timeout kills the episode, not the line.
API_URL is forced for the 5055 -> 5056 remap; SURREAL_URL addresses the database
by container name; CORS_ORIGINS is origin-form (scheme://host:port), the form
the app compares against. OPEN_NOTEBOOK_PASSWORD stays absent here on purpose:
the app treats a set-but-empty value as auth-on.
Secrets stay placeholders in the tracked file and in dankclaw/.env.example, which
lists SURREAL_PASSWORD rather than SURREAL_PASS — the deployer derives the
surreal CLI's spelling from it when it seeds, so the app and the database cannot
be handed different values.
The stock SearXNG image ships a native kagi engine; enabling it needs an
API key that must never enter git, and SearXNG does not expand env vars
in settings.yml (the live secret_key literally was '${SEARXNG_SECRET}'
until now — the app tolerated the placeholder string silently).
- settings.yml: kagi engine enabled (weight 2, kg shortcut, paging off so
exactly one API credit per aggregated query, timeout 8.0 vs 5.0 scrapers
so a slow paid query is not a wasted credit); api_key stays ${KAGI_API_KEY}.
- new scripts/searxng-render-settings.py: deploy-time renderer, allowlisted
to KAGI_API_KEY/SEARXNG_SECRET/SEARXNG_BASE_URL, fails the deploy loudly
on an unresolvable placeholder, idempotent on redeploys.
- deploy-remote.sh copy_searxng_config runs the renderer against
/opt/searxng/.env after copying settings.yml into /opt/searxng/config.
- KAGI_API_KEY placeholder added to dankclaw/.env.example (real key staged
into the host-side /opt/searxng/.env, mode 600, out of band).
- bats: engine wiring, renderer substitution, loud-failure, deployer seam.
- docs: SearXNG.md Kagi section + renderer law; Providers.md carve-out on
the no-credentials policy (paid engine acceptable when bounded + ordered).
Verified live on dankclaw: direct API probe via the gluetun netns (200,
data.search[] shape), then an aggregated query returned 29/29 results
tagged kagi, zero unresponsive engines.
The embedded outpost carries no provider token (token=None), so the
auth_proxy identity header was never set and no user could log in. RP
mode is topology-independent: challenge gate stays in front, login runs
inside Grafana via the OAuth2 code flow against auth.franksdank.cloud.
Provider 'grafana' (pk 9, confidential) created via ak shell; secret
written straight into the live .env (never in git). Auth URL uses the
global /application/o/authorize/ path — this fork resolves the provider
by client_id query param; per-slug authorize does not exist.
Caddyfile comment corrected: no identity header is forwarded to Grafana.
Grafana leaves the exempt-by-construction set: grafana.franksdank.cloud
now terminates at the Anubis guard (anubis:8923) and authenticated
traffic returns at the internal :8017 listener, where an @grafana Host
handler proxies through to grafana:3000 with the outpost-proxy trust
token (GRAFANA_PROXY_TOKEN = client_id_client_secret of the new
'grafana-proxy' ProxyProvider on the embedded outpost; created via
ak shell before this route flip — provider-first ordering per the
External Exposure Policy).
The Grafana admin account is intentionally kept: auth.proxy in
auto-upsert mode only creates non-admin users, so the local admin
remains the only way to administer Grafana. The old edge-basicauth
wrapper is retired (shared family password, no per-user audit trail).
- Caddyfile: grafana vhost flipped to the guarded chain; @grafana
handler added at the :8017 return listener.
- compose.yaml: GF_AUTH_PROXY_ENABLED/HEADERS/TOKEN on the grafana
service (auth_proxy trusted-proxy CIDRs left at the image default —
the proxying Caddy container is not statically addressable on
10.89.0.0/24, so Grafana trusts any in-network source and relies on
the token as the capability).
- .env.example: GRAFANA_PROXY_TOKEN placeholder so test env_consistency
keeps guarding the compose<->env contract.
The homepage user page + shared data now use a dedicated CADDY_HOMEPAGE_HASH
(username dankuser), separate from the shared family password (CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH,
username dank, still used by the other vhosts) and the operator password
(CADDY_ADMIN_HASH, username frank, the /admin/ page). This lets the homepage be
re-logged independently without touching the other sites. deploy.sh renders the
new placeholder; the .env.example documents all three hashes.
- Caddyfile: drop http:// site prefixes, global acme_dns porkbun block,
HTTPS redirects on the bare-IP and legacy vhosts
- new dankclaw/caddy/Containerfile: xcaddy build with caddy-dns/porkbun
- compose: caddy uses franksdank/caddy-porkbun:latest + Porkbun env vars
- deploy.sh: build the image on first deploy if missing
- .env.example: rename PORKBUN_API_SECRET -> PORKBUN_API_SECRET_KEY
(the name the caddy-dns/porkbun module expects)
- tests: 7 new caddyfile/compose seams for the TLS config
Per user direction, Caddy runs only on dankclaw. It fronts every
service on both hosts: local services by container name, quadlet
services by published LAN port, dankserver services by published LAN
port (192.168.0.235:PORT).
- dankclaw/Caddyfile: merged vhost list (was: two Caddyfiles, one per
host). gitea's single vhost moves in from the retired gitea-caddy
quadlet (option B). Upstreams fixed to live reality: gitea :3000,
search :8081 (gluetun), chat :3005 (open-webui quadlet), media
services via 192.168.0.235. Retired: llms (open-webui on dankserver
is removed; chat is its successor), the dankserver homepage (302 to
the shared one).
- dankserver/Caddyfile, dankclaw/gitea/Caddyfile: deleted (git rm).
- dnsmasq addn-hosts: every name -> 192.168.0.143 (the one Caddy
host); no .235 records, no llms.
- compose.yaml: removed the openwebui/postgres/gitea services (they
are quadlets now); caddy service mounts the rendered Caddyfile from
/home/dank/Containers/caddy, healthcheck probes the bare-IP
catch-all (302).
- deploy.sh: per-target logic (dankserver = pull-only, health via the
shared Caddy at 192.168.0.143); renders CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH from
the host .env into the mounted Caddyfile.
- .env.example: CADDY_BASICAUTH_HASH on dankclaw; Porkbun block
dropped from dankserver (its Caddy is gone); SEARXNG_BASE_URL to
the flat name; stale OPENAI_* block dropped (quadlet is
self-contained).
- tests: caddyfile.bats now asserts the single-Caddyfile invariant;
dnsmasq.bats cross-checks vhosts -> .143 and the retired names.
Real tokens live only in the host .env files (git-ignored):
- /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankclaw/.env
- /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankserver/.env
Token is scoped to the franksdank.cloud zone (DNS read/write).
The hermes container reaches the host signal-cli daemon via podman's
host.containers.internal alias (127.0.0.1 in the container is not the host).
SIGNAL_ACCOUNT/SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS come from the git-ignored .env (the phone
number is personal, not committed). Move the data volume to a dank-owned path
(/opt is root-owned and not writable by the run user).
The compose only forwarded VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER, VPN_TYPE and the private
key, so Gluetun could not form a tunnel. Forward the peer public key,
endpoint IP/port, addresses, allowed IPs and keepalive interval. Add
matching placeholders to .env.example (current Gluetun uses the
single-peer WIREGUARD_* model, not the old WIREGUARD_PEERS_* names).
Frank