The full-suite re-run after the reset fix came back "1 flaky": 12-crawl reached
plex.franksdank.cloud, the guard cleared, and Plex Web — signed out in the
qa-e2e profile — handed the browser to its own hosted sign-in surface, so the
hostname never settled on the vhost (60 s poll, Expected plex.franksdank.cloud /
Received app.plex.tv). settleThroughGuard now takes a HANDOFFS landing list per
vhost; only plex.franksdank.cloud gets one, every other host still has to land on
its own vhost, and the guard assertions (Anubis cleared, no authentik uidField,
status < 500) are unchanged. Worklog and E2E gotcha 6 carry both symptoms: the
ERR_ABORTED reset and the hand-off.
Two faces of the same verification round.
12-crawl returned to the homepage between links with a bare page.goto, and Plex
Web (signed out, so it renders its own sign-in iframe for its Plex-account flow)
keeps redirecting the top frame: Chromium cancelled our goto with
net::ERR_ABORTED, outside the try, so the whole crawl died — once as a 420 s
timeout in the deploy gate, once at 5.4 s on the same link. backHome() tolerates
that one error class and re-issues; any other error still propagates, and the
per-app verdict (guard settled, hostname, no authentik uidField, status < 500)
is unchanged. Plex was healthy throughout (container up 2 days, 32400 answering
HTTPS 401 / plain-HTTP empty reply), so this was app behaviour, not a fault —
recorded as gotcha 6 on the E2E page.
The 200,704 boot printed 5.5 GiB reserved and 74.1 GiB in all (not the ~5.4/~74
my arithmetic predicted), so every prose figure is re-keyed to the ledger, and
the runbook gains the second production-boot section: marker revision, pool
reservation, shape line, prompt-cache entry size, and the refusal contract at the
new ceiling (400 in 0.86 s naming 200704 and the 96,405-token overage, before any
prefill). Cost stated (two maximum-length conversations never coexist; the 180k
compaction target is unreachable inside a 155,648 window) and purchase stated
(1.7 GiB of page cache, 9.1 GiB against the 2026-10-06 shape).
- Every app card carries hex-clipped art: 19 amber-tinted brand marks
from the Simple Icons CDN plus 19 improvised monogram SVGs, wired via
a per-service "art" field; homepage_config.bats pins art presence for
all 32 apps.
- Model cards render zealot -> dragoon -> archon (registry order pinned
in the seam).
- Dragoon and zealot share one common uncensored legal warning (adult
content, harmful/hateful/illegal descriptions, sensitive offensive
cybersecurity topics, severe legal risk, "don't ruin this server for
everybody"), hover label on card and docs.
- Archon gets a bordered red permission callout: ask Frank before use.
- SearXNG obfuscation-not-anonymity note moved to a card-level hover
warning (.svc-warn) and a docs hover note.
- Gitea: self-service signup flow; no need to ask Frank.
- Footer docs/admin/account-settings become glowing bordered buttons;
the admin button is shown only to homepage-admins members via a new
Caddy /whoami endpoint echoing the outpost-injected X-Authentik-*
headers (spoof-proof; the /admin* 403 stays the real gate). e2e pins
both sides.
- Docs naming swept: Protoss names primary, bracketed api ids, explicit
note that a future switchover renames the ids themselves.
The Protoss model cards render as .mi-name inside one full-width panel;
the panel-name census now counts both render styles, keeping services.json
the single source of truth.
The default-project-set rewrite dropped non---project args (e.g. --list),
so 'run.sh --list' silently RAN the whole suite instead of listing.
Args now ride alongside the default set; an explicit --project still
takes over. Verified: default --list = 33 tests listed; opt-in --list =
34 with the frankbook walk.
The 11-admin spec walked links that terminate on FrankBook-Pro
(192.168.0.112), which sleeps when idle — every deploy gate timed out
there (measured 2026-10-05, two deploy windows). Split: the frankbook
links move to tests/e2e/specs/19-frankbook.spec.ts under a frankbook
project that run.sh excludes by default and deploy.sh triggers ONLY
when a frankbook blast-radius path changed (the spec, frankbook-pro/,
the homepage registry, the Caddyfile arr vhosts). deploy.sh computes
the trigger from the same BASE..HEAD revision range the plan uses.
fill-verify-Enter with a single inputValue read per stage (identification
and password); the toHaveValue assertion hard-failed every attempt when the
re-render wipe landed inside its 5s window (00-auth.setup failure 2026-09-24)
Two gaps behind the same near-miss.
1. **No spec covered hermes.franksdank.cloud** — the one guarded vhost whose
upstream is a host address (`reverse_proxy 192.168.0.143:8787`) rather than a
container name, because its service is host-networked. That is how a
loopback-only bind could take the vhost down with a 502 and leave every gate
green. tests/e2e/specs/17-hermes-vhost.spec.ts asserts what a dead upstream
violates: no 5xx through the guard chain, no Caddy error page, and no app
bytes to an unauthenticated raw client. It does not assert SSO-silence, since
this app has its own password login.
2. **Specs are matched by number prefix, not globbed.** A spec file whose prefix
is in no project silently never runs — which is exactly what happened to the
new one until it was registered. The prefix is registered now, the comment in
playwright.config.ts says why, and tests/e2e_scaffold.bats fails if any
spec file matches no project.
The hermes-webui seam assertion is corrected too: it asserted the loopback bind
I wrongly imposed, and now asserts the real contract — the unit's bind must serve
the address the Caddyfile fronts it on.
16-marreta.spec.ts (standard project) asserts the user homepage's Marreta
open link actually reaches the Marreta app through the full guard chain
(Anubis PoW -> Authentik SSO -> app), and explicitly NOT the authentik
login flow. Guards the 2026-09-12 incident where marreta-proxy was created
without a linked Application, so the embedded outpost never loaded it and
the homepage link parked on a login wall.
Wires spec 16 into the standard project testMatch. Verified passing live.
Wget-style (no-JS) clients must never receive application bytes from guarded
services: copyparty serves authenticated traffic with anonymous read perms, so
the guard chain is the only boundary between an unauthenticated client and the
file bytes. Assertions target leakage markers in app code (Copyparty UI title,
homepage panel grid, services.json JSON shape), not gate internals, so any
guard-route regression fails the suite while any gate implementation passes.
Also route 15-*.spec.ts into the guest project (empty storage state).
Live run against the fleet showed the outpost redirects direct navigation to
auth.franksdank.cloud with the guarded host preserved as redirect_uri, rather
than rendering the flow UI in place. The security property under test is that
an unauthenticated visitor never sees app content; assert that shape (uidField
visible + no leak markers + gate is either in-place or a redirect carrying the
return path) instead of hostname preservation.
14-guard.spec.ts: every authentik-guarded vhost (www, search, romm, files,
seerr, grafana, prometheus, loki) must challenge an unauthenticated direct
navigation; plex is asserted exempt (PMS answers directly, no IdP form).
11-admin.spec.ts: admin direct-nav to grafana/prometheus/loki passes through
with host preserved and no uidField challenge.
The loki/grafana/seerr proxy providers were script-provisioned with no
flows and no Application: null flows made the embedded outpost's Rust
deserializer reject the whole config (all guarded vhosts down after any
outpost reload), and the missing apps bounced post-login to authentik's
user UI instead of the app. Backfilled both live; documented the two
provisioning rules and updated the provider inventory. SSO e2e now
asserts the app landing (pathname leaves /if/, no IdP markers in body)
instead of only the hostname.
Frank