e2e: accept Plex's session-less hand-off to app.plex.tv

The full-suite re-run after the reset fix came back "1 flaky": 12-crawl reached
plex.franksdank.cloud, the guard cleared, and Plex Web — signed out in the
qa-e2e profile — handed the browser to its own hosted sign-in surface, so the
hostname never settled on the vhost (60 s poll, Expected plex.franksdank.cloud /
Received app.plex.tv). settleThroughGuard now takes a HANDOFFS landing list per
vhost; only plex.franksdank.cloud gets one, every other host still has to land on
its own vhost, and the guard assertions (Anubis cleared, no authentik uidField,
status < 500) are unchanged. Worklog and E2E gotcha 6 carry both symptoms: the
ERR_ABORTED reset and the hand-off.
This commit is contained in:
Frank
2026-10-17 22:49:35 -07:00
parent d2587e1d29
commit fc099d9b3c
3 changed files with 80 additions and 11 deletions
@@ -82,10 +82,14 @@ real IdP credentials.
5. **Solve-once cookie.** Since Anubis v1.27.0 + `COOKIE_DOMAIN` (see 5. **Solve-once cookie.** Since Anubis v1.27.0 + `COOKIE_DOMAIN` (see
[[Anubis]]), one PoW per fresh context covers every guarded vhost — crawl [[Anubis]]), one PoW per fresh context covers every guarded vhost — crawl
and SSO specs complete in ~0.5 s per vhost instead of a PoW each. and SSO specs complete in ~0.5 s per vhost instead of a PoW each.
6. **Apps navigate too.** `12-crawl` returns to the homepage between links, and 6. **Apps navigate too — and may leave.** `12-crawl` returns to the homepage
Plex Web (signed out, so it shows its own *"would like to sign in to your between links, and Plex Web (signed out in the `qa-e2e` profile) runs its own
Plex account"* iframe) keeps redirecting the top frame — Chromium cancels our sign-in flow: it redirects the top frame, so Chromium cancelled our
`goto("/")` with `net::ERR_ABORTED`, which used to abort the whole crawl `goto("/")` with `net::ERR_ABORTED` (once as a 420 s timeout, once at 5 s on
(once as a 420 s timeout, once at 5 s on the same link). `backHome()` re-issues the same link), and the same redirect then lands the browser on
the navigation; the app itself was already judged, so the abort is the app's `app.plex.tv` — Plex's hosted surface for a session-less client — which broke
behaviour, not a guard-chain failure. the `hostname == target` law. Two narrow answers: `backHome()` re-issues the
navigation on that one error class, and the landing check takes an explicit
hand-off list (`HANDOFFS`) instead of a single host. The guard contract is
untouched: challenge cleared, no authentik `uidField`, status < 500, and every
host NOT in the list still has to land on its own vhost.
+49
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@@ -1954,3 +1954,52 @@ every restart since the cutover.
thinking ×1.9. Bought: 7.4 GiB of RAM back as page cache for the table long thinking ×1.9. Bought: 7.4 GiB of RAM back as page cache for the table long
prompts read, +12.6 % cold prefill, retrieval 18/18, the base checkpoint prompts read, +12.6 % cold prefill, retrieval 18/18, the base checkpoint
itself instead of the finetune. itself instead of the finetune.
## 2026-10-17 — frank-dragoon: ceiling and pool cut to 200,704; crawl reset fix
- Ask: lower frank-dragoon's context "to 196k". Settled on **200,704** for BOTH
`HALOGEN_CTX` and `HALOGEN_KV_POOL_POSITIONS` (49 × 4096 — the per-slot rung
frank-zealot runs; the card recommends pool == ctx, and that equality is where
the memory is). Nothing in the fleet needs the bigger window, and the v2
checkpoint serves anything up to its native 262,144.
- Boot ledger (`7c4dbeb`, `status=deployed`): `reserving the KV pool, 200704
positions (about 5.5 GiB)`, `62.9 GiB of weights … 5.5 of KV pool, 5.7 of
working memory, 74.1 GiB in all`, prompt cache entries 111 MiB at the new ctx,
no clamp line. My arithmetic predicted 5.4/74 — the ledger is quoted instead.
- Harness moved WITH the ceiling (400-zone law): `models.yml`
`contextWindow: 155648` = ceiling − 45,056; compaction now fires at 85 % =
132,301 est ≈ 136k measured, and the 180k compaction target of the 262,144 era
is unreachable because the window itself is smaller. `maxTokens` 45,056 and the
coupled cap/timeout 65536/7200 untouched. Worst-case harness request =
1.03 × est + min(45056, 151552 − est) ≤ 156.2k tokens vs the 200,704 ceiling.
- Probes on the live endpoint: over the ceiling → `400 … it is 297109 tokens and
the context is 200704, 96405 tokens over` in 0.86 s (preflight rejects before
any prefill, so probing costs the endpoint nothing); harness-shaped admission →
122,679-token prompt with `max_tokens: 45056` (reservation 167,735) accepted,
81.1 s wall (≈1,513 t/s cold prefill), `27*59` answered **1593** from inside a
122k-token haystack, `finish_reason: stop`.
- Seam re-keyed (`frank_dragoon_unit.bats`): the fit-law test now proves the
invariant at the new pair — `ctx ≤ pool ≤ slots × ctx` and
`harness window ≤ ctx − 45056` — so a future raise of one without the other
fails the gate. bats 371/371.
- Deploy verdict: the endpoint dispatched healthy (`status=deployed`, `/health`
200), but the `[3/3]` Playwright gate failed on `12-crawl` and the deployer
correctly said **DEPLOY INCOMPLETE**. Root cause was NOT the endpoint — it was
Plex Web, signed out in the `qa-e2e` profile, running its own sign-in flow,
which broke the spec two different ways:
1. it redirects the top frame, so Chromium cancelled the crawl's in-loop
`page.goto("/")` with `net::ERR_ABORTED` — and that reset sat outside the
`try`, so one host aborted the whole crawl (once as a 420 s timeout, once at
5.4 s); fixed with `backHome()`, which re-issues on that one error class.
2. the same hand-off leaves the browser on `app.plex.tv` (Plex's hosted surface
for a session-less client), so the `hostname == target` law could never
settle — this is what the first full-suite re-run surfaced as `1 flaky`;
fixed with an explicit `HANDOFFS` landing list.
Plex itself was healthy throughout (container up 2 days; 32400 answers HTTPS
401 / plain-HTTP empty reply, which is what Plex Web authenticates against),
and the guard contract is still asserted for every vhost: challenge cleared, no
authentik `uidField`, status < 500. Both symptoms recorded as gotcha 6.
- Cost of the cut: two maximum-length conversations never coexist (one
200,704-position pool behind both slots; two of ≤100k still do). Bought: 1.7
GiB back as page cache for the 47.68 GiB n-gram table — 9.1 GiB against the
2026-10-06 shape's 524,288 pool — and a smaller prompt-cache entry.
+20 -4
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@@ -8,15 +8,31 @@ import { expect, test, type Page } from "@playwright/test";
const CHALLENGE = "Making sure you're not a bot"; const CHALLENGE = "Making sure you're not a bot";
async function settleThroughGuard(page: Page, targetHost: string): Promise<void> { // Vendor hand-offs. An app may legitimately carry a session-less browser to its
// OWN hosted surface: Plex Web (plex.franksdank.cloud, served by our stack)
// bounces a signed-out visitor to app.plex.tv after it has already answered.
// That is the app working, not a guard-chain failure — the fleet contract this
// spec owns is still judged: the Anubis challenge cleared, no authentik
// uidField prompt appeared, and the app answered below 500. Any host NOT listed
// here still has to land on its own vhost.
const HANDOFFS: Record<string, string[]> = {
"plex.franksdank.cloud": ["app.plex.tv", "accounts.plex.tv", "clients.plex.tv"],
};
async function settleThroughGuard(
page: Page,
targetHost: string,
foreignHosts: string[] = [],
): Promise<void> {
// Each guarded vhost runs its own Anubis proof-of-work on first visit; // Each guarded vhost runs its own Anubis proof-of-work on first visit;
// wait for the challenge to clear before judging the destination. // wait for the challenge to clear before judging the destination.
await expect await expect
.poll(async () => !(await page.locator("body").innerText()).includes(CHALLENGE), { timeout: 90_000 }) .poll(async () => !(await page.locator("body").innerText()).includes(CHALLENGE), { timeout: 90_000 })
.toBe(true); .toBe(true);
const landing = [targetHost, ...foreignHosts];
await expect await expect
.poll(() => new URL(page.url()).hostname, { timeout: 60_000 }) .poll(() => landing.includes(new URL(page.url()).hostname), { timeout: 60_000 })
.toBe(targetHost); .toBe(true);
expect(await page.locator('input[name="uidField"]').count()).toBe(0); expect(await page.locator('input[name="uidField"]').count()).toBe(0);
} }
@@ -58,7 +74,7 @@ test("every user open link reaches its app", async ({ page }) => {
const target = new URL(link.href); const target = new URL(link.href);
try { try {
await page.goto(link.href); await page.goto(link.href);
await settleThroughGuard(page, target.hostname); await settleThroughGuard(page, target.hostname, HANDOFFS[target.hostname] ?? []);
const resp = await page.request.get(page.url()); const resp = await page.request.get(page.url());
if (resp.status() >= 500) { if (resp.status() >= 500) {
failures.push(`${link.label}: ${page.url()} answered ${resp.status()}`); failures.push(`${link.label}: ${page.url()} answered ${resp.status()}`);