The Authentik SSO button returned "Server Error" (500): the grafana provider had
a NULL authorization_flow and the authorize view crashed building a None flow
planner. After that, the login failed with "InternalError" — no email claim
reached Grafana, so it fell back to GET <api_url>/emails, which authentik 404s.
Unit env: request authentik real scopes (openid email profile, not the GitLab
user:email that crashes the authorize view); standard userinfo API_URL with no
?api=1 (Grafana v13 turns ?api=1 into a /emails 403); email/sub/preferred_username
attribute paths; ALLOW_SIGN_UP=true since the Anubis->Authentik guard fronts the
callback. scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh idempotently re-applies the two
IdP-side causes (NULL authorization_flow; grafana-email-scope returning a bare
string instead of {"email":..}). Verified end to end: RP login lands on / and
/api/user answers 200 with the real email, user provisioned as Viewer.
The Authentik SSO button returned "Server Error" (500) because the grafana
provider authorization_flow was NULL and the authorize view crashed building a
None flow planner. After that, the login failed with "InternalError": no email
claim reached Grafana, so it fell back to GET <api_url>/emails, which authentik
404s.
Unit env: request authentik real scopes (openid email profile, not the GitLab
user:email that crashes the authorize view); read claims from the id_token
(USE_ID_TOKEN=true) and drop ?api=1 from the API URL (Grafana v13 turns it into
a /emails 404); pin email/sub/preferred_username attribute paths; allow
first-login provisioning since the Anubis->Authentik guard fronts the callback.
scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh idempotently re-applies the two IdP-side
causes (NULL authorization_flow; the grafana-email-scope mapping that returned
a bare string instead of {"email":..}). Verified end to end: RP login lands on /
and /api/user answers 200 with the real email, user provisioned as Viewer.
A rootless Alloy shipped zero lines: the journal files are
root:systemd-journal 0640 (other::---) and a rootless container carries no
supplementary groups, so sd_journal_open sees an empty view silently; the
rootless quadlet container logs also live in user-1000.journal, not the
ctr.log paths the old config tailed.
As root, one loki.source.journal reads system.journal + user-*.journal
and carries both. Network=host because Loki publishes 127.0.0.1:3100 and
no bridge container can reach the host loopback; the UI binds loopback
directly (no PublishPort). The /etc/machine-id mount is load-bearing —
sd_journal finds the journal dir by the local machine id; without it the
source reads 0 lines, health green.
deploy_alloy routes around the rootless loop: build rootless, mirror the
image into the root store (a root build fails on DNS in the build
container), retire the old rootless alloy unit, install to
/etc/containers/systemd. Validated with a throwaway root probe: 31,825
lines read, 26,966 pushed to Loki in 20s, zero drops.
169.254.1.2 is not a local address on this host (netavark runs its
bridges in aardvark-dns' netns), so the relay cannot bind it — and a
loopback bind refuses container traffic. Probe-socket proof: a host
socket on 192.168.0.143:18094 answers the container's 169.254.1.2:18094
dial while the LAN IP refuses from the container. The relay binds
192.168.0.143:18093 and the deployer installs an iptables INPUT pair
(ACCEPT 10.89.0.0/16, DROP rest) so the unauthenticated endpoint stays
off the LAN.
A socket bound to 127.0.0.1 refuses container traffic that arrives via
the podman bridge: the first live webhook failed with 'dial tcp
169.254.1.2:18093: connection refused'. The relay now binds the
host-gateway endpoint — link-local to the podman bridge, off the LAN —
and the deployer's health probe follows it there.
Retiring dankclaw/compose.yaml and adding alert rules invalidated claims across
the repo, including in the rule file agents read first. Clean cutover includes
the prose.
**Tests that had gone hollow.** Four assertions grepped dankclaw/compose.yaml
for a service name. With the file gone they passed by *absence* — a gate that
can no longer fail. Each now asserts the real invariant ("no dankclaw compose
file competes with the quadlet units") and keeps a live check for a re-added
entry, so it still fails when one appears: verified by recreating a compose file
with a comfyui service and watching three tests go red, then removing it.
**AGENTS.md, which was wrong about ComfyUI.** It said ComfyUI runs CPU-only
("no ROCm wheels for gfx1151, CUDA images wrong"). That was true in the
compose era and is false now: the restored unit runs with /dev/kfd + /dev/dri and
must NOT pass --cpu. An agent trusting the rule file would have re-broken it.
Also corrected: the observability paragraph ("RUNNING BUT UNCONFIGURED, no
datasource, no rules" — all three have been configured since 2026-09-16), the
Active runbook row that still named halogen for frank-large, halogen's absence
from the Retired table, the benchmark policy naming halogen's harness, and the
seam list.
**Unit and page claims.** prometheus.container said "no alerting rules anywhere
in this stack"; node-exporter.container said Dankserver runs from its compose
stack; Prometheus.md documented three jobs as working (they scrape HTML: they
can never report up) and said no dashboard existed; index.md and the three
authentik service pages pointed at the retired file; Authentik.md's upgrade
instruction told you to bump an image tag in it.
One bad edit of my own on the way (a stale line number clobbered a See Also
entry in Prometheus.md) — caught by reading back, fixed, and the vault link
checker now proves the cross-references hold.
The loki unit came up 'unhealthy' after the quadlet cutover. Cause: a unit's
HealthCmd reaches podman as CMD-SHELL, i.e. /bin/sh -c, and the loki image is
distroless — no shell exists in it. The busybox command itself works (probed
by hand: /ready answers 'ready'); it was the shell wrapper that could not run.
podman does not accept an exec-form command through --health-cmd either: it
stores a JSON array as one literal argument.
The command therefore moves into dankclaw/loki/Containerfile as a
HEALTHCHECK ... CMD [...] exec form, which is what that image exists for — it
already ships the static busybox solely so a healthcheck has something to run.
podman reads the image's healthcheck when the unit declares none.
The first deploy of the grafana unit failed: 'stat /root/.config: permission
denied', exit 1, restart loop. Cause — the repo-root .env that the compose
service used to pick up is a gluetun env file, and it carries HOME=/root (and
the WireGuard keys). Pointing the unit's [Service] EnvironmentFile at it sets
HOME for the service, so podman looks for its configuration under /root.
grafana now reads /home/dank/Containers/grafana/env, the per-service file the
deployer seeds from dankclaw/.env with a single-variable filter — the same
shape caddy, pihole, copyparty, romm and seerr use. The seed is validated, so
a missing secret fails the deploy loudly instead of starting a container whose
OAuth login cannot complete. The value was copied to dankclaw/.env, which is
where dankclaw/.env.example already documented it.
prometheus, grafana, loki, alloy and node-exporter ran only from
dankclaw/compose.yaml. Rootless podman does not restart bare containers, so
they did not survive the 2026-09-11 reboot for the amd_iommu=off change and
had to be restored by hand — the same gap that had already cost the fleet
Caddy and Pi-hole, which is why the boot-persistence rule exists.
Each is now a rootless Quadlet unit under dankclaw/observability/quadlet/,
installed and dispatched by deploy_observability in deploy-remote.sh, with
the compose definitions retired so only one owner exists per container name.
Images, mounts, arguments and container names are unchanged, so Caddy's
proxies and Prometheus' own scrape config keep resolving.
Two posture changes, both about the unauthenticated surface:
* The three HTTP UIs published on 0.0.0.0 with no authentication of any kind
(Prometheus even with the lifecycle endpoint enabled). They now publish on
127.0.0.1: the browser path is the guarded franksdank.cloud vhost, Caddy
reaches them by name over dankclaw_default, and the host-side homepage
status timer probes loopback. Nothing legitimately used the LAN port.
* node-exporter bound :9100 on every interface; it now binds exactly its two
consumers, loopback (homepage timer) and the LAN address (Prometheus, which
runs in a container and cannot reach the host's loopback).
alloy gains a reachable health endpoint: its UI listens on the container's
own loopback and alloy 1.x refuses a config block for it, so the compose
service had nothing to probe — the homepage status card for alloy read 'down'
continuously. The unit moves the UI with a command-line flag and publishes
127.0.0.1:12345.
grafana keeps its Authentik OAuth client secret without receiving the whole
.env: systemd expands the value from a [Service] EnvironmentFile, which never
reaches the container.
Frank