docs: correct Grafana Authentik SSO facts
The vault claimed the fork property-mapping evaluator was broken and userinfo returned only sub, so email could never reach Grafana (outcome unverified). That was a misdiagnosis: the real causes were the NULL authorization_flow (the NoneType.slug crash) and the email scope mapping returning a bare string rather than a dict. Record the four verified causes and fixes, point to the repair script and the new landing spec, and drop the unverified caveat.
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@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Two provisioning rules, each verified live by an outage:
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appears. Create the Application with `provider_id` set (the UI does this
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automatically; raw API/ORM drives must do it explicitly).
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## OAuth2 relying-party quirks (this fork, verified live 2026-08-31)
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## OAuth2 relying-party quirks (this fork; corrected live 2026-10-20)
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The Grafana RP provider (`grafana`, pk 9, confidential client) was created and
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verified end-to-end via `ak shell` ORM drives. This fork's OAuth2 provider
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@@ -100,23 +100,32 @@ implementation diverges from upstream in ways that bit us; all verified live:
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- **Provider resolution is by `client_id` query param** on the global
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`/application/o/authorize/` route; per-slug authorize paths do not exist in
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this build. Token/userinfo live at `/application/o/token/` and
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`/application/o/userinfo/?api=1`.
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- **Property-mapping evaluator is broken → userinfo returns `sub` only.**
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`PropertyMappingEvaluator.evaluate(*args, **kwargs)` forwards kwargs to
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`BaseEvaluator.evaluate(expression_source)`, so the first context kwarg
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becomes the *expression source* instead of the context; every call raises a
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swallowed `PropertyMappingExpressionException` and the claim is skipped.
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Scope-grant filtering has the same class of bug: `ScopeMapping` has no
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provider FK (linkage lives in the `ProviderPropertyMapping` through model)
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so `filter(provider=...)` always yields an empty queryset and tokens asked
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to carry scopes get zero. Net effect: userinfo/introspection answers with
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`{sub}` only — email/groups/entitlements claims cannot be delivered by this
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build until the evaluator is patched or upgraded. Clients consuming this
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provider must key identity off `sub`.
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- Scope mappings for this provider exist — `grafana-email-scope` and
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`grafana-profile-scope` are both rows in `authentik_core_propertymapping`
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(read-only `SELECT`, 2026-10-18) — and will start emitting claims the moment
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the evaluator bug is fixed; no config change is needed then.
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`/application/o/userinfo/` — do **not** append `?api=1` to a Grafana API URL.
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- **NULL `authorization_flow` → authorize 500, `AttributeError: 'NoneType'
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object has no attribute 'slug'`.** A provider created via raw `ak shell`
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`create()` leaves `authorization_flow` unset; the authorize view then crashes
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building the flow planner (`flows/planner.py`) and returns "Server Error —
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Powered by authentik" before any claim is built. This was previously
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mis-attributed to a broken evaluator; the crash is the missing flow. Fix: set
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`authorization_flow = default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent` (the
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flow every other provider in this instance already uses).
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- **A scope mapping that returns a non-dict emits no claim.** authentik merges a
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granted scope mapping's evaluated result into the token **as a mapping**: a
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dict contributes its keys as claims; a bare string is keyed under the
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mapping's NAME, so nothing usable appears. `grafana-email-scope` returned the
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bare string `user.email`, so no `email` claim landed — the evaluator was
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never broken (the dict-valued `grafana-profile-scope` mapping has always
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delivered, and the stock OpenID mappings return dicts). Fix:
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`return {"email": user.email, "email_verified": True}`. With no email, Grafana
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v13 falls back to GET `<api_url>/emails`; authentik 404s it → "Login failed:
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InternalError".
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- **Claims ride in the id_token.** `include_claims_in_id_token` is on for this
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provider and Grafana reads identity from it (`USE_ID_TOKEN=true`).
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- **Net (2026-10-20):** the evaluator is fine; email/profile claims reach RP
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clients. Both IdP fixes are idempotent in `scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh`
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(re-run after an ak-shell re-creation of the provider or a blueprint import,
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which revert them). Grafana's half + the verified outcome (Viewer,
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`login = <sub hex>`, email present) are in [[Grafana]].
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## LDAP provider objects (provisioned via `ak shell` ORM)
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: "Grafana visualizes the metrics that Prometheus collects from every
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tags:
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- infrastructure
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- grafana
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timestamp: 2026-09-11
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timestamp: 2026-10-20
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---
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# Grafana
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@@ -64,19 +64,28 @@ Grafana responds on `/api/health` with 200 and `"database":"ok"`; measured 2026-
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- Change the default admin credentials at first boot (env or UI).
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- Dashboards provisioned as code (dashboard JSON plus a YAML provider, `shared/grafana/provisioning/dashboards/`) survive container recreation; UI-created ones live in the data volume — back it up.
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- **Auth = OAuth2 relying-party, not auth_proxy.** The embedded outpost carries
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no provider token (`token=None`), so no identity header ever reaches Grafana;
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RP mode is topology-independent. The full verified contract (provider pk 9,
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client_id `grafana-21ca190cde75d60f`, global authorize/token/userinfo paths,
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Basic client auth, form-encoded token body, and the fork's userinfo-claims
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bug that leaves identity at the `sub` hash only) is in
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[[Authentik Outpost Reference]] → "OAuth2 relying-party quirks". Consequences for Grafana:
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The unit sets `ALLOW_SIGN_UP=false`, `AUTO_UPSERT=true`, `ALLOW_ASSIGN_ORG=true`
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`ORG_ID=1` and **no** role-attribute mapping (`grafana.container:52-55`), so
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users land as Viewer with `login = <sub hex>`; no email/groups/role claims
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reach Grafana until the evaluator bug is fixed — do not write role mappings
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that depend on those claims. The local admin account stays the only Admin.
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(The Viewer-default outcome and the `<sub hex>` login are not readable from
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the host without the database or an admin password. *(unverified 2026-10-18)*)
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no provider token (`token=None`), so no identity header reaches Grafana; the
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login is Grafana's own "Sign in with Authentik" button against the `grafana`
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confidential-client provider. **Verified end-to-end 2026-10-20** after four
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independent breakages had made it fail. The two Authentik-side causes (a NULL
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`authorization_flow` → authorize 500; an email scope mapping that returned a
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bare string so no `email` claim was emitted) and the full wire contract live in
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[[Authentik Outpost Reference]] → "OAuth2 relying-party quirks"; the IdP half is
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re-applied by `scripts/authentik-grafana-sso-fix.sh` (idempotent — re-run after
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an ak-shell re-creation of the provider or a blueprint import, both of which
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revert it silently). The Grafana half is the unit's own env (`grafana.container`):
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`SCOPES="openid email profile"` (a GitLab-style `user:email` scope crashes the
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authorize view), `USE_ID_TOKEN=true` + no `?api=1` (Grafana v13 otherwise GETs
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`<api_url>/emails`, which authentik 404s and the login dies with "Login failed:
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InternalError"), attribute paths `email`/`sub`/`preferred_username`, and
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`ALLOW_SIGN_UP=true` — safe because the guard fronts every request, so the
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callback is unreachable to unauthenticated traffic.
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- **What a new login becomes:** a Viewer in org 1 (`ALLOW_ASSIGN_ORG=true`,
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`ORG_ID=1`, no role-attribute mapping), with `login = <sub hex>` but the real
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`email`. The local admin account stays the only Admin. The landing that the
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edge-only 13-sso spec never checked is now asserted by
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`tests/e2e/specs/20-grafana-sso.spec.ts` (RP round-trip → `/api/user` 200 with
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an email).
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- **Never point this unit's `EnvironmentFile` at the repo-root `.env`.** That
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file is a gluetun env file and it carries `HOME=/root`; systemd imports it
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for the service, podman then looks for its configuration under `/root`
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