hermes-webui is Network=host, so 8787 is a bare host-netns bind, and netavark
DNATs only *published* ports. From Caddy's bridge netns 192.168.0.143:8787 and
10.89.1.1:8787 are both refused, while host.containers.internal:8787
(169.254.1.2) answers 200 — measured live 2026-09-16 from inside the Caddy
container. The dashboard's published 9119 answers on that same LAN IP, which is
what made the old upstream look sound.
The vhost comment asserted "192.168.0.143:8787 is open" from that bridge; it is
not, so the claim is replaced with the measurement, and the hermes-webui quadlet
comment carries the same correction. The seam guarding this invariant accepted
any numeric upstream, so the LAN IP passed it; it now pins the measured-working
form and fails on the LAN IP (teeth verified by substitution).
Dankclaw's endpoints are re-split. frank-large is the halogen-flash-server
quadlet again -- the 2026-09-13 unit file was never touched by the two-day
ik_llama.cpp interlude, so the runtime was still in the repo and its image is
still in local storage -- retuned to the shape asked for: HALOGEN_CTX 200192
with a 400,384-position pool and two slots, exactly two 200k conversations.
frank-small is new: mainline llama.cpp on the RTX 3090 serving
ISTA-DASLab/Qwen3.8-27B-GSQ-RCO-GGUF at IQ3_S, using the -mtp build (it carries
blk.64.nextn.*, which is what lets --spec-type draft-mtp run on the main
model's own weights instead of a second 12 GiB copy) plus the BF16 vision
projector, as one 131,072-token slot with f16 KV on port 7771.
The host is shared now, and that is what the halogen retune pays for:
HALOGEN_MAX_TOK 24576 (arena 20.6 -> 16.4 GiB, ~4-5% prefill) and the vision
tower dropped (1.97 GiB) hand ~6 GiB back to the host, and the reserve rises to
20 to keep the fit check honest. Vision moved wholesale to frank-small.
Retired to scripts/.AGENTTRASH/: the ik trio (env, service, serve script), the
Qwen-Sharp template only that runtime read, and four benchmark harnesses bound
to retired runtimes. Because retiring a file makes any test that greps it pass
by absence, the seams assert the archive exists AND the live path does not.
Retiring dankclaw/compose.yaml and adding alert rules invalidated claims across
the repo, including in the rule file agents read first. Clean cutover includes
the prose.
**Tests that had gone hollow.** Four assertions grepped dankclaw/compose.yaml
for a service name. With the file gone they passed by *absence* — a gate that
can no longer fail. Each now asserts the real invariant ("no dankclaw compose
file competes with the quadlet units") and keeps a live check for a re-added
entry, so it still fails when one appears: verified by recreating a compose file
with a comfyui service and watching three tests go red, then removing it.
**AGENTS.md, which was wrong about ComfyUI.** It said ComfyUI runs CPU-only
("no ROCm wheels for gfx1151, CUDA images wrong"). That was true in the
compose era and is false now: the restored unit runs with /dev/kfd + /dev/dri and
must NOT pass --cpu. An agent trusting the rule file would have re-broken it.
Also corrected: the observability paragraph ("RUNNING BUT UNCONFIGURED, no
datasource, no rules" — all three have been configured since 2026-09-16), the
Active runbook row that still named halogen for frank-large, halogen's absence
from the Retired table, the benchmark policy naming halogen's harness, and the
seam list.
**Unit and page claims.** prometheus.container said "no alerting rules anywhere
in this stack"; node-exporter.container said Dankserver runs from its compose
stack; Prometheus.md documented three jobs as working (they scrape HTML: they
can never report up) and said no dashboard existed; index.md and the three
authentik service pages pointed at the retired file; Authentik.md's upgrade
instruction told you to bump an image tag in it.
One bad edit of my own on the way (a stale line number clobbered a See Also
entry in Prometheus.md) — caught by reading back, fixed, and the vault link
checker now proves the cross-references hold.
I tightened HERMES_WEBUI_HOST to 127.0.0.1 on the reasoning that the compose
service had published loopback and the unit had widened it. That reasoning
missed the consumer: this unit is host-networked (it shares the CDP daemon's
loopback), so Caddy cannot reach it by container name and fronts the guarded
vhost hermes.franksdank.cloud with `reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8787` — recorded
in dankclaw/Caddyfile with the same explanation. With the app on loopback that
upstream is dead, so the vhost broke.
The wildcard bind is what serves BOTH consumers: Caddy on the LAN address and
the phone's SSH tunnel on the host's localhost. Controls are the auth chain in
front of the vhost plus the webui password. The unit comment now states this
instead of the incorrect 'as before' claim, and the near-miss is worth the
paragraph: the e2e gate stayed green because no spec covers that vhost.
Two things, found while checking whether the hermes trio still needed migrating.
1. **The phone-facing webui was exposed to the LAN.** Its unit runs with
Network=host, so there is no Podman port forwarder and the app's own bind is
the exposure. The compose service it replaced published
`127.0.0.1:8787:8787` (loopback); the unit bound `HERMES_WEBUI_HOST=0.0.0.0`,
and the LAN address answered 200 — password-gated, but on every interface,
which is not the documented "SSH tunnel is the sole ingress" posture. It now
binds 127.0.0.1, which serves the tunnel just as well (sshd dials
localhost:8787 from the host). The unit comment claiming "LAN-facing as
before" was wrong about "before", and is corrected.
2. **Dankclaw's compose.yaml is retired.** Auditing ownership showed every
running container on that host reports a PODMAN_SYSTEMD_UNIT label — the
hermes trio's units have owned their containers since 2026-09-12 — so the
three service blocks left in compose.yaml were dead weight that could only
create a duplicate container fighting a unit for a name. deploy_hermes was
already fully unit-based. The file is staged in .AGENTTRASH/; the planner
plans nothing for it, an unknown service on that target now errors instead of
silently no-oping through `podman-compose`, and DANKCLAW_COMPOSE_SERVICES is
empty.
The hermes-webui seam now reads the unit — it read compose, which is exactly how
the bind drifted while the test kept passing against a file nobody ran.
ComfyUI had failed 9,146 times and had been down ~7 hours when this was found:
its container was created 2026-09-15 14:12, BEFORE the GPU declarations were
added to the compose service, and `restart: unless-stopped` kept restarting
that stale container — no /dev/kfd, no /dev/dri, no keep-groups — so it died
every time on `RuntimeError: No HIP GPUs are available`. Its "unit" was a
hand-written ~/.config/systemd/user/comfyui.service that shelled out to
`podman compose up -d`, which is not repo-tracked state and collides by name
with the Quadlet the generator produces.
- dankclaw/comfyui/quadlet/comfyui.container: image comfyui-rocm:gfx1151
(built from Containerfile.comfyui), /dev/kfd + /dev/dri, keep-groups,
the four comfyui-data volumes, loopback-only publish (an unguarded service
is internal-only here; the homepage card probes 127.0.0.1:8188), Restart=
always, WantedBy=default.target.
- the compose service is deleted — one owner per container name.
- deploy_comfyui builds the image, installs the unit, retires the compose-era
unit into ~/.AGENTTRASH, removes the stale container so the unit's own can
take the name, and waits on :8188.
- the healthcheck is a file, because the podman 5.x v1 generator splits
HealthCmd on spaces and an inline `python3 -c "..."` becomes a quoting
puzzle that fails silently.
The comfyui seam now reads the unit instead of compose for devices, command and
groups (and resolves the Containerfile from the deployer's declaration, not
from a directory listing).
dankclaw/comfyui/Containerfile is referenced by nothing — compose builds from
dankclaw/Containerfile.comfyui, deploy-remote.sh copies that one, and the
ComfyUI doc names it — and its content is an older iteration (torch
2.9.1+rocm7.12.0rc1 against the deployed gfx1151 base). It also caused real
damage: the comfyui test's directory-listing selector picked non-comfyui files
and reported a red suite for sessions.
Staged in .AGENTTRASH/ rather than deleted, so it stays recoverable and visible
until Frank decides it can go for good. This is also why the earlier test fix
had to resolve the Containerfile from compose rather than from the filesystem:
the directory is not the contract.
The radiance MXFP4 stack cannot run TP=2 on this host. RCCL's collective
kernels carry a hidden hostcall-buffer parameter, and ROCr refuses to
dispatch them on a device without PCIe atomics: the AQL dispatch fails with
hipErrorIllegalState ("the operation cannot be performed in the present
state"), which is what every two-rank collective hit. The second R9700 sits
behind the chipset bridges 05:00.0/06:09.0, which advertise
`AtomicOpsCap: Routing-` — a read-only capability, so no software can enable
atomic routing on that path and the driver's
pci_enable_atomic_ops_to_root() fails for that card. The first card, on CPU
root port 00:01.1, has atomics enabled.
Ruled out: kernel version (7.0.0-28/-30/-31 identical, after a full upgrade),
iommu=pt, P2P hardware (45.3 GB/s between the cards), the shipped librccl (a
from-source rebuild reproduces the failure at the same call path), vLLM and
pynccl (a bare two-rank torch.distributed allreduce fails the same way), all
NCCL transport knobs, and single-rank tests (NCCL short-circuits at
world_size=1, so one-card success proves nothing).
Deployment: three rootless Quadlets — frank-medium-a (:7771, card 1),
frank-medium-b (:7772, card 2), both TP=1 at 114688 context (262144 and
131072 do not fit one card's KV) with vLLM-profiled KV — and
frank-medium-proxy (:7770), a round-robin that preserves the fleet contract
of one endpoint and one served model name. frank-medium.container stays as
the TP=2 target for a host whose second card is atomic-capable; the deploy
handler does not install it and trashes any stale copy.
Measured through the proxy (vllm bench serve, random dataset, --ignore-eos):
conc 1 42.8 tok/s, conc 4 147.6 tok/s, conc 8 230.8 tok/s, 32k prefill at
~2.8k tok/s per card, TPOT p50 23.6-28.8 ms.
Also: healthcheck reads PORT so one probe serves all three units, the hermes
example and the harness models.yml drop to the real 114688 context, and the
runbook records the full evidence chain.
Predicted ~10.8 GiB KV / ~33.4 need / ~10.5 host-left; the boot ledger
printed ~11.0 / ~31.5 / 100.0 GiB held with 9.1 GiB + 1396 contiguous
2 MiB blocks left. Stall NOTE no longer prints at this footprint. Also
documents the ~45-60 s first-request PING silence after a restart (the
healthcheck's HealthStartPeriod covers it; do not restart the unit).
The 09-12 doubled pool fit only at reserve 15, leaving 7.1 GiB / 310
contiguous 2 MiB blocks for the ~28 co-tenant containers and making the
engine print its minutes-long-stall warning on every boot. 401,408
positions (~10.8 GiB KV) hands ~3.4 GiB back while keeping MAX_TOK=32768
and reserve 15: modelled need ~33.4 GiB vs budget 38.5, so the fit check
should not clamp. Capacity becomes one full 262k conversation resident
beside a ~139k one, or three concurrent 131k chats (three slots).
Docs: AGENTS.md fleet table + halogen section, runbook flags table /
co-tenancy tense / admission-arithmetic paragraph updated for the trim.
Concurrency cap trimmed to the real fleet size. Each slot is 111.0 MiB of
O(1) state, so this hands ~111 MiB back on a host sitting at 7.1 GiB left
for everything else.
Note the slots already oversubscribed the pool (4 x 262144 > 524288), so
admission was pool-bound regardless: at most two full-length conversations,
or four at 131k. This does not change how much context fits -- it caps
simultaneous requests at three, and a fourth now queues.
Tested 16 live. Pool stayed 524288 (no clamp), server held 103.5 GiB and
reported "7.1 GiB left for everything else" at BOTH 15 and 16 — identical
footprint. HALOGEN_HOST_RESERVE_GIB feeds the fit-check budget only; it is not
an allocation, so raising it cannot give RAM back to the co-tenants. Its sole
observable effect above 16 is to take the KV pool away.
16 therefore cost half the fit margin (1.0 vs 2.0 against the engine's 36.5 GiB
requirement) and bought nothing. 15 is strictly better at the same cost.
Recorded the ceiling (16) and the real air levers in the unit comment: pool
262144 frees 7.2 GiB, max_tok 16384 frees 8.4.
Operator asked for 18. 18 is not available: the engine's own fit-check line,
read from a clamped boot rather than modelled, requires budget >= 36.5 GiB to
keep 524288 at max_tok 32768 ("524288 positions need ~35.0 GiB (plus 1.5 of
margin)"). budget(18) = 35.5, so 18 silently un-doubles the pool we just paid
the reserve for. 17 fits by 0.02, inside the noise of the 67.7 resident-weights
term. 16 is the largest reserve that survives the check with real margin:
37.5 budget vs 36.5 required.
Recorded the ceiling and both remedies in the unit comment. The reserve is now
spent, so a future stall is answered by the pool or the arena, not here.
Ledger confirms the doubled pool is actually reserved (524288, 13312.0 MiB)
at max_tok 32768 with no clamp and no WARNING: 38.5 budget vs 37.0 needed.
Recorded the cost honestly. The server now holds 103.5 of 121.2 GiB and the
engine reports only 310 contiguous 2 MiB blocks / 7.1 GiB left for everything
else (24-reserve baseline: 2081 blocks / 12.1 GiB). All 28 co-tenants stayed
up, but the engine volunteers a new note: when memory runs out, frank-large
AND its neighbours "can stall for minutes at a time at full CPU with no disk
activity and no output, which is not a crash and needs no restart". That is
the least diagnosable of the three failure modes seen today, and `free` hides
it — MemAvailable still reads ~74 GiB because the pinned weights count as
reclaimable page cache.
Sizing rule now expresses the budget as a function of reserve, shows both
endpoints (24 -> 29.5, 15 -> 38.5), and the max_tok ceiling is labelled as
reserve-conditional (<= 18,130 at 24; <= 35,700 at 15).
Neither lever alone could give both features. At reserve 24 the device budget
is 29.5 GiB and max_tok 32768's 37.0 GiB need always lost the doubling to the
fit-check clamp; at max_tok 16384 the doubling survived but prefill paid 8-9%.
Dropping the reserve to 15 moves the budget to 38.5:
121.2 host - 67.7 resident weights - 15 reserve = 38.5
need = 14.4 pool + 20.6 arena + 1.97 vision = 37.0 -> 1.5 GiB spare
So the payment is page cache for the n-gram lookup table rather than either
feature. 15 GiB, against a table of 47.7 GiB read through the file cache.
Two reasons this is a survivable risk rather than a cliff:
- The engine's own ledger reported only 12-17 GiB left at the previous 24
setting, so the declared reserve was never held literally; 15 may cost
less real cache than it reads as.
- The failure mode is legible: long prompts fault heavily against a busy
disk, and raising the reserve is the documented remedy. Not the silent
clamp, and not the 65536 no-boot mode.
1.5 GiB of headroom is thin and deliberate. Documented in the unit as a
matched pair with the pool: raise the reserve back to 24 and the doubling
quietly goes away again.
Deployed HALOGEN_MAX_TOK=32768 by operator call (upstream default, full prefill
speed) and confirmed the prediction from the ledger:
kv pool: 524288 positions need ~35.0 GiB ... LOWERING THE POOL TO 262144 (~27.8 GiB)
memory: 68.0 weights + 7.2 KV pool + 21.1 working = 96.3 GiB in all
so the effective pool is 262144 again and the doubling this task set out to do
is not in force. Healthy, completion verified. Left the pool requesting 524288
deliberately: with KV_POOL_FIT on that is a grow-if-RAM-frees-up declaration,
not a mistake.
Two corrections to what I wrote earlier today:
1. The engine's sizing block, and its "WARNING even 262144 ... host RAM cannot
spare it" line, print ONLY when the fit check had to clamp something. The
09-11 baseline boot prints no kv pool: sizing lines at all. So the absence
of a warning in old logs was never evidence of headroom.
2. The budget needs a vision term. Actual need is pool + arena + 1.97 GiB of
vision tower, not pool + a 1.5 GiB nominal margin. That makes the ceiling
for a doubled pool max_tok <= 18,130 rather than 19,115, and it means the
32768/262144 corner this box has run in since 09-11 is ~0.3 GiB OVER its own
stated budget -- and has been the whole time. It boots and serves with
12-14 GiB genuinely free because the 24 GiB reserve is generous. A soft
floor, not a wall.
The arena model also reproduces upstream's three published "on the device"
figures exactly (35 / 42 / 41 GiB), confirming they are pool+arena totals at
the default max_tok and not pool-only -- which is the misreading that made the
doubling look affordable in my first estimate.
Operator call. Prediction from the measured model: 524288 positions cost
35.0 GiB against a 29.5 budget, so HALOGEN_KV_POOL_FIT clamps the pool to
262144 (27.8). Rollback is a single revert; 16384 was the config that made
the doubling real.
Raising HALOGEN_MAX_TOK to 65536 did not shrink the pool, it OOMed the boot:
the arena alone (37.3 GiB) exceeds the 29.5 GiB device budget, so even the
minimum pool faulted and dmalloc failed at 39.97 GiB. Rolled back to 16384,
which restored the 524288 pool and a clean completion.
The three measured arenas are exactly linear in the flag — 3.80 GiB base plus
8.40 GiB per 16384 tokens, predicting all three to 0.1 GiB. That gives a real
sizing rule instead of guesswork, and it says the deployed 16384 is the
CEILING, not a conservative choice: 29.5 - 1.5 margin - 14.4 pool leaves 13.6
for the arena, i.e. max_tok <= 19,115.
The corner check falls out of the same model: set max_tok back to 32768 and
only 7.4 GiB remains for the pool, ~269k positions, which is precisely the
262144 config this host ran before. The two corners of the feasible box are
the only two points it has ever served.
No functional change — the quadlet edit is comments only; the running service
is already at 16384 from the rollback deploy (258cccb).
Operator call, measuring what the prefill arena actually costs against
upstream's do-not-raise warning. Rollback is one revert: the settled
config was 16384, which made the 524288 pool fit at 26.6 GiB.
The previous commit's doubling was a silent no-op. HALOGEN_KV_POOL_FIT
measured the device budget at startup and lowered the pool straight back
to 262144, while the deploy still reported healthy in 12s.
The engine's arithmetic: 121 GiB host - 67.7 resident weights - 24.0
reserved for the n-gram page cache and the OS = 29.5 GiB of device
budget, and that single budget carries the KV pool AND the prefill arena.
At HALOGEN_MAX_TOK=32768 the arena is ~20.6 GiB, so 524288 positions
need 35.0 GiB against 29.5 available.
HALOGEN_MAX_TOK=16384 halves the arena to ~10.5 GiB, bringing the
524288 need to ~24.9 GiB, which fits with ~3 GiB of margin. Cost is
about 8-9% of prefill throughput, per upstream. This is the engine's own
prescribed fix, quoted verbatim in its refusal message.
Lowering HALOGEN_CTX was the other option the engine offered; rejected
because both clients declare 262144 as the context window, so it would
break the client contract rather than pay for the pool.
HALOGEN_KV_POOL_POSITIONS 262144 -> 524288, which is upstream's own
default (2 x HALOGEN_CTX). The old pool was the binding constraint on
concurrency, not context: a request reserves prompt + max_tokens against
the pool, so with pool == CTX four concurrent 65k chats were contending
for one full-length conversation's worth of positions. Two full-length
conversations, or four at 131k, now stay resident.
Cost is ~7.2 GiB more device RAM (measured 28 KiB/position), taken from
the page cache the 47.7 GiB n-gram lookup table reads through. Live
startup ledger for the prior config: 68.0 weights + 7.2 pool + 21.1
working = 96.3 GiB held, 12.1 GiB left on the host. The doubled pool
puts the remainder near 5 GiB against a ~4.3 GiB co-tenant working set,
and cache at ~69 GiB -- still above the lookup table, so the table can
stay hot. Compensating lever if long prompts start crawling:
HALOGEN_MAX_TOK=16384, which frees 8.3 GiB of prefill arena for ~8%
of prefill throughput.
Docs updated to match, including the admission-trap paragraph, which was
only true while pool == CTX.
Verbose engine logging is the vendor's first-line evidence for load,
allocation and admission questions; shipping it on means an incident
report already carries the full startup account instead of needing a
restart-into-debug. HALOGEN_DMALLOC_LOG stays off (every alloc >64MB is
steady-state noise on a shared host). Doc updated with the rootless
podman-logs-vs-journalctl retrieval note.
The healthcheck added to the loki image was discarded by the build:
'HEALTHCHECK is not supported for OCI image format and will be ignored'.
podman builds OCI by default, and OCI has no HEALTHCHECK field, so the
container came back with no health at all — worse than the failing check it
replaced, because nothing reports the loss.
The build now passes --format docker, and the seam pins it so a future edit
cannot quietly reintroduce an image with no health field.
The loki unit came up 'unhealthy' after the quadlet cutover. Cause: a unit's
HealthCmd reaches podman as CMD-SHELL, i.e. /bin/sh -c, and the loki image is
distroless — no shell exists in it. The busybox command itself works (probed
by hand: /ready answers 'ready'); it was the shell wrapper that could not run.
podman does not accept an exec-form command through --health-cmd either: it
stores a JSON array as one literal argument.
The command therefore moves into dankclaw/loki/Containerfile as a
HEALTHCHECK ... CMD [...] exec form, which is what that image exists for — it
already ships the static busybox solely so a healthcheck has something to run.
podman reads the image's healthcheck when the unit declares none.
The first deploy of the grafana unit failed: 'stat /root/.config: permission
denied', exit 1, restart loop. Cause — the repo-root .env that the compose
service used to pick up is a gluetun env file, and it carries HOME=/root (and
the WireGuard keys). Pointing the unit's [Service] EnvironmentFile at it sets
HOME for the service, so podman looks for its configuration under /root.
grafana now reads /home/dank/Containers/grafana/env, the per-service file the
deployer seeds from dankclaw/.env with a single-variable filter — the same
shape caddy, pihole, copyparty, romm and seerr use. The seed is validated, so
a missing secret fails the deploy loudly instead of starting a container whose
OAuth login cannot complete. The value was copied to dankclaw/.env, which is
where dankclaw/.env.example already documented it.
prometheus, grafana, loki, alloy and node-exporter ran only from
dankclaw/compose.yaml. Rootless podman does not restart bare containers, so
they did not survive the 2026-09-11 reboot for the amd_iommu=off change and
had to be restored by hand — the same gap that had already cost the fleet
Caddy and Pi-hole, which is why the boot-persistence rule exists.
Each is now a rootless Quadlet unit under dankclaw/observability/quadlet/,
installed and dispatched by deploy_observability in deploy-remote.sh, with
the compose definitions retired so only one owner exists per container name.
Images, mounts, arguments and container names are unchanged, so Caddy's
proxies and Prometheus' own scrape config keep resolving.
Two posture changes, both about the unauthenticated surface:
* The three HTTP UIs published on 0.0.0.0 with no authentication of any kind
(Prometheus even with the lifecycle endpoint enabled). They now publish on
127.0.0.1: the browser path is the guarded franksdank.cloud vhost, Caddy
reaches them by name over dankclaw_default, and the host-side homepage
status timer probes loopback. Nothing legitimately used the LAN port.
* node-exporter bound :9100 on every interface; it now binds exactly its two
consumers, loopback (homepage timer) and the LAN address (Prometheus, which
runs in a container and cannot reach the host's loopback).
alloy gains a reachable health endpoint: its UI listens on the container's
own loopback and alloy 1.x refuses a config block for it, so the compose
service had nothing to probe — the homepage status card for alloy read 'down'
continuously. The unit moves the UI with a command-line flag and publishes
127.0.0.1:12345.
grafana keeps its Authentik OAuth client secret without receiving the whole
.env: systemd expands the value from a [Service] EnvironmentFile, which never
reaches the container.
Hermes hardcodes response_format=json_schema on its title call. No local
back-end implements constrained decoding — frank-small and frank-large both
answer 400 'response_format json_object/json_schema is not supported' — so
every session logged a title failure and fell back to a message-derived
title. The NPU endpoint that used to absorb this call was retired on
2026-09-11.
The call now goes out over the Responses transport (the only one that does
not forward response_format) with thinking off. A 64-token cap cannot hold a
thinking pass plus a title: with the default reasoning effort the model spent
all 64 tokens thinking and returned empty content, which is why disabling
reasoning is part of the fix and not decoration.
Verified against the live endpoint with the real prompt and the real
extraction path: raw {"title": "Friendly greeting"} -> title
'Friendly greeting' in 3.4s, where the previous configuration returned 400.
frank-large moves from the kingjones30/ROCmFPX llama.cpp build to
peonist-ai/halogen-flash-server 0.5.8 serving Qwen3.8-Flash-Next (w4b
.hgn 115.55 GiB + quality overlay). Upstream measures this engine at
roughly 4x the prefill throughput of the llama.cpp family on the same
gfx1151 silicon, and prefill dominates any prompt with real context.
Shape: a rootless Quadlet container (dankclaw/frank-large/quadlet/),
engine on container loopback :8730 (never published), OpenAI front-end
:8731 published as host 7770, HALOGEN_MODEL_ID=frank-large so no client
renamed anything. Context 262144, KV pool 262144 positions (~7.2 GiB,
conservative for a shared 121 GiB host), 4 slots, host reserve 24,
vision tower on, weights pinned, all other flags at vendor defaults.
Weights are fetched by HALOGEN_DOWNLOAD on first start into a writable
/home/dank/models/halogen.
The llama.cpp era (unit, env, serve script) is staged in .AGENTTRASH/
rather than deleted; the STRIX payload and the ROCmFPX build stay on
disk as the rollback target. deploy_llm_large becomes a user-quadlet
handler: it retires the old ROOT unit (moving its checkout symlink into
the home trash, never rm) and gates the first start on the download
rather than reporting a failure for a fetch that is working exactly as
designed.
frank-npu is retired in the same change. The kernel cmdline moves from
iommu=pt to amd_iommu=off for the 13-16% of prefill upstream measured,
and that takes the XDNA2 NPU with it: without PASID/SVA the driver
cannot open /dev/accel/accel0 (err=-19). Its five dependent routes are
repointed (Hermes vision -> frank-large, Hermes title generation ->
frank-small, harness vision -> frank-large, tiny -> frank-small, task ->
frank-large:medium) and its provider blocks are removed from both the
harness config and Hermes's live config. Audio input leaves the fleet
with no replacement; image input survives on halogen's vision tower.
Docs: new halogen-flash-server runbook, new IOMMU decision record, and
frank-npu rewritten as a retirement record. AGENTS.md topology, runtime
sections, benchmarking policy (frank-large is a user unit now) and the
harness model-config section are corrected.
The unit comment always claimed the webui drives the same agent state as
the gateway, but the image bakes HERMES_HOME=/opt/data and no unit
overrode it. Podman auto-creates a fresh anonymous volume at every
image-VOLUME point on container recreation, so each restart reset the
webui's config home to the image-default template (provider: auto ->
openrouter.ai with no API key), while the gateway read the corrected
/data/config.yaml. Pin HERMES_HOME=/data so both processes share one
config/state root and config edits propagate without a recreate.
Live config was still routing on pre-rename aliases (frank-default-large,
frank-default-small) after the 2026-09-03 frank-large/frank-small/frank-npu
rename cutover; hermes-webui resolved those ids to nonexistent models and
requests failed. Live config fixed in place (backup kept on-host as
config.yaml.bak-20260905); this backup now mirrors the live shape: named
providers for aux routes, title_generation/triage/kanban routed to their
actual models, moa + mcp sections, signal disabled.
Flip the homepage Sonarr card from the user category to admin and repoint
its link at the LAN-direct port (192.168.0.112:8989). Retire the unguarded
public vhost sonarr.franksdank.cloud (direct reverse_proxy, no auth) and its
post-auth @sonarr handler from the Caddyfile; drop the Pi-hole addn-hosts A
record with it. No public Porkbun record ever existed (NXDOMAIN at the zone),
so after this there is no WAN path to Sonarr: users request TV via Seerr
(guarded), admins reach Sonarr's own UI from the LAN only.
Fixes the seerr/sonarr mix-up from 19b2589/e0bade6.
FrankBook-Pro becomes the only *arr/qBittorrent deployment. Every fleet
container (qB + five arrs) now shares gluetun's netns, so all egress —
torrent, indexer APIs, metadata lookups — exits the WireGuard tunnel by
construction (AllowedIPs=0.0.0.0/0); the arrs' own ports publish on the
gluetun unit, none on the arr units themselves.
- dankserver/compose.yaml: remove the six arr services (the Aug 20 compose
copy — never healthy, superseded; config dirs trashed on the host)
- dankclaw/Caddyfile + shared/homepage/services.json: arr vhosts and
probes repoint 192.168.0.235 -> 192.168.0.112 (FrankBook-Pro)
- frankbook-pro units: five arrs join gluetun netns (Wants/After/Network);
gluetun publishes 9696/8989/7878/8686/8787 alongside 8080/6881
- tests/frankbook_quadlet.bats: new VPN egress seam — every arr+qB unit
must share gluetun's netns and publish no port; gluetun must publish the
whole fleet's ports
- deploy-plan.py: gluetun changes carry the whole netns family (a gluetun
recreation kills all six joiners); dankserver compose set loses the arrs
- AGENTS.md: deployment is complete only when unit tests AND the Playwright
E2E suite both pass
The arr stack (prowlarr, radarr, sonarr, lidarr, readarr, qbittorrent)
had A records in addn-hosts but no Caddyfile blocks. This adds:
- Six public vhost blocks in the dankserver section, each proxying to
192.168.0.235:<port> (exempt by construction: own auth, no Anubis)
- Six @arr named handlers inside :8017 for authenticated traffic routing
All 233 bats tests pass.
Mechanical identity rename across the knowledge base, AGENTS.md, README, the
hermes config example, and homepage services.json. No behavior change; served
aliases on the LLM endpoints change with the deploy of commit 69f87c8.
Post-change doc reconciliation for the hermes vhosts + DNS deletion batch:
- Hermes-Dashboard.md: access is now the hermesadmin.franksdank.cloud vhost
(direct Caddy proxy to 192.168.0.143:9119, no guard chain — exempt because the
dashboard enforces its own basic-auth login), plus the raw LAN port. The old
text claimed an Authentik-guarded public vhost, which was decommissioned.
- Hermes-WebUI.md: description updated — the webui is now also reachable via the
unguarded hermes.franksdank.cloud vhost (its own password auth is the gate).
- LAN-DNS.md: "add a name in two places" corrected to a two-or-three-step
decision; internal-only names (prometheus/loki/grafana/seerr) deliberately get
no public A record and resolve on the LAN only, and DNS-01 issuance is
unaffected because the challenge is a TXT record in the same zone.
- Seerr.md: DNS row corrected — addn-hosts only since 2026-09-02; NXDOMAIN on WAN.
- hermes-dashboard.container: unit comment no longer claims Authentik termination.
No behavior change in this commit; tests 233/233 green (docs-completeness seam included).
Both Hermes services get direct (unguarded) vhosts: each authenticates itself
(webui password; dashboard basic_auth in /data/config.yaml), so no Anubis
challenge and no Authentik proxy provider is required. Upstreams are the host
LAN IP because Caddy itself sits on dankclaw_default, where the gateway
address 10.89.1.1 has nothing serving 8787. Internal-only by DNS absence:
hermes.franksdank.cloud already resolves via Pi-hole addn-hosts; hermesadmin
is added in this same commit so the caddyfile/addn-hosts cross-check (test 178)
stays green.
podman 5.7.0 refuses ghcr.io/goauthentik/ldap:2026.8.0's nested manifest
list ('Unexpectedly received a manifest list instead of a manifest for a
single image'); pin the linux/amd64 single-platform digest instead.
Repoint Volume=/EnvironmentFile= in the 8 affected quadlet units to the
caddy-established Containers/<svc> layout: gitea (data, postgres, env),
authentik (data, postgres), hermes (data, webui checkout). Data-root mv on the
target happens at deploy time before each group's unit restart; same-fs rename,
instantly reversible. Running containers keep their inode-bound binds until the
unit restart flips them to the new path.
Adds a digest-pinned headless-shell Chrome DevTools Protocol daemon as a
boot-persistent quadlet unit (chrome-devtools-protocol.container). The
entrypoint override drops the image's socat front so the CDP endpoint binds
loopback-only on 127.0.0.1:9222 in the host network namespace; only the two
host-network consumers (Signal gateway, webui server) can drive it.
hermes-webui flips Network=dankclaw_default -> Network=host so its agent
process shares the daemon's namespace (0.0.0.0:8787 bind is LAN-facing as
before; no exposure change). deploy_hermes installs the new unit and starts
it if inactive without restarting in-flight browser sessions.
DNS at Porkbun was renamed (chat->ai, jellyfin->jelly) and the qbittorrent,
*arr-stack, comfyui, hermes, dankclaw, and dankserver public records were
deleted. This brings the Caddy config in lockstep: ai/jelly vhosts now match
the new names; comfyui (guarded), hermes (guarded), and the *arr/qb vhosts
are removed as their DNS is gone. The legacy dankclaw/dankserver redirect
vhosts stay: Pi-hole still answers those names on the LAN.
LAN clients now connect directly to 192.168.0.143:8787 (password-gated via
HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD); the SSH tunnel via port 22 remains the sole
off-network ingress. Recreation also re-reads the rotated password from
dankclaw/.env via the [Container] EnvironmentFile.
The embedded outpost carries no provider token (token=None), so the
auth_proxy identity header was never set and no user could log in. RP
mode is topology-independent: challenge gate stays in front, login runs
inside Grafana via the OAuth2 code flow against auth.franksdank.cloud.
Provider 'grafana' (pk 9, confidential) created via ak shell; secret
written straight into the live .env (never in git). Auth URL uses the
global /application/o/authorize/ path — this fork resolves the provider
by client_id query param; per-slug authorize does not exist.
Caddyfile comment corrected: no identity header is forwarded to Grafana.
Frank