---
name: git-repo-secret-audit
description: "Audit a git repo for leaked secrets across history, unreachable objects, LFS payloads, git config and host configs — with triage of every hit."
---

# Git repo secret audit (history + unreachable objects, not just the worktree)

Worktree greps prove nothing: the leak you care about is in a commit that was amended
away, in a branch nobody checks out, in an LFS payload, or in `.git/config`.

## 0. Build the known-value set from the live secrets, never from literals
Read the values from the secret store at runtime so no key enters the transcript:
```python
known = {}
for p in (home/".config/secrets").iterdir():
    t = p.read_text().strip()
    vals = {t}
    m = re.search(r":([^:@/]+)@", t)          # credential-store URL form
    if m: vals.add(m.group(1))
    known[p.name] = {v for v in vals if len(v) >= 12}
```
Also add every secret the repo itself embeds (e.g. credentials living in a *test helper*)
by concatenating its quoted fragments, then search for the joined value.
Report ONLY `value[:4] + len + sha256[:10]`. Never print a value, and never quote a
secret-shaped literal in a doc/commit message — the pre-commit gate will (correctly) block it.

## 1. Shapes to match (superset of the Dank gate)
`sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{18,}`, `sk-or-v1-`, `sk-ant-`, `hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`, `gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}`,
`github_pat_`, `glpat-`, `xox[baprs]-`, `(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}`, `npm_`, `pypi-`, `AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{30,}`,
`(sk|pk)_(live|test)_`, Telegram `\d{8,10}:AA`, JWT `eyJ…\.eyJ…`, `-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----`,
`AGE-SECRET-KEY-1`, `ssh-(ed25519|rsa)\s+AAAA`, `scheme://user:pass@host` basic-auth URLs,
`Bearer <24+>`, and the noisy `(password|secret|api_key|token)\s*[:=]\s*<12+>` assignment shape.

## 2. Scope, in this order
```bash
git rev-list --all | wc -l                      # revs incl. every branch + tag
git ls-tree -r --format='%(objectname) %(path)' <rev>   # sha -> path, per rev
git cat-file --batch                              # stream reachable blob content
git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch-check    # EVERY object, incl. dangling
git rev-list --objects --all                      # the reachable set; difference = dangling
git log --all --oneline --find-object=<sha>       # empty => never committed on any ref
git status --porcelain -uall --ignored=matching   # !! lines: on-disk ignored files
git config --list --show-origin                   # local/global/system credentials
git ls-files | grep -E '(auth\.json|trust\.json|\.env|\.pem|\.key|identity)'   # quarantine
```
**Invocation forms that actually work** (each of these cost a wasted round-trip):
- `git grep --all -F '<fragment>'` — the options MUST precede the pattern; `git grep -l -F '<frag>' --all`
  treats `--all` as a pathspec and silently returns 0 lines. Grepping a *fragment* (not the full
  value) is what catches split-concatenation disguises like `"Assf.""1234"`.
- `git ls-tree -r --format=... <rev>` works for ONE rev; pass several revs and it emits nothing,
  no error. For sha→path across all refs use `git rev-list --objects --all`, which yields
  `"<sha> <path>"` lines directly.
- `git cat-file --batch` fed with `rev-list --objects` lines echoes `sha path` headers, so naive
  header parsing misaligns and content is lost. Feed bare SHAs in chunks, or use
  `git cat-file --batch-all-objects --batch` and parse `"<sha> blob <size>\n<content>\n"` records.
- Check every worktree/checkout: `git -C <other-checkout> rev-parse HEAD` often differs from the
  audited worktree, so the leak may exist on `main` while the audited tree looks clean.

LFS: scan `.git/lfs/objects/**` as BYTES (`decode("latin-1")`) — a screenshot is a classic
secret carrier and the tracked tree holds only pointers.

## 3. Entropy layer (catches issuer-specific keys you did not list)
Tokens `[A-Za-z0-9+/_-]{32,}` with Shannon entropy >= 4.3 containing both digits and letters.
Flag every one whose value is in `known` as a LIVE leak; list the rest for triage.

## 4. Triage — the shapes that always fire and are fine
- `api_key="sk-no-key-required"` and other doc placeholders
- prose: `Set password: user.set_password(...)`, `authenticate(user, password)`
- 40-hex hits that are git object ids / packfile names (`pack-<40hex>.pack`)
- memory/KB records that *describe* a secret operation
- length-threshold gates that miss short passwords: a check like
  `len(val) >= 24 and re.fullmatch(...)` clears a real 12-char password, so a passing
  secret-scan test proves nothing about short credentials
A hit is a leak only when the value matches a live secret, decodes to a real credential, or
sits in a field a program reads.

## 5. Adjacent host scan (the audit's real yield)
Check file modes of the secret dir (`0600`, dir `0700`) — world-readable secret files are the
most common real finding. Then grep the live values across shell rc files, `~/.gitconfig`,
`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, `~/.curlrc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.cache/huggingface/token`,
`~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/config` and report filenames only.
Also check files the deployer *generates* on hosts: a script that writes a credential file
without `chmod 600` (while sibling writes in the same script do chmod) is the same class.

## 6. Report
Per layer: scope numbers + verdict. Every hit: path:line, redacted value, verdict
(leak / benign + why). Name the gate's coverage gap if the project's own hook misses shapes
you matched. Fix modes/chmod on the spot; changes to a security hook are the operator's call.
A secret in git history is only removable by rotation or history rewrite — say so, don't
imply an edit fixes it.