docs: grafana OAuth2-RP contract + authentik fork quirks (live-verified 2026-08-31)

Token exchange chain verified end-to-end in-process on the live provider
(pk 9): authorize -> ORM-minted code -> form-encoded token exchange with
Basic client auth -> userinfo. Key findings documented:
- Application row + grant_types must exist before authorize can complete
- token endpoint consumes form-encoded bodies only (JSON body => no
  grant_type parsed -> unsupported_grant_type); client auth is Basic-only
- PropertyMappingEvaluator.evaluate(*args,**kwargs) forwards kwargs to
  BaseEvaluator.evaluate(expression_source), so context kwargs become the
  expression source and every evaluation raises a swallowed exception;
  userinfo therefore answers sub-only claims for every provider in this
  fork. Scope granting filter (provider= M2M descriptor) is always empty.
- Grafana identity = sub hash until the evaluator bug is fixed upstream.
This commit is contained in:
Frank
2026-08-31 06:06:57 -07:00
parent 3d64f2ca99
commit 9d678122d7
2 changed files with 48 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -119,6 +119,42 @@ three flows (pk1's values: `default-authentication-flow`,
3-second cycle.
## OAuth2 relying-party quirks (this fork, verified live 2026-08-31)
The Grafana RP provider (`grafana`, pk 9, confidential client) was created and
verified end-to-end via `ak shell` ORM drives. This fork's OAuth2 provider
implementation diverges from upstream in ways that bit us; all verified live:
- **Application row required.** `OAuth2Provider.objects.create()` does not
create the single-table-inheritance `Application` row; without it the flow
executor can never complete an authorize request. Create both rows.
- **`grant_types` defaults to empty.** Until the provider's `grant_types`
contains `"authorization_code"` (enum value with underscore), the token
endpoint rejects every exchange with `invalid_request`.
- **Token endpoint is form-encoded + Basic-auth only.** A JSON body makes
`parse_token_request` see no `grant_type` → `unsupported_grant_type`;
POST-body client secrets are not accepted — authenticate the confidential
client with `Authorization: Basic base64(client_id:client_secret)`.
- **Provider resolution is by `client_id` query param** on the global
`/application/o/authorize/` route; per-slug authorize paths do not exist in
this build. Token/userinfo live at `/application/o/token/` and
`/application/o/userinfo/?api=1`.
- **Property-mapping evaluator is broken → userinfo returns `sub` only.**
`PropertyMappingEvaluator.evaluate(*args, **kwargs)` forwards kwargs to
`BaseEvaluator.evaluate(expression_source)`, so the first context kwarg
becomes the *expression source* instead of the context; every call raises a
swallowed `PropertyMappingExpressionException` and the claim is skipped.
Scope-grant filtering has the same class of bug: `ScopeMapping` has no
provider FK (linkage lives in the `ProviderPropertyMapping` through model),
so `filter(provider=...)` always yields an empty queryset and tokens asked
to carry scopes get zero. Net effect: userinfo/introspection answers with
`{sub}` only — email/groups/entitlements claims cannot be delivered by this
build until the evaluator is patched or upgraded. Clients consuming this
provider must key identity off `sub`.
- Scope mappings for this provider exist (`grafana-email-scope`,
`grafana-profile-scope`, Python-syntax expressions) and will start emitting
claims the moment the evaluator bug is fixed — no config change needed then.
## Configuration (secrets)
Two secrets live in the host `.env` (git-ignored; placeholders in
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Grafana
Grafana visualizes the metrics that Prometheus collects from every service. It runs on Dankclaw and is reachable at `grafana.franksdank.cloud` (via Caddy, with basicauth).
Grafana visualizes the metrics that Prometheus collects from every service. It runs on Dankclaw and is reachable at `grafana.franksdank.cloud` (via Caddy, behind the Anubis challenge + embedded-outpost gate; login happens inside Grafana via the Authentik OAuth2 button).
**Host:** Dankclaw — **Hostname:** `grafana.franksdank.cloud` — **Port:** 3002 (internal) — **Docs:** https://grafana.com/docs
@@ -38,6 +38,17 @@ Grafana responds on `/api/health` with 200 and `"database":"ok"`.
- Change the default admin credentials at first boot (env or UI).
- Dashboards provisioned as YAML survive container recreation; UI-created ones live in the data volume — back it up.
- **Auth = OAuth2 relying-party, not auth_proxy.** The embedded outpost carries
no provider token (`token=None`), so no identity header ever reaches Grafana;
RP mode is topology-independent. The full verified contract (provider pk 9,
client_id `grafana-21ca190cde75d60f`, global authorize/token/userinfo paths,
Basic client auth, form-encoded token body, and the fork's userinfo-claims
bug that leaves identity at the `sub` hash only) is in
[[Authentik]] → "OAuth2 relying-party quirks". Consequences for Grafana:
users auto-upsert as Viewer with `login = <sub hex>`; no email/groups/role
claims reach Grafana until the evaluator bug is fixed — do not write role
mappings that depend on those claims. The local admin account stays the only
Admin.
## See Also