chore(memory): flush runtime memories and promote managed skills

Memory-file flush for the dotfiles-deploy session with the blankpad admin
credential scrubbed to a placeholder; sessions transcripts untracked
(gitignored) since harness transcripts can carry raw secrets.
Managed skills: command-center-dotfiles-import, ssh-fish-host-remote-exec,
stash-supersession-audit-before-drop.

agent/memories/--home-dank-Projects-serverAppConfigs--/learned.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 - Frank wants periodic "what did we do" HTML change reports rendered in Firefox (asked 2026-09-01; first one at /home/dank/Reports/serverAppConfigs-24h-2026-09-01.html). Preferred standard: Keep a Changelog 1.1.0 categories (Added/Changed/Fixed/Removed/Security, omit empty) inside a post-change-review skeleton (summary → timeline → categories → code samples → verification → incidents → user actions). Reports are deliverables outside the repo at ~/Reports/ (never tracked; keeps tree clean). Frank reads the report to plan his code-review pass, so include a ready-made git show/git diff command list per theme. _(context: Built a 38 KB self-contained HTML report for serverAppConfigs covering 39 commits/24h; verified render via headless browser screenshot before handing over; opened via firefox --new-tab file:///....)_
 - Playwright automation of authentik's Lit flow executor (fleet e2e, tests/e2e/lib/login.ts akLogin): a programmatic page.fill races the stage re-render — the Lit web component re-renders right after mount and wipes the input, so the form submits an EMPTY password ("This field is required") even though fill() succeeded. Hardened pattern: fill, VERIFY the value survived (expect the input's value, short retry), submit with Enter (native form path, no button re-render race), and retry the whole stage up to 3 attempts before failing. Two adjacent musts: every login runs in a FRESH browser context (a reused/half-finished context poisons authentik's pending_user stage and hangs the next login), and the browser needs a real Chrome UA (Anubis denies obvious headless UAs); budget 60s assertions for the first Anubis PoW per fresh context (subsequent guarded vhosts skip challenge thanks to COOKIE_DOMAIN solve-once). Conventions documented in serverAppConfigs-docs/Architecture/E2E Suite.md (commit b945dd0). _(context: frank-default e2e suite hardening, 2026-09-01: 10/11 spec flake root-caused to Lit re-render race + Anubis PoW budgets; suite now 17/17 green across setup/standard/admin/guest projects.)_
 - Fleet VPN truth (verified 2026-09-01): the gluetun VPN_SERVICE_PROVIDER=custom profile on Dankclaw (endpoint 149.102.254.77:51820) points at a **ProtonVPN Seattle WireGuard server**, NOT a self-run box. Evidence: RDAP via curl -sL https://rdap.org/ip/IP (works when whois is empty) — endpoint IP → CDNEXT-CG-SEA/Datacamp; Dankclaw's tunnel v6 2a07:b944::2:2 → CH-PROTONVPN-20160719; exit IP 149.22.88.19 → CDNEXT-SEA-CG. Full 65535-port scan fingerprint: no SSH anywhere, only silent TLS listeners on 443, 4443–4468, 5995, 7770, 8443 (Proton protocol-stealth port map). Consequences: (1) adding a "peer" is never server admin — it's generating a new WireGuard config in Frank's Proton dashboard; each config = one keypair, Proton has NO BYO pubkey (a locally generated keypair is useless; one was retired to dankclaw ~/.AGENTTRASH/20260901-frankbook-wg-keypair). (2) Two hosts sharing one Proton config make the server bounce the endpoint between them — reusing Dankclaw's config for FrankBook-Pro would kill the Dankclaw tunnel (SearXNG). (3) Mac gate: second dashboard config (e.g. named frankbook) → PrivateKey/Address paste into /home/core/Containers/gluetun/env; server pubkey utqNH4P+C0fA1wTgIUaIfhm1b7ai0iEGvXyiw4KC3Fs=, gluetun ignores the .conf DNS line. General technique: identify mystery infra with rdap.org RDAP + nmap port fingerprint before asking the user to administer it. _(context: FrankBook-Pro WG gate investigation, 2026-09-01. Probes: no SSH config aliases on Dankware/Dankclaw, port 22 timeout, full nmap scan, RDAP on 3 IPs. Docs rewritten: serverAppConfigs-docs/Infrastructure/FrankBook-Pro.md "Mac provisioning" section; log.md entry. Repo commits 2d06be8, 3094ffa, f1171b9.)_
-- When a fleet credential "mystery" arises (auth works/doesn't contradict user memory): (1) assume session-archive images are corrupted — OCR of transcript frames mangles strings while preserving shape (Jellyfin admin password read as "ResFace_3241" instead of "Assface.3241"; the prefix was garbage, the digits were real; the user's own recall had the right prefix but flipped digits). (2) NEVER brute-force a live auth endpoint — pull the stored hash and verify candidates offline: Jellyfin stores it in jellyfin.db (Users table, Password column) as $PBKDF2-SHA512$iterations=210000$salt$hash where salt AND hash are HEX-ENCODED (32 B salt → 64 hex chars, 128-char hash). A parser that assumes base64 silently tests zero candidates — always print back the parsed lengths (saltbytes/hashbytes) and candidate count before concluding "no match". (3) A single matching hash is conclusive; a live POST adds nothing and just logs auth-failure warnings. _(context: Jellyfin 401 mystery on Dankserver, 2026-09-01. User's correction of the corrupted prefix + digit flip; offline hash check vs stored DB hash decided it. Files: serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankserver/Jellyfin.md, serverAppConfigs-docs/log.md (both corrected).)_
+- When a fleet credential "mystery" arises (auth works/doesn't contradict user memory): (1) assume session-archive images are corrupted — OCR of transcript frames mangles strings while preserving shape (Jellyfin admin password read as "ResFace_3241" instead of "<REDACTED-rotated-2026-09-10>"; the prefix was garbage, the digits were real; the user's own recall had the right prefix but flipped digits). (2) NEVER brute-force a live auth endpoint — pull the stored hash and verify candidates offline: Jellyfin stores it in jellyfin.db (Users table, Password column) as $PBKDF2-SHA512$iterations=210000$salt$hash where salt AND hash are HEX-ENCODED (32 B salt → 64 hex chars, 128-char hash). A parser that assumes base64 silently tests zero candidates — always print back the parsed lengths (saltbytes/hashbytes) and candidate count before concluding "no match". (3) A single matching hash is conclusive; a live POST adds nothing and just logs auth-failure warnings. _(context: Jellyfin 401 mystery on Dankserver, 2026-09-01. User's correction of the corrupted prefix + digit flip; offline hash check vs stored DB hash decided it. Files: serverAppConfigs-docs/Dankserver/Jellyfin.md, serverAppConfigs-docs/log.md (both corrected).)_
 - Rootless podman UID mapping on Dankclaw/Dankserver is CONTINUOUS, not offset: container uid N → host uid 100000 + N - 1 (dank subuid 100000:65536; container 0 → 1000, container 1 → 100000, container 1000 → 100999). Never compute host uid as 100000+N. Before chowning a bind root for a non-root image, read the real mapping from any throwaway container: podman run --rm image cat /proc/self/uid_map ("ID-inside ID-outside range" lines). A wrong chown gives EACCES crash-loops (quadlet auto-restart, container never persists; podman logs empty because --rm). Verified 2026-09-01 with seerr-team/seerr (in-image node uid 1000 → chown 100999 fixed it). _(context: Seerr first boot on Dankclaw crash-looped with EACCES mkdir /app/config/logs after chown 101000; /proc/self/uid_map showed "1 100000 65536" ⇒ container 1000 → host 100999. Second off-by-one incident on this fleet (postgres 100069 arithmetic was the first).)_
 - Two pitfalls from the 2026-09-01 frankbook/dankserver session: (1) zsh (default login shell on Dankware AND dankserver) expands =word at the start of an unquoted word to the command's path — so echo ==FOO== inside an ssh command fails with zsh:1: =FOO== not found. Quote echo arguments (echo "==FOO==") or use printf in any command line destined for zsh. (2) qBittorrent ≥ 4.2 ignores a plaintext WebUI\Password in qBittorrent.conf — it must be @ByteArray(salt:hash) from PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (100000 iterations, 16-byte salt, 64-byte key, both base64). Also when the WebUI is reached through a port forwarder that preserves the LAN Host header (e.g. socat), set HostHeaderValidation=false and ServerDomains=* or qB rejects the request. Reference implementation: VM_SEED heredoc in deploy_frankbook_stack, scripts/deploy-remote.sh. _(context: frankbook-pro *arr bring-up + dankserver cutover verification, serverAppConfigs repo)_
 - FreeToken v0.1.2 on qwen3_5_moe loads ONLY modelopt-style quant configs: block-fp8 (quant_method "fp8" + weight_scale_inv, the Huihui/official-Qwen format) works; every compressed-tensors FP8 checkpoint fails. Two live-verified failure modes (2026-09-01, Dankserver): (1) compressed-tensors per-channel (Ornith-1.5-35B-A3B-FP8) aborts at expert-source resolution — ValueError "Missing MoE expert source layers: {'gate_up': ...}" because expert tensors don't follow mlp.experts.{N}.gate_proj/up_proj/down_proj naming; (2) compressed-tensors block-fp8 128×128 (HauhauCS-Aggressive-fp8) resolves experts but _dequant_fp8_weight multiplies weight × weight_scale directly, so [out/128, in/128] block scales don't broadcast → RuntimeError shape mismatch (tensor a 2048 vs b ...). Both exit cleanly at load (~37 GB fits RAM, no swap-thrash). Before swapping any model onto FreeToken, check config.json quant_method/weight_scale shape; a "healthy after ~6s" from deploy.sh proves nothing (health gate passes while the doomed worker is still starting) — verify via journal Uvicorn startup + a real completion. Evidence: serverAppConfigs-docs/LLM/free[REDACTED].md Quantization Compatibility table. _(context: frank-default-small model-swap attempts on Dankserver, 2026-09-01: Ornith FP8 and HauhauCS FP8 both failed to load on FreeToken v0.1.2; reverted to batsclamp Huihui FP8 (commit 4d5bea4), docs commit fe34f04.)_