copyparty: read-only volume (no uploads); correct runbook anon-perms claim

-v /w::A granted anonymous full rwmda on the LAN (verified: anon PUT -> 201,
PROPFIND -> 207). New perms ::r:ra,dank: browse/download for anonymous
(required by the guarded files.franksdank.cloud chain), admin for dank,
no w/m/d for anyone. Runbook corrected with the --help-accounts semantics.

dankserver/compose.yaml

@@ -77,7 +77,12 @@ services:
     image: ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest
     container_name: copyparty
     restart: unless-stopped
-    command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::A"]
+    # read-only since 2026-08-31: copyparty perms are per-field "letters[,user]"
+    # with no user = every unauthenticated request. Anonymous gets r (browse +
+    # download; the guarded files.franksdank.cloud chain reaches copyparty
+    # unauthenticated after authentik). dank gets ra (admin panel). No w/m/d
+    # anywhere: uploads, moves, deletes rejected server-side. Interface: `--help-accounts` in-image.
+    command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
     ports:
       - "3923:3923"
     volumes:

serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankserver/Copyparty.md

@@ -27,11 +27,28 @@ envs are *not* consumed by this image (zero `COPAY_` references in the
 package). The deployed interface:
 
 ```
-command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::A"]
+command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
 ```
 
-`-a` takes `USER:PASS`; `-v` takes `SRC:DST:PERMS:FLAGS` — here volume `/w`
+`-a` takes `USER:PASS`. `-v` takes `src:dst:perm1:perm2:...` (authoritative:
-with the `A` ("all") flag for the `dank` account, nothing for anonymous.
+`python3 -m copyparty --help-accounts` inside the image, v1.20.21): each perm
+field is `<letters>[,user[,user...]]` and a field with **no username applies to
+every unauthenticated request**. Letters: `r` read (list + download), `w`
+upload, `m` move, `d` delete, `a` admin (control panel, config reload), `A` =
+`rwmda.` (everything). Empty `dst` mounts at the basename of `src` → URL `/w`.
+
+**Read-only posture (2026-08-31):** `::r` = browse + download for anonymous
+(required: the guarded `files.franksdank.cloud` chain delivers authentik'd
+traffic to copyparty *unauthenticated*), `:ra,dank` = admin for the `dank`
+account. **No `w`/`m`/`d` for anyone** — uploads, moves, and deletes are
+rejected server-side over HTTP, PUT, and WebDAV alike. There is no dedicated
+"reject uploads" volflag; the perms field is the documented mechanism
+(`--help-flags` volflags only throttle/reshape uploads).
+
+History: the pre-2026-08-31 flag `-v /w::A` was *not* "A for dank, nothing for
+anonymous" as an earlier revision of this page claimed — the bare `A` granted
+full read/write/delete to anyone reaching port 3923. Verified live the same
+day: anonymous `GET /Movies/` → 200, `PROPFIND /` → 207, `PUT` → 201.
 
 ### Configuration File Options
 
@@ -55,27 +72,27 @@ The `iv` edition is no longer available for arm32/armv6. Use `dj` for maximum co
 
 ## Volumes
 
-Live deployment (2026-08-29): the whole LUKS array is served at URL root `/w`
+Live deployment: the whole LUKS array is served at URL `/w` (the ac edition
-via the `-v /w::A` flag — account `dank` holds the `A` (all) flag, anonymous
+takes its volume roots from argv plus `chdir: /w` in `/z/initcfg`, not from a
-gets nothing. The compose bind mount is
+`/data` convention). Access is **read-only since 2026-08-31** (`-v /w::r:ra,dank`
-`/mnt/entropy:/w` (host path → container path); the ac edition serves its
+— see [[#Command-line interface (ac edition)]] above). The compose bind mount is
-volume roots from argv, not from a `/data` convention.
+`/mnt/entropy:/w` (host path → container path). Note the bind itself is still
+rw on disk — copyparty enforces read-only at the application layer, so local
+services (Jellyfin, Calibre) keep writing into the array directly.
 
 ## Docker Compose
 
 ```yaml
-services:
   copyparty:
-    image: ghcr.io/9001/copyparty:latest
+    image: ghcr.io/9001/copyparty-ac:latest
     container_name: copyparty
     restart: unless-stopped
-    environment:
+    command: ["-a", "dank:${COPAY_PASS}", "-v", "/w::r:ra,dank"]
-      COPAY_PASS: "${COPAY_PASS}"
-      COPAY_MODE: rw
     ports:
       - "3923:3923"
     volumes:
-      - /opt/copyparty/data:/data
+      - /mnt/entropy:/w
+      - /opt/copyparty/cfg:/cfg
     healthcheck:
       test: ["CMD", "python3", "-c", "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:3923/')"]
       interval: 30s
@@ -83,6 +100,21 @@ services:
       retries: 3
 ```
 
+`${COPAY_PASS}` is compose-time interpolation from `dankserver/.env` — the
+password lands in the container's **argv**, visible to anyone who can run
+`podman inspect copyparty` on the host.
+
+**Applying changes:** `scripts/deploy.sh` deliberately does not touch the
+dankserver compose stack (host containers are not quadlet-managed there), so
+`command:` edits need a manual recreate on Dankserver:
+
+```
+cd /home/dank/serverAppConfigs/dankserver && podman-compose up -d --force-recreate copyparty
+```
+
+Same project (`dankserver`), only copyparty is recreated; a fresh container
+answers `000` for the first seconds while it mounts.
+
 ## Healthcheck
 
 A simple HTTP check on port 3923 works. The root path returns HTTP 200 with the directory listing.
@@ -106,10 +138,13 @@ Upgrade to v1.20.19+ to cover all known CVEs. The dirkey fix (v1.20.17) matters
 - **Large transfers:** Disable TLS inside the app and let Caddy terminate TLS. This avoids double encryption overhead.
 - **Dedicated share directory:** Do not give Copyparty the whole disk. Mount only the intended share path.
 - **Whole-disk share (live choice):** this deployment *does* serve the whole
-  91 T array (`-v /w::A`). Safe only because anonymous gets zero permissions —
+  91 T array from `/w`. Since 2026-08-31 the volume is application-level
-  every request authenticates against the `dank` account first, and Caddy +
+  read-only for every account, so no remote write path exists. But note:
-  Anubis + authentik sit in front (see [[Anubis]], [[Authentik]]). Strip the
+  **LAN-direct `:3923` is unauthenticated browse/download** (anonymous holds
-  `A` flag or drop the account and the array becomes world-writable again.
+  `r`) — Caddy + Anubis + authentik guard only `files.franksdank.cloud`, not
+  the published port. Tighten to `-v /w::r,dank` if anonymous LAN reads become
+  unacceptable. (Before 2026-08-31, `-v /w::A` made the array world-writable
+  on the LAN — see [[#Command-line interface (ac edition)]].)
 - **Upload tokens scoped per folder:** Prevents accidental global write access.
 - **CSP nonces (v1.20.17+):** Security hardening for JavaScript execution. May break third-party JS plugins (`--js-browser` / `--html-head`).
 - **Custom thumbnail extractors (v1.20.19+):** New `thumbex` framework. Requires configuration in `initcfg`.