Landing blocker for #61 and #63: the deployment checkout is 12 commits behind and `merge --ff-only` refuses while tracked paths are dirty. Discard is not available here (workspace policy: no `checkout`/`stash` on shared state), so the dirt is committed. - `agent/APPEND_SYSTEM.md`: the point-of-use / one-work-log / PR-link doctrine, already byte-identical to `origin/main` (`cmp` against the trunk blob: no difference). No new prose — the commit exists so the trunk merge can proceed. - `agent/config.yml` and `agent/managed-skills/**`: the machine-live tier the heartbeat owns (AGENTS.md § Live-sync tiers). `ALLOW_SECRETS=1` was used, deliberately and after auditing the staged diff by hand: the only credential-shaped strings in it are two copies of `AKIA0000000000000EXAMPLE` — the inert all-zero AWS example id — and they appear inside the two skill pages that teach that exact placeholder shape. This checkout is still running the pre-#61 hook; the merged gate (value-scoped placeholder filter, `71601f7`) exempts this value, so the refusal dies with this landing. No `--no-verify` was used: the gate ran and its verdict is recorded here. Refs #61
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2.8 KiB
name, description
| name | description |
|---|---|
| recover-externally-reverted-file | Rebuild a worktree file that an external process (stale editor buffer, watcher) keeps reverting mid-session: idempotent script rebuild, verify, immediate commit, cat-file restore instead of checkout. |
Recovering a File an External Process Keeps Reverting
Symptom: edits to one file flip-flop under you — grep/wc/read return two different versions minutes apart; tool edit warnings say "file modified externally" repeatedly; committed content disagrees with reads of the same path. Typical cause on Frank's boxes: an IDE window with a stale buffer auto-saving the old version, or another agent's git operation in a sibling worktree.
Procedure
- Stop editing surgically. Line-anchored
editcalls are unsafe when the disk identity of the file is unstable. Take one snapshot:cp <file> /tmp/obs1.bats(twice, a few seconds apart; differing hashes confirm the flapping). - Write an idempotent rebuild script (
/tmp/rebuild-*.py) that transforms whichever known version is on disk into the target:- every patch is
sub_if_present(pattern, exact_replacement)/insert_before(anchor, block)/insert_after(anchor, block); - each helper first checks whether the block is already present and skips;
- anchors must be taken from the committed/original file text, re-grepped, never from memory of an edit that may have been reverted;
- print
ok/skip/FAILper patch so a mismatch is visible.
- every patch is
- Apply + verify + commit in ONE bash invocation:
python3 /tmp/rebuild.py && <syntax check e.g. bats -c / tsc> && git add <file> && git commit ...The commit is the stable artifact; the disk is not. - Restore from git without checkout (workspace policy blocks
git checkout/resetin shared checkouts):git cat-file blob HEAD:<path> > <path>. Nevergit checkout -- <path>blindly — it silently nukes uncommitted work. - Run consumers immediately after the restore/commit (tests etc. in the same
invocation where practical); re-check content with one hash compare
(
md5sum <path>; git cat-file blob HEAD:<path> | md5sum) when results look impossible. - If duplicates crept in from double-application (flapping + reruns), dedupe by
occurrence span (
src.find(marker)twice, cut the second span) — full-block dedupe fails when the two copies differ in a byte of comment text.
Distinguishing real failure from flapping evidence
If a test fails, re-run the exact command once before believing it: the failing read
may have run against the reverted file, not the committed one. Verify what the runner
saw (git hash-object <path> vs git rev-parse HEAD:<path>).
Afterward
Flag the reverter to the user (open editor buffer / watcher / sibling agent); do not fight it — commits and cat-file restores make it harmless.