docs(arr): fleet consolidated on FrankBook-Pro, VPN egress proven; E2E counts derived from registry
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---
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type: reference
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title: *arr Stack
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description: The *arr automation stack (Prowlarr, Sonarr, Radarr, Lidarr, Readarr, qBittorrent) — FrankBook-Pro quadlets and the Dankserver compose deployment (reactivated 2026-09-04): topology, wiring, auth posture, and gotchas.
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description: The *arr automation stack (Prowlarr, Sonarr, Radarr, Lidarr, Readarr, qBittorrent) — FrankBook-Pro only, every container on the gluetun WireGuard netns (all egress VPN): topology, wiring, auth posture, and gotchas.
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tags: [arr-stack, prowlarr, sonarr, radarr, lidarr, readarr, qbittorrent, frankbook-pro, dankserver]
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timestamp: 2026-09-04T00:00:00Z
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---
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@@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ timestamp: 2026-09-04T00:00:00Z
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# *arr Stack
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The *arr suite is a collection of automated media management tools for Usenet
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and BitTorrent. The stack runs in two places: **FrankBook-Pro** — the Mac mini
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and BitTorrent. It runs in exactly one place: **FrankBook-Pro** — the Mac mini
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that fronts this household's downloads — as quadlet units inside its podman
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machine (the documented wiring below), and on **Dankserver** as a compose
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stack behind six Caddy vhosts (reactivated 2026-09-04; see below). It provides
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automatic downloading and library management that Copyparty alone does not
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cover: quality profile enforcement, series/movie discovery, metadata
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enrichment, and automated file organization.
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machine, with every container (the five arrs AND qBittorrent) sharing the
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[[Gluetun]] WireGuard tunnel's network namespace so **all egress exits
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through the VPN**. A short-lived Dankserver compose copy was removed on
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2026-09-04 (see below). The stack provides automatic downloading and library
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management that Copyparty alone does not cover: quality profile enforcement,
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series/movie discovery, metadata enrichment, and automated file organization.
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The core chain is: **Prowlarr** (indexer API aggregator) →
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**Sonarr/Radarr/Lidarr/Readarr** (media-specific managers) → **qBittorrent**
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@@ -51,67 +52,45 @@ qBittorrent is special: it shares the [[Gluetun]] container's network namespace
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IP. A netns-sharer publishes no ports of its own — qB's WebUI (8080) and
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BitTorrent port (6881 TCP+UDP) are published on the gluetun unit instead.
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## Dankserver compose deployment (reactivated 2026-09-04)
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## Dankserver compose copy (removed 2026-09-04)
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The original Dankserver compose stack (`dankserver/compose.yaml`,
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`/opt/<svc>/config` data roots) was committed 2026-08-29 but **never booted**:
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the config dirs were created root-owned (`root:root 755`), and every app
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crashed at logger init (`UnauthorizedAccessException: Access to the path
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'/config/Sentry' is denied`) before binding any port — which read as a dead
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port, not a boot crash, until `podman logs <svc>` was checked.
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A copy of the stack lived in `dankserver/compose.yaml` (`/opt/<svc>/config`
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data roots) from 2026-08-20 to 2026-09-04 and never ran healthy: the config
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dirs were created root-owned (`root:root 755`), so every app died at logger
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init (`UnauthorizedAccessException: Access to the path '/config/Sentry' is
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denied`) before binding any port — which read as dead ports, not a boot
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crash, until `podman logs <svc>` was checked. After a one-day revival it was
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removed by operator decision: **FrankBook-Pro is the sole *arr deployment.**
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Config roots moved to `~/.AGENTTRASH/20260904-dankserver-arr-teardown/` on
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Dankserver (recoverable until purged).
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Fix and restart (2026-09-04): `sudo chown -R 1000:1000
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/opt/{prowlarr,qbittorrent,radarr,sonarr,lidarr,readarr}/config`, then
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`podman-compose -f dankserver/compose.yaml up -d` for the six services. All
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six now serve 200 on their ports and through the Caddy vhosts.
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### Rootless identity model (verified, do not "fix" it)
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### Rootless identity model on Dankserver (verified, keep for reference)
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- On Dankserver's podman 5.7.0 rootless, a container's default user namespace
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maps **container root (PUID=0) → host uid 1000 (dank)** and container uid
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*N* → host `100000 + N - 1`. Verified via `/proc/<pid>/uid_map`
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(`0 1000 1` / `1 100000 65536`) across plex, tautulli, jellyfin,
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calibre-web, copyparty, romm, and the arr stack. This is why PUID=0
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services write as `dank` and why data roots are owned `1000:1000`.
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- **Never add `userns_mode: host` to compose services here.** podman-compose
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1.5.0 runs every compose service inside a pod, and podman rejects the
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combination (`--userns and --pod cannot be set together`) — the stack then
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fails to recreate with no recourse. The default mapping already gives the
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fleet identity; PUID=0 + `1000:1000`-owned data roots is the whole recipe.
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calibre-web, copyparty, romm. This is why PUID=0 services write as `dank`
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and why data roots are owned `1000:1000` on that host.
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- **Never add `userns_mode: host` to a podman-compose service.**
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podman-compose 1.5.0 runs every compose service inside a pod, and podman
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rejects the combination (`--userns and --pod cannot be set together`) —
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the stack then fails to recreate with no recourse. The default mapping
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already gives the fleet identity; PUID=0 + `1000:1000`-owned data roots is
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the whole recipe. (The compose file briefly carried `userns_mode: host` on
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all six arr services on 2026-09-04 — reverted in `e454159`, same day.)
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- qBittorrent's first boot (PUID=0, empty config) prints a one-time WebUI
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admin password in `podman logs qbittorrent` — persist it via the PBKDF2
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recipe in [[qBittorrent]] before restarting the container.
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### Differences from the FrankBook-Pro deployment
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- **No gluetun on Dankserver:** this qBittorrent's torrent egress leaves via
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the residential IP (the FrankBook qB is the VPN-gated one). Route
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privacy-sensitive grabs through FrankBook-Pro.
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- **Empty config:** the Dankserver arrs have no indexers, no qB download
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clients, and no quality profiles configured — the Chain wiring section
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below describes FrankBook-Pro. Configure test-first per that section if
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wiring this stack up.
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- **Six vhosts:** `prowlarr/sonarr/radarr/lidarr/readarr/qbittorrent
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.franksdank.cloud` are exempt from the Anubis chain (own auth) with a
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documented exemption reason per the guard policy.
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- Homepage: Sonarr sits in the user section; Prowlarr/Radarr/Readarr/Lidarr/
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qBittorrent sit in admin.
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## Historical note
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The compose file briefly carried `userns_mode: host` on all six services
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(2026-09-04, reverted same day in `e454159`) — an incorrect fix for the boot
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crash that podman-compose 1.5.0 could not apply anyway (pod/userns conflict
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above). The real fix was the chown; see the identity model section.
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## Access / auth posture
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No *arr app sits behind the Anubis guard chain — the stack is exempt by
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construction (its own auth), with an exemption comment in the Caddyfile per
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vhost. FrankBook-Pro's stack is reached directly by IP:port on the LAN
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(`http://<frankbook-pro>:8989` etc.); the Dankserver stack additionally has
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six TLS vhosts (`<svc>.franksdank.cloud`) that terminate on Caddy on Dankclaw
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and route to Dankserver's published ports.
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vhost. Six TLS vhosts (`<svc>.franksdank.cloud`) terminate on Caddy on
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Dankclaw and route to FrankBook-Pro's published ports
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(`192.168.0.112:<port>`, all exposed by the gluetun unit since the netns
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consolidation); the same ports are reachable directly on the LAN.
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Auth-config history (verified live 2026-08-29): all five arrs shipped with
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`AuthenticationMethod=None` **plus** `AuthenticationRequired=Enabled`. On the
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@@ -137,17 +116,25 @@ per-arr qBittorrent clients (category = app name) → import**.
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into any config — it was generated at first boot, not a default).
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- Per-arr QBittorrent download clients exist on sonarr/radarr/lidarr
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(enabled) and readarr (**parked**: its qB proxy fails auth live even with
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correct creds — known defect of the abandoned upstream; do not enable until
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the image changes). Each was **tested before enabling**; failures stay parked
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with a reason, never enabled blind.
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- Prowlarr runs v2.5.2 where apps are first-class rows (`Applications` table):
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four Application rows (sonarr/radarr/lidarr/readarr) now carry each arr's
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real baseUrl+apiKey with `SyncLevel=FullSync`. Before this, the table was
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empty and every sync attempt threw `NullConfig` in `GetIndexerMappings()` —
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visible in `podman logs prowlarr`, not in any UI.
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- Indexers are **test-before-enable**: EZTV and 1337x stay disabled with reason
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"blocked by CloudFlare Protection" (this host's egress ASN is CF-blocked at
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those trackers); Nyaa.si, sukebei, RuTor, Byrutor, YTS passed live tests and
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correct creds — known defect of the abandoned upstream; retest needed
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after the 2026-09-04 netns move). All four clients were re-pointed to
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**loopback** (`127.0.0.1:8080`, same netns) on 2026-09-04 when the arrs
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joined gluetun's netns — the old `10.88.0.1:8080` gateway hack routes
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into the VPN tunnel (AllowedIPs=0.0.0.0/0) and is dead from inside the
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netns. Verified live: `podman exec sonarr curl` reaches qB with 200, and
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a real qB login from inside the netns returns 200.
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- Prowlarr runs v2.5.2 where apps are first-class rows (`Applications`
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table): four Application rows (sonarr/radarr/lidarr/readarr) carried each
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arr's real baseUrl+apiKey with `SyncLevel=FullSync` as of 2026-08-30.
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**Status 2026-09-04: the table is EMPTY again** (live API check — 8 rows,
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all Cardigann/Torznab, zero Application rows; lost with the dankserver
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config migration). Prowlarr sync is broken until the four rows are
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rebuilt with baseUrl `127.0.0.1:<arr port>` (same netns).
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- Indexers are **test-before-enable**: EZTV and 1337x stay disabled with
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reason "blocked by CloudFlare Protection" (this host's egress ASN was
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CF-blocked at those trackers). **2026-09-04: arr egress moved onto the
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ProtonVPN tunnel** — the parked reason may no longer hold; retest before
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enabling. Nyaa.si, sukebei, RuTor, Byrutor, YTS passed live tests and
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are enabled. A failed test = parked with reason, never enabled blind.
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- Prowlarr v2 sync model: indexers stay in Prowlarr; arrs search *through* it
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and hand off to their own qB download client (category routing). Mappings
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@@ -11,6 +11,31 @@ timestamp: 2026-09-14
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# Bundle Change Log
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## 2026-09-04 — *arr fleet consolidated on FrankBook-Pro; all egress VPN-gated
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- Operator decision: **FrankBook-Pro is the sole *arr deployment.** The
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Dankserver compose copy (booted earlier the same day) was removed;
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`/opt` config roots trashed on the host; compose/services pruned.
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- All six fleet containers (qB + five arrs) now share gluetun's network
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namespace — **all egress exits the ProtonVPN tunnel by construction**
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(AllowedIPs=0.0.0.0/0). The arrs publish no ports of their own; their UI
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ports (9696/8989/7878/8686/8787) moved onto the gluetun unit. Proven live:
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residential `71.227.227.172` vs netns-wide `51.179.177.14`.
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- New test seam `tests/frankbook_quadlet.bats`: every arr+qB unit must join
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gluetun's netns and publish no port; gluetun must publish the whole
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fleet's port set. deploy-plan.py: gluetun changes carry the whole netns
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family.
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- arr→qB download clients re-pointed `10.88.0.1:8080` (old bridge-gateway
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hack, dead inside the tunnel) → `127.0.0.1:8080`; verified by real qB
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login from inside the netns. Caddy vhosts + homepage probes repoint to
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192.168.0.112; homepage all green.
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- Defects discovered: Prowlarr's four Application rows are GONE (empty
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table; sync broken until rebuilt with loopback baseUrls) and readarr's
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qB proxy auth defect needs a retest post-move. EZTV/1337x CF-block
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parking may be stale now that egress is VPN — retest before enabling.
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- E2E specs (11-admin/12-crawl) de-hardcoded: expected open-link counts now
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derive from the live services.json registry. AGENTS.md: deployments are
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complete only when unit tests AND Playwright E2E both pass.
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## 2026-09-04 — dankserver *arr stack reactivated; rootless identity model documented
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- ARR-Stack: the Dankserver compose deployment (committed 2026-08-29, never
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booted — root-owned `/opt/<svc>/config` dirs crashed every app at logger
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