The live-sync heartbeat failed three hourly ticks (22:25, 23:27, 00:28) because a managed skill that documents how to write a secret gate quotes the vendor's all-zeros placeholder access-key id, and the shape rule fired on the documentation. The machine tier is prose ABOUT credentials — the gate's own header says a gate that fires there gets overridden until it means nothing — and a heartbeat that cannot commit is a fleet that silently stops syncing config. - shape hits are judged on the matched token, not the line: a documented fake is inert, one live token sharing the file still blocks. The match is judged with its following context, because a fixed quantifier truncates `EXAMPLE` to `EXA` and the placeholder would vanish from what is examined. - assignment values keep the stricter rule from the previous commit: a comment on the same line cannot vouch for the token beside it. - `ALLOW_SECRETS` remains the only override; nothing here widens what is scanned, it only stops flagging text that was never a credential. Verified against the payload that is stuck right now: the skill page that the heartbeat cannot commit passes the fixed hook and was refused by the live one. Refs #60
147 lines
8.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
147 lines
8.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Secret gate: block any commit whose staged diff contains live-secret shapes or
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# credential assignments. This repo IS the deployment and every workstation
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# pulls it, so a committed secret is instantly in every agent's context window
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# on the fleet. Deliberate override: ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit ...
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#
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# Two rules, deliberately different in scope:
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#
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# 1. Token SHAPES are scanned across the ENTIRE staged diff, whatever the file
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# type. The first version of this gate whitelisted extensions
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# (*.md *.yml *.yaml *.json *.toml *.sh *.ts *.js), so a `postgres.env`, a
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# `.container` quadlet, an `.ini`, or an extension-less dotfile — exactly
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# the shapes the dotfiles tier is made of — was never read at all.
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# 2. Credential ASSIGNMENTS (PASSWORD=…, secret_key: …) are scanned only in
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# non-prose files. The auto-learned memory tier is prose ABOUT credentials,
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# and a gate that fires there gets overridden until it means nothing; the
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# 2026-10-20 audit measured 7 such prose hits on the tracked tree. Markdown
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# keeps shape detection only, which is what it had before.
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#
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# Bcrypt hashes and Basic-auth headers joined the shape list on 2026-10-20
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# (issue #40) after a live Caddy basicauth hash plus its plaintext password —
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# and the Pi-hole internal password — were found in a tracked memory file.
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set -uo pipefail
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shapes='sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{18,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20}|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|ASIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY|aes_[A-Za-z0-9/+]{40}|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.ey|\$2[aby]\$[0-9]{2}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|Authorization:[[:space:]]*[Bb]asic[[:space:]]+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{24,}'
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# `newpass1234`, `secret_key: "rotated-value"` — an assignment with a literal
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# value. `$VAR`, `${VAULT}`, <placeholders> and empty values cannot match.
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assign='[A-Za-z0-9_]*(PASSW|SECRET|TOKEN|API_?KEY|ACCESS_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY|CREDENTIAL)[A-Za-z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["'"'"']?[A-Za-z0-9/+._@-]{8,}'
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placeholders='changeme|change[-_]|placeholder|redacted|example|sample|dummy|nokey|no[-_]key|not[-_]needed|your[-_]|localhost|xxxx|yyyy|\$\{|<[a-z]|\*\*\*|%s|null|false|true'
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# Exemptions: a variable naming a location (`…_FILE=`, `…_PATH=`) or a value
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# that is a filesystem path is a pointer, not a credential. Flagging those is
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# how a gate gets permanently overridden.
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assign_exempt='(_FILE|_PATH|_DIR|_URL|_ENDPOINT|_SOCKET)[[:space:]]*[:=]|[:=][[:space:]]*["'"'"']?(/|\.\./)'
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# Fail closed: a gate that cannot read the staged diff must not report success.
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#
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# `-z`, and the list lives in a file. Two traps decide this: git quotes any path it cannot print
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# as UTF-8 (core.quotePath is on by default), and a quoted name handed back to
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# `git diff -- <path>` matches nothing — the file is skipped, and a skipped file used to be a
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# silent pass. Command substitution cannot hold the list either, because $() deletes NUL bytes,
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# so the names go to a temp file and the loop reads them with a NUL delimiter.
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TMPD=$(mktemp -d) || TMPD=""
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if [ -z "$TMPD" ]; then
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echo "SECRET GATE: cannot create a temp dir — refusing to commit." >&2
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[ -n "${ALLOW_SECRETS:-}" ] && exit 0
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exit 1
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fi
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trap 'rm -rf "$TMPD"' EXIT
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if ! git diff --cached --diff-filter=ACM --name-only -z > "$TMPD/files" 2> "$TMPD/err"; then
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{
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echo "SECRET GATE: cannot read the staged diff — refusing to commit."
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sed 's/^/ /' "$TMPD/err"
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echo "Override deliberately: ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit ..."
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} >&2
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[ -n "${ALLOW_SECRETS:-}" ] && exit 0
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exit 1
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fi
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# git's stderr stays out of the name list on purpose: a `warning:` line mistaken for a path
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# becomes a file that "cannot be read", which is how a gate starts skipping the real ones.
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[ -s "$TMPD/files" ] || exit 0
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report=""
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exempt=""
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count=0
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while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
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[ -z "$f" ] && continue
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# Self-exemption, deliberately an exact filename list and not `tests/`: the
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# gate's fixtures must contain credential-shaped strings or there is nothing to
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# test against, and this hook documents the shapes it looks for. A secret parked
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# in any other test file is still caught.
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case "$f" in
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.githooks/pre-commit|tests/secret-gate.bats) exempt="$exempt $f"; continue ;;
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esac
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diff=$(git diff --cached -U0 -- "$f")
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[ -z "$diff" ] && continue
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# Only ADDED lines can leak. Matching removals too blocks the very commit that
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# deletes a credential — which is exactly what happened on 2026-10-20, when the
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# gate refused the redaction of the password it exists to catch.
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added=$(printf '%s\n' "$diff" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -vE '^\+\+\+' | sed 's/^+//' || true)
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[ -z "$added" ] && continue
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# Shape hits are judged on the MATCHED TOKEN, not on the whole line. Documentation about
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# credentials quotes vendor placeholders — AWS publishes an all-zeros access-key id that ends
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# in EXAMPLE for exactly this purpose — and
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# a gate that blocks prose over an inert example gets worked around until it means nothing:
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# the live-sync heartbeat failed three ticks on 2026-10-21 because a managed skill page quotes
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# exactly that id. A line is exempted only when EVERY shape on it is inert, so one live token
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# sharing the file with a documented fake still blocks.
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hits=$(printf '%s\n' "$added" | while IFS= read -r line; do
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live=0
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while IFS= read -r m; do
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# The shape regexes carry fixed quantifiers, so the match they return is TRUNCATED:
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# `AKIA` + exactly 16 characters stops inside the word EXAMPLE and the placeholder
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# disappears from what is judged. Judge the match plus what follows it instead.
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ctx=$(printf '%s' "$line" | awk -v m="$m" '{ i = index($0, m); print (i > 0 ? substr($0, i, length(m) + 8) : m) }')
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printf '%s' "$ctx" | grep -Eiq 'EXAMPLE|X{4,}|Y{4,}|Z{4,}|_{4,}|REDACTED|CHANGEME|PLACEHOLDER' || live=1
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done < <(printf '%s\n' "$line" | grep -Eio "$shapes" || true)
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[ "$live" = 1 ] && printf '%s\n' "$line"
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done)
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if [ "${f##*.}" != "md" ]; then
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# The placeholder filter reads the VALUE, never the whole line. A trailing comment that
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# says `# example` says nothing about the token the same line assigns; scoping the filter
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# to what follows the separator is what keeps `API_TOKEN=<real> # placeholder` a block.
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assigns=$(printf '%s\n' "$added" | grep -Ei "$assign" | grep -Ev "$assign_exempt" \
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| while IFS= read -r line; do
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# The judged value is the assigned token alone: it ends at whitespace or `#`, so a
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# trailing comment cannot vouch for it. Truncating a quoted value early only ever errs
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# toward blocking, which is the safe direction for a gate that can be overridden.
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value=${line#*[:=]}
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value=${value#"${value%%[![:space:]]*}"}
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value=${value%%[[:space:]]*}
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value=${value%%#*}
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printf '%s\n' "$value" | grep -Eiq "$placeholders" && continue
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printf '%s\n' "$line"
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done)
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hits=$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$hits" "$assigns" | sed '/^[[:space:]]*$/d')
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fi
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if [ -n "$hits" ]; then
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n=$(printf '%s\n' "$hits" | wc -l)
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count=$((count + n))
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report+=" $f"$'\n'"$(printf '%s\n' "$hits" | cut -c1-100 | sed 's/^/ /')"$'\n'
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fi
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done < "$TMPD/files"
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# Say so out loud: an exemption that prints nothing is how a carve-out becomes
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# invisible, and invisible is the property a secret wants.
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if [ -n "$exempt" ]; then
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printf 'secret-gate: self-test fixtures exempt:%s\n' "$exempt" >&2
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fi
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if [ -n "${ALLOW_SECRETS:-}" ]; then
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[ -n "$report" ] && printf 'secret-gate: ALLOW_SECRETS set, allowing %s secret-shaped string(s) through.\n' "$count"
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exit 0
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fi
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if [ -n "$report" ]; then
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{
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echo "SECRET GATE: staged diff contains $count secret-shaped string(s):"
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printf '%s\n' "$report"
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echo "Fix it, or override deliberately: ALLOW_SECRETS=1 git commit ..."
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echo "A credential that reaches a tracked file is already in history on every"
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echo "machine that pulls this repo — deleting it later does not un-leak it."
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} >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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exit 0
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