The service came up internal-only: UI on the LAN at 8502, API at 5056, both
published on every interface, with only its own shared password in front. That
put the episode library outside the fleet's auth chain and one port scan away
from anything on the network.
- Caddy: guarded vhost notebook.franksdank.cloud (Anubis -> Authentik; provider
notebook-proxy, internal_host caddy:8017) plus the post-auth route to the
published UI port. One upstream is enough, because the image's own Next.js
layer rewrites /api/* to the FastAPI beside it — so the API needs no outward
face at all, and 5056 moves to loopback, where only the deployer's health gate
dials it.
- scripts/open-notebook.env: API_URL and CORS_ORIGINS become the single guarded
origin. Left to itself the app auto-detects <host>:5055, the port seerr holds
on this host; a LAN-origin API_URL would also take the browser around the
guard chain, where its authenticated session does not ride.
- addn-hosts: the LAN A record. The homepage card goes live and links the vhost.
- Seam: the API origin is derived from whatever the Caddyfile routes to 8502, so
renaming the vhost moves the test instead of leaving it blessing a stale name,
and a new test proves the vhost hands the WHOLE request to Anubis.
Two containers, because that is what upstream runs (docker-compose.yml:6,13):
the app image under supervisord, plus SurrealDB. The `v1-latest-single` tag is
not in play — it bundles its own database, is deprecated upstream, and would
give the host a second hidden DB.
Both images are digest-pinned with Pull=never and a documented one-time pull,
the frank-dragoon posture: a Quadlet on :latest re-resolves on the first restart
after an unrelated daemon-reload, and the failure is silent.
Port map paid for by what is already on the host: seerr holds 127.0.0.1:5055
(since 2026-10-14, live `ss -ltn` agrees), so the API leaves on 5056 and the env
file has to set API_URL to match, because the frontend derives the API URL from
the window origin when it is unset. 8502 publishes on 0.0.0.0 — the service
carries its own password and the episode-audio route is unauthenticated. 8000 is
published nowhere, where upstream exposes it on loopback with root credentials.
The app joins dankclaw_default first and the private systemd-open-notebook
second: it reaches the published fleet endpoints through the former
(host.containers.internal, the arrangement Prometheus is proven against) and
finds its database by container name through the latter. Generated --network
flags keep file order, so the tunable file is listed before the host secret file
in both units — podman applies last-match-wins.
No UserMapping: the app runs as root in its namespace (no USER in the Dockerfile)
and writes only paths owned by that root. Exec= carries no database credential —
`exec start --user --pass` puts it in world-readable argv; the image's own
entrypoint passes it on stdin, so only the container env holds it.
Frank