Two gaps behind the same near-miss.
1. **No spec covered hermes.franksdank.cloud** — the one guarded vhost whose
upstream is a host address (`reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8787`) rather than a
container name, because its service is host-networked. That is how a
loopback-only bind could take the vhost down with a 502 and leave every gate
green. tests/e2e/specs/17-hermes-vhost.spec.ts asserts what a dead upstream
violates: no 5xx through the guard chain, no Caddy error page, and no app
bytes to an unauthenticated raw client. It does not assert SSO-silence, since
this app has its own password login.
2. **Specs are matched by number prefix, not globbed.** A spec file whose prefix
is in no project silently never runs — which is exactly what happened to the
new one until it was registered. The prefix is registered now, the comment in
playwright.config.ts says why, and tests/e2e_scaffold.bats fails if any
spec file matches no project.
The hermes-webui seam assertion is corrected too: it asserted the loopback bind
I wrongly imposed, and now asserts the real contract — the unit's bind must serve
the address the Caddyfile fronts it on.
16-marreta.spec.ts (standard project) asserts the user homepage's Marreta
open link actually reaches the Marreta app through the full guard chain
(Anubis PoW -> Authentik SSO -> app), and explicitly NOT the authentik
login flow. Guards the 2026-09-12 incident where marreta-proxy was created
without a linked Application, so the embedded outpost never loaded it and
the homepage link parked on a login wall.
Wires spec 16 into the standard project testMatch. Verified passing live.
Wget-style (no-JS) clients must never receive application bytes from guarded
services: copyparty serves authenticated traffic with anonymous read perms, so
the guard chain is the only boundary between an unauthenticated client and the
file bytes. Assertions target leakage markers in app code (Copyparty UI title,
homepage panel grid, services.json JSON shape), not gate internals, so any
guard-route regression fails the suite while any gate implementation passes.
Also route 15-*.spec.ts into the guest project (empty storage state).
Live run against the fleet showed the outpost redirects direct navigation to
auth.franksdank.cloud with the guarded host preserved as redirect_uri, rather
than rendering the flow UI in place. The security property under test is that
an unauthenticated visitor never sees app content; assert that shape (uidField
visible + no leak markers + gate is either in-place or a redirect carrying the
return path) instead of hostname preservation.
14-guard.spec.ts: every authentik-guarded vhost (www, search, romm, files,
seerr, grafana, prometheus, loki) must challenge an unauthenticated direct
navigation; plex is asserted exempt (PMS answers directly, no IdP form).
11-admin.spec.ts: admin direct-nav to grafana/prometheus/loki passes through
with host preserved and no uidField challenge.
The loki/grafana/seerr proxy providers were script-provisioned with no
flows and no Application: null flows made the embedded outpost's Rust
deserializer reject the whole config (all guarded vhosts down after any
outpost reload), and the missing apps bounced post-login to authentik's
user UI instead of the app. Backfilled both live; documented the two
provisioning rules and updated the provider inventory. SSO e2e now
asserts the app landing (pathname leaves /if/, no IdP markers in body)
instead of only the hostname.
Frank